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Abstract  
 
Clusters and cluster initiatives: The role of collaboration and social 
capital in building a system of innovation in Ireland.  
 
Patrick R. Ivory  
 
In Ireland, interest in the cluster concept (Porter 1990. 2003) dates back to the 1990s 
when enterprise policy focused on the development of competitive advantage in 
clusters of interlinked sectors (Doyle and Fanning 2007, Culliton 1992). Research in 
the early 1990s, found a weak system of innovation in Ireland and advocated a focus 
on broad institutional factors and the potential of clusters in the development of a 
national system of innovation (Mjøset 1992). International cluster policy is 
increasingly focused on raising levels of innovation as a means of improving 
competitiveness (Sölvell et al 2003).  
 
This thesis builds on Irish research focused on the development of clusters.  It 
reviews the state of development of clusters in two sectors of the Irish economy; the 
high-technology ICT/ software sector of the modern economy and the dairy sector of 
the traditional economy. The thesis contributes to the literature on clusters through 
the application of the ‗cluster initiative‘ concept in an Irish context and places 
greater emphasis than previous Irish studies on the role of collaboration. Sölvell et al 
(2003) defined a cluster initiative as an organised effort to increase the 
competitiveness of a cluster, involving firms, government and/or the research 
community. A new framework for analyzing collaboration is proposed, bringing 
together insights from the literature on clusters, institutional economics and the 
systems of innovation approach. This framework includes a new concept, 
organisations for collaboration (OFCs) to describe the role of industry associations 
and other organisations, which represent the views of business. The social capital 
concept (Field 2008) is used to add depth to the analysis of collaboration within 
clusters and cluster initiatives. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The motivation for this thesis arose from the potential of clusters to raise levels of 
innovation in the Irish economy. Government (DOT 2010) and its state agencies, 
such as Forfás (2008), the IDA and Enterprise Ireland, often refer to high-technology 
clusters and the need to create ‗Innovation Ireland‘ and a knowledge based economy. 
Much of this focus is driven by the need for Ireland to maintain high levels of 
productivity in order to compete on global markets. Porter et al (2008) argued that 
the foundations of productivity can be divided into ‗macroeconomic 
competitiveness‘ and ‗microeconomic competitiveness‘, with the latter in turn 
dividing into three interactive elements (Figure 1.1)  
 
Figure 1.1 Microeconomic competitiveness 
 
 
Source: Porter et al (2008).  
 
This thesis fits into the third element of microeconomic competitiveness suggested 
by Porter et al (2008) and considers the depth of clusters in the context of the Irish 
economy. It examines clusters and cluster initiatives in two sectors of the economy, 
one ‗modern‘, the ICT and software sector, and one ‗traditional‘, the dairy sector. 
State of cluster 
development  
Quality of the 
microeconomic 
business environment 
Sophistication of 
company operations 
and strategy 
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The thesis focuses in particular on the role of collaboration in cluster initiatives for 
competitiveness and innovation. 
 
Porter et al (2008) argued that productivity rises as a company improves operational 
effectiveness, assimilates global best practises, and introduces innovative products 
and processes by adopting appropriate strategies. Two of the elements, the 
sophistication of company operations and the quality of the business environment, 
can be measured while data limitations make independent measurement of the third 
element – the state of cluster development very difficult (Porter et al 2008, p48).  
 
In 2009, the World Economic Forum introduced a new version of its Global 
Competitiveness Index to create a single, fully integrated index to replace the two 
previous indices. Data for the GCI was drawn from a mixture of public sources and 
the World Economic Forum‘s annual survey of business leaders. In 2009, this 
Executive Opinion Survey covered approximately 13,000 business leaders across 
133 countries
1
. In an article
2
 on this new comprehensive Global Competitiveness 
Index, Sala-i-Martin et al (2009) identify 12 interrelated pillars of competitiveness. 
They pointed out that innovation (12
th
 pillar) requires appropriate institutions (1
st
 
pillar) that, among other things, guarantees intellectual property rights, high levels of 
education and training (5
th
 pillar), efficient goods, labour and financial markets (6
th
, 
7
th
, and 8
th
 pillars) and extensive infrastructure (2
nd
 pillar). Their 11
th
 pillar of 
competitiveness is business sophistication, which encompasses the ‗company 
sophistication‘ concept referred to above, but also concerns the quality of a country‘s 
overall business networks and supporting industries. They state that:  
 
[W]hen companies and suppliers from a particular sector are interconnected 
in geographically proximate groups (―clusters‖), efficiency is heightened, 
greater opportunities for innovation are created, and barriers to entry for new 
firms are reduced (Sala-i-Martin et al 2009, p7).  
 
                                                 
1
 The data set used for the development of the New GCI model covered 130 countries for up to 7 
years (2001-07), the longest period possible given the data sources (Porter et al 2008, p. 52).  
2
 Appendix A of this article describes the exact composition of the GCI and the technical details of its 
construction (Sala-i-Martin et al 2009). 
3 
 
Ketels and Sölvell (2006) completed a study of innovation clusters in the ten new 
member states of the European Union and used qualitative case studies to assess 
whether clustering encouraged greater innovation. They stated that: 
In-depth analysis of one specific case study per country was carried out in 
order to pass from ‗statistical clusters‘ to ‗recognised clusters‘, from 
employment figures to institutions, companies to be analysed and persons to 
be interviewed (Ketels & Sölvell 2006, p25). 
They concluded that allocating more resources to science and R&D in the EU will 
not be sufficient to improve Europe‘s innovative capacity. It will also be necessary to 
improve the microeconomic capacity of European regions by focusing on the quality 
and specialisation of factor conditions, sophistication of demand, the quality of firm 
strategies and entrepreneurship, and the presence and depth of clusters (Ketels & 
Sölvell 2006).   
 
This thesis considers the presence and depth of clusters in two sectors of the Irish 
economy; the ICT/software sector of the ‗modern‘ economy and the dairy sector of 
the traditional economy.  The thesis provides examples of cluster initiatives that 
support the development of clusters in these sectors. Cluster initiatives are defined 
by Sölvell et al (2003, p31) as organised efforts to increase the growth and 
competitiveness of a cluster within a region, involving cluster firms, government 
and/or the research community. In particular, the thesis examines the role of 
collaboration and social capital within these clusters and cluster initiatives in 
building systems of innovation in Ireland.  
 
The research questions addressed are as follows:  
(i) How can cluster initiatives contribute to embedding the Irish  ICT/software 
and dairy clusters in Ireland?  
(ii) How does the process of collaboration work within clusters and cluster 
initiatives? The thesis examines if the social capital concept can help in 
understanding this process.  
(iii) Why do firms, research institutes and state agencies engage in cluster 
initiatives? 
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Chapter 2 draws on three distinct literature streams - management strategy, 
institutional economics and the systems of innovation approach. The chapter begins 
(Section 2.1) with a review and detailed critique of Porter‘s ‗diamond cluster model‘ 
(1990, 2003) within the Positioning School of management strategy. Section 2.2 
considers a number of concepts with a theoretical grounding in institutional 
economics, such as embeddedness (Granovetter 1985), social capital (Field 2008) 
and morals norms such as trust (North 1990), which can contribute to our 
understanding of how clusters and cluster initiatives operate and the role of 
collaboration within these two concepts. Section 2.3 considers literature on the 
systems of innovation (Lundvall 1985, 2005), including its links with the concepts 
discussed in the earlier sections. This section also provides a definition for a new 
concept ‗Organisations for Collaboration‘ (OFCs), which this thesis suggests is a 
more precise descriptor for industry associations, and similar business organizations, 
than the IFC (institutions for collaboration) concept proposed by Porter & Emmons 
(2003).  Drawing on key concepts from these three different literature streams, 
Section 2.4 suggests a new framework with the potential to enhance our 
understanding of how cluster initiatives work and the role of collaboration within 
such initiatives. It also outlines the Cluster Initiative Performance Model (CIPM) 
(Sölvell et al 2003) that is used later in the thesis when analyzing the emergence of 
cluster initiatives involving collaboration in Ireland.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the Irish context and empirical setting for the thesis. It begins with 
a brief overview of Irish economic development with reference to some key 
institutional factors. It also outlines the evolution of state agencies for the support 
and promotion of enterprise in Ireland. The chapter draws on the researcher‘s own 
knowledge and is supported by reference to legal instruments establishing the 
various state organisations operating in the industrial development arena in Ireland. 
It also outlines developments in relation to the organisations representing business 
interests on a national level. The evolution of both the state agencies and business 
organisations is an important part of the business environment for industrial 
development.  
 
Chapters  5 & 6 use a number of research and data sources to identify clusters in two 
sectors of the Irish economy and a qualitative case study approach for in-depth 
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examination of  clusters and cluster initiatives in the ICT/ software and the dairy/ 
cheese and ingredients sectors. This approach is very much in line with that adopted 
by Ketel & Sölvell (2006) for their individual country analysis and reflects the 
conclusion of Porter et al (2008) that data limitations and the state of cluster 
development does not facilitate quantitative analysis. However, the focus on the 
‗institutional‘ aspects of clusters in this thesis is broader than the focus on 
‗institutions for collaboration‘ by Porter & Emmons (2003). With the concepts of 
embeddedness and, especially social capital used to add depth to the analysis. The 
study of such intangible elements also makes the choice of a qualitative research 
approach appropriate for this thesis.  
 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main conclusions and findings of the thesis. It also 
outlines the contribution that the thesis makes to understanding the state of cluster 
development in Ireland, building on the substantial research undertaken by those 
who have also studied this topic. Finally, it suggests some interesting areas for 
further research on clusters and cluster initiatives.   
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Chapter 2 Clusters for competitiveness and innovation: 
collaboration– insights from management strategy, 
institutional economics and innovation systems 
 
This chapter will examine, in some depth, contributions from three distinct areas of 
analysis. The version of the cluster concept proposed by Porter (1990) will be a key 
focus of section 2.1. Where Porter fits into management strategy will be used to 
highlight both his contribution and the limits of his model. Section 2.2 will examine 
collaboration from an institutional economic perspective, arguing that management 
strategy theories alone are insufficient to understand how and why firms collaborate 
together and with other economic actors. Section 2.3 reviews the concepts of 
‗embeddedness‘ and ‗social capital‘ that are used as analytical tools in the empirical 
research for the thesis outlined in Chapters 5 and 6. Section 2.4 will focus on the 
evolving subject of innovation systems, at a national, sectoral and regional level. It 
will also suggest and define a new concept ―organisations for collaboration‖ (OFCs) 
to enhance our understanding of how firms collaborate together and with other actors 
in the economy. Finally, section 2.5 will draw on the concepts discussed in the 
previous four sections to propose a new framework for understanding cluster 
initiatives and collaboration, including those involving firms, research institutes and 
state agencies.  
Section 2.1: Management strategy – the firm, clusters and 
collaboration 
 
The Positioning school approach and industry ‘clusters’ 
 
Mintzberg et al (1998, 1999) divided management strategy literature into two 
different groups, the most influential prescriptive school was the Positioning School 
and the major descriptive school was the Learning School. Literature following the 
Positioning School of management strategy includes strategic groups, value chains, 
game theories (Mintzberg and Lampel 1999, p22) and the industry ‗cluster‘ 
approach. A detailed analysis of the cluster concept of strategy is warranted in the 
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context of this thesis.  The major impetus for the cluster approach grew out of 
Porter‘s publications on ‗competitive strategy‘ and ‗competitive advantage‘ during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Porter 1980, 1981, 1990)
 3
. Porter (1990) observed that the 
treatment of location in economics had largely followed the tradition established in 
the neoclassical theory of trade. In the neoclassical theory of trade, location choices 
and effects are assumed to be based on an input cost minimisation framework. In 
effect, the principal focus was on the cost of land, labour and capital with location 
choices viewed more as an operational detail than strategic (Porter 1990). Porter 
studied the formation and sustained presence of ‗clusters‘ of interconnected 
industries at particular locations and argued that a small number of exporting clusters 
could drive demand for local industries in a region or nation.  
 
Management scholars have criticised Porter, particularly his early work, for paying 
too much attention to the business environment and too little attention to the firm 
itself. Porter‘s firm, it is argued, ends up being determined, like the neoclassical firm, 
by the market structure ― with little room for strategy (Langlois 2003, p285, Best 
2001, p8).  The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm was introduced by the 
Learning School of strategy partly in response to the neglect of the firm within the 
Positioning School (Mintzberg et al 1998, 1999). Pitelis (2005) argued that despite 
these competing perspectives and Porter‘s (1999) own criticism of the RBV, there 
are commonalities between the Positioning and Learning Schools. Porter‘s later 
work exhibits some influence of the Learning School. For example, the regression 
analysis undertaken by Porter et al (2006, 2008) built from a survey developed for 
the World Economic Forum, included variables under the heading ‗Company 
Sophistication‘ and variables under the heading ‗Business Environment Quality‘. 
Porter accepted that the competitiveness of companies and the competitiveness of 
locations are different, but also argued that they are related, concepts. Locations 
compete based on productivity as locations for business, while companies also 
compete based on productivity, but can choose among locations. He conceded that 
‗the competitiveness of a company, then, depends on both its internal capabilities, 
                                                 
3
  Mintzberg puts Porter in the Positioning School but his table does not refer to Porter (1990). 
Although one could argue that Porter‘s work from the 1990s on clusters is very different to his earlier 
work it can still be categorised as part of the Positioning School but with influences from the Learning 
School. 
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which is a key pillar of the RBV, and the results of its location choices‘ (Porter et al 
2006)
4
.  
 
Some writers in economic agglomeration and geography (e.g. Boschma and Frenken 
2006) tend to ignore Porter‘s ideas on ‗industry clusters‘, arguing that they are 
saying nothing new. Other critics such as Martin and Sunley (2003) continue to 
argue that the definition of clusters is too vague and thus the concept is a problematic 
source of policy advice. Despite continued debate and criticism the cluster concept 
remains exceptionally influential, among management practitioners and policy 
makers (Ketels 2006). Policy makers in both the US and Europe continue to exhibit 
significant interest in Porter‘s industrial clusters concept. The concept is generally 
viewed as different to the idea of an industrial district, a term first used by Marshall 
(1920)
5
 before being revived by a number of Italian economists such as Brusco 
(1982) in the 1980s (Andreosso and Jacobson 2005, p191). An examination of 
clusters and cluster initiatives in both modern and traditional sectors of the Irish 
economy is undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6. The remainder of this section will 
consider how the concept has developed and criticisms of the diamond model in 
order to understand why it continues to influence policy makers, particularly in the 
areas of innovation and upgrading of nations, industries and the firms within them.  
 
Firm location and the evolution of the cluster concept  
 
So what is Porter asking us to accept under his cluster concept and what are the 
limitations of his diamond model? According to the Porter ‗diamond‘ model the 
competitive advantage of a nation is based on developing clusters of competitive 
industries, which in turn are based on the interrelationship between four different 
                                                 
4
 In common with this idea, some writers have suggested firms should consider combining the 
insights of some prescriptive and descriptive schools in developing their management strategy. Leavy 
(2003) used a qualitative case study (of Southwest Airlines, Ryanair, Canon, GE and Nokia) to 
recommend that many firms would be best served by combining the concepts of core competencies 
(Learning school) and market positions (Positioning school), ‗bifocal vision‘ as he calls it, to view the 
available strategic options. 
 
5
 Marshall (1920) is the 8th edition, of  the book first published in 1890,  available in printable format 
on www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html. Andreosso and Jacobson (2005) reference the 1898 
printed edition. 
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elements - factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, 
and context for firm strategy and rivalry (see Figure 2.1). This framework suggests 
that clusters affect competition in three broad ways by (i) increasing the productivity 
and efficiency of companies, (ii) stimulating and enabling innovations, which 
underpin future productivity growth, and (iii) facilitating commercialization of new 
products and companies (Porter, 1998b, 2003).    
 
Figure 2.1: Porter Clusters: the ‘diamond model’ 
 
 
Porter (1990) emphasised that one important feature of industrial clusters is that 
interactions between firms are primarily market-based and rivalry among firms is a 
key factor in the formation of a cluster. Referencing Marshall (1920) he argued that 
the broader effects of domestic rivalry are closely related to an ‗old but often 
neglected notion in economics known as external economies‘ that accrue beyond the 
individual firm but within the group of firms of a locality (Porter 1990, p144 and fn 
8, p789). He further emphasised that in classic economic treatments these external 
economies arise because of spillovers of technology and the benefits of 
specialization that accrue to a large industry through individual firms may be small. 
Porter also observed that a city or region may become a unique environment for 
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competing, where the information flow, visibility and mutual reinforcement within 
such a locale gives meaning to Marshall‘s observation that in some places an 
industry is ―in the air‖ (Porter 1990, p156). 
 
This focus by Porter on rivalry is a contrast to the hierarchical network relationships 
among firms in industrial districts. Perhaps in response to his critics, in a revision of 
some of his earlier ideas, Porter (1998) described clusters in terms that make them 
more difficult to distinguish from industrial districts. For example, he began to 
accord more weight to cooperation and trust (Jacobson et al 2001). Consequently, 
cooperation as well as competition is now seen as underlying cluster activities in the 
Porter cluster concept, ‗allowing member firms to have higher productivity than 
would otherwise be possible‘ (Doyle and Fanning, 2007, p269).  
 
Porter has also recently emphasised that as a consequence of the three broad impacts 
outlined above, clusters reflect the fundamental influence of externalities and 
linkages across firms and associated organisations
6
 in competition (Porter, 2003). 
Furthermore, research has shown that cluster dynamics do not occur automatically 
but (a) depend on action and (b) can be reinforced by action, involving roles for 
cultural factors and organisations  as well as individual leadership (Ketels 2003). 
The research undertaken in this thesis provides further evidence to support this 
contention. Rival firms within clusters compete intensely to win and retain 
customers; without such vigorous competition the cluster will fail. There is also 
cooperation, much of it vertical, involving companies in related industries and local 
organisations (Porter, 1998b). One limitation of the Porter cluster model is the 
failure to fully understand the role of horizontal cooperation or collaboration, I use 
these terms interchangeably, between firms in an industry. In fact it may be, although 
neoclassical economics finds it difficult to accept, that both intense competition and 
intense collaboration can generate success among groups of firms. The theme of 
collaboration involving firms is dealt with in more detail in the sections 2.2 to 2.5 
below.  
                                                 
6
 Here, and in the remainder of this paragraph,  I have replaced ‗institution‘, used by Porter and 
Ketels, with ‗organisation‘. The reason for taking this liberty is explained in detail in the section 
‗Organisation for collaboration‘. 
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Criticisms of the ‘diamond cluster model’ 
 
While the basic model has stayed the same over time, Porter‘s has made attempts to 
address significant criticisms.  Others have also built on the ‗diamond model‘ and 
the cluster concept, thus ensuring its broad and enduring policy appeal. Ketels (2006) 
addresses in a formal way a number of criticisms and extensions of the diamond 
model. For example, one criticism is that the diamond model is close to ‗picking 
winners‘ in the tradition of the ‗new‘ strategic trade policy. However, the 
competitiveness framework developed within the diamond model identifies the 
degree of competition to which a cluster is exposed as one of the critical factors 
driving firm productivity – an insight that runs against a ‗picking winners‘ approach 
that curbs competition (Ketel 2006, p123). The following four sections outline in 
greater detail some further criticism of the diamond model.  
 
 
A. The emphasis on local demand in the ‘diamond cluster model’  
 
An aspect of the ‗diamond model‘ that has been widely discussed and criticized is 
the emphasis placed on both the size and quality of local demand. Ketels (2006, 
p124) argued that the focus on local demand does not imply that global market 
access does not matter but that it is usually not a factor that differentiates one 
location from another.  
 
But how does one define ‗local demand‘ particularly when attempting to apply the 
cluster concept to small open economies within a highly developed customs union? 
We can see the limitations of this overemphasis on local demand, when we try to 
apply the diamond model to Ireland. Ireland as part of the European Union operates 
within a highly developed customs union with a single market in goods since 1993, 
with no tariff or regulatory barriers to trade between countries, and which, in 2010, 
made some significant progress to moving towards a single market in services. To an 
extent, Ireland – rather than being a completely separate national economy – is a 
region within the European Union (EU). As such it is surely inappropriate to restrict 
the definition of local demand to the small domestic Irish home market 
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(O‘Donnellan 1994). Furthermore, competitiveness of small open economies as 
locations may be intrinsically linked to membership of a broader market union, such 
as the European Union. For example, Ireland‘s success in attracting FDI investment, 
which has been an important part of its economic development, is linked to its 
membership of the EU. Porter placed too much emphasis on the competitive 
advantage of large nations and he does not consider how his model might have to be 
modified in order to be applied to a broader range of economy types. Particularly 
countries that from an economic perspective can, in many ways, be viewed as 
regions of a market union rather than as independent nations in the sense that the 
USA and Japan are.  
 
B. Foreign investment and the role of multinational corporations in 
clusters 
 
A second criticism of the diamond model in international studies is in relation to the 
role of foreign investment in clusters. The relative importance of local demand and 
the home base is also related to this second contested element. The question is what 
is the role of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in the diamond model? Porter 
(1990, p679), in a passage referring to developing countries, acknowledged an 
occasional ‗seed‘ role for MNCs but his emphasis was almost exclusively on 
indigenous home-based industries (Clancy et al 2001, p11; O‘Malley and Van 
Egeraat, 2000).  Ketels (2006, p125) maintained that there is nothing in the Porter 
concept of competitiveness and clusters that denies the important role of 
multinational firms; they can contribute new skills, technology, ideas and provide 
better channels into other clusters and markets. But he emphasised that 
multinationals are most likely to be critical to the success of emerging cluster 
locations. He argued that in more mature clusters multinationals may emerge, from 
the national base, as indicator of the success of the cluster.  
 
Dunning (1998, p15) would agree with Porter (1990, 1998a) that attention needs to 
be given to location per se as a variable affecting the global competitiveness of 
firms. But for Dunning the role of FDI and the MNC in building competitiveness is 
much deeper than the ‗occasional seed‘ suggested by Porter (1990, p679) or the 
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emergence of domestically owned MNCs in the clusters referred to by Ketels (2006, 
p125). For small open economies, such as Ireland, both inward and outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have important roles to play for various industries at 
different stages in the economic development process. Dunning‘s Ownership-
Location-Internalisation (OLI) framework (Dunning 2001, 2002) could be a useful 
tool in drawing attention to the most important theories to explain the impact of 
multinational corporations in industry development. Ireland provides at least two 
examples: - in the case of inward FDI in high technology areas of computer 
technology and software and in the case of outward FDI in the low/medium 
technology area of the dairy industry. The first of these two examples can certainly 
be linked to the concept of Ireland as a region of the European Union which attracted 
US investment to gain access to that market; Dunning‘s OLI framework may explain 
this better then Porter‘s cluster model7. But the second example may fit Ketel‘s point 
that domestically owned MNCs can emerge from established clusters
8
 and this is 
considered using the diamond model in an examination of a cheese and ingredients 
cluster in Ireland in Chapter 6.   
C. The role of Government policy in clusters 
 
Some critics have also argued that ‗government‘ is missing in the Porter framework. 
Berggren and Laestadius (2003) examined the importance of public-private 
partnerships and system building in the development of the telecommunication 
sectors in Finland and Sweden. They argued that the telecoms sector had followed a 
complex trajectory with clustering developing on two levels – the supranational 
(primarily bi-national) and the local district (regional) level. They claim that one 
                                                 
7
 In an early paper presented to a Nobel symposium on the international location of economic activity 
in Stockholm, Dunning (1976) emphasised a distinction between two ways of considering a country‘s 
economic space that is particularly important in understanding the economic development of small 
open economies. The first way is to consider a country‘s economic space in terms of the value of 
output within a country‘s national boundaries independently of the ownership of that production. The 
second way is to consider the output produced by a country‘s own firms, including that part produced 
outside its national boundaries. This further distinguishes between the competitive advantage of 
countries and the competitive advantage of firms (Dunning 1995, 2001). 
 
8
 Dunning‘s OLI framework may still be relevant in explaining why exactly this happens from the 
point of view of the individual firm and therefore might be useful to consider in a firm level analysis, 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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notable weakness of Porter‘s diamond model is ‗neglect of long-term cooperative 
relations and the role played by government‘ (Berggren and Laestadius 2003).  
 
However, supporters of Porter‘s model maintain that government impacts on all 
dimensions of the diamond and that much of the advice derived from applying the 
diamond is directed at government policy (Ketels 2006, p124). In a chapter of his 
1990 book focused on the role of government, Porter suggested a ‗more subtle, and 
thoughtful, role for policy makers‘ than commonly supposed (Porter 1990, p617). 
Porter‘s approach to government was influenced by the economic backdrop and 
context during the period when he wrote his seminal contributions. He argued that 
during the 1980s subsidised capital, research, raw materials and exports were 
employed by nearly every nation, but were rarely successful in building sustainable 
competitiveness. Instead, in many cases, a culture of reliance on subsidies delayed 
adjustment and innovation rather than promoting it. Porter took the view that tax 
incentives were better vehicles than subsides because they resulted in firms 
undertaking projects with an economic return. Indirect subsidies in areas such as 
education, research universities and infrastructure were a much better investment of 
government funds than direct subsidies (Porter 1990, p640).  
 
Essentially, Porter‘s view was that the central goal of government policy should be 
to create an environment in which firms can increase productivity and innovation by 
introducing more sophisticated technology and methods to (i) upgrade competitive 
advantages in established industries and (ii) develop the capacity to compete 
successfully in new industries (Porter 1990, pp618-619). An upgrading economy 
should be ready for less productive jobs to move to other nations via outward direct 
investment and foreign outsourcing. But if high productivity jobs are lost to a firm‘s 
foreign rival, then long term economic prosperity is compromised. However, 
uncoordinated action by government in a single policy area, such as R&D, taxation 
or regulation could actually harm competitiveness if taken in isolation. In summary 
Porter (1990) saw a very limited role for government intervention and argued that 
the role of government was frequently overstated because the economic 
underpinnings of success were not examined in studies that set out to examine the 
influence of government. There also tended to be a focus on a small number of 
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highly supported industries, for example steel and automobiles, rather than a more 
representative sample of the economy (Porter 1990, fn. 67, p788).  
 
Dunning (1998) also argued that governments need to pay closer attention to 
ensuring that their actions help to fashion, support and complement efficient firms 
and markets.  He maintained that this is necessary for two reasons: (i) in order to 
make optimal use of the existing location-bound assets within their jurisdiction and 
(ii) to promote the dynamic comparative advantage of resource capabilities of their 
economy and the firms operating in it.  
 
D. Firm and industry collaboration within clusters 
   
Collaboration among the different players in an economy is an issue that was not 
fully developed in the diamond model presented by Porter in 1990 or in subsequent 
versions of his cluster concept. Porter (1990, pp152-153) did express support for 
mechanisms that facilitate information flow and create trust, mitigating perceived 
differences in economic interest between vertically and horizontally linked firms. 
However, Porter saw a limited role for cooperative research (1990 p635) and 
expressed the view that cooperative R&D among direct competitors was a risky 
approach that could reduce incentives to innovate within firms (1990, p594). 
 
When addressing the strategy that the individual firm should adopt in taking 
advantage of a domestic cluster, he took a more open view towards cooperation with 
customers and suppliers. Porter emphasised that home-based buyers and suppliers 
are allies in international competition and not just the other side of transactions 
(Porter 1990, p589). In this context, he encouraged firms to develop trust by 
pursuing regular contact between senior management and interchange between 
research organisations. He also referred to the potential for cooperation in 
penetrating and serving international markets.   
 
One important option for firms is to participate in trade associations involved in 
‗factor creation‘ by investing in improving information flow, training and education 
initiatives, infrastructure, and research that benefits the entire national industry. In 
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this way firms, through industry or cluster-wide (sectoral) programs, can 
complement and support their internal efforts at factor creation to improve 
competitiveness (Porter 1990, p594). Despite his reservations in relation to 
cooperation between direct competitors, his own research provides some evidence to 
the contrary. Porter provides examples of how firms in the Italian apparel, shoe, 
ceramic tile and furniture industries, while competing fiercely, still recognised that 
cooperation through trade associations could improve communications and logistical 
facilities, investment in process technology and help promote their products at trade 
fairs. In Japan, Porter observed that ‗umbrella trade associations‘ often cover many 
distinct industries within a sector and sponsor factor-creating investments that add 
benefit to the competitiveness of clusters. In America, the Electronics Industry 
Association showed initiative by taking an active role in working with schools and 
universities to raise skill levels into which firms could then tap (Porter 1990, p594)
9
. 
This thesis will show that a similar approach was taken by ICT Ireland, the business 
association representing the computer and software industry in Ireland, which is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. Trade associations that are primarily 
lobbying organisations are squandering many of the important potential benefits of 
factor creation.  
 
In the US, the development of trade associations was not helped by antitrust 
authorities adopting a suspicious view due to the perceived risk of them degenerating 
into cartels that would damage competition and harm consumers (Porter 1990, fn 3, 
p807). These antitrust concerns can be overcome when both firms and government 
recognise that trade associations involved in factor creation, such as collaborative 
R&D with universities, can improve competitiveness while not engaging in activities 
of a price-fixing or cartel nature. Strong governance of trade associations, with 
executives fully aware of what is and what is not allowed from a regulatory 
competition view point, is also important in terms of gaining the trust of both 
business and government.  
                                                 
9
 While Porter clearly saw a role for trade associations, he warned against direct competitor to 
competitor cooperation, sometimes justified on the basis of avoiding duplication of effort or achieving 
economies of scale, even going as far as to state that ‗joint production by leading competitors should 
be prohibited‘(Porter 1990, p667). This is a rather severe and narrow view of the potential of joint 
ventures. But his view was that such direct cooperation was both bad public policy and bad strategy 
that could undermine competitive advantage in the long run.  
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A final limitation of the Porter (1990) cluster diamond model is that it offers a 
framework to examine whether a cluster exists or not, but does not address how 
clusters might be developed and further embedded in an economy.  More recent 
research by Sölvell et al (2003) focuses on organised efforts to increase the growth 
and competitiveness of clusters within a region. They describe these as ‗cluster 
initiatives‘ involving firms, government and/or the research community.  Section 2.5 
will outline in detail the cluster initiative performance model (Sölvell et al 2003) and 
comment on the role of collaboration between different economic actors within 
clusters. 
Section 2.2: Collaboration and the ‘institutional economics’ 
approach 
 
Despite the potential of collaboration to improve competitiveness of firms and 
economies, there has been little research to date on the role of a wide variety of 
collaborative organisations (Porter et al 2006). One recent example that highlighted 
interactions between state, local firms and multinationals, and the conditions 
enhancing collective learning, was an analysis of two clusters in Chile, a tomato 
processing cluster and a farmed salmon cluster (Perez-Aleman 2005). The state role 
in the initial stage was to provide a space for exploration of new business ideas and 
productive activities. The formation of associations among Chilean firms was found 
to be more important. It pushed productivity performance, facilitated the flow of 
ideas across firms and was crucial in moving from the early stage when firms entered 
the new activity to the point of reaching a critical mass of globally competitive firms 
(Perez-Aleman 2005, p670).  
 
In recent years Emmons has developed some Harvard case studies with Porter 
coining the phrase ‗institutions for collaboration (IFCs)‘ (Porter and Emmons 2003). 
For example the Colombian trade association ‗Acoplásticos‘, established in 1961 as 
a lobbying group for the nation‘s major plastic manufacturing companies, shifted its 
focus towards improving the productivity of the plastics and rubber cluster. A new 
director appointed in 1984 expanded the association‘s membership to include 
additional industries associated with the plastics manufacturing value chain and 
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shifted the activities towards improving the productivity of the entire chain, with 
particular emphasis on upgrading technology and human resources in the cluster. 
While setting up a not-for-profit institute for training and research, Acoplástico 
commissioned a strategic analysis of the international competitiveness of the 
Colombian plastics and rubber industry that not only improved the associations 
ability to formulate appropriate activities for improving the cluster‘s productivity, 
but also developed skills in assessing changes in the cluster‘s needs over time (Porter 
and Emmons 2006).  
 
Porter and Emmons (2003, 2006) suggested a positive role for collaboration but did 
not provide a precise definition for an IFC.  However, they did list examples 
including industry associations, professional associations, chambers of commerce, 
technology transfer organizations, quality centres, non-profit think tanks, university 
alumni associations and others. They suggested that the type of organisation that 
falls into the category of IFCs can be a matter of degree, and refer to an autonomous 
government entity such as an ‗export promotion agency‘ as a possible example. 
Robust research will require a deeper understanding of the role of collaboration and 
more precise definitions. This thesis argues that the term ‗institution‘ is not the most 
appropriate term to describe the list of examples referred to above by Porter and 
Emmons (2003, 2006). In order to contribute to this literature Section 2.4 of this 
thesis will provide a precise definition for an alternative concept of ‗Organisation for 
Collaboration‘ (OFC).  
 
The remainder of this section will consider the institutional economic tradition, not 
only with a view to forming a precise definition for an OFC but also to consider how 
concepts within the discipline may help to understand collaboration in a broader 
sense. Institutional economic theory focuses on the origins of institutions, how they 
affect human action or agency, and how they change or evolve over time. The theory 
is markedly different to neoclassical economic theory. Neoclassical economics relies 
on the assumption that individual agency, following decisions based on rational 
choices, will lead to optimal outcomes under the market system.  In institutional 
economic theory, in contrast, individual agency is viewed as leading to suboptimal 
outcomes. This gives the raison d‟être for the development of institutions. They are 
created because they enable individuals to avoid these suboptimal outcomes. 
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Institutional theory recognises that collaboration among individuals and firms can 
have a greater impact on decisions than neoclassical theory assumes. This thesis 
builds a framework influenced by the institutional economic approach in order to 
better understand how firms collaborate together in clusters and with different 
economic actors in clusters initiatives  
 
The theory may be divided into two major schools - ‗Old‘ and ‗New‘ institutional 
economics. Both schools present theories that, to varying degrees, offer alternatives 
to or build on the neoclassical economic approach. Original critical institutionalism 
(i.e. ‗Old‘) rejects mainstream economic assumptions regarding the efficiency of the 
market system while neo-institutionalism (i.e. ‗New‘) is more accommodating 
towards the market system (Krier 2009, p412).  
 
Old or Original Institutionalism  
 
Old or original institutionalism is generally viewed as being founded in the early 
decades of the twentieth century in the USA. Its founders included Veblen, 
Commons, Mitchell and Ayres. It was very influential in the 1920s, largely 
dominating the American economic profession (Hodgson 2002).  
 
The neoclassical idea of ‗rational economic man‘ is replaced in old institutionalism 
by the idea of institutionalized agent, driven in the main by habit and routine. 
Accordingly, old institutionalism generally regards economics as ‗evolutionary‘ in 
character (Hodgson 2002, p529). Veblen (1898) defined an institution as a habit of 
thought common to the generality of men. Commons (1961) defined an institution as 
collective action in control and enlargement of individual action. While the two 
definitions appear to be in conflict they are quite congruent and represent heuristic 
tools for analysis – with Veblen‘s definition stressing the cognitive aspect of 
institutions and Commons stressing the interpersonal or interrelation aspect (Samuels 
1995, p575). Some have defined the term institution as a cluster of moral beliefs that 
configure power (Stanfield 1999) deriving the definition from Ayres‘s observation 
that institutions commonly share the attributes of designating authority. But one 
should be careful not to place too much emphasis on the power struggles in an 
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economy because, as Ayres noted, authority is not simply a question of force but 
more importantly of custom (Ayres 1952, p43).  Ayres also stated that economists 
should know better than anyone that no one creates anything except as a participant 
in a culture shared with other members of a community (Ayres 1967, p7).  
 
Central to old institutional economics (OIE) is the analysis of human wants and the 
resources available to meet them. Human wants and technology do change, thereby 
altering the menu of available resources, not randomly but through human agency 
and influences that are endogenous to the human social system (Stanfield 1999, 
p234). This is a sharp contrast to neoclassical economics were human wants are 
treated as exogenous variables. Stanfield (1999) summarised the ‗critical historical 
OIE method‘ as relying more on case studies, that investigate and carefully compile 
information about the activities of human groups, than on the econometric 
techniques favoured by neoclassical economists.  
 
It would be wrong to view OIE purely as an American tradition; key influential 
European writers include Kapp, Myrdal and Polanyi. Kapp observed that old 
institutionalism argued that economic processes cannot be adequately understood 
and analysed as closed self-contained and self-sustaining systems, which are isolated 
from a social and physical environment from which they derive important inputs and 
through which they are related in many reciprocal interdependencies (Kapp 1976, 
p212). OIE views an economy as an open system in continuous interaction with a 
larger social and political system, from which it receives influences and in turn 
exerts negative and positive influences. This approach is attractive in the context of 
this thesis because of its focus on the role of collaboration in clusters and cluster 
initiatives. The case studies explored in Chapters 5 and 6 will show that interaction 
between firms and the different actors in the economy, such as government, state 
agencies and universities, can contribute to building systems of innovation. 
 
Myrdal‘s (1978) most important contribution was the development of the idea of 
‗circular causation with cumulative effects‘. Under circular causation the dynamics 
of a social system meant that if there is a change in one endogenous condition in 
society, for example brought about by a policy intervention, then other conditions 
will change in response. Hence there is no one basic explanatory factor but rather 
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‗everything causes everything else‘, implying interdependence among social 
processes and, generally, that states of equilibrium do not exist (Mydral 1978, p774). 
Of the older OIE European writers, Polanyi is most relevant for this thesis because 
he introduced the concept of embeddedness, which was further developed by the 
contemporary writer Granovetter (1985) and is considered in detail in section 2.3 
below.  
‘New’ or neo-institutional economics 
 
New or neo-institutional economics (NIE) is closer to neoclassical economics than 
the ‗old‘ institutional approach. NIE tends to open up or expand the reach of 
neoclassicism, in particular in the theory of the firm (Samuels 1995, p578). 
Williamson, more than any other writer, is associated with NIE and his work is 
defining for the school. He took as a major inspiration Coase‘s (1937) Economica 
article on the ‗Nature of the Firm‘ and coined the phrase ‗new institutional 
economics‘ precisely to distinguish his approach from the original school of 
institutionalism (Hodgson 2002, p525).  
 
The ‗rational spirit‘ and employing a ‗systems approach‘ to issues such as 
hierarchies, markets and power in the economy is the economic perspective 
according to Williamson. Within that perspective, the more focused lens of 
transaction cost economics (TCE) is an interdisciplinary approach in which law, 
economics and organization are joined together (Williamson 1997, p1). TCE is 
framed mainly around an economizing perspective in which markets and hierarchies 
are alternative modes of governance, the aim being to ascertain where transactions 
go and why, with the role of power being strictly limited (Williamson 1995). In the 
mid-1970s  Fischer (1977, p322) had criticised the tautological status of transaction 
costs on the basis that everything could be rationalized by invoking suitably 
specified transaction costs with the required degrees of freedom after the fact. Coase 
had defined a tautology as a concept that is ‗clearly right‘ (Coase 1988, p19). 
Williamson asserted that while Commons (1934) was the first to propose that the 
transaction be the basic unit of analysis TCE only began to overcome its tautological 
reputation on asking and answering the question ‗What are the crucial dimensions 
with respect to which transactions differ?‘ (Williamson 1997, p13). Hence for 
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Williamson (1997, pp6-7) the predictive content of TCE rests on the argument that 
transactions, which differ in attributes, are aligned with governance structures 
supported by distinct forms of contract law, which differ in their costs and 
competencies. Williamson‘s NIE approach extends the reach of neoclassicism in 
explaining interaction between firms in such formal agreements, but is not an 
appropriate analytical tool to explore collaboration involving firms and other actors 
in the economy in less formal arrangements.  
North ‘Old’ or ‘New’ institutionalism: the rules of the game, the 
players - moral norms and ethical codes  
 
North is a second writer generally associated with new institutionalism but whose 
theories deviate more significantly from the neoclassical principles (Vanderberg, 
2002, p217). His contribution is more relevant to an in-depth analysis of the process 
of collaboration, which is the focus of this thesis, than that of Williamson. According 
to North (1991), throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings 
to create order, reduce uncertainty in exchange, and provide the incentive structure 
that shapes economic growth, stagnation or decline
10
. North (1997) listed three 
landmarks in the historical reduction of transaction costs (i) the evolution of the 
institutions that made impersonal exchange possible, (ii) the assumption by the state 
of the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and (iii) the 
realization of the gains from modern revolution in science. In many respects the 
systems of innovation approach, outlined below in section 2.4, and associated policy 
support; fits into this categorisation by North. In a departure from Williamson‘s 
approach he observed that while a narrow economic definition of transaction costs is 
the cost of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements, in the 
larger social context transaction costs are all the costs involved in human interaction 
over time (North 1997, p149). Essentially North argued that institutions are the rules 
                                                 
10
 For example, in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 Century the need for agreed rates of exchange and credit led to the 
development of financial institutions, such as banking. As trade evolved with the shipping of goods 
overseas, the need to transform uncertainty into risk resulted in the establishment of institutions 
offering marine insurance from the 15
th
 Century onwards. Thus, the development of  Western Europe 
into a world economic power by the 18
th
 century can be seen as a gradual evolution of economic 
institutions and political structures interacting together to reduce transaction costs and produce 
modern business and economic growth (North 1991). 
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of the game and organizations and entrepreneurs are the players who try to influence 
the outcome of the game (North, 1990, 1994). 
 
While North is generally viewed as being part of the NIE School, his writings 
provide evidence of commonality with the OIE tradition. For example his 
fundamental definition that institutions are ‗human devised constraints that shape 
human interactions‘ (North 1990, p1) is very compatible with Veblen‘s: an 
institution is ‗a usage which has become axiomatic and indispensable by habituation 
and general acceptance‘ (Veblen 1967, p101); and Common‘s (1961): ‗an institution 
[may be defined as] collective action in control of individual action‘ (Stanfield 1999, 
p233).  For North, human learning is accumulated and pasted on from one generation 
to the next through culture and the shared experiences of the members of society 
(Denzau and North 1994, North 1997). This also exhibits commonality with both 
contemporary and older writers in the OIE tradition. For example, Hodgson (2007) 
stated that rules and means of understanding are learned in social contexts and 
human reasoning capacities are linked to their evolving social context. Veblen (1898, 
p391) pointed out that ‗the economic life history of the individual is a cumulative 
process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes 
on‘, but that what is true of the individual in this respect is true of the group in which 
he lives as well. In other words all economic change is a change in the economic 
community, a change in the community‘s method of doing things and finally a 
change in its habit of thought (Veblen 1898). North, Hodgson and Veblen would all 
agree that ‗players‘ behave differently within an institutional context than they 
would as individuals or organisations outside of that context (Hodgson 2007).  
 
The following two paragraphs draw on a discussion of ‗free riding, opportunism and 
legitimacy‘ in Vanderberg (2002, p225) and are complemented with a discussion of 
rational choice institutionalism by Shepsle (2005, pp8-10). It is particularly relevant 
to the focus on collaboration in this thesis and will serve to illustrate one key 
difference between the institutional approach of Williamson and North. It also 
highlights further similarities between North and writers in the OIE tradition.  
 
Neoclassical economics, being based on the notion of individual welfare 
maximisation, struggles to explain the logic of collective action by firms in industry 
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associations. Positive outcomes from collective action by a group are in many cases 
public goods. While they are desired by members of the group, it is impossible to 
ensure that all prospective beneficiaries will contribute to the cost of achieving such 
outcomes.  This raises the ‗free rider‘ problem in economics and other social science 
disciplines. Olson (1965, 1988) used this free rider logic to argue that a group must 
be able to offer things of value to contributors and only to contributors – selective 
benefits and not just collective benefits
11
. Williamson staying close to neoclassical 
principles grouped the free rider problem and other issues of ‗self-interest seeking 
guile‘ under the banner of opportunism which is central to his institutionalism 
(Williamson, 1995, p47). North disagreed with the neoclassical assumption that 
individuals are always motivated by self-interest arguing that support for lobby 
groups can at times follow certain moral and ethical codes such as fair play built on 
trust. Essentially North (1981, p11) along with OIE writers such as Hodgson (1988, 
p265) reject the pervasiveness of opportunism because it is unable to explain group 
action in which free riding is possible but not acted upon.  
 
One possible solution to the opportunism is the so-called prisoners‘ dilemma (PD), 
with repeat PD situations providing logic for individuals to seize cooperative 
benefits. In a consideration of the PD, Axelrod (1984) listed three options for the 
individual (i) cooperate with another and capture a benefit, (ii) exploit the 
cooperative inclinations of the other by non-cooperating and do even better while the 
other suffers a loss, or (iii) join his opposite number in non-cooperation and get 
nothing. However, in situations where plays are repeated, today‘s payoff may 
influence the behaviour of others tomorrow and encourage cooperation rather than 
simply seizing once off benefits. North (1981, p35) also recognised that such game-
theory approaches that involve repeated plays offer some explanation as to how 
opportunism is reduced. But North argued that this was only part of the explanation 
                                                 
11
 Small groups, such as a few large firms in a concentrated industry, may organize without selective 
incentives, since each member gets a significant fraction of the benefit of any action its takes in the 
interest of the group and strategically motivated cooperation may also occur‘ (Olson 1988). In the 
context of Olson‘s view, it is important to emphasis that genuine collaboration and networking among 
firms has nothing to do with cartels, price-fixing, collusion or any anti-competitive activity. It is rather 
the coming together of business to solve information problems, understand markets and regulations, 
drive innovation, encourage economic growth and productivity and communicate with government 
and other institutions in the economy. Price-fixing, or any other anti-competitive activity, has no part 
to play. 
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for cooperation. The other, perhaps more important, part of the explanation arises 
from a commitment to ideology and the support it can lend to legitimacy, loyalty and 
trust (North 1981, p12). Vandenberg (2002, p226) concludes that the importance of 
norms for North should not be underestimated, with strong moral and ethical codes 
being seen as an essential part of society and viable economic systems. Vandenberg 
(2002) also provided a link between the importance of moral norms for North and 
the literature on social capital (reviewed below), where moral norms, particularly 
trust, underpin economic and social relations. In fact, after a detailed examination, 
Vandenberg (2002, p233) correctly concluded that North is best placed between 
neoclassical and old institutionalism. North‘s theory can also be seen as a modern 
development of Marshall‘s ideas on the character of people and their social and 
political institutions (Andreosso and Jacobson 2005, p188). 
 
This thesis is focused on the role of collaboration within cluster initiatives, which 
support the development of clusters particularly in relation to building systems of 
innovation in the Irish economy. Two concepts influenced by institutional economics 
that are relevant to the empirical work undertaken in this thesis, are embeddedness 
and social capital. The following sections review major literature on each of these 
two interrelated concepts.    
Section 2.3: Embeddedness and Social Capital 
Embeddedness  
 
Polanyi (1944) was the first to refer to the concept of ‗embeddedness‘ in his seminal 
book ‗The Great Transformation‘, but many view his conceptualisation as 
problematic and ambiguous. On the one hand, when taking a holistic view in his 
analysis of the organisation of production, Polanyi argued that economic life could 
only be understood as part of social relations and institutions.  On the other hand, he 
proposed that over time there is an institutional separation of the market economy 
from the rest of society, suggesting that embeddedness could be viewed as an 
historical variable. Gemici (2008) argued that this fundamental fracture in Polanyi‘s 
writings has resulted in two different and contradictory notions of embeddedness. 
Essentially Polanyi switched from a holistic view to a restrictive institutional view 
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when he began to compare the market system with other economic systems such as 
household, reciprocity and redistribution. Polanyi‘s theoretical proposition that the 
market economy becomes disembedded and institutionally separate from society is 
misleading; but his methodological principle that all economies are embedded in 
social institutions remains valid (Gemici 2008, pp25-26).  
 
Block (2001, 2003) argued that these tensions in Polanyi‘s work can be understood 
as a consequence of his changing theoretical orientation. When he began his research 
in the 1930s, Polanyi was working within a specific Marxist framework. But, as he 
was writing the book, he developed new concepts that led in new directions, which 
directly challenged not only Marxists and but also market liberals. Key among these 
new ideas was the embedded market economy. However, the concept was not fully 
developed due to Polanyi‘s desire to publish the book quickly in order to influence 
government policy at that time.  
 
Contemporary applications of the concept of embeddedness in economic sociology 
owe much to Granovetter‘s (1985) version of the concept (Krippner et al 2004, 
p110). Granovetter argued that most behaviour, including economic behaviour, is 
closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. He viewed this 
characterisation of behaviour as avoiding the extremes of ‗under-socialised‘ and 
‗over-socialised‘ views of human action (Granovetter 1985, p504).  Neoclassical 
economics tends to ignore the importance of socialisation by assuming that social 
outcomes are merely the aggregation of independent rational decision makers‘ 
actions. Although credit is due to Williamson for trying to introduce a socialised 
dimension into the neoclassical approach Granovetter criticised Williamson‘s (1975, 
1981) TCE for being ‗under socialised‘. For example in TCE malfeasance, the use of 
force and fraud, is seen to be averted because clever institutional arrangements make 
it too costly to engage in (Granovetter 1985, p489). This is in sharp contrast to 
Granovetter‘s view that economic actors, individuals and firms, build relations and 
structures that firstly generate trust and secondly discourage malfeasance. For 
Granovetter economic sociology on the other hand tended to over emphasise 
socialisation by taking the view that individual action is completely determined by 
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social norms and values
12
. In contrast, Granovetter argued that social and culture 
influences are not static but dynamic; they not only shape their members but are also 
shaped by them, partly for their own strategic reasons (Granovetter 1985, p486).   
 
Granovetter (1973, 1983) distinguished between strong (close) and weak ties in 
economic and social relations. Strong ties are the ties that bind a network together 
and as such they motivate people to help others. They are associated with close 
relationships where the people involved know and to a large extent trust each other. 
Weak ties represent contacts between individuals who are not part of the same 
societal or in the case of this thesis, economic grouping. Weak ties provide 
individuals with bridges to other societal and economic groupings opening up new 
opportunities. Weak ties can counteract the tendency that strong ties, at times, may 
have to restrict the behaviour of, and the information available to, network members.  
Weak ties provide access to the way different groups behave and to the different 
ideas that different groups have.  
 
Granovetter (1974, 1983) illustrated his ideas on the strength of weak ties with 
reference to how people find new job opportunities. Close friends are likely to have 
the greatest overlap in terms of contact with those one already knows, so they are 
likely to have access to much of the same information on job opportunities.  In 
contrast, acquaintances who move in different circles to close friends are likely to 
have access to information that one does not already have. Consequently, weak ties 
with acquaintances may open up new job opportunities, which one would miss by 
relying solely on close friends. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the fact that 
Granovetter saw weak ties as applicable to innovation diffusion (Granovetter 1973, 
pp1365-1369). In his view, the innovativeness of a group may be restricted by the 
intellectual perspectives of that group, but weak ties with other groups may enable 
new ideas to emanate from the margins of a network (Granovetter 1983, p216).  
 
The idea that new ideas and ways of doing things may emanate from weak ties with 
other groups or networks, and I use these terms interchangeably, will be an important 
                                                 
12
 For example Granovetter criticised Bowles and Gintis‘s (1975) view that the American education 
system destined different social classes for certain jobs in the hierarchy of production as being rather 
mechanical. 
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part of the empirical analysis that takes place in Chapters 5 and 6. Granovetter‘s 
view that cultural influences are not static, but dynamic, is also relevant in 
understanding the development of social networks. The empirical work undertaken 
in this thesis will illustrate that networks, which shape how individuals behave, are 
also shaped by their members. For example members who leverage off weak ties, 
and build bridges to other networks and groupings within an economy, may 
influence their own network.  
 
In order to understand social relations Granovetter argued that one also has to 
analyse institutions, culture and politics and all the micro and macro elements, of 
which the ‗meso-level‘ of social networks is in the middle (Krippner et al. 2004, 
p114). Heanue and Jacobson (2008), acknowledging Granovetter‘s contribution, 
suggested a concept of embeddedness that is defined by a complex web of social, 
economic and institutional connections that contribute to the innovative performance 
of firms and industries. Granovetter himself commented that even when markets are 
impersonal, and appear not to be mixed up with personal relationships, they are still 
embedded in a larger institutional framework, with a culture and set of rules that 
have been put there by a social process (Krippner et al. 2004, p115).  
 
 Granovetter (2004) stated that it is a ‗fool‘s errand‘ to try to measure embeddedness 
in quantitative terms. Rather one should use it as a conceptual umbrella under which 
one can analyse the connections between economic activity and the social, the 
political, the institutional, the historical and the cultural elements with which 
economic activity is mixed up (Krippner et al. 2004, p133).  
Social capital  
 
Another intangible and difficult to measure concept, which analytically overlaps 
with the embeddedness concept, is social capital. This thesis is concerned with how 
innovation arises from collaboration and it can be seen in the case studies presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6 that the accumulation of social capital plays a role in this 
process.  
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Despite the complexity and ambiguity of the concept, much of the research carried 
out to date in the social capital area has been based on large volume survey data, for 
example Putnam (2000), NESF (2003) and Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005). The 
term social capital is increasingly referred to in a range of academic research but 
often this reflects the popularity of the term rather than a clear understanding of the 
concept. Writers studying a range of areas, including education, community life, 
economic development and collective action, have all provided different definitions 
for social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002, p17). However, the origin of the concept is 
usually attributed to three writers, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam.  The remainder 
of this section examines different definitions and dimensions of social capital 
emphasised by these key contributors and some prominent users of the concept.  
Definitions: bridging and bonding forms of social capital  
 
Bourdieu (1986, p243), who was among the first modern writers to use the term, 
defined social capital as: 
 
[T]he aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition. 
 
Bourdieu‘s definition of social capital can fit easily into strategic models of 
economic behaviour (Sobel 2002, p139). For Bourdieu (1986) the volume of social 
capital possessed by any given actor depends on the size of the network of 
connections and the volume of capital possessed by those to whom the actor is 
connected. He illustrated his view by reference to how the upper middle classes in 
France in the 1960s and 1970s cultivated connections in order to maintain their 
superior position in society (Field 2008, p22). This view is described by Adler and 
Kwon (2002, p19) as a ‗bridging‘ form of social capital where the focus is on 
external relations, as opposed to a ‗bonding‘ form of social capital where the focus is 
on internal ties. This distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is 
important in understanding the concept and how it can impact on any given actor.  
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Coleman (1988, 1990, 1994) took a wider view of the unit of observation and 
introduced a vertical component to social capital, which opened the door to a 
broader interpretation of the concept (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, p4). 
Coleman‘s conceptualisation of social capital, which he saw as complementary to 
human capital, was developed within rational choice sociology where actors choose 
to cooperate because it is in their own self-interests to do so (Field 2008, p27). 
Coleman (1988, pS98) defined social capital as follows: 
 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety 
of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – 
whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure.  
 
For Coleman, structure is important and he saw social capital as building up ‗social 
structural resources‘ (Coleman 1994, p302). His definition enabled the concept to be 
used to examine behaviour within and among entities such as firms, with vertical 
associations being characterized by hierarchical relationships with unequal power 
distribution among members (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, p5). Physical capital 
(plant and machinery) and human capital (people‘s skills and capabilities) can be 
combined to facilitate production. The social capital that exists in the relations 
among persons can also facilitate productive activity, particularly if the group or 
network embodies extensive trust among its members (Coleman 1988, pS101). 
Coleman argued that closure of the social structure created trustworthiness that 
allowed the proliferation of obligations and expectations within a network (pS107). 
Hence, for Coleman (1988, 1994) social capital has significant bonding elements. 
This idea of network closure might seem to conflict with Granovetter‘s (1973, 1983) 
ideas on the strength of weak ties and Bourdieu‘s (1986) emphasis on external 
relations. However, Sobel (2002, p151) argued that this superficial conflict might be 
reconciled by reference to the type of social capital required. For example, collective 
action might require strong ties (or bonding social capital) while obtaining 
information might require weak ties (or bridging social capital). But Coleman seems 
to suggest that strong ties in an enclosed network will be best at generating trust for 
social capital to develop. In contrast, Granovetter‘s (1973, 1983) recognised that 
strong ties bind a network of actors together but allowed for the possibility that weak 
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ties could build bridges to other networks, which could also lead to trust and 
enhanced social capital. Being the broker between two groups or networks also, 
presumably, requires a certain level of trust. See the discussion on Burt (1997, 2004), 
below.  
 
Bourdieu‘s treatment of social capital is somewhat circular and dark in the sense that 
it is social capital that plays a significant role in maintaining privileged position and 
class differences in society. Coleman‘s view is more optimistic, based on the 
assumption that social capital is available to all actors in society regardless of 
privilege or disadvantage (Field 2008, p31). Coleman‘s definition can be criticised 
for being too vague but his emphasis on structure is interesting, particularly in 
understanding bonding social capital. Coleman influenced the concept of structural 
social capital, developed by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001) and others in work 
for the OECD, which is outlined in further details below and is used as an analytical 
tool in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Putnam (1995, 2000, 2001) stated that the central idea of social capital is that 
networks and the associated norms of reciprocity have value. Putnam‘s writings did 
much to popularise the social capital concept, particularly in the USA. He defined 
social capital (Putnam 1995, p67) as the:  
 
[T]he features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.  
 
In this later work Putnam
13
 distinguished between bonding and bridging social 
capital, with the former providing denser networks and the latter creating larger 
networks (Sobel 2002, p151, Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik 2005, p1061).  Putnam 
(2001) argued that, at least in some instances, there are ‗demonstrable externalities‘ 
to social capital, benefits to the public (public goods), as well as private benefits to 
people who are involved in the networks. However, while undoubtedly influential in 
a policy sense, one of the limits of  Putnam‘s work is that his rhetoric often 
                                                 
13
 Putnam‘s wide ranging ideas on declining political, civic and religious participation were brought 
together in his book ‗Bowling alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community‘ (Putnam 
2000).  
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overwhelms logic and the repeated use of descriptive statistics often substitutes for 
detailed analysis (Sobel 2002, p140-141). A second limitation of Putnam‘s 
conceptualisation is the tendency to assume that social capital can only lead to 
positive outcomes, whereas the concept may also have a negative or ‗dark side‘, 
which is considered in detail below.   
 
The advantages of bridging social capital have also been emphasised by Burt (1997, 
2004) in his analysis of how brokerage can span the gaps or structural holes that 
delineate the space between networks.  
 
The structural hole argument defines social capital in terms of the 
information and control advantage of being the broker in relations between 
people otherwise disconnected in social structure (Burt 1997, p340).   
 
In a study of a large American electronics company Burt (2004, p349) found that 
managers who acted as brokers between different networks were more likely to 
express ideas and have these opinions evaluated as good ideas.  Furthermore, 
managers who brokered connections across structural holes were rewarded through 
higher compensation, positive performance reviews and promotions (Burt 2004, 
p386). However, while the originality of the brokerage argument is significant, one 
of Burt‘s weaknesses is that he generalizes his model to markets without really 
testing it on firms (Comet 2007, p667).  
 
The distinction between bonding and bridging forms of social capital is important to 
research undertaken in this thesis.  The qualitative methodology adopted in Chapters 
5 and 6 draws out the significance of the distinction and the contribution it can make 
to our understanding of how social capital works. Purely bonding types of social 
capital, while facilitating collective action, could potentially result in too narrow a 
focus for network members. Cooke (2007a, 2007b), who referred to the social 
capital concept in his regional studies of SME (small and medium enterprise) 
performance in the UK, highlighted that Granovetter (1992) and Grabher (1993) 
both warned of the dangers of an over reliance on too narrow a range of business 
and social contacts – described by Grabher as ‗lock-in‘ of relationships (Cooke 
2007a, p81). Bridging types of social capital have the potential to open-up the minds 
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of network members to new ideas generated by members of other networks. 
However, an over reliance on external ties or bridging forms of social capital could 
also be limiting, particularly if collective action is needed to develop an idea and 
bring it to the market. This suggests that individuals and groups who can effectively 
utilize both bonding and bridging types of social capital may be best placed to 
advance their objectives. At the firm level, Cooke (2007a, p83) argued that the use 
of social capital could contribute significantly to the development of ‗the dynamic 
capabilities of the firm‘ (Teece 2007), with trust, especially of the reputational or 
goodwill kind, being a key element in this regard.
14
 He included the capability to 
influence government policy and state agencies that design and run industrial 
development programs among the potential positive benefits of social capital. 
Further definitions - structural and cognitive social capital  
 
The social capital term has been used by both the World Bank and the OECD in 
addressing social and economic challenges of development. This has led to further 
definitions and some refinement of the concept. Woolcock (1998), for many years a 
member of the World Bank‘s Development Research Group, defined social capital 
as:  
 
[T]he information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one‘s social 
networks. 
 
Woolcock (2001, p5-6) placed social capital within an evolutionary approach to 
understanding the factors of production and capital in economics. Economists 
identified land, labour, and physical capital as three basic factors of production that 
shape economic growth. In the 1960s, neo-classical economists, among them Becker 
(1962), introduced the notion of human capital, arguing that a society‘s endowment 
of well educated and trained workers determines its productivity and its use of the 
factors originally identified by classical economics. Woolcock (2001) argued that   
                                                 
14
 In a discussion on measurement, Putnam states that he agrees with Woolcock that social trust while 
not being part of the definition of social capital is a close consequence, and could be thought of as a 
proxy (Putnam 2001) 
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 Table 2.1: Definitions of social capital  
 
Bourdieu (1986) The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition. 
Coleman (1988) Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity 
but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: 
they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they 
facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate 
actors – within the structure. 
Putnam (1995)  The features of social organization such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit. 
Burt (1997)  The structural hole argument defines social capital in terms of 
the information and control advantage of being the broker in 
relations between people otherwise disconnected in social 
structure. 
Woolcock (1998)  
 
Woolcock (2001) 
(Note 1) 
The information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in 
one‘s social networks. 
Social capital refers to the norms and networks that facilitate 
collective action.  
Grootaert (1998)  The norms and social relations embedded in social structures of 
societies that enable people to co-ordinate action to achieve 
desired goals. 
Krishna and Uphoff 
(1999) 
The first category [structural] capital facilitates MBCA 
[mutually beneficial collective action ] through established roles 
and social networks supplemented by rules, procedures and 
precedents, while the second [cognitive] predisposes people 
toward MBCA on the basis of shared norms, values, attitudes 
and beliefs. 
Lundvall (2005) 
(Note 2) 
The willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments 
to each other, collaborate with each other (sic) and trust each 
other in processes of exchange and interactive learning.  
Cooke  (2007)  Social capital is defined as the application or exercise of social 
norms of reciprocity, trust and exchange for political or 
economic purposes.  
Nooteboom (2007)  Social capital as contributing to goal achievement of actors on 
the basis of relationships. Here, actors may be individual people 
but they may also be groups, such as firms or other 
organisations.  
Field (2008)  
(Note 3) 
Social capital may be termed capital insofar as it gives rise to 
resources that can be deployed in order to enable actors – both 
individuals and groups – to pursue their goals more effectively 
then they could without it. ...What social capital brings to social 
theory is an emphasis on relationships and values as significant 
factors in explaining structures and behaviour.  
Notes:    1.  Woolcock (2001) eliminated trust from this later definition, see discussion of social 
capital and trust. 
2. For Lundvall definition see discussion of national and regional innovation systems, 
in Section 2.4.   
3. For Field definition see discussion of social capital and government.  
 
Source: Author‘s table  
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human capital resides in individuals and social capital resides in relationships - with 
the two concepts, in essence, being complementary. 
 
Coleman also viewed social capital as complementary to human capital and was 
particularly influenced by Becker‘s work on human capital, Becker like Coleman 
was employed at the University of Chicago (Field 2008, p23). However Coleman‘s 
definition of social capital encompassed both individual and collective aspects, with 
social capital viewed as ‗a capital asset for the individual‘ and also comprised of 
‗social structural resources‘ built up in the environment (Field 2008, p28, Coleman 
1994, p302).    
 
In slightly earlier work under the World Bank‘s social capital initiative, Krishna and 
Uphoff (1999, pp6-7) used the approach known as ‗subordinate conceptualization‘ 
to break down the social capital concept into major components, with the aim of 
bringing more analytical rigor to the use of the term. They argued that the core 
meaning of capital is that it represents a stock of assets that yields a flow of revenue 
and described the revenue flow from social capital as mutually beneficial collective 
action (MBCA). They proposed two main categories or forms of social capital: 
structural forms and cognitive forms, both pertaining to and affecting social 
relationships.  
 
The first category [structural] capital facilitates MBCA through established 
roles and social networks supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents, 
while the second [cognitive] predisposes people toward MBCA on the basis 
of shared norms, values, attitudes and beliefs  (Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p7 
― underlined words and words in italics original authors‘).  
 
This distinction between two distinct types of social capital – structural and 
cognitive – has been taken up by researchers at the OECD (2000), who referring to 
Grootaert (1998) define social capital as:  
 
[T]he norms and social relations embedded in social structures of societies 
that enable people to co-ordinate action to achieve desired goals.  
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Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001, p5) argued that structural social capital facilities 
information sharing, collective action and decision making. In these instances, social 
networks and structures supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents are 
important. To a degree, this type of social capital is easily quantified as the number 
of networks, network membership, precedents etc are externally observable. 
Cognitive social capital, which refers to norms, values, trust, attitudes and beliefs, is 
a more subjective and intangible concept (Uphoff  2000). Ferlander (2007, p116) 
also distinguished between the structural dimension (networks) and cognitive 
dimension (norms) of social capital but added a third behavioural dimension to 
capture the importance of participation on the part of the individual (Field 2008, 
p160-161). Naphapiet and Ghosal (1998) also suggested three dimensions of social 
capital  structural, cognitive and relational. The duel distinction between ‗bonding 
and bridging‘ and ‗structural and cognitive‘ social capital was used in this thesis, 
because it provided greater theoretical clarity and, in the opinion of this author, a 
clearer analytical tool for examining collaboration within cluster initiatives. 
 
Both structural and cognitive social can be measured quantitatively, with much 
research to date in the social capital area focusing on the number of networks in 
society and on large survey data measuring people‘s participation rates within 
networks. While such research has merit, it can only tell us so much about social 
capital. In order to understand what motivates people to engage in collaboration, 
what they contribute to and get from such interactions, we need to go deeper.  These 
various dimensions suggest that a deep understanding of the way social capital 
works will require more qualitative methods of analysis and research.  
 
The distinction between structural and cognitive social capital is part of the social 
capital analytical tool kit used to add depth to the exploration of collaboration in 
clusters and cluster initiatives in Chapters 5 and 6.  Once again, the qualitative 
methodology adopted draws out the significance of the distinction and the 
contribution it can make to our understanding of how social capital works.  
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Social capital and trust  
 
The role of ‗trust‘ in social capital is a complex issue. It will be seen as playing a 
significant role in the collaborations analysed in Chapter 5 and 6. Trust is seen by 
some researchers as epiphenomenal, that is as arising out of social capital.  It is seen 
by others as a causal variable, as a phenomenon that must precede the development 
of social capital. Nooteboom (2007, p30) argued that while trust may be built within 
relationships, it may also arise outside relationships, on the basis of institutions and it 
may be facilitated by intermediaries or a go-between. He did not aim for essentialist 
definitions of social capital, institutions and trust but for pragmatic definitions that, 
as much as possible, accorded with established meanings, but also clarified them 
with the aim of explaining phenomena. In this context Nooteboom (2007, p32) 
defined social capital as contributing to the goal achievement of actors on the basis 
of relationships, with actors referring not only to individuals but also to groups, such 
as firms and organisations. In the latter case he emphasised the relationship between 
groups, rather than within groups, as the most relevant relationship in social capital 
terms. Social capital requires investment, in the sense of effort and sacrifice, but trust 
as a feature of social capital cannot be bought and installed  if not present; it needs 
to develop in time (Nooteboom  2007, p33).  
  
Bourdieu (1986) did not emphasize trust in his definition of what essentially is a 
bridging form of social capital, which builds benefits from ‗mutual acquaintance and 
recognition‘. Coleman (1988) who defined a bonding form of social capital by its 
functions also did not specifically mention trust in his definition. However, in further 
discussion, he does state that productive activity is particularly facilitated by 
networks that embody extensive trust among its members (Coleman 1988, pS101). 
Of the three writers considered to be the originators of the concept, it is Putnam 
(1995) who saw an integral role for trust in his definition of social capital. He 
identified it as facilitating coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. As such, 
Putnam sees trust as a cause of social capital.  
 
The OECD (2000) referred to Grootaert (1998) who did not mention trust in his 
definition, but later (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, p5) referenced Uphoff (2000) 
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who included trust among his examples of cognitive social capital. In fact in their 
work for the World bank Krishna and Uphoff (1999, p51) listed trust as a primary 
form of cognitive social capital. They argued that trust makes cooperation 
efficacious and view trust in this case as something that gives people the confidence 
to engage with others in the knowledge that others will act in a reliable way. This 
suggests that, for cognitive forms, trust may be a driver of social capital. In their 
discussion of structural social capital they emphasize that rules, procedures and 
precedents create expectations and provide assurance about how others will act 
(Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p50). This suggests that, for structural forms of social 
capital, trust may be an outcome rather than something that necessarily precedes 
social capital. Woolcock (1998) specifically mentioned trust in his definition of 
social capital, but in a later paper he stated that ‗social capital refers to the norms and 
networks that facilitate collective action‘ and argued that:  
 
 ―[T]rust‖ is better understood not as social capital per se, but rather as a 
measure of it. We invest in the networks and social institutions that produce 
trust, not trust in and of itself (Woolcock 2001, p9).  
 
In contrast Cooke (2007) appeared to view ‗trust, especially of the reputational or 
goodwill‘ to be a cause of social capital in business networks.  Finally, Granovetter 
(1985), in his development of the embeddedness concept, viewed economic actors, 
individuals and firms, as building relations and structures that generate trust.  
 
Sobel (2002, p149) pointed out that it would be useful to know whether the capacity 
to trust is based solely on deep rooted culture, as suggest by Fukuyama (1995) and 
Putnam et al (1993), or whether it can be influenced by the kind of institutions that 
can be constructed and nurtured. Nooteboom (2007, p37) argued that relationship 
reliance, which for him covered both control and benevolence, is always a part of 
social capital  but that trust, which goes beyond control and self interest, may not 
be. The qualitative methodology adopted in Chapters 5 and 6 and the use of the 
distinctions between the different forms of social capital ― ‗bonding and bridging‘ 
and ‗structural and cognitive‘ ― facilitates an exploration of this issue of trust in 
social capital.  
39 
 
The dark side of social capital in a collaborative business context 
 
Social capital is generally discussed as a positive concept that can contribute to our 
understanding of how society works and how individual and groups within 
communities are supported. But it is important to acknowledge that social capital is 
not always a positive thing and that there is a potential negative side to the concept 
as well. In the most extreme negative sense, social capital can facilitate criminal 
gang and ‗mafia‘ activity by creating strong bonds between individuals with favours 
granted, building obligations that anticipate future return that involve illegal activity 
e.g. drug cartels etc. But less extreme cases of a dark side of social capital are also 
possible. Sobel (2002, p146) pointed out that the ability to use network relationships 
to gain beneficial outcomes may come at a cost to individuals outside the group and 
society itself may lose when group members exploit social capital. For example, 
highly organised farm and industry groups who adopt a very protectionist trade 
stance may damage those outside their country who, as a result, continue to face high 
tariff levels and restricted market access.  
 
Field (2008, p92) highlighted that while trust has a general value in easing economic 
cooperation and reducing the transaction costs associated with more formal 
mechanisms such as contracts, hierarchies and bureaucracy rules (Fukuyama 2001, 
p10), it is precisely these features of social capital that represent an opportunity for 
those who wish to engage in fraud. Inappropriate use of social capital in a business 
context can also lower productivity and facilitate cartel behaviour. Business people 
who socialise with one another may be able to turn their competitive rivalry into a 
basis for cooperation in order to avoid bidding wars and keep up prices (Ingram and 
Roberts 2000). This may also reduce the impact of competition on business 
behaviour, and insulates employers from the views of customers. Far from 
stimulating innovation, then, social capital can sometimes produce stagnation and 
inefficiency‘ (Field 2008, p95-96). But modern anti-trust and competition laws, and 
adequate enforcement of these laws, can protect society against these negative 
aspects of social capital.  
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However, social capital can also have less obvious negative aspects that restrict 
behaviour and appear to limit choices, at least in the minds of those trying to follow 
a different path to the group.  Field pointed out that many people who emigrate from 
high-trust societies do so because they feel suffocated by the close and self-
monitoring community that surrounds them.  
 
At first sight, then, it seems that bonding social capital (combined with 
particularised trust) is to blame for social capital‘s dark side.…. [But] Not all 
the evidence points to such a straightforward model. Bonding social capital – 
clannishness, the use of family connections – is frequently associated with 
such public goods as raising educational attainment, reducing the costs of job 
search and minimising risks of malfeasance in business exchanges (Field 
2008, p97).  
 
Therefore, even in the case of family and community, which the individual does not 
choose, social capital properly used can be a positive rather than negative thing. In a 
business context, this potential dark side of the bonding type of social capital is 
presumably less of an issue, as one chooses the networks in which one participates. 
However, that being said, close knit and strongly bonded business networks can 
potentially restrict behaviour by closing off members of the network to new ideas 
and ways of doing business. Business networks / associations that engage in bridging 
forms of social capital can mitigate against this downside to social capital.  
 
Bridging social capital can also have a dark side. Field pointed out that: 
 
[B]ridging social capital can nurture insider networks and thus reproduce 
inequality; it may also have perverse goals. For example informal networking 
of highly skilled knowledge professionals was partly responsible for 
disguising the over-reporting of profits in the ‗new economy‘ (Field 2008, 
p98).  
 
In summary, one cannot see connectedness as invariably positive, as sometimes it 
can serve negative ends as well as good; and frequently it forms part of a wider 
structure of systematic inequality (Field 2008, p99). On the other hand, 
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connectedness is increasingly recognised as providing a range of positive aspects and 
the social capital concept provides a way to examine these in a more systematic way, 
particularly from a policy perspective. 
Social capital and government  
 
Interaction in cluster initiatives between industry and government, and state 
agencies, is an important element of the empirical analysis carried out for this thesis. 
Hence it is useful to consider the relationship between social capital and government 
in a general sense, before presenting a more in-depth examination of the relationship 
in the Irish context.  
 
Treating networks and shared norms as a form of capital has given the social capital 
idea resonance among economists and sociologists, and has helped open the door to 
serious policy debate. The OECD and World Bank have both used the social capital 
concept in policy areas such as sustainable development. In early 1990s, Putnam 
argued that US job training programmes for the unemployed would work better if 
complemented by the creation of linkages between community groups, schools, 
employers and workers; and the social capital idea influenced both US and British 
administrations in the early 2000s (Field 2008, pp133-135). Governments can create 
a stable and safe environment where different views are tolerated and property 
rights, including intellectual ones, are protected. This, in itself, can help generate 
social capital because people can be confident in associating together, expressing 
their views freely and knowing that the property they generate, intellectual or other 
types, will be protected by the state. Consequently, government awareness of social 
capital can be an important aspect of understanding economic development and 
generating new ideas and innovation in a society. Emerging economies, with less 
developed protection of intellectual and other property rights, may run the risk of 
losing out on some of the benefits of social capital in this regard.  
 
However, social capital is not easy to generate through public policy and one needs 
to be careful about state intervention. Firstly, governments and their agencies can 
have a serious negative impact on social capital when they start to undertake 
activities that are better left to the private sector or to civil society (Fukuyama 2001, 
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p18). Cooperation among individuals is often based on habit and practice; if the 
state gets into the business of organising everything, people may become dependent 
on it and lose their spontaneous ability to work with one another.  
 
A second danger of state intervention is that organisations may spring up that are 
good at writing proposals to gain access to state funds. But these organisations are 
likely to have little durability once the outside source of funds dries up (Fukuyama 
2001, p18). Essentially such organisations are little more than what economics 
would describe as rent seekers. In contrast, privately funded organisations that from 
time to time work with state agencies, while gaining access to government funds for 
various initiatives, are likely to have greater sustainability and consequently a 
greater social capital impact in the long term. State development agencies also need 
to be careful that they do not damage social capital by enticing people away from 
already established networks/associations, rather than working in partnership with 
these organisations.  Coleman (1994, pp312-313) accepted that social capital could 
suffer from under-investment as a result of market failure, but expressed concern 
that state intervention might make matters worse if it replaced existing activities and 
relationships freely entered into by individuals, which is the essence of social capital 
(Field, 2008, p135).  
 
Cooke (2007, p80) presented the results of a research project examining the effects 
of social capital on small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) performance in the 
UK and stated that:  
 
Social capital is defined as the application or exercise of social norms of 
reciprocity, trust and exchange for political or economic purposes.  
 
He warned that state agencies need to ensure that policy efforts are not applied only 
to a rather exclusive ‗in group‘, creating social capital strength for only a few 
favoured firms (Cooke 2007, p104).  Agencies focused on the development of 
SMEs need to be aware of this danger, which could reduce the potential economic 
impact of policy initiatives. Particularly since the chosen few may naturally like 
being part of a small elite group that receives a lot of policy attention and be happy 
to see competitors excluded from such initiatives (Cooke and Wills 1999).  From the 
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firm perspective they should strive to build social capital themselves both 
domestically, by embedding themselves more deeply in indigenous networks, and 
globally, by developing linkages to networks outside the home base. (Cooke 2007, 
p104).  
 
However, Field (2008, pp139-142) outlined a number of points that support the case 
for policy intervention in the creation of social capital. First, people‘s ability to 
access resources through their social capital, in areas such as health and education, 
can make a considerable difference to their life chances.  
 
Second, one should be aware that policy decisions themselves may impact on 
existing social capital, in either a positive or negative way. Field referred to a UK 
report (Performance and Innovation Unit 2002, pp57-58) that listed certain policies 
that contributed to the creation of social capital in a number of areas including the 
voluntary sector, the promotion of business sector clusters and citizenship 
education. On the other hand, the report found that housing policy in Britain 
following WWII, while providing better housing, had the unintended consequence 
of destroying neighbour connections in working class areas. The policy to move 
inner city Dublin communities to high-rise flats and housing developments, with 
inadequate recreation, education and transport facilities, on the outskirts of the city 
during 1960s also destroyed such neighbour connections in Ireland.   
 
Third, other actors in the economy recognise the potential of social capital. For 
example, limited evidence suggests that firms who invest in social capital are more 
productive than firms who leave things to chance (Field 2008, p140). At times, it 
can also be damaging if governments ignore the use of social capital by other actors, 
consequently in modern societies public policy is often explicitly designed to 
prevent people from using their connections inappropriately e.g. anti-trust and 
lobbying legislation in the USA and competition laws in the EU.  
 
Fourth, the behaviour of other people or groups can affect stocks of social capital. 
For example, public policy decisions, such as zoning and road / infrastructure 
development subsidies, which favour multinational retail chains and stand alone 
shopping centres, can impact on the local social capital of towns.  
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Fifth, one of the strengths of the social capital idea is that it emphasises resources 
that communities already have and encourages external agencies to work with and 
build on, this potential (Woolcock 2001, p15).  In this sense, social capital is highly 
congruent with the emerging interest in partnership as a basis for policy 
development and for ensuring that least advantaged members of society are not 
excluded from such strategic partnerships (Field 2008, p141).  
 
Sixth, there is evidence that citizens are concerned about the erosion of social 
capital in poor communities and the impact this has on the disadvantaged in society; 
in contrast to the more well-off in society whose use of social capital may at times 
unintentionally further disadvantage the poor.  
 
Finally seventh, and in Field‘s view most important, public support for social capital 
can help achieve more equitable access to public governance and decision making 
(2008, p142). He supported the link between social capital and democracy, which he 
pointed out, was an important part of the thinking developed by the National 
Economic and Social Forum (NESF 2003) in Ireland.  
 
To date, a relatively small number of research studies have used the social capital 
concept in Ireland. Some have focused on the role of the community and voluntary 
sector in the generation of social capital. The National Economic and Social Forum 
(NESF) commissioned an Irish survey focused on citizen involvement in voluntary 
or community groups, and concluded that ‗social capital is one resource, among 
others, which can be used in support of community development and social 
inclusion‘  (NESF 2003, p3). In a quantitative study, building on the NESF survey, 
Healy (2005) concluded that the distribution of social capital in Ireland varied 
according to social group, age, marital status and level of education. He argued that 
the main value of the social capital concept was as a useful tool for qualitative 
analysis of social systems and those quantitative analyses that employ qualitative 
indicators (Healy 2005, p71).  
 
Few Irish studies examine the relevance of the social capital concept in an economic 
and business context. Breathnach (2006) studied the relationship between social 
45 
 
capital and the effectiveness of national social partnership. She concluded that there 
were negative, as well as positive, aspects of social capital, which excluded some 
from the benefits of the policy process and insulated others from broader 
environmental and development opportunities (Breathnach 2006, p39). With respect 
to developing an innovation culture in Ireland, Bradley (2007, 2009) warned against 
ignoring the social context and emphasised the importance of human interaction and 
culture. Bradley and Kennelly (2008a, 2008b) advocated that social factors, such as 
collaborative problem-solving abilities and self-knowledge, were more important to 
the success of an innovation policy than levels of R&D expenditure in universities, 
per se. 
 
Field (2008) suggested a pragmatic usage for the term that facilitates a variety of 
different theoretical frameworks to bear on the concept:  
 
Social capital may be termed capital insofar as it gives rise to resources that 
can be deployed in order to enable actors – both individuals and groups – to 
pursue their goals more effectively then they could without it. ...What social 
capital brings to social theory is an emphasis on relationships and values as 
significant factors in explaining structures and behaviour (Field 2008, pp159-
160). 
  
The use of the social capital term in this thesis will follow this suggestion by Field 
(2008) drawing on a number of the definitions and forms of social capital outlined in 
Table 2.1 and discussed above. In this way the empirical analysis undertaken in 
Chapters 5 and 6 will identify resources deployed by actors in different relationships 
in order to pursue their goals and create social capital. The following section will 
examine the third area that will go to make up the new framework proposed in this 
thesis and which is influenced by some of the concepts outlined in this section.  
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Section 2.4: Innovation systems - national and regional   
National systems of innovation  
 
In the management strategy area Porter (1990) argued that while globalisation of 
competition might appear to make the nation state less relevant, instead it makes the 
nation more important because competitive advantage is created and sustained 
through localised processes.  
 
Differences in national economic structures, values, cultures, institutions and 
histories contribute profoundly to competitive success. The role of the home 
nation seems to be as strong as or stronger than ever (Porter 1990, p19).  
 
As discussed above, the diamond model has been criticised for placing too much 
emphasis on the home market, but the local demand is not the only role for the home 
nation. More importantly, Porter recognised that the home nation takes on a growing 
significance in a free trade environment, where firms and industries are less 
protected, because it can be the source of the skills and technology that underpin 
competitive advantage.  
 
Of course, this implies the need for appropriate policies to ensure the development 
and provision of such skills and technology, encapsulated perhaps in a ‗national 
system of innovation‘ (Lundvall 1985, 1992, 1998, 2005). Lundvall was the first to 
use the expression ‗national system of innovation‘, but he recognised that the idea 
dates back to List (1841) whose main concern was to re-establish Germany‘s 
competitiveness, compared to Britain, by advocating not just the protection of infant 
industry but through promoting policies concerned with learning about new 
technology and applying it (Freeman 1995, p5). However, Lundvall (1998) provided 
a much clearer concept of the idea. He argued that under the National Systems 
Innovation (NSI) perspective, where the focus is on economic development, 
successful innovation is more important than efficient allocation. This is an 
alternative perspective to neoclassical economics where individual agents with given 
preferences and sets of information, including publicly shared technical knowledge, 
make rational choices among well defined alternatives. Table 2.2 illustrates this key 
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basic intention behind the NSI concept ‗to change the analytical perspective away 
from allocation to innovation, and from making choices to learning‘ (Lundvall 1998, 
p408). 
Table 2.2: The NSI and standard neoclassical perspective   
 Allocation Innovation  
Making 
Choices  
1. Standard neoclassical 
perspective  
2. The neoclassical 
perspective applied 
on innovation 
Learning  3. Austrian approach to market 
as a process of learning  
4. National System of 
innovation 
perspective.  
 
Source: Lundvall 1998, Table 1, p408. 
Under Lundvall‘s NSI approach, innovation is rooted in ‗interactive learning‘, which 
does not thrive in the short-term perspective of the pure markets promoted by 
neoclassical economics.  
 
He introduced uncertainty, localised learning and bounded rationality as assumptions 
of microeconomic behaviour in his analysis of innovation. These more realistic 
assumptions are in contrast to the neoclassical assumptions of perfect information 
and hyper rationality, and contributed in the ability to define a strong system of 
innovation that would impact on a nation‘s path of development (Lundvall 1993). He 
argued that:  
 
If instrumental rationality
15
 were completely dominating among professors 
and students, masters and apprentices as well as among engineers from R&D 
laboratories belonging to different firms, very little learning would take 
place. Innovation systems where a different kind of ‗communicative 
rationality‘ were playing a major role in the private sector would therefore be 
better off in the long run than the standard exchange economy (Lundvall 
1998, p410).  
 
                                                 
15
 Lundvall (1998, p410) argued that economic transactions in the form of single and isolated 
exchange acts tended to support patterns of behaviour corresponding to instrumental rationality.  
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In the NSI approach ‗communicative rationality‘ refers to the idea that relationships 
between agents, with shared collective goals, lead to more complex decisions than 
the rational choice decisions of the individual agent under the neoclassical approach. 
Therefore, NSI is an appropriate approach for considering issues around 
collaboration and the use of social capital to enhance innovation. Furthermore, in the 
NSI approach decisions are to a degree influenced by the process of engagement as 
well as the outcome of the engagement. Lundvall argued that the institutional role of 
‗trust‘ was particularly important in the context of learning and innovation: 
 
Trust is a multidimensional and complex concept. It refers to mutual 
expectations regarding consistency in behaviour and full, truthful revelation 
of relevant information and loyalty in difficult times. Trust can be very local, 
or it can extend to a wider set of actors. These dimensions of trust are crucial 
for interactive learning and innovation (Lundvall 1998, p410).  
 
The role of trust is also an important issue in social capital theory (see discussion in 
section 2.3 above). Lundvall advocated that the National Systems of Innovation 
concept should be used for analyzing economic development.  
 
Table 2.3 presents Lundvall‘s illustration that economic growth is faced with a 
double challenge in terms of sustainability, based on the distinction between tangible 
and non-tangible resources, introduced by new growth theory (Romer 1990), and a 
further distinction between resources that are more or less reproducible. Therefore, 
for Lundvall, social capital is an intangible and non-reproducible resource.  
 
Lundvall (2005) elaborated further on the important linkages that exist between 
interactive learning, social capital and economic performance. He argued that:  
 
[T]he kind of interactive learning that interconnects users and producers in 
processes aiming at new products may have a major impact on economic 
performance of the economy
16
. To understand the prerequisites for such 
                                                 
16
 Chapter 6 will look at the relationship between dairy ingredient producers and infant formula 
manufacturers, and the impact this had on innovation levels in the dairy industry in Ireland. 
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learning to take place should therefore be of major concern not only to 
management but also for policy-makers at the national level (Lundvall, 2005, 
p3).  
Table 2.3: NSI approach – resources fundamental for economic 
growth, combining the tangible and reproducible dimensions 
 Reproducible resources Non-reproducible 
resources 
 
Tangible resources 1. Production Capital 2. Natural Capital 
 
Intangible resources  3. Intellectual Capital 4. Social Capital  
 
 
Source: Lundvall 1998, Table 2, p415.  
Producers learn by doing while customers and consumers learn by using. Connecting 
producers and users can lead to innovations in terms of new products and systems 
i.e. interactive learning. The cluster concept also emphasises the role customers and 
consumers, for example, through demand conditions and related and supporting 
industries in the diamond model. Freeman referring to Lundvall and others pointed 
out that:  
 
 [M]any improvements to products and services came from interaction with 
the market and with related firms, such as sub-contractors, suppliers of 
material and services (Freeman 1995, p11). 
 
Lundvall (2005, p5) also argued that Williamson‘s transaction cost view is not 
compatible with empirical evidence on product innovation. Williamson basically 
argued that uncertainty coupled with opportunism will limit competition leading to 
higher transaction costs thereby providing incentives for firms to integrate vertically 
i.e. substituting a hierarchy for the market. In contrast, Lundvall argued that 
‗organised markets‘ and mechanisms that limit opportunism can support interactive 
learning between producers and users with consequent benefits in terms of 
innovation. North (1996) referred to the importance of human learning as a source of 
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economic change
17
 but the main focus of his analysis is that the key to efficient 
markets is institutions that lower transaction costs.  While acknowledging the 
importance of efficient markets, Lundvall added that in the learning economy it is at 
least as important that institutions support learning within and between 
organisations. In this context Lundvall (2005) defined social capital as:  
 
[T]he willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments to each 
other, collaborate with others and trust each other in processes of exchange 
and interactive learning (Lundvall 2005, p10).  
 
This thesis provides evidence that collaboration between firms, research institutes 
and state agencies is one way to limit opportunism, reduce business costs, but at the 
same time support learning within and between organisations. One of the key 
benefits of this type of interactive learning is that it enables the outcomes of learning 
at the local level, for example between an individual firm and its customers, to 
become more widely diffused in the economy (Lundvall 2005, p10). This has the 
potential to enhance innovation and the consequent wealth creation benefits at 
economy level. 
Sectoral and regional systems of innovation  
 
During the 1980s, in the early years of the development of the systems of innovation 
approach, the main emphasis was on the national level, but since then sectoral and 
regional variants of the approach have also emerged. Edquist argued that these 
various approaches complement rather than exclude each other and that for very 
large countries the national innovation approach may be less relevant, although even 
in large countries laws and policies may be set at the national level (Edquist 2001, p2 
and fn2).  
 
Malerba (1999, pp5-6) stated that the definition of a sectoral system contrasts 
sharply with the standard definition of a sector within industrial organisation theory. 
                                                 
17
 Lundvall criticises North (1996) for, despite referring to human learning as important,  largely 
discussing institutions in terms of their impact on transaction costs rather than their impact on 
learning (2005, p9). 
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Industrial economics concentrates on firms as the main actors, with these firms using 
similar types of technologies to supply goods to their customers. Strategic decisions 
in relation to competition, cooperation and command are facilitated by vertical 
integration. In contrast, the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) approach emphasises 
the degree and determinant of ‗agents‘ heterogeneity and behavioural and 
organizational variety within sectors‘ (Malerba 1999, p5 – italics original author‘s). 
Malerba also highlighted that the SSI approach:  
 
[G]ives importance to links and complementarities at the input and demand 
levels. These complementarities are both static and dynamic and include 
interdependencies among vertically or horizontally related sectors, the 
convergence of previously separated final products or the emergence of 
demand from existing ones. Thus interdependencies and complementarities 
define the real boundaries of a sectoral system. They may be at the input, or 
at the demand level, and may concern innovation, production and distribution 
 
One can identify certain similarities between this SSI approach, the emphasis on 
factor (input) and demand conditions  and related and supporting industries in the 
Porter diamond model (see figure 2.1). However, the SSI approach, in addition: 
 
[P]laces significant emphasis on the role of non-firm organisations such as 
universities, financial institutions, government, local authorities and of 
institutions and rules of the game such as standard, regulations, labor markets 
and so on. Non-firm organizations and institutions greatly differ across 
sectors and affect the innovative, and productive activities of firms (Malerba 
1999, pp5-6 – italics original author‘s). 
 
Here one can see the influence on the SSI approach of North‘s ideas (1990, 1994) 
from institutional economics, although the distinction between organisation and 
institution should be clearer (see section below on the need for conceptual and 
theoretical clarity in the SI approach). Malerba (1999, p29) argued that the SSI 
approach differs significantly from the transaction costs approach that North is 
generally associated with, but this thesis supports the view that North‘s contribution 
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spans the old and new institutional tradition, and is wider than the narrower TCE 
focus (see section 2.2).  
 
The main difference between the NSI and SSI approaches is essentially the focus on 
sectors, rather than on the technological capabilities of countries. Studies that focus 
on regional systems of innovation (RSI) that often involve an overlap with a sector, 
for example in the case of studies of industrial districts, are closer to the SSI 
approach (Malerba 1999, p30).   
 
Similarly studies that combine clusters analysis with a focus on RSI overlap with SSI 
in their movement away from the national level approach. Even in small countries 
there has been a shift in the spatial dimension of innovation systems approach from 
the original national level
18
 to the regional level (Giblin 2007, p44). In the context of 
this thesis, it is useful to briefly consider the regional approach and the role that 
clusters and cluster initiatives might play within it for two reasons. Firstly, clusters 
and cluster initiatives may be located in the different regions of Ireland. Secondly, 
from an economic perspective, Ireland as a small open economy member of the EU 
and the Euro zone, behaves in many respects as a region of the European Union.  
 
Cooke (2002) argued that a consensus has formed that accomplished regional 
economies tend to display the important common features of: agglomeration, 
institutional learning, associative governance, proximity capital, and interactive 
innovation. He pointed out that Krugman in a study of Ireland (Krugman 1997) 
itemised three advantages of agglomeration as follows: 
 
1. A concentration of producers supports local suppliers of specialised inputs, 
helping to generate external economies of scale. 
                                                 
18
 The concept ‗national‘ is pragmatically defined as those persons who are citizens of a sovereign 
state, but like many concepts in the social sciences, it is unclear and essentially contested (Cooke 
1997, p477). European examples of a less than definitive nature include Flanders and Wallonia in the 
case of Belgium, the ‗Basque Country‘ in the case of Spain, and Scotland and Wales in the case of the 
UK. The case of Ireland is also interesting. For example Northern Ireland, the nature of whose 
sovereignty has been a major political issue for generations, is in some aspects closer to the Republic 
of Ireland than to other areas of the United Kingdom e.g. population size, lower levels of traditional 
manufacturing, etc.   
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2. A localised skills pool benefiting workers and firms creates flexible labour 
market opportunities. 
3. Information spill-over is implied by agglomeration. 
 
In regional innovation, these translate into opportunities for lowering transaction 
costs by reducing uncertainty due to the possibilities for specialist, tacit knowledge 
exchange arising from the agglomeration (Cooke 2002, p135). This view follows 
North‘s norms, routines, ―rules of the game‖ and ―conventions‖ whereby certain 
practices are acceptable and promote trust in relationships among firms, also helping 
to reduce costs. Cooke emphasised that openness to learning good practice from 
others is of growing importance both via the ―learning organisation‖ or firm and via 
government agencies that ―learn by monitoring‖, with such learning being global as 
well as local. Under associative governance, government agencies should facilitate 
regional innovation by ‗letting go‘ of the function, or at least sharing this 
responsibility with legitimate private governance bodies such as business 
associations or chambers of commerce (Cooke 2002, p135)
19
.  
 
In addition, Cooke listed two forms of ‗proximity capital‘ important to regional 
development. The first is access to trustful ways of raising investment capital, not 
necessarily through banks but also through local entrepreneurs or ‗business angels‘, 
which is particularly important for SMEs. The second is intellectual capital, arising 
from investments in university and research institutes that flows to, and 
complements, the innovation capabilities of firms in proximity to these institutes. 
This second form of Cooke‘s ‗proximity capital‘ is more relevant to this thesis, 
although empirical evidence provided in the thesis suggests that drawing on 
intellectual capital that is not proximate or within the region can also be important. 
Cooke also pointed out that ‗interactive innovation‘20, a concept very much 
associated with the ―national systems of innovation‖ literature, is also relevant at 
regional level.   
 
                                                 
19
 These fit into my OFC categorisation outlined later in this chapter. 
20
 ‗The idea of benefits from interactive learning was inspired by a case where a Swedish dairy 
technology producer (Alfa Laval) kept an affiliate in Denmark making repeated losses year after year. 
Asking the management of Alf Laval why they did not close it down, they responded that they were 
willing to pay a price for being close to and learning from the most advanced dairy technology-users 
in the world.‘ (Lundvall, 2005, fn. 11, p7). 
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This ―new regional science‖ approach is obviously compatible with evolutionary 
economics
21
, with both approaches (a) envisaging innovation and learning processes 
involving knowledge transfer in a systemic interaction within political economies 
and (b) being concerned with questions of path dependency, development 
trajectories and the role of institutions and the way they evolve over time (Cooke 
2002, p136). According to Giblin (2007) who refers to Doloreux (2002), the 
dynamics of a regional innovation system are defined by social embeddedness 
involving networks of firms, which generate and diffuse knowledge,  interacting 
with public technology transfer and advisory agencies and R&D organisations
22
, 
such as universities and research institutes (Giblin 2007, pp46 -47).   
Systems of Innovation (SI)  need for conceptual and theoretical 
clarity  
 
Edquist (2001, 1997) criticised the SI approach for using concepts such as 
‗institution‘ and ‗organisation‘ in inconsistent ways, which led to lack of theoretical 
clarity. The review of North‘s contribution to institutional economic outlined in 
section 2.2 supports this distinction. North argued that institutions are the rules of the 
game, and organizations and entrepreneurs are the players who try to influence the 
outcome of the game (North 1990, 1994). Edquist also characterised certain key 
dimensions of the SI approach, which addressed this weakness of the SI approach:   
 
Maybe the most important one [dimension] was that innovations are 
normally seen as based on learning that is interactive between organisations 
in the SI approach; firms do not generally innovate in isolation (Edquist 
1997: [Ch]7, [pp]20-22). Another important feature is that institutions are 
considered to be crucial elements in all versions of the SI approach (Edquist 
1997: [pp] 24-26). The institutions shape (and are shaped by) the actions of 
the organisations and the relations between them (Edquist 2001, p2) 
                                                 
21
 The evolutionary economics approach is influenced by  institutional economics. For example, 
Nelson and Winters (1977, 1982), the first writers to develop a comprehensive evolutionary theory of 
economic growth, change and innovation, started in neoclassicism but moved in the direction of 
institutionalism (Samuels, 1995, p579).  
22
 Giblin referring to Doloreux (2002) mentions R&D ‗institutions‘ but following Edquist and 
Johnson (1997, pp46-47) they are more accurately described as R&D organisations.  
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He argued that theoretical development and sharpening of the SI approach required a 
greater degree of rigour and specificity, for example with regard to statements on 
relationships between variables. The best way of achieving this was to use the SI 
approach in empirical research and through applying theoretical constructs to 
empirical evidence to arrive at clearer concepts and unambiguous statements 
(Edquist 2001, p3).  
 
Further weaknesses of the SI approach were identified by Edquist (2001), who 
argued that the approach partly neglected other kinds of learning processes than 
those directly leading to innovation. This criticism applied to certain kinds of 
organisational learning, such as the building up of firm routines and databases. In 
addition, he argued that individual learning in the form of education was largely 
neglected in the SI approach: 
 
Another weakness of the SI approach is that it lacks a ‗theoretical‘ 
component about the role of the state. This is an important neglect, since the 
state and its agencies are obviously important determinants of innovation in 
any SI (Edquist 2001, p3). 
 
Edquist (2001) pointed to this lack of focus on important determinants of innovation 
as a general weakness of studies focused on innovation, not just of the SI approach. 
The roles of state agencies and business organisations for collaboration, and the 
relationships between the two, are important elements of the empirical analysis 
undertaken in this thesis. Edquist (2001, p7) also emphasised that different kinds of 
innovation can be expected to have different determinants and proposed a taxonomy 
of innovations (Figure 2.2).  These roles will be considered with reference to cluster 
initiatives focused on innovation (and competitiveness) in the Irish context, which fit 
into the organisational process stream of this categorization.   
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Figure 2.2: A taxonomy of innovation  
 
 
 
Source: Edquist 2001, p7. 
 
Definition and characteristics of organisations for collaboration 
(OFC) 
  
Porter and Emmons (2003, 2006a, 2006b) can also be criticised for a lack of 
theoretical clarity in their description of organisations such as industry associations 
and chambers of commerce as ‗institutions for collaboration‘ (IFC).  They did not 
provide a precise definition for an IFC, but instead stated that IFCs may be a matter 
of degree and listed various examples such as industry associations, technology 
transfer organizations and state agencies for export promotion as possibilities. 
 
In their writing on the SI approach, Edquist and Johnson (1997) clearly distinguished 
between institutions and organisations. They defined institutions as: 
 
Innovation 
Process 
Technological Organisational 
Product 
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[S]ets of common habits, routines, established practises, rules, or laws that 
regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups 
(Edquist and Johnson 1997, p46). 
 
 In a discussion of the main components of SIs, Edquist (2001, p5) provided two 
examples of important institutions in SIs (i) patent laws and (ii) norms influencing 
the relations between universities and firms. In contrast, they defined organisations 
as:  
 
[F]ormal structures with an explicit purpose, which are consciously created 
(Edquist and Johnson 1997, p47).  
 
Examples of organisations in the SI approach are ‗companies (which can be 
suppliers, customers or competitors in relation to other companies), universities, 
venture capital organisations and public innovation policy agencies‘ (Edquist 2001, 
p5).  
 
These definitions of institutions and organisations are influenced by North and the 
Old Institutionalism Economic (OIE) tradition. As outlined in Section 2.2, North 
(1990, p1) defined institutions as essentially ‗human devised constraints that shape 
human interactions‘, which is very compatible with the old or original institutional 
economist Veblen‘s definition of an institution as ‗a usage which has become 
axiomatic and indispensable by habituation and general acceptance‘ (Veblen, 1967, 
p101). So, essentially, institutions are the rules of the game and organizations and 
entrepreneurs are the players or actors who try to influence the outcome of the game 
(North, 1990, 1994). In this context, the work of the European Commission and 
Parliament or the US administration in establishing practices, rules and laws that 
regulate activity between different players in the market can be described as 
institutional. They do this in a whole range of areas, including those impacting on 
enterprise and innovation. Industry associations, chambers of commerce etc. that try 
to influence the practices, rules or laws in these areas are not institutions in this 
sense. They can be described, more accurately, as ‗organisations for collaboration‘ 
(OFCs) rather than ‗institutions‘. Many OFCs are private sector organisations, for 
example industry associations funded by their members. Some public sector 
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organisations, such as state development agencies, may at times take on or support 
the role of an OFC, although they are likely to have a much broader remit then 
collaboration ― for example, allocating state grants to industry. The following 
section outlines in detail the key characteristics of an OFC in the industry or business 
context.  
 
The first basic function of an OFC is to facilitate information flow and exchange, for 
example by improving access to information on regulatory changes at national and 
international level.  This type of activity can be important for industry development, 
particularly if the OFC not only passes on the information but also helps firms 
interpret and understand the impact that such regulatory changes will have on their 
businesses. In this way, OFCs can complement and support internal efforts by firms 
to improve competitiveness; by supporting regulations that reduce costs and increase 
productivity and opposing changes that do the opposite. This information 
dissemination and interpretation function has the potential to strengthen ties and 
build social capital bonds among firms. 
 
A second function of an OFC is to act as facilitator of interaction (a) between firms, 
large and small, within an industry and (b) between firms and other players in the 
economy, such as government. OFCs can also help build long term relationships 
between industry and the other stakeholders in the economy, improving 
communication with governments at national and international level, for example. 
While some of this interaction with governments might be of a traditional lobbying 
kind, for a modern business association it may also be of a more developmental long 
term nature.  
  
A third function that an OFC can perform is to enhance international connectivity for 
firms via linkages with OFCs in other countries and supranational OFCs ― for 
example within the European Union. In these situations the OFC is spanning the gap 
between knowledge available to its members at a national level and the knowledge 
available to industry at the supranational level. For example, the Irish government is 
likely to interact with Irish industry associations, whereas the EU Commission and 
Parliament tend to engage with European industry associations that, generally 
speaking, comprise the industry associations of different member states. By actively 
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participating in a European association, a national OFC is also exposed to the views 
of OFCs in other countries and to the views of EU Commission and Parliament. 
Engagement with these international organisations can include the participation of 
both OFC executives and firm executives, who are members of the national 
association. In addition to the interaction at formal committee and working group 
meetings, executives who participate in these initiatives also have the opportunity to 
build informal (weak) ties with their counterparts in organisations and firms in other 
countries. Therefore OFCs, which engage in this bridging social capital, build 
international linkages that can help senior executives in firms anticipate future 
developments in their industries that, in turn, can contribute to management 
capabilities to prepare appropriate strategies to enable firms to compete and grow. 
From the individual firm perspective Teece defines dynamic capabilities as ‗the 
firm‘s ability to learn to sense the need for change and then reconfigure internal and 
external competences to seize the opportunity created by rapidly changing 
environments‘ (Teece 2002, p157) . OFCs certainly can play a significant role in that 
regard. Involvement by firms in business and trade associations at national and 
international level can be an important means of building such dynamic capabilities, 
as firms are exposed to three elements that could impact substantially on their 
business: (i) the ideas, approaches and strategies of other firms, (ii) the development 
of policy by national and international government institutions, and (iii) changes in 
the regulatory environment and global market. OFCs that build linkages with OFCs 
in other countries are, therefore, likely to enhance the dynamic capabilities of the 
firms involved in them. 
 
Business OFCs, such as industry associations, can also engage in a range of other 
activities that support the development of their member firms. Sector specific OFCs 
can often communicate an industry message to the wider public via websites, print 
media, radio and television. Again, this has the potential to strengthen ties within an 
industry and build social capital bonds.   
 
Of course, social capital within OFCs is not automatically a positive thing for society 
in general and some industry associations may engage in protectionist type activity 
seeking to keep competitors out of their market. However, such an approach is short-
sighted and likely to restrict and hold back innovation and long term 
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competitiveness, rather than enhance and support it. OFCs that engage in any anti-
competitive activity such as price-fixing, or any activity of a cartel nature, are not 
only acting illegally but are doing nothing to improve the long term competitiveness 
of their member firms.  
 
OFCs might also fall into what Best (1999, p113) describes as ‗inter-firm networks‘ 
in his diagram on regional growth dynamics. OFCs are likely to fit into the related 
and supporting industry part of the Porter diamond, facilitating and enhancing the 
level of embeddedness of an industry in a location. The potential of OFCs to 
facilitate collaboration in cluster initiatives, focused on raising levels of 
competitiveness and innovation, will be explored in greater details in Chapters 5 and 
6 and is a key focus of the empirical work for this thesis.  
Section 2.5:  Collaboration within a new framework  
 
This chapter has reviewed literature in three different areas ― management strategy, 
institutional economics and systems of innovation. Giblin (2007, p50-51) correctly 
observed that industrial clusters (from the management strategy area) and regional 
innovation systems have both different and overlapping features. Regional 
innovation systems are likely, by their nature, to cover a number of different 
economic sectors.  Industry clusters can exist within a region with an innovation 
systems approach. Giblin argued that clusters focus on building competitive 
advantage via production chains, supply services and networking while the systems 
innovative approach focuses on building the technology, science and research base, 
and capacity of the region. However, this distinction between clusters and innovation 
systems is an over simplification. Recent cluster work in Europe has a much greater 
focus on innovation than in the past (Ketels and Sölvell 2006, Sölvell et al 2003). 
This thesis suggests that the overlap between the development of the cluster 
approach and the innovation systems approach is greater than suggested by Giblin 
and builds on the work begun by Sölvell et al (2003).  
 
Section 2.1 provided a review of the cluster diamond model developed by Porter 
(1990) and others and placed in the broader context of management strategy theories. 
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It highlighted some important limitations of the model for example in relation to the 
role of multinational corporations and the role of government in clusters. However, 
the idea of clusters remains influential in policy terms and writers in both the EU and 
the USA continue to build on the concept. One comprehensive study developed by 
Sölvell et al (2003) places greater emphasis on collaboration between various 
economic actors, defining ‗cluster initiatives‘ as: 
 
[An] organised effort to increase the growth and competitiveness of a cluster 
within a region, involving cluster firms, government and/or the research 
community (Sölvell et al 2003, p31). 
Figure 2.3: The Cluster Initiative Performance Model (CIPM) 
 
Source: (Sölvell et al 2003, Figure 16, p25) 
 
The institutional set-up is a core feature of this cluster initiative approach and in 
addition to the three sets of actors listed in their definition (firms, government and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
 Research and networking 
 Policy action 
 Commercial co-operation 
 Education and training 
 Innovation and technology 
 Cluster expansion 
Setting 
 
 Business Environment 
 Policy 
 Cluster Strength 
Performance 
 
 Competitiveness 
 Growth 
 Goal fulfilment 
Process 
 
 Initiation and planning 
 Governance and financing 
 Scope of membership 
 Resources and facilitators 
 Framework and consensus 
 Momentum 
62 
 
the research community), they identify a fourth actor involved in clusters - financial 
institutions. However, the focus is not only on competitiveness and the objectives set 
out in their clusters initiatives performance model (CIPM) (Figure 2.3) clearly also 
exhibit a strong focus on innovation and an emphasis on commercial cooperation. 
 
They presented data on 250 of these emerging forms of partnership in cluster 
initiatives (CIs) around the world. Based on a survey and a series of case studies, 
they argued that many of the cluster initiatives identified follow on from Porter‘s 
diamond model concept. The CIs identified were mainly in Europe, North America, 
New Zealand and Australia.  
 
Some of key findings of Sölvell et al  (2003, p10) were that: (i) cluster initiatives 
were most frequent in developed and transition economies tending to focus on 
technology intensive or ‗high-tech‘ areas such as information and communication 
technology (ICT), medical devices, biopharmaceuticals; (ii) however, ‗low-tech‘ 
clusters like furniture, processed food and textiles were also represented; and (iii) 
that cluster initiatives were present in a range of other areas including plastics, 
aerospace vehicles and engines, and financial and business services. 
 
Most of the initiatives analysed were relatively recent, with 72 percent of the CIs 
surveyed in 2003 initiated in 1999 or later. Most were in economies where science 
and innovation promotion is an important part of government policy and occur in 
clusters that are often of national importance and always of regional importance. Of 
the cluster initiatives surveyed, 32 percent were initiated by government, 27 percent 
by industry and 35 percent equally by government and industry. With regard to 
financing of cluster initiatives, in 54 percent of cases funding came from 
government, in 18 percent of cases from industry and in 25 percent of cases equally 
from both government and industry. Firms or companies were the most influential 
parties in the governance of the cluster initiatives. Only in rare cases did government 
initially pick the members of the cluster. In general, they tended to have a narrow 
geographical focus, with members within one-hour travel distance in 50 percent of 
cases. Finally, the cluster initiatives tended to have a broad membership and rarely 
excluded foreign owned companies, competitors or small companies from cluster 
involvement. In fact, Sölvell et al (2003, p11) found that cluster initiatives limited to 
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domestic companies performed worse. The national social, political and economic 
context within which CIs were implemented was important for performance, with 
key factors including:  
 
[A] high level of company trust in government initiatives and having 
influential local government decision makers, which are both clearly related 
to good CI performance.  
 
CIs that served strong clusters of national and regional importance were more 
successful than others. Furthermore, CIs that built a clear framework, based on the 
cluster‘s own strengths, and spent time sharing the framework with all the parties, 
were more successful in promoting competitiveness (Sölvell et al 2003, p12) 
 
Sölvell et al (2003, p17) also observed that cluster initiatives are emerging within 
three distinct policy areas: (i) regional, industry and SME policies, (ii) foreign direct 
investment (FDI) attraction policies, and (iii) science, research and innovation 
policies. Cluster initiatives were used to boost development of weaker regions. 
Initiatives were also undertaken to rejuvenate industry clusters, with emphasis 
shifting from cost reduction (via subsidies and tax incentives) towards promoting 
innovation and new partnerships. FDI policies have shifted from a focus on 
attracting individual firms to attracting industry clusters and more embedded 
investments. In the policy areas of research and innovation, the tendency has been to 
focus on science-driven industries such as ICT, medical devices, biopharmaceuticals 
etc.  
 
With a focus on collaboration, Sölvell et al (2003, p18) placed institutions for 
collaboration (IFCs) (Porter and Emmons, 2003) as a fifth actor at the centre of the 
interaction between the four actors involved in clusters i.e. companies, the research 
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community, government, and financial institutions
23
. However, in section 2.4 above, 
an alternative ―organisations for collaboration (OFCs)‖ is suggested, which is more 
robustly defined than the IFC.  
 
In order to better understand the role of collaboration in clusters and cluster 
initiatives this thesis explores institutional economics and the discussion in Section 
2.2 provides some important insights useful in considering how collaboration works. 
North (1990, 1994, 1997), who is normally associated with new institutional 
economics, was shown to have commonality with the old institutionalists as well. 
For example, North (1981) suggested opportunism is not simply overcome by the 
threat of being caught out in repeat plays, but that it can be partly overcome by a 
commitment to ideology and the support it can lend to legitimacy, loyalty and trust.  
 
There is also a link between the emphasis that North places on moral norms and the 
literature on social capital, where moral norms, particularly trust, underpin economic 
and social relations (Vandenberg 2002).  Embeddedness argues that social action is 
embedded in ongoing networks of social relations (Granovetter 1985). Social capital 
resulting from participation in embedded networks, involving significant levels of 
trust at both local and non-local level, can contribute significantly to the dynamic 
capabilities of the firm (Cooke 2007).  
 
The social capital concept was explored in some depth in section 2.3, with 
distinctions being made between ‗bonding and bridging‘ forms and ‗structural and 
cognitive‘ forms. These distinctions have proved particularly insightful in the 
analysis of the case studies presented in this thesis. Table 2.1 provides a list of the 
                                                 
23
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definitions of social capital covered in the discussion and that were important to 
consider in the context of this thesis. This review of the institutional economics 
tradition, with a particular emphasis on key concepts such as social capital, helped to 
build a research tool kit that is important in terms of adding depth to the empirical 
analysis of how collaboration works, undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
The focus on collaboration and social capital in clusters also led to a consideration of 
linkages with the systems of innovation approaches, at national, sectoral and regional 
level, in Section 2.4. A key concept of the innovation systems approach is 
‗interactive innovation‘ (Lundvall 2005). Here, social capital can be defined as ‗the 
willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments to each other, 
collaborate with each others and trust each other in processes of exchange and 
interactive learning‘ (Lundvall 2005, p10). There are also links between North‘s 
work and Lundvall‘s (2005) view of interactive innovation as outlined in Section 
2.3. Edquist (2001, 1997) criticized the SI approach for a lack of theoretical clarity, 
and for using the concept such as institution and organisation in inconsistent ways.  
 
A significant difference between the cluster approach and the systems of innovation 
approach is the emphasis placed on institutional economic factors.  To date, these 
have played a relatively peripheral role in the analysis of industrial clusters in 
contrast to their more central role in innovation systems. In later contributions, Porter 
(1998c, 2000) placed stronger emphasis on social relations between cluster 
participants, facilitated by trust and coordination that enhanced knowledge flows, but 
these were still described in relatively limited form in comparison to the innovation 
systems approach (Giblin, 2007, p51). It remains the case that the importance of 
institutional factors is not fully understood in research on industrial clusters and 
cluster initiatives. This thesis provides a stronger link between institutional 
economics and clusters than previously expounded, supporting complementarities 
between the cluster and innovation systems approaches. The call by Edquist (2001) 
for greater theoretical clarity combined with (i) the lack of a precise definition for the 
IFCs concept put forward by Porter and Emmons (2003, 2006) and (ii) the 
understanding of collaboration gained from the review of key concepts from 
institutional economics undertaken in section 2.2 and 2.3, enabled this thesis to 
define a more useful concept of organisations for collaboration (OFCs).  
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Figure 2.4: Clusters Initiatives & Collaboration - key concepts from 
3 sources 
 
Note:  Organisations for Collaboration (OFCs) included in the interface between the three disciplines, 
along with Cluster initiatives, replaces what Porter and Emmons (2003) describe as ‗Institutions for 
Collaboration (IFCs).  
 
Source: Author‘s diagram. 
 
This thesis also provides a new framework presented in Figure 2.4 using key 
concepts drawn from the three areas of literature reviewed in this chapter  
management strategy, institutional economics and systems innovation. Cluster 
initiatives focused on competitiveness and innovation involving collaboration  
Management   
Strategy 
Innovation 
Systems 
Institutional 
Economics 
 Cluster 
Initiatives 
 Organisations for 
collaboration 
(OFCs)  
 Embeddedness 
 Social capital  
 Moral norms 
and  trust.   
 Industrial clusters 
 Networking & 
collective learning 
 
 Interactive 
innovation  
 Learning firms  
 Proximity capital 
– intellectual  
 
 
67 
 
between different actors in the economy, such as firms, research communities and 
government agencies, are placed at the centre of this new framework.  
 
Organisations for collaboration (OFCs), also placed at the centre of this framework, 
are proposed as an alternative to Porter and Emmon‘s (2003, 2006) Institutions for 
Collaboration (IFCs). The OFC concept is theoretically grounded in institutional 
economics and better explains the contribution of industry associations, and other 
such business organisations, in helping the different actors in the economy to 
collaborate together within clusters. North‘s (1990, 1994) major contribution to 
economic theory was to explain the development of institutions; included among 
these were foreign exchange, banking and marine insurance. North (1990, 1994) also 
made an important distinction between institutions and organisations, describing the 
former as the ‗rules of the game‘ and the latter as ‗players‘, including firms, which 
try to influence these rules and the outcome of the game. In this context the work of 
the EU Commission and Parliament in agreeing directives and regulations impacting 
on the enterprise and innovation environment for EU member states, including 
Ireland, can be viewed as institutional in nature.  
 
In extending  economic theory, Williamson (2005) in his new institutional 
economics argued that the firm can be described not only in technological terms as a 
production function but also in organisational terms as a particular mode of 
governance among a number of alternative modes. In 2005, the integrated 
NEWGOV project
24
 under the EU‘s 6th Framework Programme produced a glossary 
of different modes of governance, under which ‗coordination‘ was described as a 
non-hierarchical mode of governance where actors accommodate behaviour in a 
process of communicative exchange – without being subject to binding legal 
obligations. OFCs, such as industry associations and business representative groups, 
are such an alternative non-hierarchical mode of governance. To a significant degree 
OFCs, using North‘s (1990, 1994) terminology, can be described as players that try 
to influence governments at national level and the EU Commission and Parliament 
in an EU context. OFCs also strengthen industry ties and build bridges to other 
actors in the economy.   
                                                 
24
  http://www.eu-newgov.org//public/NEWGOV_pub.asp, Glossary of shared terminology (M) 
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As well as being theoretically grounded in institutional economics, the OFC concept 
is consistent with the systems of innovation (SI) approach, particularly that of 
Edquist and Johnson (1997, pp46-47) who also clearly distinguished between 
institutions and organisations. They defined institutions as common sets of habits 
and routines that regulate interaction between individuals and groups, while 
organisations are structures with an explicit purpose, which are consciously created.  
 
Chapter 4 as part of setting out the Irish context for the thesis, will outline the 
evolution of OFCs in the business sector in Ireland. In their research Sölvell et al 
(2003) placed substantial emphasis on collaboration between various economic 
actors. In the application of the Sölvell et al (2003) cluster initiatives model in 
chapters 5 and 6, the OFC concept is used in preference to IFCs. This main empirical 
work will consider the role of organisations for collaboration (OFCs) in facilitating 
not only information flow, exchange and interaction among firms, both large and 
small, but also interaction between firms and other actors (or players) in the 
economy, such as government and state agencies. It will also illustrate that OFCs can 
enhance international connectivity by facilitating contact between industry and 
business associations at a national level and similar organisations, and their 
members, at a European or global level.  
Concluding comments 
 
The OECD has made some interesting observations in relation to public sector 
involvement in clusters that indicate a need for a deeper understanding of the role of 
collaboration. At the government level, evolutions in regional, science and 
technology and industrial/enterprise policies are converging on the objective of 
supporting linkages between firms, people and knowledge. One of the vehicles 
commonly used to achieve these goals is to support clusters involving concentration 
of firms and supporting actors (OECD 2007, p1).The following are listed by the 
OECD as some examples of such programmes: the Pôles de Compétitiveité in 
France, the Centres of Expertise in Finland, and Japan‘s Industrial Clusters.  
 
There is a need to develop robust tools, with strong analytic frameworks, to evaluate 
and measure both the performance of clusters or cluster initiatives and the impact of 
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particular public policy interventions. According to the OECD (2007, pp6-7), early 
learning indicates the following three factors that could contribute to a more robust 
analytical framework: (i) Cluster programmes need to be well designed, realistic and 
flexible enough to achieve their goals. (ii) Governments need to pay attention to 
policy coherence. Policy makers in one area (e.g. regional policy) need to understand 
policies in other related areas (science / technology and industrial/ enterprise 
policies) and how they can work together in a complementary fashion. (iii) The long 
term effectiveness of cluster initiatives depends on private sector involvement during 
a programme and continuing to act after a programme ends. In this regard, the 
OECD argues that the public sector needs to avoid excessive involvement and 
develop effective exit strategies. 
 
How to evaluate government intervention in establishing industry-led networks, 
some of which are linked to cluster initiatives, was considered by Lynch et al (2009) 
who proposed a logic model based on an analysis of inputs and outputs in a chain of 
cause and effect approach. This thesis takes a different, more qualitative, approach 
and will provide some Irish examples that could be added to the OECD list. 
 
The new framework presented in Figure 2.4 above suggests that, in terms of 
understanding cluster initiatives and collaboration, there is much to be gained from 
combining the insights of concepts from a number of different disciplines. It 
proposes that firms embedded in collaborative cluster relationships, involving 
significant levels of trust, can achieve benefits from social capital. These benefits 
include the opportunities to reduce costs, improve competitiveness and raise levels of 
innovation within firms and industries. Involvement in cluster initiatives and 
organisations for collaboration (OFCs) can enhance a firm‘s dynamic capabilities, 
enabling it to build strategies that anticipate, rather than react to, change. The social 
capital concept is used to add depth to the analysis of such ‗interactive innovation‘ 
involving business, government agencies and research institutes, including 
universities.  
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Chapter 3  Philosophical basis and Methodology of the thesis 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of improving systems of innovation in an Irish 
context. Despite evidence of a weak system of innovation (Mjøset 1992), efforts to 
build a stronger national system of innovation have been fragmented. A better 
understanding of collaboration within clusters and cluster initiatives, in both the 
modern and traditional sectors of the economy, can contribute to solving this 
problem. Organisations for Collaboration (OFCs), such as industry associations, 
have a particular contribution to make in this regard, which is not well understood. 
The three central research questions of the thesis are:  
(i) How can cluster initiatives contribute to embedding the Irish  ICT/software 
and dairy clusters in Ireland?  
(ii) How does the process of collaboration work within clusters and cluster 
initiatives? The thesis examines if the social capital concept can help in 
understanding this process.   
(iii) Why do firms, research institutes and state agencies engage in cluster 
initiatives? 
Section 3.1: Philosophical basis of thesis  
 
This thesis draws on two main disciplines –management strategy and economics, 
particularly institutional economics. The methodological and philosophical 
approaches of different disciplines fuel and contribute to a debate within business 
research. From a methodological perspective the debate might be distilled down into 
the question ‗what is the correct balance between quantitative and qualitative 
methods of analysis?‘ From a more fundamental philosophical perspective, questions 
of ontology (what is the form and nature of reality?) and epistemology (what is the 
relationship between what is being researched and the researcher?) arise. Karami et 
al (2006) carried out an analysis of preferences in 120-refereed articles published 
between 1991 and 2000 in twenty top management journals. They found that the 
debate has centred on the relative value of two fundamentally different and 
competing schools of thought or paradigms, positivism and phenomenology.  
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Positivism contends that sense perceptions are the basis of knowledge. It refers to a 
set of epistemological perspectives that advocate the scientific method as the best 
approach to understanding the processes by which physical and human events occur. 
The term is associated with the 18
th
 century British empiricists
25
, who established the 
academic foundations for economics, and with the 19
th
 century philosopher Comte, 
who is credited as a founding father of sociology. Phenomenology is essentially the 
study of lived experience and its emphasis is on the world as lived by a person, not 
the world or reality as something separate from the person (Laverty 2003). For the 
phenomenologist, sense perceptions go beyond what we can see and measure 
(Benton and Craib 2001, p83). Phenomenology is associated with the 20
th
 Century 
philosophers Husserl and Heidegger among others.  
 
Healy and Perry (2000, p118) identified different views by which researchers 
investigate the world; included among these is realism.  In both economics and 
management strategy, the dominant ontological perspective is realism. Realism is 
based on the notion that a reality is ―out there‖; it is an objective reality in the sense 
that it is assumed to exist independently of the language we use to describe it. Where 
economists and management strategists begin to diverge is in relation to 
epistemology i.e. how we come ‗to know‘ and what is the relationship between what 
is being researched and the researcher?  
 
The epistemological perspective of orthodox economics is the positivist doctrine
 
. 
One core principle of positivism is that to accept a knowledge claim as true then it 
must be capable of being shown to be true or false, by referring to and indeed testing 
actual or possible sources of evidence (Benton and Craib 2001, p15). Hume 
introduced an element of scepticism when he established that inductive inference – 
that the past acts as a reliable guide to the future – while useful, cannot be justified as 
a matter of logical necessity (Russell 1946, pp634-647).  Popper
26
 provided an 
important solution to Hume‘s problem of induction through his criterion of 
falsification that econometricians have adopted through the testing of ‗null 
                                                 
25
 The fundamental academic foundations for economics emerged from the philosophy of the 
eighteenth century, dominated by the British empiricists e.g.  Locke (1623-1704), Berkeley (1685-
1753) and Hume (1711-1776). 
26
 The Austrian philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994) was professor at the London School of Business 
from 1949 to 1969. 
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hypotheses‘ (Popper 1972).  Subsequently a new research style emerged27, one based 
in deductive methods, the falsification philosophy of Popper, and the multivariate 
statistical methods characteristic of econometrics (Rumelt et al 1991, p8). The logic 
of deductive reasoning is first to build a theory, then to test a specific hypothesis by 
reference to observations. This deductive process will at least indicate if the theory is 
valid or invalid.  
 
Modern orthodox economics can be criticised for an almost exclusive reliance on 
this formalistic-deductive framework. In contrast, this thesis adopts what might be 
described as a heterodox economic approach. ‗Heterodox economics‘ is an umbrella 
term for economics that extends beyond, and challenges, the neoclassical mainstream 
approach. It includes, but is not limited to, the approaches of old and new 
institutional economics discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
This thesis is also influenced by mainstream management strategy theories. 
Management strategists generally do not outline any philosophical underpinnings for 
their research. As a result, it is difficult to identify a clear philosophical orientation in 
much of this work. However, the prescriptive nature of much of this literature, and 
the substantive links between it and industrial economics, would suggest no 
fundamental contradiction between it and the choice of pragmatic realism as an 
approach for this thesis.   
A pragmatic realist philosophy of research  
 
From an ontological perspective, pragmatic realists are similar to positivists: both 
assume that reality is objective. But from an epistemological perspective, they 
diverge. Pragmatic realism, associated with Hilary Putnam and others, is a 
development of the philosophical tradition
28
 first established in America around the 
turn of the 19
th
 century by the classical pragmatists: Peirce, James and Dewey 
(Hookway 2010)
29
. A broadly empiricist approach to the study of inquiry is central 
                                                 
27
 Prior to the 1970s, academic management strategy research consisted mainly of clinical case 
studies of actual situations, with generalization sought through induction. This qualitative style of 
research continues to play an important role.  
28
 Richard Rorty has also extended pragmatism, but in a post-modernist direction. 
29
 This section draws on Christopher Hookway‘s comprehensive overview of Pragmatism presented in 
the Standford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 edition), which is available online.  
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to pragmatic realism developed by Putnam. In contrast to the positivist conception of 
verification as ―truth likeness‖, Putnam concluded that it is the interdependence 
between our conceptual abilities and our practical abilities that is at the heart of the 
verification of our beliefs (Putnam 1995, pp305-306). A theory is preferred if it 
solves our problem. This is different to the strictly positivist position on verification, 
where the researcher is seen as completely separate to what is being researched and 
attempts to prove theory as true from this strictly objective stance. This means that 
pragmatic realists do not need everything to be precisely measurable and objectively 
proven beyond doubt before choosing to accept a theory. They trust everyday beliefs 
until given a reason for doubting them, with  further discussion and investigation 
then helping to identify errors, correct these errors and arrive at more robust theories 
and beliefs.  
 
The key point here is that, for a pragmatic realist, the focus of epistemological 
inquiry is not on showing how we arrive at absolute certainty. Instead, we need to 
understand how we can arrive at methods of inquiry that contribute to making sense 
of imperfect information.  This is different to the neoclassical economic approach 
which assumes the existence of perfect information. When commenting on 
institutionalism in economics, Heiskala (2007, p256) referred to North‘s (1990) view 
that modern Western societies are as close to costless information as any known 
society has been but that:  
 
[E]ven in these societies, actors spend a great deal of time on acquiring 
information, and even then the result is far from the state of perfect 
information. What prevails instead is a chronic lack of information and its 
asymmetrical breakdown between different actors. …Enforcement costs, 
again, are costs of implementing norms. 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted that North (1990), while generally associated with new-
institutionalism, has significant commonality with the old tradition of 
institutionalism. Heiskala (2007, p258) points out that the work of the old economic 
institutionalism was partly based on American pragmatist philosophy and that:  
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In pragmatist institutionalism, institutions are seen as socially shared habits 
some of which are conscious, some tacit; there is a continuum of different 
institutions from explicitly and formally defined ones, with formal sanctions, 
to mere half-conscious or unconscious regularities in interaction, without 
other sanctions than the mere existence of the tradition.   
 
Having removed the positivist‘s necessity of proving the absolute truth of theories, 
pragmatic realists are free to incorporate unobservable concepts into theory
30
.  In 
contrast to positivists, pragmatic realists hold such concepts as being true without 
having to prove or comment on their veracity. In line with the pragmatic realist 
approach, analytical concepts such as embeddedness and social capital, which has 
significant intangible elements, are incorporated into this thesis. This thesis provides 
evidence of the usefulness of these intangible concepts in understanding 
collaboration within cluster initiatives, which involve different economic actors. 
Pragmatic realism is well suited to addressing the problem of how and why firms, 
research institutes and state organisations collaborate in addressing challenges of 
innovation. Pragmatic realism has also been used as a philosophical basis for public 
administration and policy (Hildebrand 2005, Shields 2003), which supports it as a 
philosophical basis for this thesis, given the focus on policy issues around clusters 
and cluster initiatives.  
 
Therefore, the aim for pragmatic realists is to solve problems and to do so by 
adopting a range of different quantitative and qualitative research methods. The 
choice of method will depend on the nature of the problem to be solved or the 
question to be addressed.  It will take on board the unique and general characteristics 
of the problem.   Pragmatic realists include, among their tools, qualitative methods 
involving an element of interpretation by the researcher, but interpretation 
undertaken from a broadly empiricist perspective rather than, for example, a more 
phenomenological based perspective.  Conclusions reached will still be based on 
evidence provided and generally accepted beliefs established through the experience 
                                                 
30
 Positivists do not have a problem with the use of unobservable concepts in theories but unlike the 
pragmatic realist do not agree that one can confer truth status on them.   
75 
 
of actions in the past
31
. Finally, while pragmatic realism is used as a philosophical 
guide, the main contribution of the thesis is at the level of content. The following 
section will outline the methodology used in this thesis.  
Section 3.2: Methodology of thesis  
 
A pragmatic realist researcher may choose quantitative, qualitative or some 
combination of these two methodologies
32
. The selection criterion will be how useful 
is the methodology in solving the problem posed.  
 
While multiple strategies can be used in research studies, there are also situations in 
which a specific strategy has a distinct advantage. For the case study, this is when 
‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions are being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the researcher has little or no control (Yin 2003a, p9). Consequently case 
study research continues to be an essential form of social science inquiry. Yin 
(2003b, pxvii) outlines that the method is appropriate when the researcher desires, or 
is forced by circumstances, to: (i) define research topics broadly and not narrowly, 
(ii) cover contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated 
variables, and (iii) rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence. One reason 
for qualitative research is to study a case when is it of special interest  in order to 
gain a greater understanding of the case.  
 
We want to appreciate the uniqueness and complexity of the case, its 
embeddedness and interaction with its context (Stake 1995, p16). 
 
This thesis addresses the process of collaboration within clusters and cluster 
initiatives, involving different economic actors, in the Irish economy.  It provides 
evidence that such initiatives can support the embedding of clusters and help build 
systems of innovation. The thesis also considers the contribution that Organisation 
                                                 
31
 This is in contrast to a constructivist view that adopts an instrumentalist approach to knowledge and 
argues that one view of the world is as valid as any other. 
32
 It is important to note that a researcher‘s epistemological approach does not necessarily determine 
the methodology s/he may use. Quantitative methods are generally associated with positivists, who 
accept the notion that reality is adequately described by stable, general laws. However, researchers far 
removed from such a premise may also use quantitative methods.  
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for Collaboration (OFCs), such as industry associations, can make to achieving these 
goals. Staber (2007) argued that situational context is important in understanding the 
complex area of collaboration, involving intangible concepts such as social capital, 
in cluster analysis. This thesis asks ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions about a contemporary 
set of events in Ireland around the development of clusters and cluster initiatives 
involving collaboration between firms, government, including state agencies, and 
universities. Yin emphasised that:  
 
[R]eliance on theoretical concepts to guide the design and data collection for 
case studies remains one of the most important strategies for completing 
successful case studies (Yin 2003b, p.3).  
 
Consequently, this thesis used a case study methodology guided by the theoretical 
framework developed following the literature review undertaken in Chapter 2. This 
framework included intangible concepts such as social capital and interactive 
learning in systems of innovation. Because of their nature, it is difficult to show how 
these concepts emerge and develop over time using quantitative techniques. The 
qualitative methodological approach of this thesis fits into what Yin (2003b, p.13) 
describes as a replication design and logic, whereby the overall investigation is 
focused on determining whether similar frameworks and causal events within each 
case produce positive outcomes. Influential international studies on clusters and 
cluster initiatives, such as those by Porter (1990, 2003), Sölvell et al (2003), and 
Ketels (2006), also use qualitative techniques, specifically case studies. 
 
The author could be viewed as an insider researcher with a contextual understanding 
of the clusters and cluster initiatives explored in the thesis. He is currently head of a 
policy unit of a national OFC, IBEC, and in this capacity has collaborated with 
various sector based organisations for collaboration (OFCs), including ICT Ireland 
and the ISA, which formed part of the analysis of Chapter 5. He was executive 
director of the sector based OFC the Irish Dairy Industry Association, between 1994 
and 2004, which formed part of the analysis in Chapter 6. The author has also 
actively participated in various committees and working groups of a number of 
European OFCs and has been involved in building social capital bridges between 
European and international OFCs.   
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The position as an insider researcher raises questions as to whether the author had 
preconceptions of the process he was investigating and whether this might have led 
to some personal biases. However, the author was not close to the specific initiatives 
being investigated and he was not directly involved in any of the cluster initiatives 
covered in the various case studies
33
. Therefore, he understood the context of 
initiatives and knew some of the people involved but was not a participant himself. 
The author also analysed collaboration through the lens of a framework built around 
academic literature, of which he was unaware  prior to his research for this thesis. 
This enabled him to take a fresh approach to how he viewed collaboration. The 
guidance and challenges presented by his academic supervisors for the thesis also 
mitigated against any unconscious tendency towards personal biases.  
 
Substantial information was gathered, and analysed, from a range of sources 
including government, company, industry organisations and state agencies. CSO 
statistical data on the national accounts, industrial production and trade were useful 
for analysis of the national economy and the different sectors covered in the thesis. 
The evolution of state agencies presented in Chapter 4 was complemented by an 
analysis of the relevant statutory instruments establishing the various agencies 
between 1950 and 2003.  
Outline and methodology of the case studies  
 
Chapter 5 examines the stage of cluster development in the ICT/software sector and 
includes five case studies focused on collaboration within clusters and cluster 
initiatives. Case study 1 examines the role of industry OFCs in building social bonds 
in the ICT/ software sector of the Irish economy. Case 2 examines the role of OFCs 
in building social capital bridges between ICT/ software firms and other actors in the 
economy, including government, state agencies and the broader business community. 
Case studies 3 and 4 examine collaboration involving universities and high 
technology firms within cluster initiatives, supported by the state agencies  SFI, 
IDA and Enterprise Ireland.  Case study 5 examines a cluster initiative involving an 
                                                 
33
 As Director of the IDIA, the author did facilitate and participate in the functional foods mission to 
Japan referred to in case study 6, but had left this position by the time the national functional foods 
forum was formed in 2004 and had no involved in the subsequent establishment of FHI cluster 
initiative.  
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industry OFC, a state agency and a leading international university. Tables 3.1 
provides the code used to identify different interviewees and a description of 
individuals interviewed for the 5 case studies included in Chapter 5. 
Table 3.1: List of interviewees for the 5 case studies in Chapter 5 
 
Interviewee 5A: 
  
Executive director of the organizations for collaboration for the 
ICT and ISA sectors and member of a number of collaborative 
groups involving industry and state participants. 
 
Interviewee 5B: Senior manager of ICT multinational, Chair of ICT Ireland (organization for collaboration) working group and industry representative on Customs Consultative Committee established by government  
 
Senior man ger of ICT multinational, Chair of ICT Ireland 
(organisation for collaboration) working group and industry 
representative on Customs Consultative Committee established 
by government. 
 
Interviewee 5C: Senior civil servant of Irish government department, chair of a 
number of collaborative groups and task forces involving 
industry and state participants. 
 
Interviewee 5D: Leading Irish software entrepreneur, founder of software SME 
and chair of CSET initiative. 
 
Interviewee 5E: University Professor and Deputy Director of CSET initiative. 
 
Interviewee 5F: Senior manager for human resource development in a state 
agency deeply involved in design of cluster initiative. 
 
Interviewee 5G: CEO of software company and chair of industry organization for 
collaboration (OFC); deeply involved in design of cluster 
initiative and firm level participant in the initiative.   
 
Interviewee 5H: CEO of company, with substantial international experience, and 
Irish mentor for group of CEO participants in the programme 
under the cluster initiative. 
 
Interviewee 5I: Leading Irish software entrepreneur, founder of software SME 
and Irish mentor for group of CEO participants in the 
programme under the cluster initiative. 
 
 
Source: Author‘s table 
 
 
Chapter 6 examines the stage of cluster development in the traditional dairy sector of 
the Irish economy and includes a case study (number 6 of the thesis) examining 
collaboration within a cluster initiative, involving four Irish cooperatives/ 
companies, four universities and a state agency. Table 3.2 provides a code and 
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description for the individuals interviewed for the cluster analysis and case study of 
Chapter 6. As less cluster research has been carried out in the dairy sector than in the 
high technology sector, the cluster analysis was strengthened by interviews 6A and 
6B.  The cluster initiative examined in case study 6 is a relatively new development 
for the traditional economy and its analysis is supported by interviews 6C to 6H.  
Table 3.2: List of interviewees for cluster research and case study in 
Chapter 6  
 
Interviewee 6A: Managing Director of consumer foods and growth strategy 
division of major Irish cooperative. 
 
Interviewee 6B: Board member / former Managing Director of infant formula / 
baby food company.   
 
Interviewee 6C: Senior manager in state agency with responsibility for the 
development of the food and beverages sector. 
 
Interviewee 6D: Director of state agency with responsibility for development of 
the food and beverages sector. 
 
Interviewee 6E: Senior commercial and research manager in dairy cooperative / 
company and board member of cluster initiative. 
 
Interviewee 6F: Senior commercial and research manager in dairy cooperative / 
company and board member of cluster initiative. 
 
Interviewee 6G: Professor of food microbiology at major university, with 
extensive food research experience, who was deeply involved in 
establishing cluster initiative. 
 
Interviewee 6H: CEO of cluster initiative and former director of international 
food company. 
 
Source: Author‘s table 
 
The author leveraged off his own social capital in approaching and gaining access to 
high-level civil servants, state agency and business executives, and entrepreneurs 
interviewed for the thesis. Each interview was digitally recorded and then 
transcribed, mainly by the author of the thesis, which facilitated a deep level of 
analysis and interpretation guided by the theoretical concepts referred to earlier.  
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Interviews were between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours in duration, most were conducted 
face to face. However, some interviews were conducted by telephone due to the 
travel schedules of individuals being interviewed. Each interviewee was informed, at 
the outset, that the purpose of the interview was to contribute to analysis for a PhD 
thesis and that transcripts would be destroyed after the research had been completed.  
 
Interviewees were also assured that a code would be used for quotes from interviews, 
included in the thesis, to protect the identity of individuals. Each individual was also 
informed that the interview could be stopped at any time, if they felt uncomfortable 
with the line of questioning or if they wished to withdraw from answering particular 
questions. In one situation, an interviewee did ask for the recording to be paused in 
to consider a particular question. After a brief discussion to explain the context, the 
interviewee freely agreed to answer the question and the recording resumed.   
Concluding comments  
 
Government reviews and reports, including those produced by Forfás and various 
government departments, in the areas of innovation, science and technology and 
food research were used to strengthen the thesis analysis. State agency documents 
relating to various cases studies were examined and website material relating to these 
cluster initiatives was also explored. The websites and annual reports of a number of 
companies involved in the clusters and cluster initiatives provided useful information 
for various parts of the analysis. Leveraging off his own social capital, the author 
also gained access to unpublished minutes of meetings of cluster initiatives involving 
government and industry. EU Commission websites provided access to useful data 
and reports on the cluster issues being examined. The European Cluster Observatory 
and Oxford Research AS websites were very useful for information and country 
reports relating to cluster development.  These various sources of information were 
complemented by detailed interviews with senior management and directors of 
organisations for collaboration, companies and state agencies involved in the clusters 
and cluster initiatives being studied, as outlined in tables 3.1 and 3.2 above. Chapter 
4 will outline the empirical setting and Irish context of the thesis.  
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Chapter 4 The Irish Context state agency and business 
organisation evolution 
 
Chapter 2 developed a new framework to analyse collaboration within clusters and 
cluster initiatives focused on competitiveness and innovation. Staber (2007) argued 
that situational context is important in understanding social capital in cluster 
analysis. The empirical setting for this thesis is Ireland; hence the chapter begins 
with a brief overview of Irish economic development with reference to some key 
institutional factors. Brief comment is also made on cluster policy and the historical 
weakness of the system of innovation in Ireland. Field (2008) argued that social 
capital can be termed capital insofar as it gives rise to resources that can be deployed 
to enable actors to pursue their goals more effectively than they could without it. The 
core meaning of capital is that it represents a stock of assets that yield a flow of 
benefits; Krishna and Uphoff (1999, p6) proposed that the revenue flow from social 
capital is mutually beneficial collective action (MBCA) that produces positive-sum 
outcomes. The stock of social capital in an economy includes state organisations and 
business associations that engage with each other in the creation of such a revenue 
flow.  With a view to setting the scene for the main empirical work of the thesis, this 
chapter explores the evolution of state agencies focused on industrial development 
and business organisations for collaboration, as examples of the stock of potential 
social capital assets in the Irish economy.  
Section 4.1: Irish Economic Development – institutional factors  
 
Like all small open economies, Ireland is extremely dependent on international trade. 
In 2010 exports of goods and services accounted for 102.9 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) or 126.9 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), which 
adjusts for net factor income from abroad
34
 (CSO 2011a). However, the ability to 
trade for any economy should not be taken for granted. Behind these figures lies the 
transformation of Ireland, over the last 50 years, from an economy based on 
                                                 
34
 Given the high levels of foreign investment by multinational corporations in the Irish economy it is 
important to adjust for net factor income from abroad for comparison with GDP of other countries, 
where FDI is a lower proportion of the overall economy.  
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agriculture and a limited traditional manufacturing sector to a much more broadly 
based economy. Today, Ireland has strong economic bases in areas such as 
pharmaceutical, health and life science manufacturing and internationally traded 
services, including computer related services. This transformation is inherently 
linked to a number of institutional changes that effectively changed the rules of the 
economic game in Ireland.  
The impact of institutional economic change on Ireland  
 
Perhaps the most important factor in economic, political and social change in the 
history of the Irish state was Ireland‘s decision to become a member of the European 
Union.  Ireland became a member state of the EEC (the forerunner of the EU) in 
1973, after spending a period of more than ten years preparing for membership in 
parallel with its major trading partner at that time, the UK
35
. Embracing the 
institutional changes that EU membership entailed meant that Irish governments 
were no longer solely responsible for setting the rules of the game, either politically 
or economically. In many areas such as agricultural and industrial development the 
Irish government now had to negotiate with fellow member states and the EU 
Commission to agree rules, regulations and legislation. Social changes resulting 
from EU membership also had economic impact. For example, EU equality 
legislation meant that the so-called ‗marriage bar‘, whereby women had to leave 
public sector employment after marriage, could no longer be used in Ireland. While 
it took over a decade for the impact of this change to be seen from the late 1980s, 
there was a very significant rise in married women‘s participation in the labour 
market (Russell 2002, p94), which made a significant contribution to economic 
growth during the Celtic tiger period.  
 
In many respects Ireland can be viewed as a regional economy located on the 
periphery of the EU. There is, from an institutional economic perspective, also 
evidence of a long term Irish commitment to the EU. For example, Ireland supported 
the development of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) during the 1990s and was 
one of the most enthusiastic adopters of the EU single currency – the euro – from 
                                                 
35
 During the period of preparation for EEC membership, one significant development in terms of 
industrial policy was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement by the UK and Irish 
governments in 1966. 
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January 1999. This was despite the fact that Ireland‘s nearest neighbour, and still one 
of its most important trading partners, chose to remain outside the euro system. In 
addition to the implications for trade of adopting the euro, it also meant that the Irish 
government relinquished unilateral control over monetary policy, for example in the 
setting of interest rates.  Authority to set interest rates passed to the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in 1998. In a very real sense, this makes industrial development policy 
even more important because some short term instruments, such as devaluation of 
the currency to stimulate exports in times of recession, are no longer available as 
policy options. Longer term policy instruments that support Irish industrial activity 
in emerging sectors such as medical devices, software and internationally traded 
services, therefore, take on a greater significance to support the continued growth of 
exports. Industrial policy instruments can also support developments within more 
traditional sectors. They can, for example, support a shift towards the production of 
more innovative value-added products in the food sector, which helps to reduce 
dependence on commodity type products. Of course, EU membership also imposed 
limits on national state interventions to support industries and firms. Nevertheless, 
the potential of industrial policy deserves more focus and chapters 5 and 6 will 
examine support for the development of clusters and systems of innovation in the 
Irish economy.   
 
A second important institutional economic development that impacted on Ireland 
was movement towards a single EU market. Progress towards this objective was 
accelerated in 1993 with the increased free movement of goods and some services 
across internal EU frontiers. While increasing competition on the domestic market, it 
opened up opportunities across Europe for indigenous firms and multinationals that 
had chosen Ireland as their European base. The single market benefited EU 
consumers through access to a greater range of more competitively priced goods. 
Consumers also had increased access to competing providers in a range of services 
including utilities, such as telecoms, electricity and gas, although state support for 
national utility companies resulted in a slower pace of change here than on the goods 
side. Consumers also gained from the liberalisation of services such as air transport 
(European Commission 2005, p3.), in which the Irish airline Ryanair played a major 
role. Further liberalisation of trade in services continued in Ireland and other EU 
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members, with the transposition into legislation of the EU Services directive in 
2010
36
.  
 
A third institutional development that had an impact during the ‗Celtic Tiger‘ period 
was the emergence of ‗social partnership‘ in Ireland. This involved agreements 
between government, business employers and trade unions, under which Irish 
economic competitiveness improved markedly. Some key features of this social 
partnership were agreements on wage restraint coupled with tax reductions and a 
substantial improvement in industrial relations. There were seven ‗social partnership‘ 
agreements beginning with the Programme for National Recovery (1988-90) through 
to Towards 2016 (2006-2007). The contribution that these agreements made to 
Ireland‘s success during that period of rapid development can be debated. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Mjøset (1992) carried out a study for the National Economic 
and Social Council (NESC) that, from an institutional perspective, compared Irish 
economic development with that of a number of similar sized countries  including 
Denmark and Finland. He argued that consensus alone was not sufficient to turn Irish 
development on to a virtuous circle. He suggested a focus on inter-relationships 
between broader institutional arrangements and the development of a ‗national 
system of innovation‘, which in turn would require the development of important 
clusters of firms (Mjøset 1992, p16). It has been argued that social partnership was a 
vital ingredient that became part of the fabric of Ireland‘s political, economic and 
social life (Hastings et al 2007).  
 
Certainly from the late 1980s, when social partnership first became a feature in 
Ireland, economic progress markedly improved for a prolonged period. In fact over 
the 16 year period 1987-2003, growth of real GNP per person in Ireland averaged 5.5 
percent per year; this was easily the highest in Europe during that period and was 
more than twice that achieved in most other European economies (Crafts 2009, p71). 
                                                 
 
36
 At the beginning of 2010, eleven member states (Denmark, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) had adopted 
legislation incorporating the services directive into national law. Eight others (Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Portugal) planned to finalise the national 
transposition process by the end of the first half of 2010. (Bulletin Quotidian Europe No. 10050, 7 
January, 2010, p6). 
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But the success of this period of economic growth cannot be attributed to any single 
factor, such as social partnership. Similarly economic success cannot be attributed 
solely to the more open stance of industrial policy from the late 1950s. In fact the 
road to the economic success experienced by Ireland during the 1990s was long and 
difficult.  For example the period 1950 to 1973, while being a ‗golden age‘ of 
European economic growth, was one of growth failure for Ireland. Ireland sank to 
the bottom of the west European league in terms of the level of real GDP per person; 
the period to the mid-1980s was also challenging, with Ireland still at the bottom of 
the European income-levels league in 1987 (Crafts 2009, p64). This was despite the 
fact that from the 1960s, the Irish government had adopted a strategy of export led 
growth (ELG) to encourage FDI and remove the protection of manufacturing sectors 
that had been a feature of the import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) of the 1930-
1950 period (Jacobson et al. 2001, p6).  Therefore, Ireland‘s more outward looking 
policies while contributing to growth cannot be the full explanation for the higher 
income levels achieved during the 1990s.  
 
In reality, Irish economic success during the Celtic tiger period was due to a 
combination of factors coming together, influenced by the institutional changes 
outlined above.  The remarkable economic growth of the 1990s resulted when 
Ireland‘s outward looking policy stance was combined with the ‗social partnership‘ 
agreements and a number of other factors: (i) The growth of FDI flows into Ireland, 
particularly from the US multinationals, as the single market finally emerged in the 
EU in 1993 was a key contributor to growth. (ii) A general upturn in international 
markets and global economic growth, helped by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Uruguay Agreement in 1994, provided substantial trading opportunities for 
Ireland. (iii) A ready supply of labour was provided by higher female participation 
rates in the labour market and net immigration, as more people stayed in Ireland and 
people who had previously left returned to avail of opportunities at home
37
.  
 
                                                 
37
 The high levels of foreign immigration during the early to mid-2000s were significantly linked to 
the unsustainable construction boom of that period, which ultimately led to a property bubble crash 
and the associated banking crisis. Therefore, foreign immigration is not included here as a major 
contributor to economic growth during the Celtic tiger period.  
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Therefore, these combined institutional factors contributed significantly to economic 
development. From the mid 1990s Ireland was seen as one of the most attractive 
locations in the world to do business, ranked 10
th
 out of 82 countries in terms of 
favourable business environment in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007). 
Ireland was also ranked as having the 5
th
 least restrictive product market regulation 
in the OECD (2006) and was ranked 2
nd
 out of 41 countries in the European region 
in the 2007 index of economic freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and 
the Wall Street Journal
38
.  
 
However, by the late 2000s, Ireland once again faced huge economic challenges 
exacerbated by poor policy choices. Direct tax reductions introduced in the latter 
years of the Celtic tiger period, while politically expedient, proved to be 
inappropriate. Support for the construction sector fuelled a property boom. An 
overemphasis on consensus resulted in a lack of critical analysis that contributed to 
the less than rigorous regulation of the financial sector (Regling and Watson, 2010). 
These factors combined to deepen the impact of the global recession, leading to a 
rapid increase in Irish national debt as the government struggled to deal with a 
property bubble crash and manage an associated banking crisis. Irish growth rates 
plummeted to negative figures and the government introduced a series of austerity 
measures including increased taxes and expenditure cuts. At the end of 2010 the 
government agreed a financial loan programme under which Ireland could borrow 
from the EU (€45bn) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF- €22.5bn)39. 
Austerity measures are likely to continue during the first half of the 2010s as Ireland 
struggles to reduce the ratio of budget deficit to GDP. At 32 percent, the ratio for 
2010 was almost eleven times the 3 percent level defined under the EU‘s stability 
and growth pact. The rescue package agreed for Ireland, which was partly driven by 
the EU desire to protect the Euro, emphasizes the regional aspect of the economy 
and will lead to further EU involvement in Irish economic affairs. 
                                                 
38
 In the 2011 index of economic freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal, Ireland had slipped to 7
th
 place, available at http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
39
 The annual average interest rate on the loan facility was set at 5.8 percent and, as part of the 
package; Ireland would be subject to quarterly reviews by the EU, IMF and ECB officials. The 
appropriateness of  the  interest rate became an issue of considerable debate between the troika and a 
new Irish government, which came to power in 2011. 
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The changing nature of Irish trade  
 
Despite these severe economic challenges, Ireland‘s export sector proved to be very 
resilient. Irish exports of goods and services grew by over 9.4 percent in 2010, 
supported by a better than expected recovery in export markets, favourable exchange 
rates with sterling and the US dollar and improved competitiveness (CSO 2011a).  
 
The change in focus of economic policy, EU membership and the advent of the EU 
single market, and the WTO free trade agreement all impacted on Irish trade over the 
last 50 years. In the 1950s, agricultural exports to the UK were still the predominant 
source of Ireland‘s foreign earnings, which were affected by unfavourable British 
pricing policies, and manufactured goods were only 6 percent of total exports 
(Whitaker 2009, p20-21). As a result of significant industrial development, 
supported by Ireland‘s membership of the EU, dependence on the UK declined while 
trade with other members of the EU and the USA increased. In 2009
40
, the UK 
accounted for 16 percent of exports of goods, EU members of the euro-zone for 42 
percent and the US for 21 percent (CSO 2010a). CSO figures for 2009 on exports of 
services provide evidence of a similar pattern, with the UK accounting for 20 
percent, EU members of the euro-zone for 37 percent and the US for 6 percent (CSO 
2010b).   
 
By the late 2000s, Ireland had a much higher share of total manufacturing in high-
technology sectors (17.6 percent) than EU countries on average (EU-25 6.4 percent), 
which have a greater concentration in medium-high and medium-low technology 
(LMT) sectors (Heanue and Jacobson 2008, p120).  The substantial Irish high-tech 
exports are accounted for by a small number of sectors dominating Irish merchandise 
trade. Chemical, pharmaceuticals and related products account for over 55 percent of 
goods exported and machinery and transport equipment, the majority of which is 
information and computer equipment, accounts for 16 percent of exports (CSO 
                                                 
40
 Detailed trade figures here, and in the remainder of this section, refer to 2009 because at the time of 
writing this was the most recent year for which a full market share and sector breakdown was 
available for exports of both goods and services. Published detailed trade statistics on services exports 
are nearly a full year behind those for goods. 
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2010a). Both of these sectors have attracted a substantial amount of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Ireland, particularly from the US.  
 
The largest indigenous sector of the Irish economy on the merchandise goods side is 
the food and drink sector, which accounts for just less than 10 percent of exports. In 
the food sector, in particular, a number of Irish multinationals have emerged to 
support employment and drive growth. Furthermore, the relatively low import 
component content of food exports relative to other sectors means that the sector‘s 
share of total exports underestimates the net contribution of the sector to Irish 
economy. Other significant industrial manufacturing sectors of Irish economy 
include building materials and concrete manufacture, plastics, and corrugated 
products,  
 
Over the last decade internationally traded services have become increasingly 
important in terms of economic development in Ireland. But international services 
are not as well defined or understood in economic development terms as industrial 
manufacturing. The value of Irish exports of services increased from €21.7 billion in 
2000 to €66.6 billion in 2009; services now account for 45 percent of the total value 
of Irish exports (IBEC 2009). In 2009 computer related services, including software 
exports, accounted for 36 percent of total service exports, financial and insurance 
services accounted for 20 percent, and other business services account for 31 percent 
(CSO 2010b).  
 
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 will focus on the development of the ICT and 
software sector and will comment on how it shifted its focus from assembly of 
computer components towards high-technology manufacturing and traded services. 
Chapter 6 will look at the development of a core subsector, the dairy industry, of the 
indigenous Irish food sector. It will highlight a focus on developing more innovative 
value-added products and reducing dependence on commodity type trading. Both 
empirical chapters will also examine the role of cluster initiatives, involving 
collaboration (between firms, the research community and government), and the 
development of systems of innovation approaches in these sectors. The following 
section will look at the development of cluster policy and comment on the 
historically weak system of innovation in Ireland.  
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Section 4.2: The industrial cluster concept and a weak system of 
innovation in Ireland 
 
Cluster policy in Ireland  
 
In Ireland, interest in the concept of clusters dates back to the early1990s when 
discussion around policy focused on the proposition that successful industrial 
performance required the development of competitive advantage in clusters of 
interlinked industries or sectors (Clancy et al 2001). The debate began in 1992 with 
the ‗Culliton Report‘, which published the findings of a review group established by 
the Irish government. The report concluded that the identification of areas in which 
to build industrial clusters should be an important element guiding interventions by 
state agencies (Culliton 1992). The views expressed in the Culliton Report were 
heavily influenced by Porter‘s (1990) book where the cluster concept was introduced 
in the context of national competitiveness (Doyle and Fanning 2007, p268). Since 
then the concept of clusters, and more recently the role of business networks, have 
been widely used by Irish policy makers (Forfas 2008).  
 
Several cluster-based studies were carried out in Ireland as international interest in 
cluster policy was intensified (Doyle and Fanning 2007, p275). O‘Donnellan (1994) 
examined the extent of clustering in Irish manufacturing and found some evidence of 
clustering in the food and printing industries. But he argued that there was little 
association between clustering and performance. In 1997, a group of cluster studies 
was commissioned by the NESC. These examined in detail the extent to which 
competitiveness achieved in a number of sectors could be explained by the presence 
of clusters of related or connected industries. Two of these sector studies, on which 
separate research papers were published, were
41
: 
 
1. The indigenous software industry, a sector influenced by the presence of 
multi-national foreign investment in Ireland (O‘Gorman et al 1997), 
                                                 
41
 A third study looked at the music industry, as an example of the internationally traded service 
sector (Clancy et al 2001).  
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2. The Irish dairy industry sector, an indigenous traditional manufacturing 
sector (O‘Connell et al 1997).  
 
The first of these sector studies will be commented on further in Chapter 5, which 
focuses on clusters and collaboration within cluster initiatives in the ICT and 
software sector. The second study will form part of the analysis of cluster 
development in the traditional dairy sector of the Irish economy in Chapter 6.  
 
A decade after the 1997 NESC studies, Forfás, the state agency that provides policy 
advice to the government, argued that Ireland can be characterised as having both a 
policy push and bottom-up approach to cluster formation. Forfás identified three 
major areas containing cluster groupings in Ireland: (i) Biotechnology and 
Pharmachemicals, (ii) Information and Communications Technology (ICT) including 
software and (iii) Internationally Traded Services (Forfás 2008). The authors of the 
report maintained that a number of clusters had developed as a result of Ireland‘s 
successful foreign direct investment (FDI) policies. Such a central role for foreign 
direct investment runs counter to the concept of clusters developed by Porter (1990). 
Confusion over the role of foreign investment and MNCs in cluster development, 
particularly in the model proposed by Porter (1990) did not help the clarity of policy 
focus in Ireland.   
 
In an effort to arrive at greater clarity, various critiques of Porter‘s model of the 
cluster concept are reviewed in section 2.1 of Chapter 2.  To a degree, the original 
model has been adapted and developed over time, partly in response to some of these 
criticisms. But the diamond model cannot, and in reality should not, be expected to 
answer all questions on the relationship between location and competitiveness. For 
example, Dunning‘s (1998) OLI model may be better equipped to answer many 
questions in relation to the location of MNCs. However, the diamond model, with its 
four principal determinants, remains a useful framework for examining the sources 
of an industry‘s competitive advantage. It covers the range of potential significant 
influences on competitive advantage that need at least to be considered, particularly 
the role of other industries as customers affecting domestic demand conditions or as 
related or supporting industries (O‘Malley and O‘Gorman 2001, p305).  
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The report ‗Ahead of the Curve: Ireland‘s place in Global Economy‘, by an 
enterprise strategy group established by the government, stimulated a policy focus on 
the role of networks in 2004. It also contributed to the ongoing debate around the 
concept of clusters. The report recommended the allocation of a budget of €20 
million per annum for five years from state development agencies resources to 
support the creation of enterprise-led networks to foster collaboration in defined 
areas (Forfás 2004, pXVIII). This network approach was not entirely new. The Irish 
government, through local development agencies, introduced a Pilot Network 
Programme (PNP) in 1996. This involved 17 networks e.g. the TORC network, and a 
total of 31 SMEs focusing on enabling companies to work together as a team on the 
strategic development of new business opportunities (Jacobson et al 2001, p12).  
 
A country report as part of the Europe INNOVA Cluster Mapping Project (Oxford 
Research AS 2007) concluded that, although there were no cluster programmes per 
se in Ireland, there were a number of programmes with the objective of developing 
networks of enterprises, academic institutes and state organisations that may over 
time mature into clusters. Among the examples they cited were: (a) Enterprise 
Ireland‘s Industry-led Research Network schemes and (b) Science Foundation 
Ireland (SFI) funded programmes aimed at developing collaboration between 
enterprises and third level research organisations, including the Centres for Science, 
Engineering and Technology (CSETs) and Strategic Research Cluster programmes 
(Oxford Research AS 2007, p12).  The report suggested that the focus on enterprise 
led networks and many initiatives involving linkages between industry and academia 
aimed at promoting regional development could be the building blocks for cluster 
formation.  It also suggested that national and regional cluster policies should 
become a more integral part of Irish enterprise development policies (Oxford 
Research AS 2007, p15).  
 
Forfás (2008) did not make reference to the development of clusters in the 
indigenous food sector. This is despite the fact that one of the studies commissioned 
by NESC in the late 1990s concluded that were aspects of a cluster and a clustering 
process in the dairy sector, with the potential for further development of a cluster in a 
less supported and protected economic environment (O‘Connell et al 1997, p79-80). 
This fact raises two questions: (i) Why does Forfás make no reference whatsoever to 
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the existence or otherwise of clusters in the food sector? And (ii) more than ten years 
after the NESC study has the process of clustering further developed in the dairy 
sector in Ireland? The first question is partly answered by the fact that the evolution 
of state agencies created a certain disconnect in terms of industrial policy and a low 
level of awareness in Forfás of developments in the food sector. This issue is 
covered in detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 below. The second question will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Before proceeding to consider in further detail cluster initiatives and the role of 
collaboration and social capital in major areas of economic activity in Ireland, it is 
important to acknowledge that such initiatives should not be viewed as a panacea for 
innovation and competitive challenges. Heanue and Jacobson (2008)  in a recent 
study involving firms from two low and medium technology (LMT) sectors, 
furniture and fabricated metal products, argued that a complex variety of policies are 
needed to ensure increased levels of innovation and competitiveness for firms. They 
concluded that cluster promotion may not always be the correct strategy. Depending 
on the stage of development of both the firm and the industry, reducing or increasing 
local linkages and levels of embeddedness may be appropriate. In the case of the 
furniture sector, the firms they studied responded to the pressures of increased global 
competition in different ways, but each involved fewer connections to the local rural 
area. Earlier research concluded that while there appeared to have been an element of 
causation in the relationship between state support and the development of the 
furniture sector in the Monaghan industrial district, the TORC network involving 
three furniture firms more geographically dispersed was a better example of firms 
being embedded in the environment (Jacobson et al 2001, p18). In contrast to the 
Irish furniture sector, the fabricated metal product firms studied showed deeper 
levels of spatial embeddedness, with very close linkages to their localities, partly 
linked to the role of Irish-based MNC customers – a stimulus that would change if 
the MNCs decided to relocate (Heanue and Jacobson 2008, p132).  
A weak system of innovation  
 
International cluster policy is increasingly focused on raising levels of innovation as 
a means of improving competitiveness (Sölvell et al 2003). Mjøset (1992, pp5-23) 
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found that a weak system of innovation combined with population decline, due to 
high levels of emigration in Ireland, resulted in vicious circles of under-development 
for decades. Furthermore, Ireland‘s economic growth lagged behind similar 
countries in both difficult and dynamic phases of world growth. Building a system of 
innovation is a complex process and is not just about the percentage of GDP that a 
nation spends on R&D. Empirical evidence from the US, Europe and Japan showed 
that the success of innovations, their rates of diffusion and the associated 
productivity and competitiveness gains depended on a variety of other influences as 
well as formal R&D (Freeman 1995, p10)
42
. In Ireland, consensus building among 
the different players in the economy, such as government, employers and trade 
unions, known as social partnership has received much attention. But, Mjøset (1992) 
warned that consensus alone would not be sufficient to turn Irish development onto a 
virtuous circle in the long term:  
 
If a general formula is needed concerning relations between institutions and 
growth, it should focus on the inter-relationships between the broader 
institutional arrangements and the ―national system of innovation‖ 
surrounding the ―development blocks‖ – the clusters of important firms – of a 
particular economy (Mjøset 1992, p16). 
 
In a review of social capital Field (2008, p150) points out that ‗partnership- based 
approaches have been widely cited as a way of promoting social capital‘. The social 
partnership process in Ireland, which Mjøset (1992) referred to as consensus, 
certainly used the resources within the community, with government working with 
business and trade union organisations to reach agreement, particularly on general 
pay and income taxation levels. Later agreements, from 1997 until the process 
collapsed in the late 2000s, also attempted to expand the agenda of partnership 
beyond the core pay issues to broader areas such as environment and social policy. 
However despite the growth in policy areas covered: 
 
                                                 
42
 Freeman (1995) provides an interesting discussion and summary of some empirical evidence on 
innovation systems not only from US, Europe, and Japan but also from Brazil, South Korea and 
Russia.  
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[Agreements] were still based upon the primacy of the central trinity of the 
Government, Employers and Trade Unions agreeing parameters on pay and 
other relevant central issues. It is only at the latter stages of any draft 
agreement formalisation that the other two pillars (the Farming and Social 
Pillars) become involved and it is questionable whether any deal would be 
possible without having the central pay agreement (Smyth 2010, p121).   
 
In terms of social capital Ireland‘s ‗social partnership‘ process established certain 
structures that facilitated collective action, particularly in the areas of pay and 
industrial relations, for the mutual benefit of many in society. But critics of the Celtic 
Tiger economic model, of which social partnership was a key element, argued that it 
resulted in social deprivation and exclusion for other communities (O‘Malley 2008, 
p8, Kirby et al 2006). The divergence between Irish institutional development and 
the corporatist model was very clear when the partnership process extended beyond 
national wage deals to try to deal with broader societal issues such as social 
exclusion, rural development, incorporation of the community and voluntary sector 
(Ó‘Riain 2006, p312). This thesis will not attempt to reach a conclusion on the 
merits or otherwise of the social partnership model, but it is clear that the model did 
not survive the Irish economic crisis of the late 2000s and that Mjøset (1992) was 
correct in pointing out that consensus alone would not be sufficient to ensure a 
virtuous circle of development in the long term.  
 
This thesis will consider whether progress has been made in Ireland in establishing 
the system of innovations approach, based on clusters of important firms, promoted 
by Mjøset (1992). In the latter years of the social partnership process it did attempt to 
address issues in some areas related to building such a system, for example in 
education and technology. This resulted in government agencies supporting a 
number of initiatives involving collaboration between firms and research institutes. 
Ó‘Riain (2006, p316) commenting on the need to better understand alternatives to 
hierarchical systems pointed out that important questions remain regarding the 
dynamics of network forms of organisation and the conditions under which they are 
most effective. This thesis will focus on better understanding the dynamics of 
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collaboration within a range of organisational structures that have emerged in Ireland 
around the area of innovation.   
Section 4.3: State agencies for industrial development - the 
evolution of organisational structure in Ireland  
 
This thesis explores the process of collaboration within clusters and cluster 
initiatives involving different economic actors, including state agencies, with the 
social capital concept used to add depth to the analysis. Drawing on Irish legislation 
and other sources, this section outlines for the first time in a systematic way the 
evolution of state agencies focused on industrial development in Ireland. How these 
organisations report to government is also discussed. This highlights a lack of 
coordination between agencies focused on development of the ‗modern economy‘ 
and those focused on development of more traditional sectors.  The overall role of 
each agency is broad, including promoting Ireland as a location for investment and 
the allocation of state and EU funds for industrial development. In the context of this 
thesis, when state agencies are engaged in or encourage collaboration in cluster 
initiatives they can be viewed as social capital assets of the economy. 
 
Originally established in 1950, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) is the 
oldest of Irish state agencies supporting enterprise development (see Table 4.1). In 
addition to the IDA, the Irish government also established two other state agencies 
focused on enterprise development in the early 1950s.  Bord Iascaigh Mhara (BIM), 
with responsibility for developing the sea fishing and aquaculture industries, was 
established in 1952 under the Sea Fisheries Act. BIM continues to provide a range of 
services including advisory, financial, technical, marketing and training supports to 
all sectors of the seafood industry. Its current three year plan entitled ‗Delivering the 
Potential of the Irish Seafood 2010-2012‘ is built around four key themes: Business 
Development and Innovation, Knowledge and Technology Transfer, Skills 
Development, and Environment and Sustainability. Bord Fáilte was also established 
in 1952 and was only replaced by Fáilte Ireland under the Tourism Development 
Authority Act in 2003.  
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Table 4.1 – Evolution of state agencies supporting enterprise 
development at national level in Ireland 
 
 State Agency – National Level  Date of establishment 
1 Industrial Development Authority  1950 
2 Bord Iascaigh Mhara (BIM)  1952 
3 Bord Fáilte  1952 
4 Agricultural Institute (Foras Taluntais) 1958 
5 Córas Tráchtála (Export Promotion Board) 1959 
6 Institute for Industrial Research and Standards 1961 
7 CBF (Irish Meat and Livestock Board) 1969 
8 ACOT (Agriculture Advisory & Training 
Institute) 
1980 
9 Eolas (Irish Science and Technology Agency) – 
replaced 6 above 
1987 
10 Teagasc (Agriculture and Food Development 
Authority) – amalgamation of 4 and 8 above  
1988 
11 Irish Trade Board (An Bord Tráchtála) – replaced 
5 above  
1991 
12 Forfás  (National Policy Advisory Agency)  1994 
13 Forbairt  - replaced 9 above plus new functions  1994 
14  IDA Ireland – effectively replaced 1 above 1994 
15 Bord Bia – amalgamation of 7 above and food 
elements of 11 above 
1994 
16 Enterprise Ireland – amalgamation of non-food 
elements of 11 above and 13 above 
1998 
17  Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) 2003 
18  Fáilte Ireland 2003 
Source: Author‘s table 
 
Fáilte Ireland provides a range of support services to tourism professionals and 
service providers at local, regional and national levels. In addition to supporting 
enterprise development, the organisation also works to develop Ireland as a tourist 
destination by engaging in overseas promotion including supporting business 
tourism, sporting and culture events. Neither the fishing nor tourism sectors are 
examined in this thesis. Chapter 5 focuses on the development of the ICT sector, 
where the IDA played a key role in attracting FDI to Ireland. 
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The IDA reports to the Minister of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation
43. The IDA‘s 
original mandate was both the development of existing Irish industry and the 
establishment of new industries in Ireland (Industrial Development Act 1950). From 
1958 onwards, the agency played a critical role in moving Irish industrial policy 
away from a largely protectionist stance towards a more open and outward looking 
approach.  A key factor in this change in focus was the then Secretary General of the 
Department of Finance, TK Whitaker‘s landmark publication ‗Economic 
Development‘ and the accompanying First Programme for Economic Expansion. 
Ireland‘s protectionist policy stance of the early 1930s should not be seen as an 
aberration. It reflected a view formulated against a backdrop of world depression, 
with the economist Keynes speaking in Dublin in 1933 appearing to endorse the 
outlook of the Irish government towards self-sufficiency (Whitaker 2009, p20).  
 
By the late 1950s, a new policy stance was required if Ireland was to move beyond 
the industrial development constraints imposed by (i) an over-reliance on agriculture 
as a source of exports and employment and (ii) the UK market as the single primary 
destination for Irish goods. Consequently, in addition to the change in IDA focus, 
Córas Tráchtála (CT) was established in 1959 to promote the export of Irish goods 
and services on European and international markets. CT performed this role for three 
decades until it was replaced in 1991 by the Irish Trade Board (An Bord Tráchtála), 
which was given wider powers to promote, assist and develop the marketing of Irish 
goods and services in international markets. The trade board was subsequently 
broken up and its functions transferred to new agencies in the late 1990s, described 
below. 
 
The IDA played a substantial role in the necessary expansion of the industrial base in 
Ireland; especially into the areas of pharmaceuticals and information and 
communication technology. The key overriding success of the organisation was in 
helping to attract foreign direct investment into the Irish economy, particularly by 
USA multinational corporations. For example, in 1990, supported by historically 
high IDA grants, Intel located its European manufacturing facility for computer 
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 Prior to 2010, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment. The IDA now also reports to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, on matters relating to promoting Ireland abroad.  
 
98 
 
chips near Dublin. But the IDA was not just attracting Intel  nearly every other 
major global player in the computer industry followed Intel to Ireland (O‘Hearn 
2001, p82). Indeed, the IDA, with this ability to attract foreign investment projects to 
Ireland has been widely acclaimed as one of the most sophisticated industrial 
development agencies in the world (Cassidy et al 2009, p16).  
Figure 4.1: IDA strategic focus 1970-2010 
Timeline
Main 
Activity
Focus
Key 
Interventions
Education Training IFSC
1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2008
12.5 % CTR SFI
Life Sciences
Manufacturing
Software
Financial Services
Internet
R&D
Services Innovation
Global 
Crossing
History of Strategic Interventions…
Cleantech
Source: IDA, 2010 
 
Figure 4.1 outlines the focus of strategic interventions by the IDA over the period 
1970 to the late 2000s. It provides an interesting illustration of how the agency 
adjusted its target industry focus over time in order to continue to attract foreign 
investment into the Irish economy. It also provides a graphical indication that 
attracting FDI is not simply a matter of low corporate tax rates, but is a much more 
complex combination of key interventions and strategic focus.  
 
With a far lower international profile than the IDA, the state agency Teagasc was 
established under the Agriculture Act in 1988.  Its remit is to provide integrated 
research, advisory and training services to the agriculture and food industry.  
Teagasc reports to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Teagasc 
amalgamated the national advisory and training body ACOT, which was set up in 
1980, and the much longer established Agricultural Institute (An Forus Tálunatas), 
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which was set up in 1958. In the commitment to a more open and less protectionist 
stance than that of the 1950s, the Irish government was keen not to ignore the needs 
of the agricultural sector. The establishment of the Agricultural Institute and its 
subsequent evolution into Teagasc reflects a long held commitment by the Irish state 
to productive investment in agricultural development (DOF 2008). As part of this 
commitment, applied research centres were established in five locations throughout 
Ireland during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Teagasc Moorepark, in Cork, focuses 
on research in the milk and dairy sector; it will feature in the consideration of 
collaboration between business and state agencies in the indigenous dairy sector in 
Chapter 6.   
 
On the industrial development side while the IDA was undoubtedly successful in 
attracting foreign investment, some argued that support for indigenous industry was 
less wholehearted. According to O‘Hearn (1989, p581), the IDA went ‗out of its way 
to attract large foreign companies rather than nurturing new Irish enterprises that 
may or may not succeed. Capital grants for foreign firms [were] much higher on 
average than grants to domestic industry‘. From the mid-1990s the Irish government 
began to focus on the needs of indigenous enterprise in a more targeted way and ‗it 
was only when a new development regime emerged that emphasized local structures 
of innovation that the conditions for indigenous upgrading and employment growth 
were put in place‘ (O‘Riain 2004a, p233). The Industrial Development Act of 1993 
established a new state agency structure for industrial development. From a legal 
perspective, three new bodies were established from the 1 January 1994 under the 
auspices of the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation
44
: IDA (Ireland), 
Forfás and Forbairt. The original IDA and Eolas, the state science and technology 
agency, were dissolved. Although, in effect, the main core of IDA‘s work of 
attracting FDI continued unabated. The establishment of Forfás and Forbairt, which 
reflected a new emphasis on science and technology, will be discussed in the section 
below on the foundations of a national system of innovation. This new emphasis was 
particularly important for certain sectors, for example indigenous software, where 
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 In 1993, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and, between 1994 and 2010, the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation.. 
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these new ‗state agencies played a key role in promoting R&D, business 
development and the growth of indigenous firms in the 1990s‘ (Ó‘Riain 2004c, p41). 
 
In response to the evolution of the Irish food sector, the government also established 
An Bord Bia, the Irish Food Board, in 1994. Bord Bia brought together the former 
CBF (Coras Beostoic and Feola – the Irish Meat and Livestock Board) and the food 
promotion activities of the Irish Trade Board. The functions of Bord Bia are to 
promote, assist and develop the marketing of Irish food and livestock (Bord Bia Act, 
1994), including beef, pigmeat, poultry, sheepmeat, dairy products, prepared 
consumer foods and beverages. In 2004, responsibility for the development of the 
horticultural industry in Ireland, which formerly rested with Bord Glas, was 
integrated into Bord Bia, extending the responsibilities of the agency. Horticulture is 
divided into two main sectors – the food sector, including fruit and vegetables such 
as mushrooms, potatoes and glasshouse crops, and the amenity sector e.g. trees, 
shrubs, flowers and bulbs. Bord Bia reports to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, whose government department is responsible for policy, development and 
regulation of the food industries. It is also responsible for monitoring the strategic 
direction of all state agencies focused on the needs of the food sector. 
 
Despite the significant review in the early 1990s, the fragmented development of 
state agency structure continued throughout the decade. State–society alliances 
facilitated by these agencies had upgraded industry capabilities and laid the 
foundations for a national system of innovation, but they were never able to 
overcome the dominance of the IDA-led emphasis on foreign investment (Ó‘Riain 
2004c, p41). A review of industrial policy in 1998 led to the creation of Enterprise 
Ireland to focus on the development and promotion of the indigenous business 
sector.  The establishment of Enterprise Ireland involved the amalgamation and 
restructuring of the services to business functions of Forbairt and the remainder of 
the Irish Trade Board (An Bord Trachtála). It reflected an institutional support and 
legitimizing of the focus on developing indigenous industry and it export potential. 
The mission of Enterprise Ireland is to help client companies, comprising 
manufacturing and internationally traded companies that are ‗genuinely Irish-based‟, 
to develop sustainable competitive advantage, leading to profitable sales, exports and 
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employment (DOF 1998). Forfás retained responsibility for ensuring the coherence 
of policies across the development agencies supporting enterprise, which now 
included Enterprise Ireland and the Industrial Development Authority of Ireland 
(IDA). All three of these state organisations are currently agencies of the Department 
of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.  
 
The food promotion activities of the trade board, originally transferred in 1994, were 
left with Bord Bia rather than transferred to Enterprise Ireland. This created 
confusion as to which agency was ultimately responsible for the development of the 
food sector. The lack of clarity was contributed to by the fact that the allocation of 
government and EU funds for investment in food sector development projects were 
controlled by Enterprise Ireland. On the other hand, the promotion of food exports 
abroad was still under the remit of Bord Bia. The end result was competition rather 
cooperation between the two state organisations in terms of supporting and 
promotion of Irish food companies.   
The foundations of a ‘national innovation systems’ approach  
 
In his study of the Irish economy Mjøset (1992) warned against an over dependence 
on social partnership and recommended a greater focus on the inter-relationships 
between broader institutional arrangements and the development of a national system 
of innovation. He concluded that in the post war period Ireland had failed to address 
its weak national system of innovation, which was compounded by high levels of 
emigration and a low state capacity for policy implementation to create such a 
system (Mjøset 1992, p13).  
 
As mentioned above, as part of the establishment of a new state agency structure for 
industrial development in 1993, two new agencies were established, Forfás and 
Forbairt. The science and technology agency Eolas, which in 1987 had replaced the 
Institute for Industrial Research and Standards (IIRS), was dissolved. The remit of 
Eolas and its predecessor was to undertake, encourage and foster scientific research 
to promote the utilisation of natural resources of the state, other than those covered 
by the Agriculture Institute. A key role for Eolas was to facilitate the expansion of 
existing or new industries, in areas other than agriculture and food. Under the new 
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structure, the functions of Forfás included the provision of research and advice to the 
government in the areas of enterprise and science policy. It also has a role in 
evaluating enterprise policy interventions. Forbairt was established as an agency of 
Forfás to support and help develop industry by strengthening the technological base 
and the capacity to innovate. It also made investments in industry, including the 
administration of EU funds. Ó‘Riain (2004c, p42) provided evidence of the 
importance of this state intervention in supplying finance and stimulating investment 
in indigenous firms in computer related sectors, electronics, ‗other manufacturing‘ 
and communications in the late 1990s. Forfás provided research and administrative 
support to various independent advisory groups established by government. For 
example Forfás provided the secretariat for the National Competitiveness Council, 
which was set up in 1997 as part of the ‗Partnership 2000‘ social partnership 
agreement. As outlined above, Enterprise Ireland assumed responsibility for the 
services to business functions of Forbairt in 1998 e.g. allocating EU investment 
funds to firms and making equity investments in early-stage firms.  
 
As Ireland reached higher levels of economic development and could no longer be 
viewed as a location for low-labour-cost type manufacturing, Ireland‘s international 
competitiveness came under pressure. Confirming the view expressed by Mjøset 
(1992), it became increasingly clear that relying on a consensus around wage 
restraint and on one of the lowest corporation tax rates (12.5 percent) in the world 
would not be sufficient to sustain economic growth into the future. Consequently 
both government and business were keen to emphasise a commitment to building an 
innovation based economy.  
 
A significant policy intervention in this regard was the establishment of Science 
Foundation Ireland (SFI) under the Industrial Development (SFI) Act of 2003. Prior 
to this, the SFI had operated for the period since 2000 as a sub-board of Forfás to 
administer Ireland‘s Technology Foresight Fund. In April 1999, the Irish Council for 
Science, Technology and Innovation (ICSTI), which was established by the 
government and Forfás, published an overview of the findings and recommendations 
of a technology foresight exercise carried out in Ireland. The foresight time horizon 
for the exercise was set at 2015 and the exercise was completed over the twelve 
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month period March 1998 to April 1999. The Foresight process involved significant 
collaboration between industry, Government departments and state agencies, and the 
science and engineering research communities who worked together in eight 
individual panels in the following industry sector areas:  
 
 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals  
 Information and Communication Technologies 
 Materials and Manufacturing Processes 
 Health and Life Sciences 
 Natural Resources (Agri-food, Marine, Forestry) 
 Energy 
 Transport and Logistics 
 Construction and Infrastructure 
 
The foresight exercise concluded that: (i) Under globalisation, economic 
competitiveness would increasingly be achieved through knowledge-based 
technological innovation and (ii) Ireland needed to reposition the economy and ‗to 
evolve rapidly to a knowledge society‘ (ICSTI 1999, p4). As figure 4.2 illustrates, it 
emphasised that the knowledge framework could be visualised as ‗a pyramid – 
where industry, the higher education sector, Government and society are the four 
interlinked faces forming a partnership at all levels‘ (ICSTI 1999, p5).  
 
The Council also identified a relatively small number of areas where they felt 
knowledge societies would best exploit the potential of new technologies. These 
included information and communications technology (ICT), biotechnology, medical 
systems and nanotechnology. This had the advantage that Science Foundation 
Ireland (SFI) could focus on the development of these areas in the Irish economy. 
The effectiveness of this strategy in the case of the ICT and software sector will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. But it also meant that certain industrial sectors, including the 
large indigenous food and drink sector, were effectively excluded from receiving 
state support via the SFI. The consequences of this and an emerging cluster initiative 
that addresses this gap will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 4.2: The four interlinked faces of the knowledge framework 
pyramid  
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
 
In the late 2000s, Irish government policy reiterated its commitment to an innovation 
driven economy by stating that ‗Ireland by 2013 will be internationally renowned for 
the excellence of its research, and will be at the forefront in generating and using 
new knowledge for economic and social progress, within an innovation-driven 
culture.‘ Part of the strategy to achieve this objective was an emphasis on 
‗interconnectivity and convergence‘ between all the participants in the economy such 
as Government, state funding agencies, regulatory authorities, academia and industry 
(Forfas 2008, p3).  
Section 4.4: An assessment of organisational structure and 
enterprise supports for industry 
 
The evolution of the organisational structure of industrial development agencies, 
particularly since the mid 1990s, brought together certain functions of state support 
in a more targeted and focused way. For example, the establishment of SFI in 2003 
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indicated a renewed government intention to build a national system of innovation. 
The earlier agency, Forbairt, had also focused on this objective but in a less defined 
way, although Ó‘Riain (2004a, 2004c) concluded that state intervention during the 
late 1990s did support the development of indigenous technology based firms, in 
areas such as software. Chapter 5 will examine whether SFI has helped to move 
Ireland closer to establishing a genuine system of innovation. 
 
The evolution of agency structure also created a certain disconnect in terms of Irish 
industrial policy. Each agency has its own board, CEO and management structure. 
This indicated a significant level of, and indeed desire for, organisational 
independence. But it also suggested the potential for overlap and duplication of 
activities in certain areas. The IDA is Ireland‘s inward investment promotion agency 
responsible for the attraction and development of foreign investment in Ireland. 
Consequently, IDA interaction is essentially with foreign owned multinational 
corporations. Enterprise Ireland‘s client base is primarily indigenous Irish 
companies, many of whom are small and medium sized enterprises. Enterprise 
Ireland has limited contact with foreign owned multinationals, as support for these 
MNCs is seen as the mandate of the IDA. In turn, IDA has no role in the 
development of Irish owned MNCs. As mentioned above, Forfás is responsible for 
the policy coherence of both the IDA and Enterprise Ireland. The CEO of IDA 
Ireland and Enterprise Ireland both sit on the board of Forfás. But the CEO of Forfás 
is not a member of the board of either organisation. Therefore, Forfás could not be 
described as being directly involved at the highest organisational level in setting the 
strategy of either organisation, even though it is responsible for industrial policy 
coherence. The Secretary General of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Innovation is a member of the board of Forfás. Senior civil servants from that 
department are members of the board of both IDA Ireland and Enterprise Ireland. 
But, no individual state official with responsibility for industrial policy sits on the 
board of all three organisations.  
 
The CEO of Bord Bia and the Secretary General of the Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food are not on the board of Forfás, nor are any senior civil servants 
from that Department. Therefore, the top state officials with responsibility for the 
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development of the food sector do not have a formal link into the agency accredited 
with the responsibility of advising government on policy for enterprise support and 
development. Neither do Bord Bia or the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food sit on the boards of IDA Ireland or Enterprise Ireland. This reflects the fact that 
Forfás, IDA and Enterprise Ireland were all established by, and report to, the 
Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation. Forfás is also not represented on the 
board of Bord Bia.  
 
This state organisation structure suggests a low level of interaction and relationship 
between Forfás, the government advisory agency in relation to industrial policy, and 
Ireland‘s largest indigenous manufacturing sector – the food sector. Forfás reported 
to the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation along with the IDA, Enterprise 
Ireland and Science Foundation Ireland (SFI). This focused the work of these 
agencies on the government priorities to develop the high-technology sectors, for 
example the ICT, software and biotechnology sectors which came under the 
responsibility of that Minister. The development of the food sector was the 
responsibility of the Minister for Agriculture and Food and Bord Bia. In such a 
situation it is perhaps not surprising that Forfás (2008) made no reference to the 
existence or potential development of clusters in the food and drink sector in its 
reports. However, this is despite the fact that in recent years Enterprise Ireland has 
been actively involved in the development, support and promotion of a significant 
cluster initiative for innovation in the food sector, which will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6.  
 
The Irish state faced significant challenges as a result of the global economic 
recession of the late 2000s. But the depth of the crisis facing Ireland was in crucial 
ways ‗home made‘. Inappropriate fiscal and budgetary policies ‗heightened the 
vulnerability of the economy‘ instead of dampening ‗the powerful monetary and 
liquidity impulses that were stimulating the economy‘ (Regling and Watson 2010, 
p5). In part response, the Irish government of the time announced, in its statement on 
‗Transforming Public Services‘ (DOT 2008a), the establishment of a Special 
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Group
45
 to review public expenditure and numbers employed in the public service. 
The Special Group was tasked to undertake its work with a view to sustaining public 
finances in the years ahead. It recommended that enterprise supports for indigenous 
industry should be delivered through a single agency, operating under a well-defined 
oversight mechanism (DOF 2009, pp15-16). The Group made the following 
observations in relation to the existing agency structure: 
 
 ‗expenditure and staffing levels have risen over the period 2003 to 2008 with 
no obvious associated increase in output; 
 there is a high degree of overlap across the services delivered by the agencies 
(e.g. training, grant assistance); 
 there is significant duplication of overseas representation with Enterprise 
Ireland, the IDA, and An Bord Bia (and Tourism Ireland) operating 
independent overseas office networks; and  
 there is a lack of consistency in reporting what is achieved in terms of cost 
effectiveness (estimated grant per job). Based on the available information, 
there are significant variations between the agencies in the estimated average 
grant cost per job suggesting that some agencies are less cost effective than 
others.‘ 
 
The board structure of the various state organisations described in this section and 
the lack of coherence implied by this governance structure contributed to the 
problems outlined above by the Special Review Group. No single top level state 
official was responsible for, or even involved in, decisions in relation to staff levels, 
overseas representation or indeed cost effectiveness of the different state 
organisations. Individual agencies had different boards and reported to different 
Ministers, leading to a lack of coherence in Irish industrial policy and a significant 
degree of inter-agency rivalry.   
 
                                                 
45
 The Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan T.D. appointed Colm McCarthy, from the School of 
Economics in University College Dublin as the Chair of the Special Group. Its report was sometimes 
referred to as ‗the McCarthy Report‘. In the media the group was often referred to as ‗An Bord Snip 
Nua‘.  
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In essence, the Special Group was critical of the fragmented nature of the 
organisation agency structure that had evolved in Ireland, particularly since the 
mid 1990s, and which is outlined in section 4.2 in detail for the first time. The 
Special Group Report proposed that ‗a re-constituted Enterprise Ireland‘ should 
subsume and consolidate all indigenous enterprise support and sector marketing 
functions. Those organisations losing functions would be rationalised as appropriate. 
The proposal encompassed the relevant enterprise and marketing support functions 
of Ứdaras na Gaeltachta, Shannon Development (two agencies focused on enterprise 
development in the Western region of Ireland), Bord Iascaigh Mhara and Bord Bia 
(DOF 2009, p27). The Special Group estimated that the rationalisation that it 
proposed would save the Irish exchequer approximately €10 million per annum. In 
addition the enterprise functions of Teagasc and the activities of County and City 
Enterprise Boards, the Business Innovation Centres and the Western Development 
Commission would also be merged (an estimated saving of €2.2 m) within the ‗re-
constituted Enterprise Ireland‘ (DOF 2009, p16). In making these proposals on 
rationalisation of state agencies, the report emphasized that ‗decisions should be 
cognisant of duplication, overlapping and similarities of functions and roles of 
agencies, and the synergies from bringing together separate bodies within cognate 
areas‘ (DOF 2009, p 24). 
 
The proposals of the Special Group to merge the enterprise support and marketing 
functions of agencies such as Bord Bia (food) and Bord Iascaigh Mhara (fish and 
seafood) into Enterprise Ireland would certainly help address the disconnect in 
industrial development policy referred to above. It seems to make sense for one state 
agency to be responsible for the development and promotion abroad of the 
indigenous industry of a small open economy such as Ireland. The combined agency 
should also report to the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, which would 
also contribute to industrial policy coherence.  
 
However, caution would need to be used in merging all regional and city enterprise 
support and development functions into one super agency. Enterprise Ireland‘s 
primary focus is on the important task of helping companies internationalise their 
businesses. By doing so, the agency strives to increase Irish exports and employment 
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in the indigenous manufacturing and services sectors of the economy. In contrast, 
regional and city development agencies are focused on enterprises where the main 
area of activity is the domestic economy. Ireland has also been criticised in the past 
by the European Commission for its economic development policy being too 
centrally focused and not providing enough of a regional focus. Considerations other 
than the cost efficiencies that will flow from rationalisation of state agencies should 
be included in decisions. For example, the objectives of regional and spatial 
development need to be taken on board and the benefits of supporting city 
agglomeration need also to be considered carefully. Otherwise, in the drive for the 
albeit recognised and needed increased cost efficiencies in organisational structure of 
state agencies, the longer term industrial development objectives of the Irish 
economy could be damaged.  
Section 4.5: Industrial and business representation  the 
evolution of organisation structure in Ireland  
 
The structure of the organisations representing industry interests evolved 
significantly during the 1990s and early 2000s. These groups facilitate information 
flows among firms and interaction between firms and government, fitting into the 
category of Organisations for Collaboration (OFCs) described in detail in section 2.3 
of Chapter 2. New business sectors emerged during this period of rapid economic 
development and organisations adapted to represent the views of these sectors.  
 
In 1993, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) was established 
through the merger of the Confederation of Irish Industry (CII) and the Federation of 
Irish Employers (FIE). The CII and the FIE traced their roots back to industry 
organisations founded during the early years of the Irish state.  The CII traced its 
history back to an organisation called the Federation of Irish Industries (FII), which 
was founded in 1932.
46
 Despite a number of name changes before settling on CII in 
                                                 
46
 One of the oldest business associations in Europe is Irish and can trace its origins back to a marine 
insurance issue in the late 17
th
 century,  linking in with North‘s (1990, 1991) description of the 
evolution of institutions in Europe. In 1695 a vessel ‗Ouzel Galley‘ owned by a Dublin shipping 
company went missing on a trading journey in the near Eastern seas. When the vessel did not appear 
for three years, the insurance policy was cashed in; two years after the ship (footnote cont. p108) 
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1969, the evolution of the organisation could be seen in many ways as a mirror 
image of Irish industrial development (O‘Hagan and Foley 1982, p7). In the period 
from 1932 to the late 1950s, the organisation adopted quite a protectionist stance 
reflecting Irish economic policy of that time. By 1969, when a bigger and 
strategically improved organisation adopted the name CII, the organisation took a 
much more outward looking approach.
47
 The overall objective of the CII was to 
represent the whole of the business community, with its articles of association giving 
formal recognition to industrial sector organisations and trade associations (O‘Hagan 
and Foley 1982). The Federated Union of Employers was founded in 1942 in 
response to the Trade Union Act 1941, which required both trade unions and 
employer organisations to hold a negotiation licence (Chubb 1992, p3). FUE 
continued under this name until 1990 when it became the Federation of Irish 
Employers (FIE).
48
  
 
With the establishment of IBEC, for the first time in Ireland business representation 
on both labour and economic affairs was brought together under the direction of one 
organisation. The organisation was headquartered in Dublin, with six regional IBEC 
offices in Ireland and an office in Brussels, the administrative centre of the EU. 
IBEC‘s stated mission is to promote the interests of business and employers in 
Ireland by working to foster the continuing development of a competitive 
environment that encourages sustainable growth, and within which both enterprise 
and people can flourish (IBEC 2006).
49
 The FUE and CII were both involved in the 
‗social partnership‘ process that was a feature of the Celtic tiger period of economic 
                                                                                                                                          
reappeared with the Captain claiming that the vessel had been commandeered by pirates. In 1705, the 
Ouzel Galley Society was set up to sort out the issue. Its success in providing a forum for discussion 
on business issues led to a change of name to the Dublin Chamber of Commerce in 1783, which 
continues to represent the interests of business in Ireland‘s capital city today (Cullen 1983).  
47
 This international focus was emphasised when the CII hosted the annual conference of the Council 
of European Industrial Federations (CEIF) in 1970 (O‘Hagan and Foley 1982).  
48
 Ireland joined the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva in 1923. From the beginning, 
Irish employers through the FIE and then the FUE played an active part in the ILO gaining from the 
opportunities to view their approach to business in a wider international context and also from the 
relationships built up with other members of the Irish delegation, with senior trade union and public 
sector officials (Chubb 1992, p173).  
49
 IBEC continues to take an international outward looking focus, actively participating in Business 
Europe, the pan European organisation for employers, and hosting a meeting of their governing 
council of Presidents in Dublin, and also continuing its long commitment to the ILO. IBEC also took 
leadership roles on behalf of business in promoting an open and outward looking stance in referenda 
on the Lisbon and Nice Treaties of the Europe Union.  
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growth, from the first agreement in 1987 but employers really became ‗full partners‘ 
in the process with the formation of IBEC
50
 (Hastings et al, 2007, p51).  
 
By the late 2000s, IBEC had 7,500 members and there were approximately 60 
business sector federations and associations within the organisation.
51
 This 
organisation structure, combining direct membership and affiliated associations, 
strengthened the ties that bound the business community together and also facilitated 
information flow and exchange. Membership mirrored the developments in the 
economy covering a broad range of manufacturing and services areas. The traditional 
manufacturing sectors continued to play a major role in the work of the organisation. 
These included organisations for collaboration (OFCs) in the areas of food, alcohol 
beverage and industrial products such as plastics, paper and packaging. The role of 
one of these OFCs will be commented on further in analysis of clusters and cluster 
initiatives in the dairy sector in Chapter 6. New sectoral OFCs also emerged, focused 
on the development of the modern economy and covering areas such as 
pharmaceuticals, health and life sciences, and ICT (information and communications 
technology). The emergence of ICT Ireland and the role of the Irish Software 
Association (ISA) will be discussed further in Chapter 5. Mirroring global trends as 
Ireland achieved higher levels of economic development; the provision of services 
became a more important part of the economy. The evolution of IBEC also reflected 
this trend towards domestic and international traded services. OFCs in the areas of 
                                                 
50
 Paddy Teahon, the former Secretary General of Department of the Taoiseach maintained that 
employers only became ‗full partners‘ in social partnership process in the ‗John Dunne period‘, John 
Dunne was the first Director General of IBEC from 1993 until 2000 and was instrumental in the 
forming of the organisation. (Hastings et al, 2007, p51).  
51
 The signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 between the Irish and UK Governments, and the 
endorsement of that agreement by the political parties in Northern Ireland, led to greater political, 
economic and social cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (Forfas 2008, 
p4). Following this agreement, a new all-island agency ‗Intertrade Ireland‘ was established to support 
trade between the two parts of the island.  
 
Intertrade Ireland identified 110 business ‗networks and clusters‘ (their definition of clusters, in 
particular, is rather loose) involving 9,860 primarily Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs). It 
broke these down into three main categories i.e. business networks (74), development networks (18) 
and regional business clusters (18) (InterTrade Ireland 2005). Forty percent of the 110 networks were 
supported by a programme called ‗Skillnets‘, which was a joint initiative involving government, 
IBEC and trade unions,  to enhance people skills in employment, funded from the Irish National 
Training Fund. Some of these Skillnets programmes were led by business and sector associations. 
While such networks can make a valuable contribution to firm development e.g. in the human 
resource training area, the question arises as to whether these networks will continue to exist once the 
substantial public funding, €55 million for the period 2005-2010 in the case of Skillnets, is no longer 
available to the network.  
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retail services, financial services and computer related and software services played a 
more significant role in the organisation.
52
 In addition to representing the interests of 
large firms, IBEC also established the small firms association (SFA) to focus on the 
development of small and medium sized business in Ireland.
53
 
 
The organisation also provided social capital bridges to government, with IBEC 
seeing its role in representing business being enhanced by inputs from the different 
sectors of the economy and their industry groups. The National Council of the 
organisation, made up of CEOs and senior executives of member firms, meets at 
least quarterly to review developments in the economy. Government ministers and 
senior civil servants meet with this IBEC council on a regular basis for an exchange 
of views on business and economic policy. The organisation has five divisions 
covering (1) sectors associations, (2) industrial relations and human resources, (3) 
finance, internal HR and IT, (4) corporate affairs and (5) policy. The policy division 
is broken into a number of units focused on policy development in the areas of (i) 
economics and taxation, (ii) environment, energy and climate change, (iii) 
international relations, trade and transport and (iv) innovation, education and social 
policy. Policy documents produced benefit from a combination of expert business 
insights from the individual firm executives who participate in IBEC policy 
committees, inputs from the various sector groups affiliated to IBEC and the 
expertise of IBEC policy executives.  
 
The organisation also facilitates international connectivity for firms on business and 
policy issues. IBEC is a member of Business Europe, the confederation based in 
Brussels, which brings together employers and business organisations from the 
                                                 
52
 A full list of IBEC business sectors and associations is available on the organisations website 
www.ibec.ie/businessgroups 
53
 Not a part of IBEC and in fact the second largest industry representative organisation in Ireland is 
the Construction Industry Federation (CIF). The CIF was founded in 1935 and by the late 2000s 
represented over 3,000 members covering businesses in all areas of the Irish construction industry.  
The CIF has 37 different affiliated associations that are grouped in four key categories: (i) General 
building and engineering contractors, (ii) Home Builders, (iii) Mechanical and Electrical Contractors, 
and (iv) Specialist Contractors e.g. roof, floor and tiling. The organisation and its members were 
particularly badly affected by the economic downturn and the collapse in the property market in 
Ireland at the end of the 2000s.  
 
Also not a part of IBEC, ISME is an independent organisation for the Irish small and medium 
business sector, with over 8,500 members nationwide.  
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different countries of Europe. Senior IBEC executives participate in the key policy 
committees of the European confederation covering all major area of economic and 
social policy. This facilitates contact with the EU Commission and Parliament, and 
enables IBEC to bring Irish business concerns to the attention of political leaders and 
key officials within these organisations. For example, in April 2011 IBEC facilitated 
meetings between business leaders and the EU/IMF/ECB troika, to discuss Ireland's 
progress under the loan agreement and give the view of Irish business on the 
economic challenges that the country faces. Issues covered included the level of 
corporation tax, restructuring of the banking sector, labour market issues, public 
sector reform and job creation programmes (IBEC 2011a). Many individual sector 
OFCs within IBEC are also members of their respective European industry 
associations and executives working for these Irish associations participate in the 
work of these pan European groups. This delivers similar bridging social capital 
benefits for firms involved in the OFCs affiliated to IBEC at the sectoral level.  
 
Finally IBEC represents the views of Irish business to the wider public through its 
website and in the media. IBEC‘s Director General and senior executives regularly 
speak at national and international conferences to promote Ireland as good place to 
do business. Individual sector OFCs, also communicate industry views for members 
via websites, print media, radio and television.  
Concluding comments 
 
In the late 2000s, Ireland is a far more complex economy than it was 50 years ago, as 
the economy has been transformed from one highly dependent on agriculture to one 
that is much more broadly based, both in terms of economic activities and market 
focus. Organisational support for industry has also changed dramatically during that 
period. State agencies and business representative groups have evolved to service the 
perceived needs of the economy at different periods of development. This chapter 
has provided a new perspective on the evolution of these organisations with 
particular reference to the fragmented nature of the structure of state agencies. Like 
many evolutionary processes, learning is embodied in different stages of 
development and the path forward may require adjustments from time to time. The 
Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
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Programmes, published in mid-2009, supports the case for further rationalisation of 
the organisational structure of the state agencies. This should be done not only to 
increase cost efficiency but also to improve effectiveness of the supports for 
industrial development. The organisations representing business, encompassing 
business and trade associations, referred to as ‗institutions for collaborations‘ by 
Porter and Emmons (2003) but better described as ‗organisations for 
collaboration‘54, have also evolved in the Irish context as the economy has changed. 
In many instances, business sector federations and associations have evolved and 
emerged to match the needs of the economy, reflecting, for example, the evolution of 
the Irish economy from one based on agriculture to a much broader based economy.  
 
This chapter also highlighted the need for a better understanding of clusters in 
Ireland and the contribution that cluster initiatives can make to building up systems 
of innovation in the Irish economy. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the role of some 
business federations and associations within the ‗new modern Irish economy‘ sectors 
of ICT and software, and considers collaboration with state agencies in clusters 
initiatives.  Chapter 6 will explore this topic in the case of one of the more traditional 
indigenous sectors of the Irish economy – the dairy food and ingredients sector – and 
also consider an emerging cluster initiative involving industry, universities / research 
centres and a state agency.   
                                                 
 
54
 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on this point.  
 
115 
 
Chapter 5 Clusters, social capital and the building blocks of a 
national innovation system in the modern economy of Ireland 
  
Chapter 2 provided an overview of academic writing on the ‗cluster‘ concept and 
proposed a framework and theoretical basis for understanding clusters initiatives and 
collaboration between firms and other actors in the economy. It drew on certain 
insights from institutional economics, with particular reference to the emerging 
‗social capital‘ concept. Chapter 4 outlined the economic context for this thesis and 
examined the evolution of state agencies, focused on industrial development, and 
business organisations for collaboration (OFCs) as examples of the potential social 
capital assets.  
 
This chapter will look at the development of the cluster concept in the modern 
economy with particular reference to the ICT sector in Ireland. It will examine the 
role of OFCs in the building of social capital, of both a bonding and bridging nature, 
in the ICT and software sector. It will also explore social capital within state funded 
research cluster initiatives involving industry and the research community. Cluster 
initiatives involve different actors in the economy but they are not clusters in 
themselves, although they may support or help build clusters. Finally, it will examine 
a cluster initiative in the software sector that involved an OFC, the Irish state agency 
responsible for the development of indigenous industry and an internationally 
renowned university. In five case studies outlined in this chapter, the social capital 
concept and interviews were used to add depth to the analysis. A number of the case 
studies can be viewed in the context of the building blocks of a national innovation 
system in Ireland.  
Section 5.1: The modern economy - Irish ICT and software 
clusters  
 
Ireland‘s economic development since the late 1950s has been greatly assisted by the 
decisions of multinational corporations to locate the country. This, in turn, has been 
influenced by a range of factors including a favourable tax regime, e.g. the 12.5 
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percent corporation tax rate, and a highly skilled workforce. Access to European 
markets, which is greatly enhanced by Ireland‘s membership of the EU and the euro 
zone, is also an important factor.  While these factors will continue to be important, 
government and business in Ireland are placing increasing emphasis on building a 
knowledge based economy.  As section 4.2 of Chapter 4 outlined, a key focus of 
recent industrial development policy is developing science and technology 
capabilities. The role of SFI and its programmes in developing collaboration between 
enterprise and research organisations, referred to above, is evidence of a building 
block towards a ‗national system of innovation‘ approach. A robust legal system and 
modern business culture are other institutional factors that enhance Ireland‘s 
reputation as a good location for the exploitation and protection of intellectual 
property. An effective legal system gives companies the confidence to invest in 
R&D type activities, with the knowledge that  other companies will respect 
intellectual property rights not only for legal reasons but because they are  also 
focused on innovation. The education system and support for creativity in general 
also contribute to the national system of innovation. 
 
Two sectors in particular have been the focus of this science and technology focused 
industrial policy. The first is the pharmaceutical sector, much of which is located in 
the Munster and Leinster regions. In recent years, activity in this area has expanded 
into sub-sectors of bio-technology and medical devices, extending the geographical 
reach to the Connaught region. The second major area of focus is the information 
and communication technology (ICT) sector. Originally the ICT sector in Ireland 
focused on hardware manufacture and assembly, but increasingly the sector has 
developed in the direction of software and services provision.  This chapter will 
focus primarily on the development of the ICT and software ‗clusters‘ in Ireland, 
although one of the case studies in section 5.4 will examine collaboration in a state 
funded cluster initiative in the biotechnology sector. It will also take an in depth look 
at collaboration between the indigenous industry and Enterprise Ireland in a cluster 
initiative designed to enhance the competitiveness of Irish software SMEs.  
 
In so far as an ICT cluster exists – and this issue is addressed below –  it owes a 
significant part of its origin to the IDA‘s continuing success in attracting leading 
global computer companies to locate substantial manufacturing and services 
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operations in Ireland.  In many cases these MNCs have established their 
headquarters in Ireland for their activity in European, Middle East and Africa 
(EMEA) regions. IBM and Ericssons established operations in Ireland in the mid-
1950s. Hewlett-Packard (hp) and Analog Devices Inc first invested in Ireland in the 
mid 1970s. Microsoft, Intel and Oracle all set up operations in the mid- to late 1980s 
and Dell established an Irish base in 1990. Over the years many of these companies 
have expanded their investments in Ireland with a greater focus on R&D and 
services provision, rather than basic manufacturing. Success continued in the 21
st
 
century, with Google establishing its EMEA headquarters in Ireland in 2004. 
Facebook also decided Ireland was the best place to establish its new headquarters 
for the EMEA in 2008.  
 
Green (2000) argued that, primarily due to the impetus provided by this globalised 
and sophisticated ICT sector, Ireland had recorded an average increase in export 
volumes of more than 12 percent per annum and a trade surplus in excess of 10 
percent of GNP during the 1990s. This overstates the influence of the ICT sector, 
failing to give due credit to the pharmaceuticals and life science sector that has also 
attracted FDI to Ireland. The following facts from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
report on the information society and telecommunications (CSO 2009) indicate that 
the importance of the ICT sector to the economy is nevertheless very substantial:  
  
1. The ICT sector total turnover was valued at €75.6 billion, which accounted 
for 24 percent of total industry and services turnover in Ireland. Almost 51 
percent of this turnover was generated in manufacturing and 49 percent in 
services.    
2. At €15.5 billion, value added in ICT accounted for 19 percent of the total for 
industry and services in Ireland.  
3. The ICT sector in Ireland represented 8 percent of total persons engaged in 
industry and services. Approximately one third of these workers were 
employed in ICT manufacturing, while two-thirds were employed in ICT 
services.   
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, ICT activity in Ireland was characterised by 
manufacture and assembly of electronic hardware. By the late 1990s a more complex 
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integration of manufacturing and software operations was beginning to emerge, 
evidenced by facts (CSO 2009) outlined above. The role played by the indigenous 
software industry in the 2000s is growing in significance, although the multinational 
ICT and software corporations continue to make a major contribution.  
 
Electronic hardware and the decline of microcomputer assembly 
 
The manufacture of micro-computer and mainframe assembly began in Ireland 
during the 1970s. An analysis by Barry and van Egeraat (2008, p53) of the relative 
decline of this hardware sector and how Ireland responded to that challenge, revealed 
an extensive change of both firms and activities since the 1970s.  Early firms, such 
as Digital and Amdahl, were replaced by new PC assembly firms in the mid-1980s 
and 1990s, such as Apple, Dell and Gateway (Barry and van Egeraat 2008, p45).  By 
1998, the Irish microcomputer assembly sector had reached its peak in employment 
terms of 6,719 jobs (van Egeraat and Jacobson 2004, p813). In the 2000s the PC 
assembly firms were coming under intense competitive pressure from lower cost 
locations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In 2001, Gateway closed its European 
manufacturing headquarters, which had been established in 1993, with the loss of 
900 jobs in Dublin. Further evidence of the decline of the hardware assembly sector 
was provided by the Dell decision in 2009 to move production of computer systems 
for customers in the EMEA region from Limerick to its Polish facility. This resulted 
in the loss of 1,900 jobs to the Limerick region. These decisions by Gateway and 
Dell support the view that the concentration of micro-computer assembly plants in 
Ireland was more to do with low wages and fiscal incentives rather than being part of 
a genuine industrial cluster (van Egeraat and Jacobson 2006, p415).  
An embedded ICT sector — the potential for cluster initiatives   
 
However, other firms have stayed in Ireland and adapted their business strategies to 
meet the new challenges. Decisions by these firms to expand high value-added 
functions, including in some case local R&D, provided evidence of a deeper level of 
embeddedness. It suggested that a change in Irish industrial strategy towards a 
‗technology innovation‘ route to cluster development might lead to ‗stickier‘ or more 
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enduring industrial clusters (van Egeraat and Jacobson 2006, p415). From the mid-
1990s onwards, companies like Apple, IBM, Compaq and Sun increasingly added 
functions to local operations. These included sales call centres and higher-end 
activities such as technical support call centres, shared services and software 
development (van Egeraat and Jacobson 2004, p828). By 2001, Apple‘s operations 
in Cork had been transformed from a manufacturing base to a services campus, with 
approximately 66 percent of the 1,200 workforce involved in customer support 
services, finance functions and logistics (Barry and van Egeraat 2008, p48). IBM 
during the course of the 1990s also moved towards an increasing focus on services. 
One-third of IBM staff worked on sales and support for the EMEA region with most 
of the remainder employed in its technology campus just outside Dublin (Cassidy et 
al 2009). As a result as many jobs were created in computer services and Business 
Process Services Export (BPSE) activities as were lost in the hardware sector during 
the early 2000s (Barry and van Egeraat 2008, p53). Many of these services jobs are 
higher-skilled, and not as dependent on low wages as the computer assembly type 
jobs of earlier decades, which may support more enduring cluster development in the 
ICT sector.  
 
The production of electronic components, such as microchips, is also more highly 
skilled than computer assembly and represented a growing share of ICT activity in 
Ireland. The performance of Intel‘s Irish operation in the context of process 
development also provided evidence of embeddedness in the economy. Intel‘s 
decision to invest €2.5 billion in a new FAB 24 fabrication facility in Ireland, 
involving advanced 300 millimetre wafers on both 90 and 65-nanometer process 
technologies, provided a vote of confidence in Ireland as a location in the 21
st
 
century (Barry and Curran 2004, p911)
55
. However, the extent to which increased 
investment by Intel and other multinationals will lead to clustering, particularly with 
indigenous firms, is debatable. Görg and Ruane (2000) used econometric 
methodology to study backward linkages between firms and domestic sub-suppliers 
in the electronic sector. The Forfás definition they used is broad, effectively covering 
the whole ICT sector. Using data for the period 1982 to 1995 they found that foreign 
                                                 
55
 Barry and Curran (2004) also pointed out Scotland, the other major location for the FDI in ICT in 
Europe, did not attract any new investment of a similar scale to the Intel investment in the Ireland at 
this time. 
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firms had lower linkages than indigenous firms. Their research also suggested that 
both foreign and indigenous firms increased their material linkages over time, the 
gap between them narrowing, and that linkages were stronger in the case of services 
firms than for manufacturing (Görg and Ruane 2000, p233). However, the 
limitations of the econometric study based on sample panel data meant that it could 
not be regarded as representative of the total population of firms in the electronic 
sector. Indigenous firms were underrepresented in the study (foreign firms made up 
75 percent of the sample compared to 43 percent of the population), the exclusion of 
small firms led to an over-representation of large firms and the sample‘s coverage in 
terms of employment differed widely by sub-sector (Görg and Ruane 2000, p222). 
Furthermore, while the study commented on the level of linkages and their growth 
over time, the data available did not allow Görg and Ruane (2000, p222) to 
‗distinguish between linkages with domestically based Irish-owned firms and 
domestically based foreign-owned firms‘. Supplementing the econometrics with a 
qualitative methodology, which focused on small firms and the distinctions between 
sub-sectors, could have provided richer and more definite evidence on the linkages 
between indigenous and foreign firms in the electronic industry in Ireland.  
 
A second point to note is that multinational high-tech firms are not immune to 
economic recessions and, in July 2009, Intel announced the implementation of 294 
compulsory redundancies at its older Fab Operations (IFO) facility in Leixlip, Co 
Kildare. This reflected a decline in demand for the less technologically advanced 
products produced at that facility. The Intel announcement attracted significant 
media coverage and raised concerns at both government and society level as to how 
embedded the company really was in Ireland. But Intel was keen to point out that the 
company remained strongly committed to Ireland, having invested more than €6 
billion over 20 years and employed 4,500 at its Leixlip plant and a further 300 at its 
Shannon facility (RTE 2009). Intel management argued that reduced numbers 
employed in Ireland needed to be viewed in the context of the global economic 
recession of the late 2000s, and the closure of six Intel factories in the USA, China, 
Malaysia and the Philippines with a total loss of up to 6,000 jobs. Furthermore, in an 
interview in the Irish Times (Collins 2009), Jim O‘Hara, General Manager of Intel 
suggested an increased focus on research activity in Ireland:  
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―Picture a scenario in five to ten years time where we have 600 or 800 people 
[in Shannon] doing research and development in the core of Intel‘s road map, 
and we have thousands of people delivering the latest generation technology 
here. The combination of that really puts Ireland on the map for Intel 
Corporation as a really strategic piece of its core competency. I don‘t see any 
reason why we can‘t do that.‖  
 
This increased focus on R&D in Ireland by ICT multinationals is also supporting the 
development of research cluster initiatives in Ireland. The extent to which foreign 
owned ICT corporations have added R&D functions to their investments in Ireland, 
as they make the shift from manufacturing to internationally traded services, was 
examined by Grimes and Collins (2009). They concluded that there was evidence to 
suggest that foreign-owned ICT companies were interested in tapping into the 
knowledge resources of local economies. In Ireland this process was facilitated by 
the state through SFI developing focused research clusters involving linkages 
between both foreign and Irish companies and third level institutes (Grimes and 
Collins 2009, p64). As already outlined in Chapter 4, few sectors are within the remit 
of the SFI, namely ICT, biotechnology, medical devices and nanotechnology. Other 
major indigenous sectors, such as the food sector, are effectively excluded from 
receiving state support via SFI.  
 
Grimes and Collins (2009, pp62-63) provided several examples of firms deeply 
embedded in the economy engaging in more R&D activities in Ireland. Nortel 
Networks evolved from manufacturing to an almost complete focus on R&D. In the 
case of IBM, a relatively small R&D operation in Ireland resulted not only in 
important collaboration with other companies and universities but also in important 
linkages with IBM labs in other countries. Within Ireland, R&D activity in the ICT 
sector is heavily concentrated in and around the Dublin region, but the potential of 
collaboration with universities and research institutes outside the capital is also 
important to recognise.  For example, the Tyndall National Institute
56
 played an 
                                                 
 
56
 The Tyndall National Institute was founded in 2004 by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, which established SFI, University College Cork and the Cork Institute of Technology. 
Its focused areas of research include photonics, electronics, material and nanotechnologies.  
 
122 
 
important role in attracting investment in R&D to the Cork/Munster region, where 
both Xilinx and Analog Devices established design centres near the institute. These 
examples suggested economic benefit at regional and national level from 
collaboration. Section 5.4 below explores in greater detail the nature and benefit of 
social capital from collaboration between industry and universities in state supported 
research centres. 
 
The microcomputer/PC assembly subsector relied substantially on low cost labour 
and could not survive in the long term in Ireland, as people became better educated 
and demanded higher wages. But, the research evidence above suggested that, other 
parts of the ICT sector became more embedded over time as companies moved 
towards the provision of traded services and a greater focus on R&D capabilities in 
Ireland. These higher-tech subsectors provided opportunities for higher skilled 
people and were not as sensitive to labour cost pressures as the computer assembly 
subsector. The research also suggested a positive role for collaboration between 
firms and research institutes, which as outlined in section 5.4 below, in a number of 
cases took place in cluster initiatives supported by the state organisation SFI.    
Clustering in the ICT Software and services subsectors  
 
The decision of leading multinational corporations to locate in Ireland has been a key 
factor in the development of indigenous ICT services and the software subsectors. 
Green (2000) estimated that indigenous software firms achieved per annum growth 
rates of 11 percent in employment, 25 percent in the value of sales and almost 40 
percent in the value of exports during the 1990s. An expert group report on future 
skill needs for the ICT sector confirmed that total employment in the sector 
increased rapidly during the 1990s, peaking at over 80,000 in 2000, declining in the 
early years of the 21
st
 century before resuming growth in the mid-2000s (Forfás 
2008, p20)
57
. The global recession of the late 2000s caused employment growth to 
decline once more.  
                                                 
57
 The CSO in their Information Society and Telecommunications report (CSO 2009) estimate that the 
ICT sector in Ireland employed almost 87,200 people in 2006 representing 8% of total persons 
engaged in industry and services. Approximately one third of these workers are employed in ICT 
manufacturing, while two-thirds are employed in ICT services.  This figure is nearly 25% higher than 
the Forfás figure of 70,000 people. Forfas comment that their estimates looks at individual companies 
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At the beginning of the 2000s, O‘Malley and O‘Gorman (2001, pp 318-319) 
concluded that the Irish indigenous software industry can be regarded at least as ‗part 
of something rather like a ‗cluster‘, in the sense used by Porter (1990)‘. Their cluster 
study made a number of interesting findings. The ‗seed‘ role, suggested by Porter for 
FDI in establishing a cluster, had a real significance in the case of the Irish software 
industry. Irish software firms were geographically concentrated in urban centres, 
particularly in Dublin but also around other cities such as Cork and Galway. All four 
elements of the diamond model had impacted on the competitive performance of 
Irish software firms. Factor conditions such as the Irish education system and 
companies‘ own staff training and development (supported by state agencies) had 
been important. Domestic demand conditions were a positive influence in 
developing competitive advantage for the majority of software firms, although for a 
minority of software firms with a strong export focus from the start, domestic 
demand was of little or no relevance. Significant related industries, such as foreign 
owned computer and telecommunications subsectors, provided help in developing 
labour skills and, at times, valuable work experience. For some indigenous software 
firms, related industries actually provided a formal business relationship. In the areas 
of strategy, structure and rivalry, most indigenous Irish software firms had 
‗appropriate strategies of specializing and developing expertise in market niches, 
which appears to give them a sustainable position‘ (O‘Malley and O‘Gorman 2001, 
p318).  
 
Table 5.1 breaks down ICT employment by both subsector and whether the 
companies covered were Irish or overseas owned. The table is based on analysis of 
employment data compiled by Forfás (2008), which estimated the total employment 
in ICT at just fewer than 70,000 in 2006.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
and assess whether or not they are part of the ICT, rather than including all employment within a 
particular NASC code.   
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Table 5.1: ICT employment by sub-sector and company ownership 
  
Sub-sector Irish 
Owned 
Overseas 
Owned 
Total Sub-
sector 
Share of 
Total 
Irish 
Owned 
Share of 
Subsector 
Overseas 
Owned 
Share of 
Subsector 
    Percent Percent Percent 
Software 11,545 15,866 27,411 39.6 42.1 57.9 
IT Services 1,119 1,803 2,922 4.2 38.3 61.7 
Web 316 3,404 3,720 5.4 8.5 91.5 
Electronic 
IC Design 
494 1,881 2,375 3.4 20.8 79.2 
ICT Storage 
Media 
0 329 329 0.5 0.0 100.0 
Electronic 
Hardware 
3,011 18,087 21,098 30.5 14.3 85.7 
Semiconductor 
Production 
164 5,884 6,048 8.7 2.7 97.3 
Automation / 
Control 
Services 
1,393 128 1,521 2.2 91.6 8.4 
ICT 
Distribution 
987 1,081 2,068 3.0 47.7 52.3 
Financial 
Service 
Unit of  ICT 
Company 
0 544 544 0.8 0.0 100.0 
Business 
Process 
Outsourcing 
154 399 553 0.8 27.8 72.2 
Shared Services 
of  ICT 
Company 
0 622 622 0.9 0.0 100.0 
Total 19,183 50,028 69,211 100.0 27.7 72.3 
 
Source: Based on Forfás, 2008, p24. 
 
The data provided further evidence of the importance of the software sector and the 
Irish ownership of that subsector.  By 2006, software companies accounted for 39.6 
percent of total employment in the ICT sector compared to 30.5 percent in electronic 
hardware and 8.7 percent in semiconductor production. Employment in Irish owned 
software companies accounted for 42.1 percent of employment in the subsector 
versus 57.9 percent in foreign owned companies. This employment pattern was a 
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significant contrast to the electronic hardware subsector, where Irish owned 
companies accounted for 14.3 percent of employment while foreign owned 
companies accounted for 85.7 percent.  
 
The contrast was even more pronounced in the case of the semiconductor subsector, 
where Irish owned companies accounted for a very modest 2.7 percent of 
employment versus 97.3 percent in foreign owned companies. Table 5.1 also 
illustrates that significant numbers of Irish people were employed in the provision of 
a range of ICT services. 
 
 Furthermore, in the case of ICT services, while the gap in productivity between 
foreign and Irish owned was still substantial, it was far less so than for ICT 
manufacturing. Average GVA (gross value added) per person engaged in foreign 
owned services enterprises was €190,800, approximately 2.6 times that in Irish 
owned enterprises at €72,340 (CSO 2009a, p10).  
 
In addition to the importance of software and ICT services for employment, these 
subsectors also played an increasingly important role in terms of exports. The value 
of Irish exports of internationally traded services increased from €21.5 billion in 
2000 to €66.6 billion in 2009, and accounted for 45% of total Irish exports. Exports 
of computer related services, including software, valued at €24.2 billion in 2009 by 
the CSO, accounted for the single biggest category (IBEC 2009, p2). 
58
 This increase 
in exports of computer related services was important, not least because of the 
decline in merchandise exports of ICT at the end of the 2000s with the closure of the 
Dell plant in Limerick.   
                                                 
 
58
 Other key export categories in 2009 included Financial (€5.7 billion), insurance (€7.6 billion) and 
business (€20.5 billion) services.   
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Section 5.2: Social capital and Organisations for Collaboration 
(OFCs): ICT Ireland and the Irish Software Association  
 
By the end of the 2000s, all sectors of the Irish economy, including ICT and 
software, faced significant challenges due to the economic recession and the collapse 
of the Irish banking system. In December 2008, the Irish government, in part 
response to the economic downturn at that time, published a framework for 
sustainable economic renewal entitled ‗Building Ireland‘s Smart Economy‘.  The 
smart economy is described as combining ‗the successful elements of the enterprise 
economy and the innovation or ‗ideas‘ economy, while promoting a high-quality 
environment, improving energy security and promoting social cohesion‘ (DOT 2008, 
p7). The primary objective of the document was to outline a pathway, which 
acknowledged the severe challenges facing the economy, to return to sustainable 
economic growth in the medium term (DOT 2008).  
 
Figure 5.1 Accumulated capital in a Smart Economy 
 
Source: DOT 2008, p33. 
 
The framework (Figure 5.1) outlined that ‗smart economic growth recognises the 
interdependence between four forms of capital accumulation that drive the economic 
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and social progress of a nation‘(DOT 2008, pp32-33). Despite the inclusion of social 
capital as one of four types of capital accumulated in order to drive economic 
growth, the document exhibited only a partial understanding of the concept.  
 
It defined social capital in an all encompassing way as ‗the networks, connections, 
mutual trust and shared values and behaviours of the population‘ (DOT 2008, p32) 
but failed to elaborate on what this actually means.  The document set down 
objectives to ‗increase significantly the capital and business networks for start-up 
research-intensive enterprises‘ (DOT 2008, p61) and argued that ‗networks are key 
drivers for turning research and innovation into valuable commercialised products 
and services‘ (DOT 2008, p62).  It stated that:   
 
‗Smart Capital‘ can be defined as (a) adequate levels of early stage funds for 
SMEs; (b) providing value-added networks to key decision-makers; and (c) 
experienced investment managers. (DOT 2008, p64).  
 
But no consideration is given to how such value-added networks can be created or 
supported. No distinction is made between bonding and bridging social capital or 
between structural and cognitive forms of social capital. In fact in the 104 page 
document, there is essentially no discussion of how social capital works in the 
business or any other context. Apart from the all encompassing definition above, the 
only other reference to social capital is that Ireland as an attractive place to live and 
work is ‗supported by recent investment in social and cultural infrastructure as well 
as historic social capital in voluntary (e.g. sports and cultural) organisations‘ (DOT 
2008, p63).  The framework document will do little to support the development of 
the value-added networks it defines as an integral part of ‗smart capital.  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed key literature streams on the emerging social capital concept and 
the analysis undertaken in this and subsequent sections will apply learning from this 
literature to understanding collaboration in the modern economy.  
  
Throughout the economic challenges of the late 2000s, the ICT sector remained a 
key sector of the Irish economy. Sections 5.1 provided evidence of an evolving 
sector, with a significant number of multinational and indigenous firms becoming 
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more embedded in the economy. The multinational subsector had evolved from an 
initial focus on microcomputer assembly to a more complex combination of high 
tech production and services. Indigenous software firms were also becoming 
embedded in clusters concentrated in urban centres.    
 
In order to understand the role of social capital in the ICT sector in Ireland, one has 
to go back to the beginning of the 2000s when industry representation in the ICT 
sector was rather fragmented, with several OFCs representing different ICT 
subsectors. The American Chamber of Commerce represented the interests of US 
multinational corporations, including ICT corporations.  The Irish Software 
Association (ISA) represented the interests of multinationals and indigenous 
software firms. There were also a number of other associations representing a range 
of areas connected to the ICT sector. But there was no one organisation focused on 
the needs of the ICT sector as whole. Consequently, in 2001, the Irish Business 
Employers Confederation (IBEC) formed a new OFC, ICT Ireland, to represent the 
interests of the overall ICT sector. In this case IBEC acted as a broker between the 
different ICT subsectors to bridge what Burt (1997, 2004) might describe as the 
structural gaps that characterised business representation in the sector. 
 
Case study 1: ICT Ireland and ISA - bonding social capital  
 
Coleman (1994, p302) saw social capital as building up ‗social structural resources‘.  
This case study illustrates that structure can be an important aspect of building ties 
between firms in organisations for collaboration (OFCs) and facilitating bonding 
social capital, where reciprocity is inherent in the relationships developed. However, 
it also suggests that structure alone is not sufficient; shared norms and values, such 
as the recognition of the importance of reciprocity and belief in the network, 
described by Krishna and Uphoff (1999, p7) as cognitive social capital, is also 
important. 
 
ICT Ireland comprised over 300 foreign-owned and indigenous companies from the 
hardware, software and telecommunications subsectors. Six industry associations 
affiliated to the new umbrella organisation. These covered areas such as software, 
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telecoms and the internet, cellular phones, the audio visual industry and consumer 
electronics. ICT Ireland was made up of a large number of firms, some who directly 
competed with each other in the marketplace and others who complemented each 
other in the supply chain of technology. There were also differences in terms of 
market focus, for example telecommunication companies mainly focused on the 
domestic Irish market while the ICT multinationals focused on Europe, the Middle 
East and African (EMEA) markets. In a sector with such large numbers of 
companies focused on different aspects of technology and different markets, 
companies‘ knowledge of each other and relationships of trust varied quite 
considerably. In effect, the information necessary to facilitate cooperation for mutual 
benefit and the norms of reciprocity inherent in social networks (Putnam 1995, 
Woolcock 1998) were underdeveloped in the sector.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the distinction between structural and cognitive social capital. 
Structural capital facilitates mutually beneficial collective action (MBCA) through 
social networks supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents, while cognitive 
social capital predisposes people toward MBCA on the basis of shared norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs (Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p7).  The structure of the 
new ICT Ireland organisation (Figure 5.2) was important in strengthening the bonds 
between firms that would facilitate coordinated action to achieve desired goals for 
the sector. A governing council of ICT Ireland was formed, composed of CEOs who 
represented multinational and indigenous members and their various subsector 
groups. An ICT Chairman was appointed from among the membership of this 
council, which would meet twice a year to review and agree overall policy and the 
progress of the organisation.  
 
The strengthening of bonds was most successful between ICT multinationals and the 
software subsector, which was represented by the Irish Software Association (ISA). 
These firms were focused on delivering sales internationally, although the market 
penetration of the indigenous software sector was far less developed than that of the 
ICT multinationals. However, the ICT Ireland objective of strengthening bonds was 
not equally successful in all cases. For the telecommunication subsector, major 
companies maintained their seats on the governing council of ICT Ireland but social 
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capital ties with the other subsectors remained relatively weak. As Interviewee 5A 
commented: 
 
―Vodafone and O2 here are predominately serving the Irish market. The guys 
in Microsoft, Google etc. are serving the Irish market, but also the EMEA 
markets and even some global markets. Therefore the issues for the 
multinationals who are the IT part of ICT are different to the 
telecoms…When an issue comes up that is interesting to them they will take 
part but their agenda is …covered through the TIF structure, but the Director 
of TIF and a lot of the CEOs are still on the governing council of ICT 
Ireland.‖   
 
Therefore, the telecoms companies largely focused on developing the Irish market 
and preferred to maintain a higher level of independence from ICT Ireland than other 
sub-sectors, through their Telecommunication and Internet Federation (TIF) 
organisation. TIF maintained its organisational structure quite separately from ICT 
Ireland, serviced by a different team of executives. Two additional affiliates of ICT 
Ireland, the cellular phone and audio visual groups, were also run by TIF‘s Executive 
Director and his team.  
 
There was a far higher degree of integration between the two organisations ICT 
Ireland and the ISA, with both serviced by the same Executive Director and 
executive team.  The structures of ICT Ireland and the ISA were similar (see Figure 
5.2 and 5.3 below), with a governing or executive council at the top of each 
organisation, to which working groups reported. The working groups of the two 
organisations were important in building bonds between members, with each group 
comprising industry specialists from ICT and software companies. The working 
groups, in each case supported by the appointment of a chairperson and the recording 
of minutes and action points, facilitated substantial information sharing and 
collective action in a range of different areas. For example, the ICT Ireland 
organisation established a public affairs group to work with the governing council in 
preparing for high level meetings and to coordinate the organisation‘s interaction 
with third parties.  
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Figure 5.2: ICT Ireland: OFC council and working group structure - bonding social capital 
 
 
Figure 5.3: ISA Ireland: OFC council and working group structure - bonding social capital 
 
Source: ICT Ireland 
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Interviewee 5A outlined that:   
 
―We set up the public affairs group to serve two purposes. One is to help us 
prepare for our clearing house meetings
59
, where we deal with a lot of the 
current issues with the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation. The 
second is to act as a coordinating body for our engagement with high profile 
external bodies such as parliamentarians, government departments, agencies 
etc. They try to capture the main themes that the Governing Council discuss 
and guide us in terms of public affairs action in relation to those themes.‖   
 
The ICT Ireland governing council wished to encourage more students and graduates 
to consider a career in the ICT sector. So the public affairs group prepared a position 
paper that outlined the skills needed, the number of jobs available etc and met with 
key education journalists to encourage them to cover the issue in media articles 
targeted at students. According to Interviewee 5A, the group proved to be a 
significant asset to the ICT Ireland organisation, leveraging off the substantial 
knowledge and skills of public affairs managers from major multinational 
corporations such as IBM, HP and Intel.  
  
The working groups also made a significant contribution in terms of building ties 
and social capital bonds between ICT Ireland members in a range of areas. For 
example, members of the trade and customs working group included both ICT 
multinationals and software providers. It focused on understanding and 
implementation of new electronic custom procedures developed at EU level. 
Members worked together to influence how these new procedures were introduced in 
Ireland to replace the paper based export and imports control systems. The group 
elected its own Chairman who, together with an ICT Ireland executive, prepared 
agendas and working papers for meetings. One benefit for group members was 
coming together with industry peers to interpret new EU legislation and customs 
rules, instead of trying to interpret new procedures in isolation. Interviewee 5B, a 
                                                 
59
 The clearing house structure between ICT Ireland and Department of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation is explored in details in the next section.  
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working group member and chairperson, commented in this regard that:  
 
―This provides cross fertilisation of ideas and potential concerns.  In one 
instance where a new export control SI [Statutory Instrument] was being 
drafted, ICT Ireland was able to ensure a potential unintended catch-all was 
refocused to the primary target and [would] not side swipe other exports.  It 
was much easier to do this at inception rather than by a introducing a clean-
up amendment [to the SI at a later date].‖   
 
Therefore, members of the trade and customs working group were able to learn about 
these new rules as they were being developed, which placed their firms in a strong 
position to be at the forefront of introducing new electronic procedures. This yielded 
benefits for the firms themselves in terms of their own export and import procedures. 
It also meant that indigenous software firms, who had been involved in the ICT 
Ireland working group, were in a stronger position than their non-group competitors 
to develop new software packages and services in the customs area. They could then 
sell these packages and services to client companies across Irish industry, who would 
need to introduce the electronic export and import controls in order to comply with 
new EU legislation. 
 
Discussions with Interviewee 5A indicated that other ICT and ISA working groups 
operated in a similar way to that described above and helped to strengthen 
membership bonds in areas such as procurement and environment. Coleman (1988, 
pS98) defined a bonding form of social capital by its functions and the ICT Ireland 
structure facilitated information sharing, discussion and collective action on issues of 
a highly technical nature through its working groups. In effect, the ICT working 
groups strengthened bonds between the different individuals and firms involved and 
yielded both private and public social capital benefits. Further evidence of the close 
bonds built up within the ICT and ISA structures was that the two organisations 
shared certain working groups on HR and Education and Skills.  This facilitated a 
significant level of joint activity when collaborating with other actors such as 
government.  Discussions with both Interviewee 5A and 5B emphasised the 
importance of achieving the commitment of a number of firms in committees and 
working groups. If one firm dominated, in terms of input or control, or if different 
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group members did not feel that there was a genuine level of reciprocity, then the 
committee or working group was unlikely to be effective in the medium to long 
term. This suggested that structure alone was not sufficient. Shared norms and 
values, such as the importance of reciprocity and belief in the network, described by 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999, p7) as cognitive social capital, were also important.  
 
Before concluding this section, it is appropriate to focus briefly on the Irish Software 
Association (ISA), which was founded in the 1970s. The ISA chose to work closely 
with ICT Ireland and benefited significantly from social capital interaction within the 
latter organisation‘s structure. For example, ISA member collaboration with the 
multinational members in ICT Ireland committees and working groups increased 
their access to top level government officials. ISA members also benefited from the 
opportunity to collaborate with companies at different points along the ICT supply 
chain, strengthening the bonds that tied the combined ICT and software sector 
together.  However, the ISA organisation also maintained its own identity and 
continued to service the needs of around 200 software company members. The ISA 
has its own Council, Chairperson and working group structure (Figure 5.3) to work 
on issues of concern and advance the specific interests of their subsector.  In the case 
of the ISA, the mix between multinational software corporations and indigenous 
software SMEs was an important characteristic of the organisation, as Interviewee 
5A commented: 
 
―Google, Microsoft and Oracle are on our ISA Executive Council, so it is 
made up of a mix of multinationals and [indigenous] SMEs. In the software 
community, everything is inextricably linked in the software ecosystem in 
Ireland. So you require both, they both gain mutual benefit off each other.‖ 
 
Strong ties bind a network together and motivate people to helps others and to work 
together (Granovetter 1973, 1983). This case study indicated that ICT and software 
firms worked together effectively to strengthen ties within their sector.  The ICT 
Ireland structure, with its governing council, public affairs and working groups, 
facilitated coordinated action to achieve desired goals for the firms involved. The 
ISA organisation structure facilitated a focus on issues of specific interest to software 
entrepreneurs. Field argued that ‗social capital may be termed capital insofar as it 
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gives rise to resources that can be deployed in order to enable actors – both 
individual and groups – to pursue their goals more effectively then they could 
without it (Field 2008, p159). The bonding social capital achieved by ICT Ireland 
and the ISA choosing to work closely together, yielded benefits for multinational and 
indigenous information technology and software firms, satisfying the criterion 
outlined by Field. The same cannot be said in the case of telecommunications firms 
who maintained weaker ties with ICT Ireland and largely pursued their sub-sector 
interests within their own organisation, TIF.  
Case Study 2: ICT Ireland and the ISA   bridging social capital 
 
This second case study shows that the OFCs ICT Ireland and ISA also facilitated 
bridging social capital (Figure 5.4). Chapter 2 discussed the distinction between 
bonding and bridging social capital, with the former providing denser networks and 
the latter creating larger networks (Putnam 2001, Sobel 2002). Bourdieu‘s (1986) 
conceptualisation of social capital focused on the benefit of external relations and 
equated the volume of social capital possessed by any given actor as depending on 
the size and extent of network connections. Nooteboom (2007) emphasised the 
relationship between groups, rather than within groups, as the most relevant 
relationship in social capital terms. This case will provide examples of how ICT 
Ireland and the ISA extended their network of relations and connections beyond their 
own industry sector. Putnam (1995) saw an integral role for trust among networks 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit in his definition of 
social capital, while Burt (1997) highlighted the advantage of being the broker in 
relations between people otherwise disconnected in social structures. This case 
illustrates that, at least in one instance, the respect gained by ICT Ireland and the ISA 
as organisations for collaboration that could be trusted by government and its 
agencies helped deliver that broker advantage. However, in other instances, trust was 
seen as something developed within a bridging social capital relationship.  
The Customs Consultative Committee (CCC)  
 
This first example of ICT Ireland engaging in extending its network of connections 
involved the trade and customs working group referred in case study 1 above. The 
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group selected its Chairman, who came from an ICT multinational, an indigenous 
software firm member and an ICT Ireland executive to represent their interests on 
the national Customs Consultative Committee (CCC) established by government.  
Figure 5.4: ICT Ireland and ISA: broker advantage – bridging 
social capital 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram  
 
The CCC was chaired by an assistant secretary general of the Irish Revenue 
Commissioners and there was active industry participation in the committee. The 
CCC structure gave ICT Ireland
60
 regular access to such high-level officials who 
were not only influential in a national context but who also represented Ireland at EU 
Commission meetings, where new customs rules were developed. This aligns, at the 
group level, with Bourdieu‘s (1986) idea that an actor‘s social capital is extended by 
the volume of capital possessed by those to whom the actor is connected. As 
highlighted in case study 1 above, social capital benefits for group members were 
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enhanced by increased understanding of new customs rules. The bridge that the CCC 
created with the revenue commissioners facilitated this with ICT Ireland bringing 
back information to their working group members and bringing forward industry 
concerns to the CCC. There were also broader bridging social capital benefits from 
the ICT Ireland involvement in the CCC, spanning the gap between industry 
managers and the network of customs officials responsible for introducing new 
procedures. Interviewee 5B, an ICT Ireland working group chairman and member of 
the CCC, commented that:  
 
―The fundamental benefit of ICT [Ireland] is our ability to develop trusting 
relationships at an executive level with customs and trade enforcement 
agencies, where each party gets to understand the other to a degree not 
otherwise possible.‖ 
 
This facilitated the dissemination of information on customs procedures to industry 
in general, helped to prepare firms to meet these new challenges, helped custom 
officials to understand the challenges that new procedures would present to firms and 
helped to resolve differences between the two groups when they arose. The quotation 
above suggests that trust was an outcome of engagement in the CCC structure, or at 
least developed within it, rather than a precursor of it. It also aligns with Woolcock‘s 
(2001, p9) assertion that we invest in the social capital networks that produce trust, 
rather than trust in and of itself.  
The ICT Clearing House  
 
A second higher level example of bridging social capital was the ‗clearing house‘ 
established in the late 2000s by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation 
(DETI)
61
 and ICT Ireland. Under this structure the DETI Secretary General met with 
a high level delegation from ICT Ireland on a quarterly basis to help solve problems 
facing the sector. The Secretary General invited senior officials from his own 
department or from other government departments depending on the items on the 
agenda for discussion e.g. education, tax credits and accounting rules for R&D, 
procurement (DETI 2010). The ICT Ireland delegation comprised the Chairman and 
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 In 2011, the name of the department changed to the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation 
(DJEI). The change had no immediate impact on the clearing house or the way it operated.  
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CEO members of ICT Ireland‘s governing council, including the ISA Chairman, and 
senior company managers from the organisation‘s Public Affairs Group.  
  
When asked why the interaction between the DETI and ICT Ireland in this clearing 
house structure was valuable, Interviewee 5A from the industry side commented: 
 
―Because things get actioned and completed very quickly. The set up is there 
to deal with crucial issues that come up. The relationship has been built up 
over time, they trust us and understand quickly what the issues are … It‘s a 
very open debate as to what might work, what won‘t work and indentifying 
solutions. It is an open discussion, open engagement that works quickly and 
is also very pragmatic.‖ 
 
This view of an open engagement built on trust was also reflected in an interview 
with a high level civil servant covering the clearing house structure and other 
processes of collaboration with industry. Interviewee 5C from the state side 
commented:  
 
―Trust is a huge aspect of collaboration ..; very often we are taken into spaces 
that are quite sensitive. … being able to trust people..that [sic] will respect 
confidences, that [sic] will not run off issuing press releases in the middle of 
a process. …If trust is solid and maintained, it allows people...to be much 
more open, constructive and prepared to go into areas... that they might 
otherwise be nervous of. Where trust is strained or begins to break down, I 
would say that it would seriously impair the capacity of the government side 
to be as open and engaged in these kind of collaborative environments as 
they ideally should be.‖ 
 
Therefore, in the context of the clearing house, trust could be seen as a cause of 
social capital rather than an outcome, which aligns with Putnam‘s definition (1995) 
that trust facilitates cooperation for mutual benefit. This contrasts with the social 
capital of ICT Ireland where the structure of the organisation (Figure 5.2) 
strengthened bonds, with increased levels of trust between firms being an outcome. 
However, the quotation from Interviewee 5B above in relation to the ICT Ireland 
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working group involvement in the CCC committee suggested that, in certain 
instances, bridging forms of social capital can build relations of trust as well as being 
based on such relationships. Nooteboom (2007, p33) emphasised that social capital 
requires investment in terms of effort and sacrifice and that trust cannot be bought 
and installed, which suggests in many instances trust may need to develop over time.  
 
Furthermore, the clearing house structure certainly enabled the trust that existed 
between ICT Ireland and the DETI to be secured and enhanced. ICT Ireland could 
raise industry concerns at the highest level with the government department most 
closely aligned to the development of their sector. Once an issue was discussed with 
the Secretary General, further lower level meetings were set up with relevant 
officials and ICT Ireland to work on solving the problem identified or advancing a 
particular item (DETI 2010). This had distinct bridging social capital benefits for 
ICT Ireland members because not only were industry issues discussed at the highest 
level but also follow up action was taken with the endorsement of the DETI 
Secretary General. As Interviewee 5A from the industry side commented:  
 
―Then we can have further meetings [with other officials] but the important 
point is that we are not going to these individuals as a cold call. Essentially 
the Secretary General has said to these people, be they Assistant Secretaries 
or Principal Officers in the DETI or other departments, this is a key issue for 
the department and a key issue for the ICT Sector. That tends to get things 
done more quickly.‖ 
 
Woolcock (1998), in his definition of social capital, emphasised that norms of 
reciprocity inherent in one‘s social network were important. The above comment by 
a senior organisation executive indicates that industry gained significant value from 
the clearing house relationship.  The ICT clearing house and other collaborative 
processes were also valued by the state side, as Interview 5C commented: 
 
―We see, from the state side, collaboration as absolutely intrinsic and 
essential to develop the business environment in which we are trying to 
create growth, whether it is in the research space or with a sector such as ICT 
or Pharma or Financial Services. It is absolutely imperative that there is 
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collaboration, an interaction, cross fertilisation and understanding of where 
business is coming from. I think it is terribly important for business to 
understand where the state is coming from. ….but it would be a fatal mistake 
for the state to stand in some form of isolation and decide what is good for 
business unilaterally.‖ 
 
The above quotation also illustrates once again, similar to case study 1, that structure 
on its own is not sufficient to create bridging social capital. Cognitive social capital 
predisposes people towards mutually beneficial collective action on the basis of 
shared norms, values, attitudes and beliefs (Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p7). The 
attitudes to collaboration and the value placed on developing such relationships 
expressed by Interviewee 5C from the state side, and shared by the industry side (see 
below) were important in achieving the bridging social capital within the ICT 
clearing house structure. The shared nature of these attitudes and values, between 
state and industry actors, once again suggests the importance of reciprocity in such 
bridging social capital relations.  
 
In addition to benefits to companies in the sector, this bridging social capital 
interaction between the government department and ICT Ireland also had broader 
societal benefits. The education area is an example of how private and public social 
capital benefits can at times converge. From the ICT Ireland perspective, a world 
class education system was a key strategic objective in ensuring that Ireland 
remained a competitive location for investment by both foreign and Irish owned 
firms. A better education system would not only address the skills needs of the sector 
and further embed the ICT and software clusters in Ireland, but could also contribute 
to building a national system of innovation. Interviewee 5A added: 
 
―There is an understanding that achieving economic goals allows us to 
achieve social goals. There is a real collegiality in the room that both sides 
see it as honest discussion in order to improve Ireland‘s prosperity…. From 
the companies‘ perspective, improving Ireland‘s education system would be 
the biggest social goal, which is important for whatever sector or part of 
society you are coming from. For the ICT sector, a ‗world class‘ education 
system is an incredibly strong competitive advantage. It attracts and holds 
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companies here. From a social perspective a well educated society is very 
important for a whole range of different reasons.‖ 
 
The above quotation from Interviewee 5A, from the industry side, provides further 
evidence of the importance of cognitive social capital and reciprocity, here reflected 
in shared values and beliefs in improving Ireland‘s prosperity and education system, 
with benefits not only for the sector but for broader society.  At times, ICT Ireland 
member firms have been outspoken critics of the Irish educational system, second 
and third level, with the objective of keeping standards achieved at the level required 
of an innovation driven economy.  Jim O‘Hara, Vice President of Intel Corporation 
and Intel Ireland General Manager in an interview with the Business & Finance 
magazine emphasised that it should be the policy to make the Irish education system 
among the best in the world and stated that: 
 
The other aspiration we should have is that enough bright young students are 
pursuing disciplines, science, engineering and technology, that are 
strategically important to the country. Industry can play more of a role here 
by showing students what the future can look like in areas like pharma, 
information technology and engineering (Walsh 2009).  
 
In this context, ICT Ireland worked in collaboration with a number of schools and 
member firm executives to inform students of career opportunities in the ICT sector. 
Putnam (2001) argued that, at least in some instances, social capital results in 
‗demonstrable externalities‘ or public goods, in addition to benefits to the people 
involved in the networks. ICT Ireland‘s commitment to improving educational 
standards and its work with schools is evidence of a bridging social capital that 
extends far beyond the industry sector itself. The organisation was a strong advocate 
for a focus on maths and science in second level education. ICT Ireland, bridging 
social capital linkage with the broader business group IBEC (discussed below), was 
also important in pursuing this objective. Both IBEC and ICT Ireland welcomed the 
decision by the Irish government to award an additional 25 points to honours maths 
in the leaving cert from 2014 onwards. 
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The DETI clearing house structure is an example of how the state worked with the 
ICT and software community to advance ideas and address problems to the benefit 
of both sides, with reciprocity inherent in the relationship. Interviewee 5C referred to 
further examples of this form of bridging social capital involving both the state and 
industry in Ireland such as the Company Law Review Group and various task forces 
set up for a defined period of time to address a particular issue and produce 
recommendations for government e.g. Innovation Task Force.  There was no 
standard model for choosing partners for these various initiatives. One of the 
strengths of social capital is that it emphasises resources that communities already 
have and encourages the state to work with, and build on, this potential (Woolcock  
2001, p15, Field 2008, p141). Sometimes the state side worked with organisations 
for collaboration such as in the ICT and Financial Services Clearing House 
structures. At other times, for various task forces, the state chooses specific public 
and private sector partners depending on the item being addressed e.g. innovation, 
taxation, company law etc.  Coleman (1994) and Woolcock (2001) both saw social 
capital, which resides in relationships, as complementary to human capital, which 
resides in individuals. In the various social capital relationships outlined by 
Interviewee 5C there was evidence that the state side saw benefit from working with, 
and leveraging off, the human capital resources in the business community:  
 
―We are leveraging off the knowledge, the expertise, and the intellectual 
capital of the people who are out there. The state side brings its offering and 
capacity to the table, to legislate, to develop policy, to adapt the taxation 
system or whatever it might be. We try to use the cutting edge expertise of 
the people who are closer to the market, the people who live the challenge 
everyday of making decisions on major investments, trying to gain export 
sales, trying to compete themselves with competitors around the globe.‖ 
 
The clearing house operated in a different way to organisations for collaboration 
such as ICT Ireland and the ISA. The clearing house model did not involve the 
formal establishment of working groups, although items discussed were advanced at 
follow-up meetings at a lower level between industry and the state. For the clearing 
house, interviewee 5C viewed structure as relevant in terms of getting the right 
people involved, an appropriate balance between public and private sector, getting 
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the right working methodology and timelines to ensure effective outputs. 
Interviewees from both the state and industry side emphasised flexibility to enable 
different participants and experts to attend meetings, to share specialist knowledge in 
areas such as taxation or education, depending on the agenda. Trust was seen as an 
important precursor of this bridging social capital, with any breakdown in trust 
between partners seen as limiting the openness and potential benefits of the 
collaborative engagement.  
ISA and Enterprise Ireland  
 
A third example of bridging social capital involved the ISA, the organisation for 
collaboration for the software industry, working with Enterprise Ireland, the state 
agency responsible for the development of indigenous SMEs. This collaboration 
with the state goes back many years with the ISA organising trade missions with the 
National Software Directorate, a state body that preceded the establishment of 
Enterprise Ireland, in order to build linkages with US companies (Ó‘Riain 1997, 
p202). Given the large number of SME members, the ISA was keen to help 
companies build scale and gain access to funding from state agencies and 
government programmes. Cooke (2007a, p83 and p104), in his regional analysis of 
social capital in the UK, emphasised the importance for SME development of 
developing close linkages to programme executives responsible for government 
funding support and investment grants. Interviewee 5A, commenting on the 
importance for the ISA of developing its relationship with the state agency, said:  
 
―It is one of the platforms for the executive, the council and the chair of the 
ISA to develop linkages with Enterprise Ireland. So, for example, every 
couple of months we meet with the head of the software division in 
Enterprise Ireland and run through our agendas together etc. …Collaboration 
is not just something that can be picked up easily, it is all about relationships. 
From an ISA point of view, and I have seen this because we have had a 
number of chairs, that its about having a chair that is respected by the 
agencies – then they will engage with you much more readily. So we have 
built good relationships from the CEO right down to the development 
officers that sign off on company grants.‖ 
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Cooke (2007a, p100) found that social capital was a key ingredient for successful 
SME performance and was the very nature of most SME businesses. Interviewee 5A 
also emphasised the importance for the ISA, from an industry development 
perspective, of building strong relations with the state agency:  
 
―If you want to create a community of software companies, that requires a lot 
of networking, a lot of engagement and discussions with different agencies. 
Enterprise Ireland provided support for high potential start ups and other 
groups of companies, they also held sessions on technical issues etc. So there 
are a lot of support mechanisms that Enterprise Ireland provided, almost like 
an arm of the software company community.‖ 
 
In addition to the benefit of regular one to one meetings with the state agency, the 
ISA gained bridging social capital benefits from frequent engagement between IBEC 
sector organisations as a group, which included the ISA, and Enterprise Ireland. This 
brought industry concerns right up to the CEO and board level of the state agency 
and the broader business organisation.  
 
One good example of the benefit to software companies of the close relationship 
built up with the state agency is an ISA project supported under Enterprise Ireland‘s 
Enterprise Innovation Networks initiative. Under this initiative, the ISA applied for, 
and successfully secured, funding for two and half years for the development of a 
software innovation network. Interviewee 5A outlined that:  
 
―We set up the ‗Irish Software Innovation Network‘, which employs Michael 
Martin on a full time basis. He works within the ISA and his whole objective 
is to achieve engagement between the software community and the research 
community. To try to commercialise research that is taking place, he works 
with the indigenous software community and with software multinationals – 
again all about trying to develop a community. It is a practical element to 
fulfil the discussions that have been taking place about how do we get more 
research commercialised out of our universities and institutes of technology. 
All the stories we hear about companies like Google emerging from a strong 
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link with Stanford University, how do we get that type of business going here 
in Ireland?‖ 
 
The organisation structure of the ISA contributed to this initiative with their 
Industries and Academia working group acting as a steering committee for the 
network. The ISA saw this as very positive because, instead of simply looking at 
policy, the group was now actively engaged in delivering an innovation based 
initiative for the software community. The executive employed under the network 
initiative acted as a broker between software companies and the research community. 
He reported to the Steering Committee with his performance measured against a 
matrix of deliverables, for example, the number of collaborations facilitated during 
this year, his input to these initiatives, and so on.   
 
The ISA also provided subsidised training for firms through a government supported 
‗Software Skillnet‘ programme and developed an ‗All-Island Software Network‘, 
together with software firms in Northern Ireland with the support of the cross border 
agency Intertrade Ireland. A cluster initiative involving the ISA, Enterprise Ireland 
and a world class university is outlined and discussed in greater detail in section 5.4 
below. These various examples highlight the potential bridging social capital 
benefits of state agencies, such as Enterprise Ireland, working with established and 
well structured organisations, such as the ISA, in cluster initiatives. As Fukuyama 
(2001, p18) has pointed out, governments and their agencies can negatively impact 
social capital if they seek to undertake activities that are better left to the private 
sector. In this case, Enterprise Ireland by collaborating with the ISA, an organisation 
established more than twenty years prior to the state agency, leveraged off the social 
capital bonds already in existence and developed in the software community. It also 
accords with the idea (Woolcock 2001, p15, Field 2008, p141) that one of the 
strengths of social capital is that it emphasises resources that communities already 
have and encourages agencies to work with and build on this potential. Cooke 
(2007a, p82-83) argued that where state agencies run programmes, social capital 
linkages nearly always involve rent seeking. It is certainly true that a substantial part 
of the motivation for the ISA in building a relationship with the state agency was 
gaining access to funding i.e. rent seeking. But this should not be viewed negatively 
if the social capital benefits support the objectives of the state and industry to build a 
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stronger software community. Cooke  and Willis (1999, p233) concluded that 
policies focused on innovation that succeeded in building up social capital for SMEs, 
through supporting collaboration and networking, produced positive results for a 
significant portion of SMEs in terms of business performance, innovation and 
knowledge exploitation. However, Fukuyama (2001, p18) warned against supporting 
organisations that simply spring up to write proposals and gain access to state funds. 
By working with the ISA, Enterprise Ireland was engaging with an OFC that had 
existed for approximately forty years and was involved in a wide range of social 
capital activity. This also meant that the state agency was using a resource available 
in the community as recommended by Woolcock (1998). 
ICT Ireland and IBEC  
 
A fourth example of bridging social capital benefits arose from the decision to set up 
ICT Ireland within the business group, IBEC. Woolcock (1998, 2001) defined social 
capital in terms of the norms of reciprocity inhering in social networks that facilitate 
collective action. ICT Ireland became part of a broader network of sector groups 
from a diverse range of industrial areas within IBEC. The chair of ICT Ireland 
automatically got a seat on the IBEC national council and the organisation 
nominated a number of CEOs of member companies to sit on the council
62
. This 
meant that CEOs from ICT Ireland sat around the table with other business leaders of 
the day to share information on and discuss economic and business developments. 
This had social capital benefits for both the ICT multinationals and the other 
business groups represented on the council. Granovetter (1992) emphasised the 
strength of weak ties while Grabher (1993) warned of the danger of an over reliance 
on a narrow range of contacts, described as ‗lock-in‘ of relationships.  By linking 
into the broader business network, ICT multinationals were exposed to the 
challenges faced by low and medium technology sectors, which at times are very 
different to the high-technology sector, and vice versa. This, to an extent, 
counteracted Grabher‘s warning regarding lock-in of relationships.  
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 In 2011, Regina Moran, CEO of Fujitsu Ireland took over the Chair of ICT Ireland. Other IBEC 
national council members from the ICT sector included Paul O‘Riordan, Oracle, Lionel Alexander, 
HP, Peter O‘Neill, IBM and John Hennessy, Ericssons. 
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Another social capital benefit was that representation on the national council gave 
the ICT sector a strong voice at the table when IBEC met with the Taoiseach, 
Ministers and senior civil servants to discuss the development of key government 
policies. This had benefits for both ICT Ireland and for IBEC. For example in the 
area of taxation, ICT Ireland‘s involvement in IBEC helped secure the commitment 
of both the Irish government and its agencies, such as the IDA, to maintaining a 12.5 
percent corporation tax rate and the introduction of tax credits for R&D. Paul Rellis 
CEO of Microsoft in Ireland will become IBEC President in 2013 for a year, 
securing the commitment of such a high profile business executive to this role has 
reciprocal benefits for the both the ICT sector and the broader business group. 
 
In the area of trade, ICT Ireland involvement in IBEC was important in raising 
awareness at government level of the increasing importance of internationally traded 
services. This in turn impacted on the position taken by the Irish government at EU 
level in relation to multilateral (WTO) and bilateral trade negotiations, where 
previously Irish Ministers had focused almost exclusively on the needs of the 
agricultural sector. ICT Ireland, through its affiliation with IBEC, also gained access 
to the IBEC office in Brussels, which helped organise meetings for the organisation 
with the EU Commission and Parliament, and to the confederation of European 
employers, Business Europe. Consequently, there were significant bridging social 
capital benefits for ICT Ireland operating within the broader IBEC structure. Of 
course, the engagement of the key ICT companies and their CEO within the IBEC 
structure also yielded many benefits for IBEC. Burt (1997, p340) points to the 
information and control advantage of being the broker in relations between people 
otherwise disconnected in the social structure. IBEC, by establishing ICT Ireland, 
not only helped bridge the gap between government and the ICT sector it also 
strengthened IBEC‘s own position as a business organisation for collaboration. ICT 
multinationals and the other members of IBEC, from Pharmachemicals, food and 
other sectors, effectively strengthened their ability to take collective action to 
influence government policy.  
 
The case studies (1 and 2) in this section both involved industry OFCs, privately 
funded by industry members. Case study 1 provided evidence of the generation of 
social capital within an OFC in terms of building bonds and strengthening ties 
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between firms. Case study 2 provided examples of the generation of bridging social 
capital, with OFCs facilitating interaction between industry firms and other 
economic actors such as government and state agencies.    
Section 5.3: SFI and CSETs – social capital within the building 
blocks of a national innovation system   
 
This section will look at collaboration in the ICT sector between universities and 
industry in state supported cluster initiatives focused on raising levels of innovation 
in the Irish economy. The case studies (3 and 4) explored in this section differ from 
those covered in section 5.2 in that here, firms collaborate in initiatives outside of 
their involvement with their industry OFCs. This shows that engaging firms in 
collaborative initiatives does not necessarily involve an industry OFC. However, 
even though the initiatives explored in case studies 3 and 4 may have listed more 
than one firm as partners, the collaboration that takes place is mainly between 
individual firms (rather than groups of firms) and research institutes.   
 
Science Foundation Ireland  
 
As outlined in section 4.2 of Chapter 4, the establishment of Science Foundation 
Ireland (SFI) by the Irish government in 2003 can be viewed as part of the building 
blocks for a national innovation system. Since 2007, an annual census of holders of 
SFI‘s major grant categories has been completed, which provides data on research 
outputs, team compositions, collaboration and funding (SFI 2009). In 2009, SFI 
supported 3,225 team members under 666 actively funded initiatives. This was a 15 
percent increase on the previous year and in line with the target set for building 
human capital in the then government‘s Strategy for Science, Technology and 
Innovation (SSTI) 2006-2013.  
 
SFI measured both academic and ‗pre-commercial‘ output in their annual census. 
Peer reviewed publications were up 26 percent to 4,057 in 2009. This, and previous 
increases, contributed to Ireland‘s relative volume of scientific publications growing 
from below EU average levels to average OECD levels (SFI 2009, p6). This also 
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assisted Ireland moving into the top 20 ranked countries for international scientific 
quality, up from 36
th
 position in 2003.  These developments were important from an 
academic and international reputation perspective for Ireland. But what progress was 
made in relation to pre-commercial research and initiatives involving industry? Had 
SFI funding contributed to building social capital as well as human capital?  
 
Table 5.2 presents data on pre-commercial outputs from SFI funded initiatives for 
2008 and 2009. One third of the invention disclosures and one quarter of the patents 
filed in 2009 arose from Centres for Science, Engineering & Technology (CSETs). 
In addition 5 of the 13 standards contributed to arose from CSETs.  
Table 5.2: SFI Summary of Pre-Commercial Outputs 2008 and 2009  
 
Type of Output 2008 2009 
Invention Disclosures 135 136 
Patents Filed 97 108 
Patents Awarded  13 10 
Standards Contributed To 6 13 
Spin-Offs Reported 3 6 
Licensed Technologies 22 20 
Source: SFI 2009, p.7.  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the theory and conceptualisation of the systems of innovation 
(SI) approach, which Lundvall (1998, 2005) advocated should be used for analyzing 
economic development. In his taxonomy of innovation, Edquist (2001) outlined that, 
among other elements, innovation involves an organisational process (see Figure 2.2) 
and that ‗innovations are normally seen as based on learning that is interactive 
between organisations in the SI approach; firms do not generally innovate in 
isolation‘ (Edquist 1997, pp20-22). The interaction, between research institutes and 
firms, in the CSETS supported by SFI can be viewed as part of the building blocks 
for systems of innovation, at national and regional level, in Ireland. The following 
section will look at the structure of the CSETs which involves such interaction, 
provide two case studies of CSETs and consider whether these CSETS contributed 
to building social capital. In line with broader SFI objectives, grant funding of CSET 
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is focused on the high technology sectors of economy. A significant number of 
CSETS involved collaboration in the ICT and software sector and some of these are 
outlined below.  One specific example of a biotechnology based CSET, operating in 
the interface between food and health and well-being, is provided. Chapter 6 will 
provide further new research evidence of a cluster initiative operating in the interface 
between dairy food and health and well-being.  
Centres for Science, Engineering & Technology (CSETs) - social 
capital in cluster initiatives  
 
Figure 5.5 provides a diagrammatic representation of a CSET in the ICT and 
software sector. It includes three of the five actors that Sölvell et al (2003, p.18) 
suggest compose a cluster. In this case, SFI and the state development agencies, IDA 
and Enterprise Ireland, represent the government actor, universities play the role of 
the research community actor and ICT and software firms are the company actors. 
However, two further actors from the Sölvell et al (2003) model are omitted from the 
configuration presented here.  
Figure 5.5: Centres for Science, Engineering & Technology ― 
cluster initiatives 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
CSET 
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The first of the Sölvell et al (2003) actors to be omitted is ‗financial institutions‘. 
Banks, business angels or venture capitalists were not involved in these CSET 
initiatives (although they may have indirect involvement through their role in the 
development of any spin-off companies generated from the cluster initiatives). 
Initially, CSETS were funded by grant awards from SFI, often supplemented by 
funding from other state agencies such as the IDA and Enterprise Ireland. Industry 
partners also part funded the CSETs by way of the scientific and technical expertise 
they provided at no cost to the initiative. An innovation taskforce established by the 
previous government identified the need for a ‗transformation in the scale and nature 
of the Irish venture capital environment‘ in order to successfully support the growth 
and scaling up of innovative companies (DOT 2010). 
 
This taskforce recommended that Ireland should nurture a national portfolio of 
business angel funds, due to the under-developed nature of the venture capital sector 
in Ireland. Furthermore, it recommended that while this was being developed, the 
State, on a temporary basis, should provide a new Seed Capital scheme. The 
taskforce also identified a set of tax initiatives to incentivize start-ups and angel 
funding activity. While Enterprise Ireland is active in this space, the taskforce 
criticized the broad focus of the agency and recommended instead a more targeted 
focus on start-ups and early stage activities in order to support job creation. This 
recommendation should be viewed with caution because it is important to recognize 
that innovation can also take place in established companies and is not solely the 
preserve of start-up companies. If the venture capital market develops in Ireland then 
there may be a possibility for involvement in CSET type initiatives, particularly if 
public funding is reduced or is no longer available, which appears likely given the 
budgetary constraints facing Ireland. However, regardless of the presence of venture 
capitalists or other financial organisations, collaboration between firms, universities 
and state agencies can generate social capital as the case studies presented in this 
section will illustrate.   
 
The second of Sölvell et al (2003) actors to be omitted from Figure 5.5 are 
‗institutions for collaboration‘ (IFCs).  IFCs are not included here because of the lack 
of definitional clarity of the IFC concept already discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 
2. This thesis has provided an alternative and more robustly defined concept of 
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―organisations for collaboration‖ (OFC). Sölvell et al (2003, p.18) place IFCs at the 
centre of their five cluster actors. The diagram above does not place the alternative 
concept OFC at the centre of the three actors in a CSET as OFCs in this case were 
not directly involved in the initiatives. However, they may have made a significant 
contribution in an indirect way through their central role in the development of an 
industry norm of collaboration. The majority of the firms that participated in CSETs 
were active in ICT Ireland and the ISA.  As such, they were used to working with 
other organisations to achieve shared objectives, yielding social capital benefits from 
their involvement in embedded networks.  
 
While the industry OFCs are not directly involved in the CSETs, the SFI itself might 
be seen as performing a public OFC role in this instance. But again, the SFI could 
not be placed at the centre, because its role was essentially assessing the suitability 
of the cluster initiative for funding, providing the grant award and monitoring the 
results of the initiatives. The SFI was not directly involved in the day-to-day research 
that the CSET carried out and therefore it would not be accurate to describe it as 
being at the centre of the initiative.  
 
Several writers (Coleman 1988, Grootaert 1998 and Krishna and Uphoff 1999) 
emphasize structure in their definitions of social capital. Figure 5.6 outlines the 
governance and operating structure of a CSET. Each CSET is required to have an 
institute board, which is responsible for oversight of the CSET. This governing 
board is comprised of the lead research institutes, the major industry partners, and 
the Director, Deputy Director and Executive Director of the CSET. The board is 
chaired by an independent chairperson drawn from outside the research institutes and 
industry partners. It is advised by a scientific board, comprised of international 
researchers whose expertise largely represents the scientific activities being pursued 
by the CSET but who are not directly involved in the initiative. In recent years, SFI 
has also required the establishment of an industry board, comprised of each industry 
partner in the CSET. The role of the industry board is to provide industry feedback 
and input to the CSET board and management team. 
  
153 
 
Figure 5.6: Structural Social Capital in an SFI funded CSET 
 
 
 
 Source: Author‘s diagram  
 
The following two brief case studies examine the role of this structure in the 
generation, accumulation and circulation of social capital. The case study evidence 
includes two interviews with individual actors in the CSETs, one with an industry 
background and the other with an academic research background.   
Case Study 3: Centre for Telecommunications Value Chain Driven 
Research  
 
This case study provides an example of a complex bridging social capital initiative, 
involving seven research partners, seven industry partners and the support of three 
state agencies. In terms of collaboration it differs from case studies 1 and 2 above, as 
the initiative does not involve an industry organisation for collaboration, such as TIF 
or the ISA. It is a national initiative rather than a regional one, with the partners 
spread across the country. This is a contrast to case study 4 below, which is a smaller 
regional CSET based in Munster.  
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Figure 5.7: CTVR -an example of a specific CSET cluster initiative  
 
 
 
 
CTVR is a dynamic cluster initiative focusing on the development of wireless and 
optical networks, with a strong emphasis on the technologies that underpin such 
networks. It is Ireland‘s largest telecommunications research centre. The Director of 
CTVR is based in Trinity College Dublin (TCD), where the initiative is 
headquartered. However, the bridging social capital potential of the initiative is 
highlighted by the fact that the other Principal Investigators (PIs) are spread across a 
range of universities situated in different locations. The Deputy Director of CTVR is 
based in the University of Limerick, with the remaining five PIs based in the 
National University of Ireland Maynooth (NUIM), the Tyndall National Institute, 
University College Cork (UCC) and TCD. The research teams led by these PIs are 
also spread throughout these universities and research institutes, with some 
researchers also based in Dublin City University and the Dublin Institute of 
Technology (DIT).  
 
An in-depth interview with a leading Irish software entrepreneur involved in CTVR 
provided evidence that SFI involvement had changed the landscape for collaboration 
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in this case. Interviewee 5D commented (firms names have been removed from 
quote for confidentiality):  
 
―I think it (SFI) achieved two things in the context of CTVR. One is the very 
strong inter-university collaboration, amongst the academics themselves in 
different locations. It is really very strong. And secondly…there is actually 
quite a lot happening in terms of combined research with industry. Industry 
partner ‗X‘ shared absolutely trade secrets with some of the academic 
researchers, facts that were extremely commercially valuable. Also [with the] 
sharing [of] the cost of equipment in the field, there is a lot of collaboration 
in terms of developing the working model to predict failure. Industry partner 
‗Y‘ also indicated to the IDA that one of the reasons they came to Ireland 
was because of SFI‖. 
 
When asked whether the motivation for university involvement in the CSET could 
be viewed purely as a way of gaining access to SFI research funds, that is, purely for 
rent seeking, Interviewee 5D commented:  
 
―It is because of the scale of the research they are doing, research that no 
single university or research group could do on their own. It is very much 
cross-disciplinary research and I think if it was not so cross disciplinary then 
you would not need a CSET, you could fund them separately as groups of 
projects.‖ 
 
Hence, one of the key contributions that the SFI funded CSET structure made in this 
case was encouraging social capital bridges between university researchers working 
in different disciplines based in different locations. This was a departure from the 
previous tendency for university researchers to work on individual research projects, 
rather than in collaborative initiatives with researchers in other universities. But the 
fact that universities collaborate together does not of itself exclude the possibility 
that alliances could be formed with the intention of rent-seeking. Cooke argued that 
contact with state agencies who implement programmes is almost always rent-
seeking practice in the sense of a direct bid for government funding (Cooke 2007a, 
pp82-83). However, from the perspective of building national systems of innovation, 
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such collaboration had the positive benefit of enhancing the ability of Irish 
universities, working in teams, to compete better with larger international 
universities.  
 
The CTVR initiative also encouraged collaboration between academic researchers 
and specific industry partners. Collaboration took the form of teams of researchers in 
universities working with industry researchers based in company R&D teams, with 
frequent, even daily, electronic contact supplemented by regular meetings to advance 
the research objectives. This was further evidence of social capital of a bridging 
nature, this time between universities and individual companies. However, inter-firm 
collaboration was not a significant feature of the CTVR initiative, Interviewee 5C 
commented that:  
 
―It is primarily collaboration between the company and the universities, 
rather than inter-company. The companies meet in the context of the research 
setting rather than actually working with each other on specific research.‖  
 
This was a contrast to case studies 1 and 2, where the industry organisation for 
collaboration (OFCs) involved substantial inter-firm collaboration. In this case study, 
firms involved in the CSET protected their own commercial interests from other 
industry actors but gained access to interdisciplinary teams of researchers spread 
across the universities involved in the cluster initiative. Therefore, the social capital 
generated in the CTVR initiative was firstly among the universities involved and 
secondly between these universities and individual firm partners.   
 
Some writers emphasised trust in their definitions of social capital (Putnam 1995, 
Lundvall 2005, Cooke 2007), others chose not to. Woolcock (1998) included trust in 
his initial definition of social capital but in a later paper (Woolcock 2001) argued 
trust is better understood not as social capital per se, but as a measure of it. When 
Interviewee 5C was asked whether he felt the experience of the CSET had build up 
trust between the people involved, he replied: 
 
―Trust was not the issue. It was perhaps the lack of a common vocabulary 
and understanding. Looking beyond one‘s own context perhaps…..They did 
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not always use the same words or the same concepts because of their 
different backgrounds. There was a learning to work together.‖ 
 
This suggests that one of the features of the CTVR was a generation and 
accumulation of cognitive social capital (Krishna and Uphoff 1999) with the 
initiative helping to build shared norms, values and attitudes that would encourage 
people to work together. It seems reasonable to assume that trust might well develop 
over time between the actors involved in the CTVR, as shared norms, values and 
attitudes are achieved.  
 
Part of the learning in the CTVR initiative was of also of a structural social capital 
nature (Coleman 1988, Grootaert 1998, Krishna and Uphoff 1999). The involvement 
of one multinational firm in particular brought greater discipline and structure to the 
recording of research findings. According to Interviewee 5D, the multinational firm 
―brought professionalism to the research procedures that were not there before‖ in 
report filing and invention disclosures. This exposure to procedures developed by a 
successful multinational firm, in effect, strengthened the research procedures of 
teams in the universities involved in the CTVR. For relatively young members of the 
research teams, this learning opportunity would be particularly beneficial. This 
accords with Staber‘s (2007, p 509) suggestion that knowledge-based firms, in this 
case a successful MNC, may have the capacity to contribute more to the building 
social capital than other firms.     
 
However, the overall structure of the CSET was viewed by Interviewee 5C as having 
both positive and negative social capital potential. On the positive side, the structure 
of the CTVR facilitated inter-disciplinary research across a number of institutes and 
deep collaboration with individual industry partners. The CTVR scientific advisory 
board comprised two Professors of Computer Science from the USA, a Professor of 
Physics and Astronomy from Scotland (who was also chief scientific advisor to the 
Scottish Executive), an Irish entrepreneur and venture capitalist (who in 2007 was 
named the ISA technology person of the year) and an independent engineering 
management consultant. This provided high level international and Irish advice to 
the CTVR board, which further strengthened the positive bridging social capital 
potential of the initiative and emphasised the strength of weak ties. But the CSET 
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structure had the potential to become too cumbersome and bureaucratic. The SFI 
requirement for three boards with a complex structure of meetings and reporting 
procedures increased the cost of management overheads. In addition the presence of 
a separate SFI scientific review panel which, at times, over-turned the advice of the 
scientific advisory board resulted in some members of this CTVR board feeling they 
had wasted their time and leaving the initiative.  
 
The outcomes of the CTVR cluster initiative are significant, with a focus on 
identifying medium term opportunities that have commercial potential. When asked 
if the initiative had produced applied industry outputs, in addition to the peer 
reviewed academic papers, Interviewee 5C replied:  
 
―There have been invention disclosures and patents in addition to academic 
papers. But there have also been licenses to industry and also [one major 
multinational] in a review relatively recently said they had put an 
extraordinary number, something like 30 things from CTVR, into 
commercial application. They were a full participant in the project, had 
shared the research procedures with the academic researchers and developed 
it jointly. So they had the rights to use the technology in their organisation‖  
 
In addition, there were some spin-off campus companies from the CTVR cluster 
initiative. For example, Socowave Limited is a wireless systems technology 
company creating radio access systems and products for high-speed cellular and 
wireless broadband networks. As a consequence of CTVR, it pioneered a new class 
of intelligent Active Antenna System that uses innovative beam forming techniques 
to significantly increase wireless link quality to mobile users.  
Case Study 4: The Alimentary Pharmabiotic Centre (APC)  
 
The case study of the CSET outlined below involved collaboration between industry 
and two institutes with research strength in the areas of biotechnology and food. This 
example is interesting because SFI does not, as such, support initiatives in the food 
sector. However, this initiative gained support because of its biotechnology 
capabilities, which does fall within the remit of SFI. It shows the potential of 
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research with applications in the food and health and well being sector. Chapter 6 
will provide a further in depth case study of a research initiative focused on food and 
health and well being, but which is not funded by SFI.  
 
The Alimentary Pharmabiotic Centre (APC) is a CSET cluster initiative (Figure 5.8) 
based in University College Cork (UCC), which operated in the interface between 
food and health and well-being. Both the research and industry actors are all based in 
the Munster region. The research actors in APC are UCC and Teagasc. The industry 
actors are the multinational pharmaceutical company Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK), 
with manufacturing bases in Cork and Waterford, and the indigenous company 
Alimentary Health (AH).   AH is a development stage speciality biotechnology 
company based on the campus in UCC. APC was founded in 2003 through funding 
from SFI, with the later involvement of GSK in the initiative supported through 
additional funding from IDA Ireland. Both funding sources are based on the 
principle of high quality research involving collaboration between universities / 
research centres and industry.  
Figure 5.8: APC ―an example of a specific CSET cluster initiative  
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
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In contrast to case study 3 above, there was a significant level of trust between the 
research partners prior to the establishment of the APC cluster initiative; one of the 
industry partners was also a spin-off campus company based in UCC. Therefore, in 
this instance, trust between these three partners could be viewed as a precursor, 
rather than an outcome, of the bridging social capital initiative. The campus 
company, AH, expressed concerns in relation to the protection of its intellectual 
property when the second, much larger, industry partner entered the relationship. 
These concerns were dealt with by establishing the rules of the game under a legal 
agreement, rather than allowing the lack of trust between the two partners to create a 
barrier to the initiative.  
 
The APC mission is to link Irish science with industry and society through 
excellence in research, education and outreach in gastrointestinal health. Six research 
themes, focused on understanding the gastrointestinal tract and its microbial 
community, are led by 22 Principal Investigators (PIs). The Director and Deputy 
Director of APC are based in UCC, with the remaining PIs and their research teams 
based in UCC and the Teagasc Moorepark Food Research Centre. These two 
research institutes are located approximately 35 kilometres apart in County Cork and 
have a long history of collaboration. They exhibit evidence of what Cooke (2002, 
p135) would describe as proximity social capital of a bonding nature. An in-depth 
interview with one of the research leaders in the APC initiative placed great 
importance on the relationship between the two institutes, Interviewee 5E outlined:  
 
―UCC and Teagasc have been very close for a long period of time, even to 
the point of cross appointments with some Teagasc people from Moorepark, 
for example, holding Professorships in the University, supervising graduate 
students, doing some teaching and so on and so forth. I also have had some 
students down in Moorepark, so we have had very close interactions and that 
has been there for a long time, [and] predates this initiative by decades.‖ 
 
This collaborative relationship, built up over decades, reflects the development of 
strong ties between the two institutes. Therefore, in contrast to the CTVR (case study 
3), the APC initiative did not broker a new bridge between the research institutes 
involved. The long established ties that exist between UCC and Teagasc does leave 
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the two institutes open to the criticism that rent-seeking was a key motivation for 
their interaction with SFI in setting up the APC. Cooke argued that the capability to 
link to state bodies who implement policy and run government programmes is 
almost always rent-seeking practice in the sense of a direct bid for government 
funding (Cooke 2007a, pp82-83). However, even if rent-seeking was a key 
motivation, one substantial social capital benefit from the initiative is that the scale 
of the APC, involving 22 PIs and a 120 strong multidisciplinary research team, 
brought the development of specialist knowledge in the area of food technology and 
microbiology research in the Munster region to a new level. 
 
The second issue to consider is whether the state intervention in the APC initiative 
made a difference to collaboration between industry and the research institutes. The 
multinational firm GSK became an industry partner in the APC in 2006, with a 5 
year collaborative project to investigate inflammatory conditions that involved an 
investment of €10.2 million supported by the IDA. A quote on the APC website 
from Dr Kevin Lee, Vice President of GSK, indicated that scientific expertise, the 
right collaborative approach and the scale of APC were all factors in deciding to 
become a partner in the initiative.  
 
―In a lengthy worldwide search of GI industrial and academic institutions 
conducted by GSK in an attempt to identify the most appropriate body for 
partnership, the APC emerged as the clear leader, based on scientific 
expertise, complementary technology, track record of successful industrial 
collaboration, access to clinical populations, productivity and availability of 
critical mass.‖  
 
GSK participation in the APC initiative is based on their belief that screening 
platforms, developed by UCC and Teagasc, could reduce the costs of bringing new 
therapeutic molecule business innovations to the market. There are 21 researchers 
based at the APC involved in the collaboration, including 4 GSK scientists. This 
APC research team collaborates closely with scientists at GSK‘s EpiNova Discovery 
Performance Unit (DPU) in the UK, which in turn has linkages to leading 
universities in the UK, Cambridge and Oxford, and in the USA, Harvard and 
Rockefeller. This provides the opportunity for UCC and Teagasc scientists to 
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develop both strong and weak ties through their collaboration with GSK. Using 
Burt‘s (1997) terminology, the APC centre acted as a brokerage, bridging the 
structural hole between the knowledge available in the research institutes, UCC and 
Teagasc, and the knowledge available in GSK, with a view to reducing costs. The 
support of SFI in establishing a research centre of the scale of APC, and the 
additional support of the IDA, helped UCC and Teagasc form a partnership with 
GSK.   
 
The other industry partner in the APC is the much smaller indigenous firm, 
Alimentary Health (AH). AH is focused on the discovery, development and 
commercialisation of proprietary probiotic and pharmabiotic treatments for gastro-
intestinal disorders and other inflammatory conditions. Both industry partners, GSK 
and AH, draw off research within APC for different market applications. 
Consequently, the structure of the social capital arrangements within the APC cluster 
initiative is important. This is particularly the case in the area of intellectual property 
(IP), because the development and protection of IP is one of the key factors in the 
successful exploitation of research. The two industry actors did not know each other 
prior to their involvement in APC and so it was important that each industry actor 
understood the rules of the game. Interviewee 5E, who in addition to being a leading 
researcher in APC is also a shareholder in AH, commented:  
 
―AH had to concede something in the intellectual property arena to allow 
GSK in, and they did …what GSK do is described in an agreement and what 
AH do is described in an agreement, and both have mutually agreed that this 
is what each does‖. 
 
The APC has a dedicated Intellectual Property Co-ordinator and a 
Commercialisation and IP Committee (CIPC) to protect and facilitate the 
exploitation of all APC IP. Nooteboom (2007, p37) argued that relationship reliance 
is always a part of social capital but that trust, which goes beyond control and self 
interest, may not be. Both AH and GSK relied on the relationships within APC to 
deliver reciprocal social capital benefits. By managing access to intellectual 
property, the APC was able to prevent the lack of trust between the two industry 
partners becoming a barrier to the initiative.  
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However, Interviewee 5E also pointed out that, while IP arising from APC was 
important to protect, the initiative has the potential to deliver cognitive social capital 
(Krishna and Uphoff 1999) benefits:  
 
―You have AH scientists and GSK scientists, and around 20 additional 
people doing R&D in partnership within APC. So you have those sets of 
scientists mixing and working in a common space. They also have their own 
space with certain interests. …Because they are talking to each other you do 
not  know what flash will happen, that new idea that either on their own 
would never come up with, generated by virtue of the fact that they are 
working in the same centre.‖  
 
These principal industry related benefits of APC indicate the generation of bridging 
social capital. Bridging social capital has the potential to expose network members to 
new ideas generated by members of other networks. GSK wanted to reduce the costs 
of bringing small molecule innovations to the marketplace. They realised that they 
had to go outside their own organisation and network to look for new ways to 
achieve this goal. The APC initiative bridged the structural gap between the 
scientists in GSK and the scientists working in UCC, Teagasc (Moorpark) and the 
campus company AH.  
 
The APC initiative enabled GSK to gain access to the screening platforms, 
developed by UCC and Teagasc (Moorepark), and this collaboration in turn enabled 
GSK to pursue its goal of reducing costs. In addition to the financial benefit of 
collaborating within the APC structure, UCC and Teagasc (Moorepark) also gained 
by extending its network of research collaboration to GSK scientists working in the 
APC centre and the EpiNova Centre in the UK. These benefits accord with Field‘s 
assertion that social capital may be termed capital when it gives rise to resources that 
can be deployed in order to enable actors to pursue their goals more effectively than 
they could without it (Field 2008, p159). 
 
The small indigenous company, AH, was concerned that through involvement in 
APC it might lose intellectual property to a large multinational.  However, at the 
outset of the APC initiative, UCC sat down with the two companies and mutually 
164 
 
agreed the rules on how they would work within the CSET. The small closed 
structure supported by this agreement could help bonding among the individual 
scientists who, by working together on common themes, get to know each other and 
have the opportunity to build relationships. Coleman argued that closure of a social 
structure can help create trustworthiness (Coleman 1988, pS107). Therefore, despite 
its absence prior to the initiative, there may be the potential over time to develop 
trust within the APC. This potential for building social capital of a bonding nature 
could also contribute to the secondary objective of generating more new ideas by 
virtue of these individual scientists working together, as described by Interviewee 5D 
above.  
 
UCC and AH were also involved in collaboration with other firms outside the CSET. 
UCC were keen to keep certain intellectual property within AH and then to work 
with various industry partners, e.g. Procter and Gamble, to bring products to the 
market. This further social capital of a bridging nature, spanned the gap between the 
technological expertise of AH and the consumer product marketing expertise of 
Procter and Gamble. It had certain benefits to the Irish economy, as Interviewee 5E 
commented: 
 
―By doing it that way, we would argue you are keeping the core research 
investment that has been made in Ireland. You are creating jobs in Ireland. 
An alternative model, which I like less, is that we stay as university 
researchers and as such simply licence the technology to companies like 
Procter and Gamble and say right, off you go, and then it is out in Cincinnati 
that all the action takes place.‖ 
 
One tangible success of this approach was the launch by Procter and Gamble of an 
AH product called ‗Align‘ on the US market, making the product available 
nationally in Wal-Mart and other stores around the US. Align is a probiotic 
supplement that helps build and maintain a strong and healthy digestive system. The 
product contains a probiotic ingredient Bifantis (Bifiobacterium infantis 35624), 
developed and clinically demonstrated by scientists in UCC and AH, to promote 
normal digestive health when taken regularly. One can clearly argue that the 
collaboration with Procter and Gamble is a success from a commercial perspective, 
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bringing a product using AH technology from the research stage to the marketplace. 
But the social capital from this initiative may be less than the social capital potential 
of the CSET involving UCC, Teagasc, AH and GSK. The CSET brings scientists 
from the different organisation together in a research centre, suggesting the potential 
for deeper collaboration over time.  
CSETs a rich area of potential research and analysis  
 
Ten CSETs received funding from SFI
63
 and they provide a rich topic for research 
and analysis. Collaboration within two of these was examined, using the social 
capital concept to add depth to the analysis, in case studies 3 and 4 above. In order to 
qualify for funding, the CSETs did not only have to exhibit outstanding research 
quality and intellectual breadth but also had to show active collaboration between 
research institutes and industry. This aligned with emphasis on interaction between 
organisations in the systems innovation approach (Lundvall 1998, Edquist 2001). 
The SFI funding requirements for the CSETs is an example of government policy in 
the innovation area encouraging structural social capital interaction, mainly of a 
bridging nature. Using Burt‘s (1997) terminology, SFI effectively acted as a broker 
bridging the structural hole between the knowledge available in research institutes 
and the knowledge available in multinational and indigenous firms. 
 
The detailed CSET case studies (3 and 4 above) provided evidence of social capital 
arising from cluster initiatives involving collaboration between universities (research 
institutes) and firms.  Each CSET yielded social capital benefits for both the 
researchers and the firms involved in the initiative, while at the same time 
contributing towards building an innovation system at regional and national level. 
This supports Putnam‘s (2001) contention that, at least in some instances, there are 
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 The ten CSETS that received SFI funding  in 2009 were:  
 Alimentary Pharmabiotics Centre, UCC 
 Digital Enterprise Research Institute, NUIG 
 Centre for Research on Adaptive Nanostructure & Nanodevices, TCD 
 Regenerative Medicine Institute, NUIG 
 Centre for Telecommunications Value-Chain-Driven Research, TCD 
 Lero – Irish Software Engineering Research Centre, UL 
 Biomedical Diagnostic Institute (BDI), DCU 
 Next Generation Localisation, DCU 
 CLARITY, UCD 
 Systems Biology Ireland (SBI)  
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‗demonstrable externalities‘ to social capital, public goods, as well as private 
benefits, to those involved in the networks. The public research institutes benefited 
in two specific ways. Firstly they gained access to funding by collaborating with 
other universities and secondly they benefited from the opportunity to further 
develop their research in collaboration with companies who were active in the 
market place. When these two aspects are taken together the scale of these research 
cluster initiatives is far greater than achieved previously in Ireland. The 
competitiveness benefits gained by firms involved in the CSETs were examples of 
private benefit. The strengthening of research methods and capabilities in 
universities was a public good. Each CSET was required to have an education and 
outreach programme e.g. which included presentations and engagement with primary 
and second level schools. An SFI Grant reviewer concluded that the APC (case study 
4) website for school age children, microbemagic.ucc.ie, showed a real commitment 
to educating the next generation of Irish scientific investigators. These various 
benefits from CSET initiatives contributed to building systems of innovation on both 
a regional and national basis. The two detailed case studies above also provide 
evidence that the CSETs impacted on social capital in Ireland in a largely positive 
way. Although a leading industry figure interviewed in case study 3 warned that the 
development of an overly complex structure could result in the loss of social capital 
potential. This aligned with Field‘s observation that policy decisions can impact on 
social capital in a positive or negative way (Field 2008, p139).  
 
CSETs can be described as cluster initiatives as defined by Sölvell et al (2003), with 
state support targeted at the development of the ICT, software and biotechnology 
sectors. The CSETs involved significant levels of collaboration between firms and 
universities with both public and private social capital benefits. The knowledge 
difference between organisations may be a problem, for mutual understanding and 
agreement, but it is also an opportunity for learning (Nooteboom 2007, p34). 
Lundvall (2005) defined social capital in terms of the willingness and capabilities of 
people to make commitments to each other and to collaborate with each other in the 
process of exchange and interactive learning. In this sense, the CSETs, defined here 
as structural social capital, provided an opportunity for universities and firms to 
work together, share knowledge and experience and, by making informed collective 
decisions, advance ideas and innovation. The CSETs also provided opportunities for 
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the individuals involved in the cluster initiatives to build relationships and increase 
learning. This has the potential over time to yield cognitive social capital (Krishna 
and Uphoff 1999), altering the value and belief that the individuals in the different 
organisations have in each others‘ knowledge and work.  
 
The two case studies (3 and 4) in this section provided evidence that trust was not 
paramount to the development of social capital. In case study 4, a lack of trust 
between actors over who would have access to intellectual property arising from the 
collaboration was overcome by formal agreement between the industry partners. In 
this sense, the formal structures within the CSET helped ensure that a lack of trust 
was not a barrier to the generation of social capital. In case study 3, the structure of 
the CSET was important in helping people to get to know each other and to better 
understand each other‘s work, suggesting that through achieving shared norms, 
values and attitudes (cognitive social capital) that trust might well be built up over 
time and be an outcome, rather than a necessary precursor, of social capital. Lundvall 
(1998, p410) correctly observed that ‗trust is a multidimensional and complex 
concept‘ and he saw dimensions of trust, such as ‗consistency in behaviour and full, 
truthful revelation of relevant information‘, as crucial for interactive learning and 
innovation. This suggests that a lack of trust must be dealt with, as evidenced by case 
study 4, if interactive learning has a chance, and that the development of trust within 
such relationships will surely increase the possibility of innovation taking place.     
 
Other CSETS provide further potential for case study work to explore the 
development of social capital and collaboration within these cluster initiatives. 
CRANN is a large SFI-funded research centre at TCD and UCC that collaborates 
with both indigenous firms and MNCs to harness nanoscience research. The 
initiative involves 17 principal investigators and 250 researchers based across 
multiple disciplines including physics, chemistry, medicine, engineering and 
pharmacology. CRANN has ten industry partners, including multinationals (Hewlett-
Packard, Intel and Boston Scientific) and a number of indigenous SMEs (e.g. 
Creganna, Elena Photonics). An innovation task force established by the Irish 
government concluded that not only did the CRANN project aid the attraction of 
new FDI to Ireland but also further embedded existing industry and the associated 
jobs (DOT 2010). A second example, the Centre for Next Generation Localisation 
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(CNGL) in DCU, is a dynamic academia-industry initiative involving over 100 
researchers developing novel technologies addressing key ‗localisation‘ challenges. 
Localisation refers to the process of adapting digital content to culture, locale and 
linguistic environments at high-quality and speed. Industry partners in CNGL 
include both MNCs e.g. IBM and Microsoft, and indigenous Irish firms e.g. 
Alchemy Software Development and Traslán. A third example of a CSET 
encouraging structural social capital in the ICT and software sector is the Digital 
Enterprise Research Institute (DERI) based in NUI Galway, which has become an 
internationally recognised for semantic web research, education and technology 
transfer. DERI industry partners again include both MNCs e.g. CISCO and 
indigenous firms e.g. Storm Technology. DERI has been successful in attracting 
software companies to establish subsidiaries in Galway e.g. Cyntelix. 
 
While the SFI policy can be viewed as positive in terms of the generation of social 
capital, the question is: will CSETs continue to exist if public funding dries up? The 
case studies, examined here, suggest that it will be challenging to maintain these 
initiatives if public funding dries up. The amount of money put into these initiatives, 
by the SFI, and often supplemented by the IDA in the case of multinationals, is 
substantial. The case studies also suggest that access to such funds, in other words 
rent-seeking, is a key motivation for both university and industry actors.   Exploring 
the potential role of business angels and venture capital in such initiatives in Ireland 
could be an interesting area of research in this regard.  
 
In addition to the CSETs, other SFI award categories may result in some 
collaboration with industry. At the end of 2009, SFI funded 149 PIs. Three of these 
PIs
64
 conducted research in the Neonatal Brain Research Group (NBRG) in UCC, 
which developed innovative software to detect seizures in newborn babies with a 
view to preventing long term brain injury. However, here the collaboration took 
place more at the output stage as opposed to during the process stage. For example 
the NBRG research team collaborated with a global healthcare company, Cardinal 
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 Dr. Geraldine Boylan, Dr. Gordon Lightfoot, and Dr. Liam Marnane.  
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Health
65
, to bring their novel technology to the market (DOT 2010, p9). This is 
another example of social capital of a bridging nature, spanning the gap between 
technological and marketing expertise. This innovative research-based collaborative 
initiative is also an example of convergence technology, with technology from the 
software sector being applied in the health care sector as a medical device. But 
similar to the example above of collaboration between AH and Procter and Gamble, 
the social capital benefit from the collaboration between the NBRG and Cardinal 
Health is more limited than the potential of social capital within a CSET cluster 
initiative. Another example of collaboration in the ICT sector is the multi-
disciplinary research and education institute Innovation Value Institute (IVI), 
established in 2006 by Intel and the National University of Ireland Maynooth 
(NUIM). IVI is designed to help achieve sustainable economic value from IT and 
strategic IT investments. By 2009, IVI had over forty members including Google, 
Microsoft, SAP and BP. Research at IVI is carried out in an open innovation, 
collaborative fashion involving industry members, leading academics and OFCs in 
the sector, including ICT Ireland.   
Section 5.4: Leadership 4 Growth social capital in a cluster 
initiative in the software sector  
 
Case study 5, the final one of this chapter, will examine the development of the 
Leadership 4 Growth programme, which was a cluster initiative that fits in the centre 
of the framework presented in Figure 2.4 of Chapter 2. The number of actors 
involved here is greater than in case studies 1to 4, with case study 5 involving four 
of the five cluster actors put forward by Sölvell et al (2003). Their cluster initiative 
performance model (CIPM), presented in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2, is used here to 
assess the L4G programme, with the analysis presented under headings taken from 
that framework. The social capital aspects and benefits of the initiative are also 
drawn out and the analysis is supported by in-depth case study interviews with the 
various actors involved in establishment of the cluster initiative.  
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 Cardinal Health is a global medical devices corporation who, for a number of years, owned a 
manufacturing facility in Gort, Co. Galway. In 2009, Carefusion, a new company formed through a 
spinoff of Cardinal Health‘s clinical and medical products business, took over the Gort factory.   
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Case Study 5: Leadership 4 Growth (L4G) 
 
Four of the five actors that Sölvell et al (2003) suggested form a cluster were 
involved in the design and delivery of the original L4G programme (Figure 5.9). The 
government actor in this case was the state agency, Enterprise Ireland. The industry 
side provided two actors: the OFC, the Irish Software Association (ISA), and a 
number of Irish software firms who participated in the programme. The fourth actor 
was the internationally renowned Graduate School of Business at Stanford 
University, which represented the research community. The fifth of Sölvell et al 
(2003) actors – financial institutions once again – is absent from the initiative.  
Figure 5.9: Leadership 4 Growth -an example of collaboration in a 
cluster initiative 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
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Setting and Objectives of the Leadership 4 Growth Cluster Initiative 
 
Staber (2007) argued that situational context is important in understanding how 
social capital evolves and how the social capital existing in a cluster can make a 
significant difference to the performance of cluster firms. The context for the 
establishment of the L4G programme was the software sector, which involves 
significant investment by, and interaction between, US multinationals and 
indigenous firms. Section 5.1 provided evidence of a sector deeply embedded in the 
Irish economy, with O‘Malley and O‘Gorman (2001, pp. 318-319) concluding that 
the Irish indigenous software industry can be regarded at least as ‗part of something 
rather like a ‗cluster‘, in the sense used by Porter (1990)‘. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 
provided evidence of initiatives within the sector generating both bonding and 
bridging social capital. Chapter 4 summarised Mjøset‘s (1992, pp5-23) finding that a 
weak system of innovation combined with population decline, due to high levels of 
emigration in Ireland, resulted in vicious circles of underdevelopment for decades. 
The vast majority of firms that participated in the first Leadership 4 Growth 
programme were part of the indigenous software sector, development of which is a 
key element of the government policy of building a national innovation system in 
Ireland.  
 
The aim of the Leadership 4 Growth programme was to develop and enhance 
leadership ambition and the management capabilities of Irish firms. Essentially, L4G 
sought to help the CEOs of Irish SMEs, together with their senior management 
teams, to grow their firms to a more sustainable international scale. This placed the 
initiative within the list of objectives for cluster initiatives outlined in the CIPM 
model (see Figure 2.3), that is policy action to educate and train senior management 
of SMEs in order to expand cluster development. This was an ambitious objective 
and it took a significant amount of effort to convince software CEOs who had 
already exhibited significant leadership abilities in establishing their firms to agree to 
do the programme. As Interviewee 5F from the state agency side of the initiative 
commented: 
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―Enterprise Ireland and the people from the software side who designed the 
programme had to say ―Here is our proposition, trust us‖. CEOs effectively 
had to buy into a new product and typically CEOs, certainly entrepreneur 
type CEOs, don‘t do leadership programmes. So the first thirty [participants] 
were quite the group of pioneers.‖ 
 
The quote above also suggests that trust was, to an extent, a precursor to engaging 
the software CEOs in the cluster initiative. In this context, the bonding social capital 
ties built up over decades between software firms, partly through their involvement 
in their OFC the Irish Software Association (ISA), were important. 
Process and design  
 
In fact the idea for the programme originated from an informal discussion, following 
an ISA event, between two CEO members of the association. One of the CEOs was 
the incoming chair of the ISA and the second CEO was a senior member who had 
led some ISA initiatives in the past. According to Interviewee 5G from the industry 
side: 
 
―One characteristic of the indigenous software sector in Ireland was a large 
number of small companies who rarely got beyond €5million turnover. We 
were having some debate around why was that. Is it because of lack of 
ambition to create companies larger than that, in essence undertaking these 
roles as lifestyle choices, or is it because the CEO and firms didn‘t know the 
way to scale up? …I said maybe it‘s that we don‘t know the way and let‘s 
work on that basis‖  
 
The two CEOs had built up a relationship of mutual respect and trust for each other‘s 
judgement, strengthened by their involvement in the ISA. They agreed that a 
leadership programme for CEOs of small software firms would help address the 
challenge outlined above. They also agreed that if a programme was to have any 
chance of success, it would have to be of world class standard and, because of the 
size of companies likely to be involved, would require state support. Interviewee 5G 
commented further that:  
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―This should be about giving people two things (i) a roadmap, in so far as 
that can be done, to show CEOs how to achieve scale and (ii) the confidence 
for people to say yes, I can do this. This was probably the biggest single thing 
in many respects – yes, I can do this.‖ 
 
When one of the two CEOs became ISA Chairperson, she discussed the idea with the 
Executive Director of the association. They agreed to bring the idea for the 
leadership programme to members of the ISA Council where, following further 
discussion, the idea gained wider industry support. In this way, the structural social 
capital (Krishna and Uphoff 1999, Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2001, p5) within the 
ISA facilitated decision making and collective action. The idea that had originated in 
informal discussion could now be brought forward by the ISA Chairperson and 
Executive Director as a formal ISA proposal to the state development agency. 
 
A small ISA delegation then met with the CEO of Enterprise Ireland to seek support 
for  developing and implementing a ‗world class‘ leadership programme for CEOs of 
software SMEs. This was confirmed by Interviewee 5F from the agency side of the 
initiative: 
 
―A couple of people at the top of the software association at that time took a 
view that the barrier to scaling in the sector could be part of the solution too, 
which is the ability to compete and grow to scale. So if you like they took a 
view ... based on their own experience and then based on the view of a cohort 
of colleague companies. This view married with the view of the CEO of 
Enterprise Ireland.‖ 
 
The ability of the ISA to gain access to the CEO of Enterprise Ireland to discuss their 
idea was facilitated by bridging social capital previously established by the ISA, 
which is outlined above in case study 2, section 5.2. The agency‘s software division 
manager, with whom the ISA had built up a relationship over a number of years, also 
participated in the meeting.  
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Several social capital theorists have emphasised norms that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1995, Krishna and Uphoff 1999, 
Woolcock 2001) and norms of reciprocity (Woolcock 1998, Cooke 2007a). The ISA 
and EI had built up such norms over time, which were important in the achieving the 
subsequent joint action that took place in this initiative. The ISA and the EI manager 
had developed a number of other successful initiatives together, so both sides knew 
and respected each other; they could feel confident of the norms of reciprocity 
inherent in their social network relationship.  
 
The response from Enterprise Ireland CEO was positive and the head of human 
resource development at the agency was assigned to work with the ISA delegation to 
design the programme. Woolcock (1998, 2001) saw social capital as complementary 
to human capital and he emphasised leveraging off the resources within a 
community. Over a period of around seven months, the ISA and EI group meet with 
various consultants with experience of developing and implementing human 
resource programmes for the software sector. The two sides eventually settled on a 
team that brought different expertise to the design process. Hence, even at this early 
stage in the initiative, the OFC and state agency, in generating social capital, were 
leveraging off the human capital resources within the community.  The ISA brought 
in a senior industry figure with over a decade of management experience and a 
strong track record of leadership within the Irish software industry. Enterprise 
Ireland brought on board a consultant with over 30 years of human resources 
development experience, who had previously worked on projects with the agency 
and knew the university business school environment in both Ireland and the US. 
Putnam (2001) emphasised that bridging social capital could create larger networks 
and extend one‘s social capital reach. The benefits of bridging social capital were 
apparent here, with the ISA and Enterprise Ireland bringing different experience and 
skills to developing the initiative from their separate extensive network of contacts.  
 
However, there was some false starts and substantial tension between the ISA and 
Enterprise Ireland in the process of agreeing the make-up of the team to design the 
programme. In resolving these differences, higher levels of trust and understanding 
of each other‘s goals and aims for the programme were achieved. This required a 
significant level of commitment, in terms of both time involved and flexibility to see 
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each others‘ points of view. Interviewee 5G from industry side indicated significant 
challenges in agreeing the design team and getting work on the initiative off the 
ground, and concluded: 
 
―Trust, if that is not there you are going nowhere and that can take time to 
build.‖  
 
As Interviewee 5E from the state agency side commented:  
 
―There were many rows as there are in the best of design teams. I remember 
one day in particular that was difficult, but out of it came a flip chart with a 
diagram which is still shown in various parts of the world. So the industry 
expertise they brought to the design was, again, a critical part of it.‖ 
 
The in-depth interviews for this case study, as supported by the quotations above, 
indicated that the trust was necessary in this case to gain the value of reciprocity 
(Putnam 1995, Cooke 2007a) from the bridging social capital. But this case study 
highlighted that such trust cannot be assumed to be straightforward. It is not just a 
case of organisations knowing and respecting each other, the individuals involved 
also matter. The development of the Leadership 4 Growth programme brought 
together two strong minded individuals with significant individual human capital 
who did not know each other. This created tensions that had to be worked through in 
order to arrive at necessary levels of trust to bring the initiative forward. This aligns 
with Nooteboom‘s (2007, p33) view that ‗trust as a feature of social capital cannot 
be bought and installed‘. If it is not present then it may need to develop over time.   
Once the team was agreed, the ISA, EI and their two advisors worked together on a 
detailed Request for Proposal (RFP) document, which was completed by end March 
2006. The group then set about persuading a number of Irish and US institutions to 
consider bidding for the project. The EI consultant made preliminary calls, informing 
various institutes about the proposal. A number indicated immediately that they did 
not do industry programmes of this nature, others agreed to review the detailed RFP. 
The Chair of the ISA, during business trips to the US visited a number of the 
universities who had expressed interest in the RFP. She was one of the CEOs who 
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had come up with the original idea and a key driver behind the initiative. These 
meetings strengthened her ability to explain the concept of the programme face to 
face.  
Framework consensus  
 
Leveraging off their substantial combined human capital and experience, the ISA 
and Enterprise Ireland team designed the Leadership 4 Growth programme around 
the following four pillars (Figure 5.10): (1) Inspire: the idea here was to tap into 
people who had achieved scale, to see how they had done it and how one could relate 
to them. Participants were given the opportunity to learn directly from world class 
CEOs who described how they developed their vision and strategy, what challenges 
they overcame and how their companies achieved leading market positions. (2) 
Educate: Participants studied entrepreneurial leadership theory and case studies. 
They were also given practical tools and techniques for creating and communicating 
company vision, devising and executing company strategy and developing personal 
leadership skills. (3) Coach: related to the understanding and addressing individual 
behaviour in relation to their position as the leader of the firm. Each participant was 
assigned his or her own leadership coach who worked with them throughout the 
programme to encourage, challenge and assist him/her in implementing the core 
concepts learned. The focus was on strengthening and enhancing the CEO‘s 
individual characteristics and attributes as a leader, within the context of the CEO‘s 
ambition for the company. This turned out to be the most controversial element of 
the social capital initiative and will be dealt with in greater detail below. (4) Execute: 
was about giving the CEOs support when they returned to their firm on how to 
implement what was learned. CEO participants were expected to take the core 
concepts learned and apply them to the leadership of their own companies. A mentor 
was appointed to smaller groups of around 6 companies to provide support during 
the taught modules and to help implement what was learned. Between modules, each 
CEO was given assignments to be completed, both individually and with their senior 
management team, to encourage and assist CEOs to put theory they were learning 
into practice.  
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Figure 5.10: The four pillars of Leadership 4 Growth  
 
 
 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999) emphasised that structural capital facilities were 
mutually beneficial to collective action through established roles and social 
networks, supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents. In addition to the 
design of the actual programme outlined above, structure was also important in 
assessing bids to deliver the programme, with the ISA and Enterprise Ireland both 
involved in the process. Four world class universities and business schools, three 
US-based and one Irish, applied for the tender. Once a formal bid was made for the 
project, the process became quite interactive. Each university business school 
provided a number of workshops, including how they would perform their role in a 
class room situation and how they saw themselves working with the coaching body 
that they had nominated for that part of the programme. The ISA and EI also visited 
short listed candidates to further refine the proposals. The bids were evaluated by 
looking at both the education and the coaching elements separately, and assessing 
which bid combination would suit the Irish context best. One bid in particular fell 
down following a presentation by the coaching organisation involved. Interviewee 
5G outlined that the assessment team felt that the organisation‘s approach was too 
distant from Irish cultural norms and would simply not work for the Irish CEOs who 
would participate in the programme. This aligns with Staber‘s (2007) assertion that 
Coach Educate 
Inspire Execute 
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context matters in terms of leveraging social capital benefits to improve firm 
performance in business clusters. 
 
The ISA and EI team spent close to a year designing the structure and identifying, 
and evaluating university business schools who could potentially deliver the 
programme. The team put a huge amount of effort into getting the project to this 
stage, in the process building what Woolcock (1998, 2001, p5-6) would describe as 
relationships of trust, leveraging off the human capital of team members to arrive at 
norms of reciprocity within a social capital network. The following sections will 
outline the benefits to ISA and Enterprise Ireland from the cluster initiative and the 
reciprocity inherent in the social capital interaction.  
Governance and Financing 
 
In early June 2006, a detailed and refined proposal, recommended by the ISA/EI 
project team with the support of the Enterprise Ireland CEO, went before the board 
of Enterprise Ireland for approval. In making the recommendation to the board, the 
scoring mechanism used was strongly linked to the four pillars of the programme – 
inspire, educate, coach and execute. Following detailed discussion at Enterprise 
Ireland board level, Stanford University‘s Graduate School of Business, who teamed 
with a US based coaching organisation specialised in organisation and leadership 
behavioural change, emerged as the successful bidder to provide the leadership 
programme.  
 
Interviewee 5G, from the industry side, commenting on the successful bidder said: 
 
―The Stanford people totally got what we were trying to do, create the 
leadership knowledge to create a company of scale and give people the 
confidence to do it‖  
 
Interviewee 5H, an industry mentor on the programme, commented on the specific 
fit of Stanford for the software industry: 
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―Right in the middle of Silicon Valley, Stanford University and its Professors 
and alumni had been responsible for the development of quite a number of 
businesses, growing them, spinning them off and making their mark in the 
whole ICT area. There was also, which was very important to the software 
companies, a very strong private equity venture capital base in California.‖  
 
Interviewee 5I, a second industry mentor, confirmed this view of Stanford as the 
right choice, with reference to the case studies that formed a key part of the 
programme: 
 
―In my view it worked extremely well by being in Stanford. Not just because 
it was Stanford, but also because it was in the Valley and you kept meeting 
the Valley people, the real people behind the case studies‖ 
 
Interviewee 5F, from the state agency side, emphasised that Stanford proved to be 
flexible in tailoring the programme to the needs of both the state agency and 
industry:  
 
―Stanford has been good, even if a bit sticky on price. They have changed 
part of their programme and have worked well with us, both Enterprise 
Ireland and the industry side, to tailor it to our needs‖ 
 
One of the challenging aspects of the process was this decision to go with an 
American rather than Irish university partner for the initiative. Members of the 
Enterprise Board would have liked to have chosen an Irish university, if possible. 
This would have seemed more obvious in the context of a cluster initiative and 
would also align with the view that social capital should leverage off the resources 
within the community (Field 2008, Woolcock 2001). But the focus on the software 
sector made it difficult for Irish universities to compete with the bid from Stanford.  
The Stanford business school was in the heart of Silicon Valley, viewed by many as 
a global centre of software firm development with a mature venture capital market. 
The decision to go with Stanford was influenced by the belief that it would be 
beneficial to expose the Irish CEOs to this environment, particularly given the under-
developed nature of the venture capital market in Ireland. Once again, this aligns 
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with Staber‘s (2007) contention that context matters in terms of leveraging social 
capital benefits to support firm performance in business clusters. If the programme 
was designed to support the development of a different sector of the Irish economy, 
for example a low and medium technology sector, then a different university and 
location would probably be a better fit.  
 
Given the quality and scale of the initiative when all the different elements were 
taken into account, particularly Stanford and the coaching elements, the cost of the 
programme was very substantial. Enterprise Ireland provided up to 70 percent of the 
funding and firms who participated provided the other 30 percent of costs to send 
their CEO on the programme. Hence the initiative involved substantial financial 
commitments from both the state agency and the SMEs who participated in the 
programme. Cooke (2007a, p82-83) argued that when social capital involves 
capabilities to link to state agencies, which run government programs and implement 
policy, there is almost always rent-seeking practice.  From the beginning, the CEOs 
who came up with the original idea and the ISA knew that their indigenous firm 
members would not be able to fund a training programme of this scale from their 
own resources. Hence, a key part of the ISA motivation in bringing a formal 
proposal to Enterprise Ireland was to seek financial support for any such programme. 
Of course, there was also the substantial social capital benefit of the advisory time 
and human resource capability that both Enterprise Ireland and the ISA put into the 
designing the programme. But these indirect benefits, on their own, would not have 
been enough to get the programme off the ground. It was clear, that without the 70% 
grant towards cost, the Irish software SMEs would not have been in a position to 
send their CEOs on the programme. The following section will address the question: 
What reciprocal social capital benefits did Enterprise Ireland receive from their 
involvement in the cluster initiative?  
Scope of member participants  
 
One of the challenges facing state development agencies is industry penetration. 
Cooke (2007a, p103) warned that state agencies need to ensure that policy efforts are 
not applied to an exclusive ‗in group‘, creating social capital strength for only a few 
favoured firms. In this case study, Enterprise Ireland collaborated with the ISA and 
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extended their industry reach, in terms of both identifying and recruiting participants 
for the programme. Joint ISA and Enterprise Ireland workshops, targeted at CEOs 
who might potentially be interested in the leadership programme, were organised. 
CEOs had to commit to travelling to Stanford three times during a twelve month 
period for intensive week long sessions. Participants also had to commit to complete 
detailed project work, which involved their management teams, between sessions in 
the Stanford business school. So it was not just a question of SMEs putting 
substantial funds into sending their CEO on the programme. There was also 
significant time and firm resources that had to be committed over a twelve month 
period.  
 
In-depth interviews for the case study revealed that after the approval of the 
programme state agency officials were concerned that adequate numbers would not 
apply. Interviewee 5F from the state agency side commented that, when approached, 
one CEO replied ―CEOs send people on training courses, they don‘t do them‖. Some 
senior officials in the state agency began to waiver in their faith in the cluster 
initiative; they wanted to reduce the places booked in Stanford Business School and 
consequently the budget for the programme. Interviewee 5G, from the industry side, 
took a different view, acknowledging that it ―required a certain leap of faith on the 
part of participants, since it was the first programme of that kind‖, but was confident 
the initiative would be over, not under, subscribed:  
 
―I said what are we going to do if we have more than 30 people who want to 
do the programme? How are we going to select them? Are we going to go 
back to Stanford who has made clear that they can only take 30 on the 
programme? They [EI] said the programme will never be over subscribed and 
I said, I will bet you anything it will.‖ 
 
The ISA led by the Chairperson of the OFC turned their focus on encouraging 
software CEOs to consider applying for the programme. Supported by this 
intervention applications vastly exceeded the state agency‘s expectations, with 75 
applications received for the 30 places originally booked in Stanford. The strength of 
social capital bonds and industry reach built up within the ISA contributed to not 
only filling the available places on the first programme but also generated sufficient 
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interest to encourage the running of a second programme in the following year. 
Therefore, the reciprocal bridging social capital benefit to the state agency was not 
only ―the industry expertise they brought to the design‖, as Interviewee 5F stated 
regarding the ISA contribution, but also increasing SME participation in the 
programme. This supported the contention that one of the strengths of the social 
capital idea is that it emphasises resources that communities already have and 
encourages agencies to work with, and build on, this potential (Field 2008, p141, 
Woolcock 2001, p15). It also supports the assertion that state intervention should 
work with, rather than replace, existing networks and relationships freely entered 
into by individuals, which is the essence of social capital (Field 2008, p135, 
Coleman 1994, p312-313).  
Resources and facilitators  
 
The Educate element of the programme took place in Stanford business school on 
three separate full week modules, approximately three months apart. Professor 
George Foster was the Stanford faculty director for Leadership 4 Growth. The 
residential modules in Stanford offered significant bridging social capital 
opportunities to participants, combining both insights from academic research and 
practise. Within the Stanford teaching methods, there was also evidence of earlier 
benefits of bridging social capital with the use of strategy frameworks developed by 
Professor Robert Burgelman during years of collaborative work with the Intel 
Corporation. The key themes of the three residential sessions in Stanford, which 
supported the building of social capital, were dynamic business strategy, high 
performance leadership and sustainable growth. Interviewee 5G commented on how 
the sessions in Stanford gave Irish SME participants rare access to software 
entrepreneurs who had successfully increased the scale of their business: 
 
“All types of people they [Stanford] were able to bring in, because they are 
right down in the heart of Silicon Valley. They were able to get some 
amazing people...and not just a matter of picking big names, if there wasn‘t a 
particular reason [that is a relevant contribution that the speaker could make] 
then don‘t get the guy in... 
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Generally the CEO came to lunch or dinner and you could sit and chat to 
them‖.  
 
For example, one contributor on the programme was Mark Leslie, founder and 
former CEO of Veritas software, who took the company from a struggling firm with 
12 employees to a billion dollar corporation with 5,500 employees. The strength of 
weak ties can be beneficial (Granovetter 1973, 1983) and the Irish SME group had 
the opportunity to leverage social capital benefits from contact with CEO presenters 
over a meal, as well as in formal classroom situations.  
 
Coleman (1988, pS107) argued that closure of a social structure created trust that 
allowed the proliferation of obligations and expectations within a network. The L4G 
initiative also strengthened social capital bonds between the participants, with CEOs 
working in small groups of around 6, facilitated by a mentor.  Significant thought 
was put into how these groups were assembled, with companies allowed to indicate 
in advance who they did not wish to be grouped with for competitiveness reasons.  
The main role of the mentors at Stanford sessions was to support their cohort group 
and to facilitate case work sessions in the evenings.  Interviewee 5H commented 
that:  
 
―The mentor‘s role in the formal educate element in Stanford was essentially 
to listen and support his cohort group. …..In the cohort group sessions it was 
important that criticism (by one participant of another) was accepted as being 
constructive. That it wasn‘t point scoring, that it wasn‘t to make someone 
feel badly but was to provide a different perspective to what the original 
person was coming up with.‖ 
 
CEOs also had substantial assignments to undertake from Stanford between the 
educate sessions, often involving the firm‘s management team. Mentors also worked 
with the CEOs on this major project work as part of the execute pillar, offering 
further opportunities to strengthen ties within the group. Interviewee 5H added that: 
 
―Each of the cohort group would host one of the sessions in their own 
premises. So the rest of us got to visit those premises, go on a short tour see 
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what was behind the business concerned, better understand the individual and 
his company, and the challenges of his company. Then get down to the work 
that we had to address under the time table dictated by Stanford.‖ 
 
Cooke (2007a, p83) argued that the use of social capital could contribute 
significantly to the development of the ‗dynamic capabilities of the firm‘ (Teece 
2007), with trust being a key element in this regard. The central focus of Leadership 
4 Growth was bridging the knowledge gap between how firms in Silicon valley 
managed to achieve scale while Irish SMEs struggled to so. Both the evening group 
work in Stanford, and project work between sessions, facilitated the building of 
understanding and trust among the cohort of CEOs. Interviewee 5H commented:  
 
―Trust was important here with confidences being shared on the strict 
understanding that what was said in the group stayed in the group.‖ 
 
The potential of this group work to build significant social capital bonds among the 
CEOs involved was confirmed by Interviewee 5H:  
 
―I would say that the bonding between them was immensely helpful to each 
and every one of them ... I was a mentor for the very first programme but due 
to time pressure decided not to continue with the subsequent programmes.  
But, I still get together with my group a couple of times a year and that group 
still meets now twenty four months after their programme finished. ….as 
recently as last month (July 2009) there was a meeting of the guys and they 
were still able to bring one another up to speed as to what their businesses 
were doing and some of the challenges. Kind of ―help me out here guys I‘m 
grappling with this issue, I don‘t know whether I need to fill this hole in my 
organisation or not‖ and indeed fellows would be able to say ―don‘t be an 
idiot of course you have to do this‖ or ―Don‘t waste time on that‖ and you 
know it was taken in the spirit in which it was intended. I would say for those 
six guys there will always be a group which will never feel the need to 
hesitate in picking up the phone to one another.‖ 
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The building of close bonds may not have been a feature of every cohort group 
involved in the programme. However, there was evidence of clustering and close 
social capital ties among successful software firms through their involvement in 
networks such as the ISA, as Interviewee 5H added that:   
 
―Maybe other groups didn‘t work as well as that particular one. Having said 
that, some members of my group would have close ties with the odd 
individual member of another group. Partly because, maybe, they were 
physically near each other in West Dublin or that they knew one another 
from some other existence, things like the Deloitte top fifty, the ISA top 
notch companies, they‘re often in for the same awards or they‘re meeting in 
the same networks.‖ 
 
The Coaching element of the L4G – positive or negative social 
capital? 
 
In addition to the distinction between structural and cognitive social capital, 
Ferlander (2007, p116) added a third behavioural dimension to capture the 
importance of participation on the part of the individual (Field 2008, pp160-161). 
Another resource provided to participants on the L4G was through the coach pillar, 
with Stanford University teamed up with a US coaching organisation specialised in 
leadership behavioural change. Each CEO participant was assigned a coach from this 
group, who worked on a one-to-one basis with the CEO on developing applied 
behavioural skills. Usually the same coach was assigned to the each member of the 
CEO‘s cohort group. Sometimes coaches attended the evening sessions in Stanford. 
In between the sessions in Stanford, one-on-one sessions were organised between the 
CEO and his/her coach, involving psychometric testing. The sessions also involved 
360 feedback with a number of interviews undertaken with members of the CEO‘s 
board of directors, including the Chairperson, peers and subordinates, and customers.  
 
Interviewee 5F from the state agency side of the initiative argued that the coach often 
challenged the participant to think differently:  
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―You know your relationship with ‗X‘ what do you need to get from him, 
how do you do that? How are you spending your time at the moment? Are 
you spending too time on operational detail? How do we get that to be 
different? You know it is kind of a lonely job being a CEO and coaching 
should help to address that.‖  
 
However, other interviewees indicated that many participants had problems with the 
coaching element of the initiative. While the US coaching organisation used 
international standard methodologies, chemistry between the individual CEO and the 
coach appeared to be important.  Interviewee 5G, an industry participant, 
commented:  
 
―A lot of people would say that they got a lot more value out of the execute 
piece than they did out of the behavioural (coach) piece. If ever there is 
chemistry needed, it is far greater in the coaching side…. Whereas on the 
mentor side you were focusing on business, which is more based on fact 
…The coaching element was to an extent opinion based, even though it 
might be substantiated by psychometric testing etc. … I do feel that we 
should stop spending the money with [the US coaching organisation] because 
of …how much the programme costs‖   
 
Interviewee 5H, an industry mentor, commented that  
 
―Of my group of six, three of them got a lot out of the coach and the other 
three didn‘t get too much. So it was mixed, it depended on their [the 
participants] own experience and development. You know how much of life 
they had seen….I‘d say the coach helped, probably the three younger guys to 
…change behaviour, to do things that they didn‘t quite realise that they 
needed to do or take things more seriously.‖ 
 
Interviewee 5I, a second industry mentor, when asked (without reference to what 
other interviewees had said) what did he think of the coaching element of the 
programme commented:  
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―I have a lot of mixed feeling about that. It depended a lot on the chemistry 
between the individual coach and the CEO. It worked very well for some and 
was appalling for others. It was very hit and miss in my view. …It got to the 
stage where some CEOs said thank you very much but no thanks. ‖ 
 
Consequently, the coaching element of the programme seemed to yield positive 
benefits for some but was a negative social capital experience for others, with the 
interaction between the coach and industry participant simply not working in many 
cases. Therefore, it is important not to assume that providing a social capital bridge 
will necessarily result in positive outcomes. Perhaps the strongly bonded nature of 
the software network closed off some members of the network to new ideas. 
Alternatively, it may have been in that, in this case, the cultural context mattered 
more than was realised, with some Irish software CEOs not being able to connect 
with the style of some American coaches.   
 
Despite the difficulty of the coaching element for some, a number of participating 
CEOs and their firms completed follow-on projects with the assistance of the US 
coaching group. This was also achieved with the financial support of Enterprise 
Ireland emphasising again Cooke‘s (2007a) assertion that rent-seeking may be an 
inevitable feature of social capital initiatives involving firms and state agencies. 
Again, the value for money of this follow-on work was questioned by one 
interviewee in particular. 
 
In summary, interview evidence indicates that the coaching element was not as 
successful as other elements of the programme.  Interviewee 5F from the agency side 
commented that ‗there is an argument as to whether you need both coaches and 
mentors, but  ...you need the two, when you have someone coaching it is all about 
you, but execution (mentors) is about the CEO and the management team, which is 
much different‘. The coaching element was particularly challenging for CEOs 
because of the openness required. If there was a strong difference of opinion between 
a coach and a participant, then this was difficult. Interviewee 5G, an industry 
participant, argued that the coaching element of the programme could be delivered 
by Irish-based coaches, who might be in a better position to connect from a cultural 
perspective. Using Irish coaches would also have substantially reduced the cost of 
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the programme. Interviewee 5F from the state agency argued that the feedback on 
the coaching was taken on board and that in subsequent versions of the programme 
two Irish coaches, with strong capabilities and wide experience, were introduced as 
part of the US led coaching team. However, the lack of a formal oversight structure 
for the L4G initiative, similar to the CSET structure outlined in section 5.4, meant 
that changes to the coaching element were incremental rather than radical. The 
coaching element was very expense and questionable in terms of value-added for 
many participants. Other elements of the programme, for example the sessions in 
Stanford and the execute element led by mentors, were generally perceived by 
interviewees as adding more value and being far more cost effective. A more formal 
structure, with an oversight committee with independent advisors, could quite 
possibly have led to more radical changes to the programme and substantial cost 
savings, without negatively impacting on the substantial social capital benefits of the 
initiative.    
Performance of the cluster initiative: A successful collaboration 
between industry, state agency and a university?    
 
Looking at Leadership 4 Growth through the lenses of Sölvell et al‘s (2003) Cluster 
Initiative Performance Model (Figure 2.3 in Section 2.5, Chapter 2) indicated a well 
established cluster initiative. The objectives, to educate, build confidence and 
improve the capabilities of CEOs of high tech SMEs, fell comfortably within the 
CIPM. However, the CIPM model alone was not sufficient to understand how, and 
where, the initiative worked and didn‘t work. By using the social capital concept to 
analyse the cluster initiative, greater depth of understanding of the process of 
collaboration was achieved.   
 
The initiation and planning stage involved deep levels of collaboration between an 
OFC, the Irish Software Association, and a state agency, Enterprise Ireland. It 
leveraged off the social capital bonds within the ISA, and built on earlier established 
bridging social capital between the ISA and Enterprise Ireland. The framework 
agreed for the programme was greatly enhanced by this collaboration. Participation 
rates by CEOs in the initial Leadership 4 Growth programme was also helped by 
social capital bonds existing within the ISA. Finance was shared on a 70:30 
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percentage basis between the agency and the firms involved, rent-seeking was 
certainly part of the motivation for the bridging social capital between the industry 
association and state agency (Cooke 2007a, p83). But the achievement of this 
objective should not be viewed as negative social capital, given that the cluster 
initiative had reciprocal benefits for the state agency as well as the firms involved. In 
addition helping Irish high-tech SMEs to achieve scale can also be seen as a 
contribution to building a national system of innovation in Ireland, which Mjøset 
(1992) recommended. The initiative was well resourced with the involvement of the 
world class business school at Stanford and the mentors who worked with 
participants on the programme. The coaching element was clearly the most 
controversial of the cluster initiative. A number of interviewees commented that it 
worked for some, but not for other, participants and it was viewed as poor value for 
money by one interviewee in particular.  
 
The design and approval of the first Leadership 4 Growth was well structured with 
the ISA and Enterprise Ireland team working closely together and the involvement of 
the Enterprise Ireland Board. The commitment of both the ISA and Enterprise 
Ireland created substantial momentum to drive the cluster initiative forward. This 
supported the contention that state agencies should work with existing resources 
within a community, rather than trying to replace existing networks and trying to do 
everything on their own (Woolcock 2001, p15).  
 
However, once the programme was approved, the structural social capital appeared 
to break down somewhat. In Stanford, an informal group of the ISA, participant 
CEOs and mentors, provided feedback to Enterprise Ireland, particularly on the 
coaching element and this feedback was acted upon. But unlike the other cluster 
initiatives reviewed, no formal oversight committee or board, involving the industry, 
state and university partners, and supported by independent advisors, was 
established. This was a structural social capital weakness of the initiative; the 
establishment of an oversight committee might well have helped to address the 
problems with the coaching element more effectively. It could be argued that the 
opportunity to build on the social capital benefits evident in the team work during 
the design stage was lost.  
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At the time of writing, the Leadership 4 Growth initiative had operated for four 
years. Subsequent rounds of the L4G programme involved additional industry actors. 
OFCs and firms from other high technology sectors of the Irish economy included 
the Irish Medical Devices Association (IMDA) and medical devices companies, and 
the Irish Biotechnology Association and biotechnology companies. Sölvell et al 
(2003) listed three performance outcomes in the cluster initiative performance 
model: competitiveness, growth and goal fulfilment. Significant cohorts of Irish 
SME firms have been assisted in developing a mindset of thinking about how to 
create companies of scale.  Since the programme was first introduced in 2006, over 
140 CEOs and their management teams participated on Leadership 4 Growth. It was 
a central part of Enterprise Ireland‘s support to Irish companies to grow their 
international business in the face of very difficult market challenges‘ (Enterprise 
Ireland 2010).  
 
Professor George Foster, Stanford Faculty Director, stated that:  
 
‗The Leadership 4 Growth programme is redefining the way CEOs and 
senior management build their human capital and that of the organisations 
they lead. It is successfully building a platform that has sizeably raised the 
expectation levels of participating Irish CEOs and has greatly increased their 
knowledge base and confidence.‘   
 
The Irish owned firm, South Western, is one example of the success of the 
programme, increasing competitiveness and growth. South Western CEO, Jim 
Costello, clearly believes that completing the Leadership for Growth programme was 
beneficial:  
 
―Our vision of growth is now more ambitious (€50m in three years) counting 
organic growth only. We now have in place a new management team and 
incentives that are aligned to our goals and are clear to the team‖ (Enterprise 
Ireland 2010a) 
South Western announced in 2010 it was creating 100 new business support jobs, in 
addition to the 450 people already employed at its base in Clonakilty, Co. Cork. The 
firm also employed 200 people in Lodz, Poland, following a move in 2007. At this 
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stage, it introduced a new combined model, which provided high-value close to 
customer activities from Ireland and back-office transaction type procedures from 
Poland.  
 
A second example provided evidence of the benefit of extending the programme to 
high technology sectors other than software. The Irish medical devices firm, 
Creganna‘s CEO Helen Ryan66, stated that:   
 
―L4G has changed our view of what was possible for us to achieve – it has 
been a big mindset shift resulting in a higher level of confidence. We are 
repositioning ourselves with our customers to make a significant step change 
in growth‖   
 
In 2010, Creganna announced the acquisition of the US firm Tactx Medical Inc. The 
move represented a key step in Creganna‘s vision to build a leading global medical 
technology company. The new firm Creganna – Tactx Medical, with a combined 
revenue of US$110 million and 800 staff worldwide, was within the top ten global 
providers of technologies and services to minimally invasive medical devices 
companies.  
 
Undoubtedly there were CEOs who found the programme less transforming than 
others. This indicated that one cannot simply assume positive outcomes from 
interactions of a social capital nature. This was particularly evident when examining 
the coaching element of the initiative.  
 
                                                 
 
66
 Creggana create innovative technologies in the medical devices sector.  
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In-depth interviews also indicated that two years after the end of the first leadership 
programme, a number of CEO participants maintained contact and continued to meet 
in their cohort groups to support each other‘s business development. This is evidence 
that cluster initiatives can have a lasting benefit in terms of strengthening ties and 
social capital bonds between industry participants.  
 
The Leadership 4 Growth programme developed by the ISA and Enterprise Ireland 
also attracted some international attention. The former ISA chairperson and CEO 
industry actor involved in the design of the programme participated in a business 
schools‘ summit in Australia that brought together 46 bodies, including the federal 
government who were interested in leadership and innovation.  The Australian 
organisers of the summit had previously visited Ireland to see how industry and the 
state sector came to work so effectively together in the L4G cluster initiative.   
 
In the late 2000s, the Leadership 4 Growth programme was replicated for the 
construction sector in Ireland, with Duke University and the London Business 
School providing the education element of the programme. The coaching element on 
the construction programme was provided by the same US coaching organisation, 
while the mentors chosen had knowledge of the construction sector. An interviewee 
from the state side indicated that collaboration on the construction programme got 
going almost from day one, with companies working together on some projects to 
develop their businesses internationally. The collapse of the Irish construction 
market undoubtedly contributed to the pace of collaboration between firms.  
 
Cooke (2007a) advised that state agencies should develop exit strategies from cluster 
initiatives and in this sense the Leadership 4 Growth may fall down. The overall cost 
of the programme involved substantial state funding e.g. 70% of the total cost 
involved. With Enterprise Ireland funding budget declining, the future viability of 
the initiative will be challenged. The initial design and establishment of the 
programme clearly involved deep levels of collaboration between the state agency 
and the organisation for collaboration. Stanford GSB also amended the programme 
to take on board feedback following the completion of the first initiative. The 
Leadership 4 Growth programme is now endorsed by a range of organisations for 
collaboration (OFCs) in the software, medical devices and biotechnology sectors. 
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But the state agency now describes the initiative as an ‗Enterprise Ireland 
programme‘. This is despite the fact that the idea for the initiative originated within 
the organisation for collaboration, the ISA, and the first programme would most 
likely not have taken place without the commitment of the leaders of the OFC.  
Concluding comments  
 
As part of the Irish Government‘s 2008 framework for sustainable economic 
renewal, five action areas were identified. The second of these was ‗Building the 
Ideas Economy – Creating ‗The Innovation Island‘ (DOT 2008, p9). State agencies 
e.g. Enterprise Ireland, were also responsible for providing strong supports for start-
up companies and entrepreneurs to create an R&D-intensive indigenous enterprise 
sector. SFI was responsible for continuing to build Ireland‘s world class research 
capacity in strategic areas allied to the needs of industry. These, and many other of 
the long list of key actions (DOT 2008, p13-16), were laudable. But the importance 
of the social capital benefits of building collaboration among firms, and between 
firms and research institutes, universities and institutes of technology, does not come 
through in the document.  It is important to recognise that ‗to innovate‘ is usually a 
collective action, and organisations and organisational capabilities play a role 
(Bender 2008, p26). The government framework clearly outlined a number of roles 
for state agencies in this regard. But the framework failed to give due weight to the 
important collaborative role played by firms and embedded networks of firms in the 
innovation process.  
 
This chapter provided evidence of firms and universities collaborating together, with 
the support of state agencies, in cluster initiatives that can be viewed as the building 
blocks towards systems of innovation in Ireland. The CTVR cluster initiative (Case 
Study 3), which involved seven research partners, seven industry partners and three 
state agencies, can viewed as a building block towards a national system of 
innovation. It focused on the development of wireless and optical networks, with a 
strong emphasis on the technology that underpins such networks.  The APC cluster 
initiative (Case Study 4), which was a much smaller collaboration, can be viewed a 
building block towards a regional innovation. It focused on the interface between 
food and health and well-being, leveraging off the human capital capabilities of food 
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and biotechnology researchers. In addition to the two examined in this thesis, there 
are eight other CSETS that might also be viewed as building blocks toward systems 
of innovation in Ireland. Case studies 1, 2 and 5 can viewed as building up and 
strengthening the ICT and software community in Ireland, which of course can also 
contribute to a national system of innovation, but in a more indirect way than the 
CSET initiatives. SFI, the IDA and Enterprise Ireland all play supporting roles in the 
establishment and funding of many of these cluster initiatives. There is the danger 
that if these state agencies do not develop effective exit strategies, as suggested by 
Cooke (2007a), then when public funding dries up so does the potential for 
innovation in these cluster initiatives. This suggests that encouraging and developing 
a role for financial institutes and venture capital in these initiatives may be important 
for future sustainability.    
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Chapter 6 Clusters, social capital and the building blocks of an 
national innovation system in a  traditional sector of the Irish 
economy 
 
Chapter 5 looked at the development of clusters and collaboration within cluster 
initiatives in the ICT and software sector of the modern economy. This chapter will 
examine the development of clusters with reference to the traditional economy, 
focusing on the food and dairy sector. It will also examine the role of collaboration 
between industry, an Irish state agency and a number of universities in a cluster 
initiative focused on food innovation and health. This issue will once again be 
discussed in the context of the building blocks of a national innovation system in 
Ireland.  
Section 6.1: The traditional economy: The food and dairy sector  
 
The Agri-Food sector makes a significant contribution to gross value added (GVA) 
in the Irish economy, accounting for €11 billion or 6.6 percent of total Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) at factor cost.
67
 The dairy industry is one of Ireland‘s 
largest indigenous industries and, as table 6.1 illustrates, an important part of the 
Agri-Food sector. 
Table 6.1: Key Dairy statistics  
Milk intake at creameries  5 billion litres Average per herd: 225,000 litres 
Farmers  19,000 16% of total employed in 
agriculture 
Milk output (value) €1.6 billion 28% of gross output in agriculture  
Dairy and ingredients 
Exports 
€2.2 billion 27% of total exports of food and 
drink  
Dairy processing 
employment  
5,300  
Sources: DAFF 2009, Bord Bia, CSO, IFA (see endnote 1) 
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 Sources for figures referred to in this paragraph and Table 6.1 include the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF 2009), The Irish Food Board (Bord Bia 2009) and the Central 
Statistics Office publications on Milk statistics and Industrial `Production (2008 / 2009). Total Gross 
Domestic Product (gross value added) in the Irish Economy at factor cost in 2007 was €167,547 
million. In 2007, there were 117,100 employed (farmers) in agriculture and a further 50,000 employed 
in the food and drink sector in Ireland. Bord Bia and the CSO value total exports of food and drink in 
2008 at around €8.2 billion. Figures on the number of dairy farmers and average production per dairy 
herd are drawn from an Irish Farmers Association submission to government (IFA 2009). 
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In addition to direct employment in farming and dairy processing, the industry 
supports employment in related industries such as infant formula manufacture, 
transport, engineering, retailing etc. 
 
The development of the Irish dairy industry up the mid-1990s can be divided into 
four phases (O‘Connell et al, 1997, p3):  
 
(i) An early development phase up to the 1930s,  
(ii) a period of stagnation from the 1930s to the 1950s, affected by 
protectionist Irish economic policies and industry conservatism,  
(iii)  a period of renewed growth and reorganisation during the 1960s and 
early 1970s, when Irish economic policy became more outward looking 
as Ireland prepared for, and joined, the EEC (the forerunner of the EU), 
and  
(iv)  a period from the mid 1980s, when dairy industry development was 
affected by a largely protectionist EU Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). 
 
In this latter period, under the CAP, the dairy industry operated in a highly 
institutionally managed and protected market environment (Dillon et al, 2008).
68
 
Between 1973 and 1983 EU milk production increased from 91.3 to 110 million 
tonnes, creating a market surplus cost equivalent to 30% of the total CAP budget. 
The adoption of milk quotas by EU member states from 1984 halted the growth in 
milk production, while ensuring price protection for EU dairy producers. But the 
CAP system required the use of export subsidies (refunds) to enable EU dairy 
products to trade on world markets. Additional subsidies were needed to encourage 
the use of dairy products on the internal markets in schemes for the manufacture of 
ice cream and confectionery, and animal feeds.  
 
Through this combination of high and stable guaranteed prices, the CAP successfully 
boosted agricultural production in many regions of Europe. In Ireland, the CAP 
                                                 
68
 The remainder of this paragraph draws on the evolution of EU agricultural policy presented in 
Dillon et al (2008, p20). 
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eased the transformation of a largely rural society to a much more broadly-based 
economy with substantial high-tech manufacturing and services sectors. However, 
the CAP became a victim of its own success, resulting in large EU surpluses and 
budget crises in the 1980s (Bureau and Matthews, 2005, p2), which resulted in the 
introduction of milk quotas to restrict the potential for the production of surpluses in 
the dairy sector.   
 
A fifth phase, which can be described as a period of EU agricultural policy reform, 
can now be added to the four phases of development outlined above. In the 1990s, 
the EU Commission faced increased criticism from some of its member states, 
including the UK, due to the continued growth in the internal budget to fund the 
CAP. Countries outside the EU also objected to the impact of the CAP on world 
trade. The EU responded by agreeing with its member states the first major CAP 
reform in 1992 under the direction of the then Agriculture Commissioner Ray 
McSharry
69
. The McSharry package of reforms was implemented in 1993/94 and 
began the process of shifting farm support from price to direct payments (Bureau and 
Matthews, 2005, p9). The reforms instigated a reduction in market support prices 
and provided compensation for farmers by means of direct income aids, with several 
rural development measures being introduced to encourage more environmentally 
friendly and less production intensive systems of farming (Dillon et al. 2008, p20). 
The main targets of this first reform package were the beef and cereals sectors, with 
relatively minor changes introduced for the dairy sector.  
 
In addition to easing the pressure on the internal EU budget, the McSharry reform 
package helped the EU to complete the negotiations on agriculture in the WTO 
Uruguay round. It was the first time that the agriculture sector was included in a 
multilateral trade agreement. In the period 1995 to 2000, further CAP changes took 
place to accommodate the newly-agreed disciplines of the WTO (Bureau and 
Matthews, 2005, p9). The EU cut domestic support schemes by 20 percent, import 
tariffs by 36 percent, and export subsidies by 21 percent in volume terms and 36 
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 Ray McSharry was EC Commissioner for Agriculture from 1989 to 1992, having previously served 
as Minister for Finance in Ireland.  
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percent in value terms. These changes had a more significant impact on the dairy 
industry than the initial 1992 CAP reform measures.  
 
Despite the McSharry reforms and the EU commitment to reduce support under the 
WTO at the end of the 1990s, agriculture spending still accounted for approximately 
half of total EU expenditure. This caused political tension between net contributors 
to the budget, such as Germany and the UK, and member states who were net 
beneficiaries of the agricultural policy, including Ireland. These tensions were 
heightened by the prospect of the EU taking in ten new member states in 2004 (and 
two more in 2005) all with less developed economies than the existing members. 
The ‗new‘ countries were likely to draw heavily on the CAP to support their 
agricultural sectors. All of this suggested that there would be substantial support 
among existing EU member states, particularly the net contributors
70
 to the budget, 
for further reform of the CAP. 
 
Consequently, the second major EU CAP reform ‗Agenda 2000‘ was implemented 
in preparation for this EU enlargement. The Agenda 2000 reform package also 
helped the EU to prepare for entering into negotiations for further liberalisation of 
agricultural trade under the WTO Doha round. This time around the dairy policy 
regime was a key focus of the EU reform process. Agenda 2000 also introduced a 
major change in the overall philosophy of the CAP, by promoting the idea of a 
‗second pillar‘ that would shift public policy focus from supporting agricultural 
production (the ‗first pillar‘) towards more support for environmental and social 
services, and the promotion of quality products (Bureau and Matthews 2005, p10). 
 
These cumulative changes in agricultural policy had an impact on the utilisation of 
milk by Irish dairy processors. A comparison of production levels at the end of the 
2000s with those at the end of the 1990s, using three year averages (Table 6.2), 
provides evidence of a quite significant shift in Irish dairy production patterns. 
Average Irish cheese production in the period 2007-2009 was 74 percent higher than 
it was at the end of the 1990s. In 2009, Ireland produced far more (35 percent more) 
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 Germany held the EU Presidency in 1999 and with the support of the other net financial 
contributors was in a good position to influence both the size of the future budget and the shape of 
CAP reform in the wake of the greatly enlarged EU.   
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cheese than butter, whereas ten years earlier Irish cheese production had been only 
two thirds that of butter (CSO 2010b). 
Table 6.2 Irish Dairy Production – selected products  
 
'000 tonnes 1997-1999 2007-2009 Percentage 
   Change 
Butter 134.9 128.5 -4.7% 
Cheese 91.5 159.2 74.0% 
Whole Milk Powder 33.7 30.7 -8.9% 
SMP  101.0 70.8 -30.0% 
Casein & Caseinates 43.4 37.3 -13.9% 
 
Source: CSO, IDB and author‘s calculations 
 
In a further policy reform, the EU has agreed to eliminate milk quotas from 2015 and 
Ireland may be one of the few member states where milk production will increase. 
Consequently, Ireland‘s share of EU milk deliveries may actually increase in the 
future and Irish dairy processors will have more, rather than less, raw material. 
Trends towards the production of more cheese and dairy ingredients based on whey 
protein are likely to continue in the future, as the Irish industry strives to survive in 
an increasingly competitive and free market environment. The production of certain 
dairy ingredients such as casein and SMP may decline, as less butter is produced in 
the absence of EU support. The importance of the cheese and ingredients segment of 
the Irish dairy industry will be discussed in further detail in Section 6.3 below. 
Section 6.2: Dairy industry clustering – cheese and ingredients  
Aspects of clustering - Irish dairy sector in the mid-1990s 
 
A detailed study of the dairy industry in the mid-1990s, carried out for the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) of Ireland, ‗identified aspects of a ―cluster‖ 
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and a ―clustering process‖ as described by Porter‘ (O‘Connell et al. 1997, p79).71 
The core of the Irish dairy industry was made up of a number of large competing 
indigenous milk processors. By the mid-1990s, some of these processors were 
developing into competitive multinational companies, with an innovative 
cooperative and plc structure, headquartered in Ireland. Smaller cooperatives, from 
an exporting point of view, were essentially a network of processors supplying the 
Irish Dairy Board (IDB), which was a marketing cooperative that owned no 
production facilities in Ireland. There was a strong geographical dimension, with 
dairy farmers, major dairy processors and supplier industries (including some 
packaging, equipment, engineering and software) spatially clustered in the South 
Munster and Leinster regions. Evidence was also found of an agglomeration effect, 
where the ‗cluster‘ of dairy processors attracted suppliers, customers and supporting 
organisations to the same region. Retailers and foreign multinational customers 
located in Ireland had a positive influence on the competitiveness of the Irish dairy 
industry. Retail multiples were sophisticated and demanding buyers, partly 
responsible for the upgrading of standards of Irish dairy processors.  But more 
important, according to O‘Connell et al (1997), was that retailers, both Irish and non-
Irish, brought constant pressure on dairy processors to reduce prices and 
consequently improve cost efficiency.  
 
Mottiar (1997) also applied the diamond model to Irish dairying and found that the 
development of the sector could be partly explained by the factors outlined by Porter. 
She suggested the Porter model might be expanded to include an ‗external circuit‘ to 
include transnational business activity and other countries‘ diamonds (Mottiar 1997, 
p257).  She correctly identified that international factors also affected the structure of 
the Irish industry, encouraging firms to merge, make acquisitions or transform into 
public limited companies (Mottiar 1997, p289). 
 
However, the cluster analysis of dairying undertaken in 1997 faced certain problems 
and limitations. One problem in applying the diamond model to the sector was that 
Porter envisaged a much less regulated and freer trading environment than that 
                                                 
71
 The section draws extensively on the assessment and conclusions of the cluster analysis study of the 
Irish dairy processing industry carried out by O‘Connell et al (1997), pp 68 – 81.  
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which characterised the dairy industry in the mid-1990s. This led O‘Connell et al 
(1997, p71) to conclude that the Irish diamond worked in conjunction with the EU‘s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to create an industry that could only be seen as 
competitive ‗within the context of the existing regulatory regime‘. The downside was 
that the CAP support programmes for commodity products, such as butter and 
skimmed milk powder, reinforced seasonality of milk production. This worked 
against the long term development of export markets for unsupported products and 
encouraged fragmented production structures. Since the mid-1990s, internal EU 
budgetary pressures and external pressure for less subsidisation of agriculture at the 
WTO has resulted in significant CAP reform. Consequently, the business 
environment for the Irish dairy industry is now less regulated, suggesting that the 
Porter model, at least in this regard, may have greater relevance in the Irish context 
today.  
 
In contrast, Wickham (2005) proposed that the role of government can be altered 
from an exogenous variable (Porter 1990) to one that is central to regional economic 
development. He found positive key government roles at the introductory, growth 
and maturity stages of a Tasmanian shipping cluster, including support for building 
industry networks and the social capital of the region (Wickham 2005, pp43-47). 
Chapter 5 provided evidence of a positive role for government in the development of 
ICT and software clusters in the Irish economy, including various forms of building 
social capital involving industry, state agencies and the research community. The 
role of government in the emergence of the cheese and ingredients cluster outlined in 
Table 6.3 below was not as positive as it was in the case of the ICT and software 
sector. However, section 6.3 provides evidence of a recent positive role for the state 
agency Enterprise Ireland in building a cluster initiative involving four dairy 
cooperative/ companies and four research institutes.  
 
One challenge that researchers, particularly those analysing clusters in small open 
economies, face in using the Porter model is the relatively minor role envisaged for 
multinationals.
72
 Foreign ownership appeared in the ‗demand conditions‘ and 
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 For a detailed discussion on this point, see the subsection on the criticisms of the diamond cluster 
model in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.  
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‗supporting / related industries‘ elements of the Irish dairy diamond, as outlined by 
O‘Connell et al (1997), rather than at the core of the diamond. For example when 
identifying the horizontal and vertical linkages characteristic of a Porter cluster, 
O‘Connell et al (1997, Figure 7, p73) placed emphasis on foreign owned beverage / 
brewing companies and chemical/ pharmaceutical companies as customers and 
related industries. But, both O‘Connell et al (1997) and Mottiar (1997) under- 
estimated the importance of the baby food / infant formula multinational companies 
to the development of the Irish dairy sector. This was probably as a result of 
inadequate knowledge of the dynamics of Irish dairy sector on the part of O‘Connell 
(1997) and Mottiar (1997). But it raises an interesting issue in relation to the lack of 
emphasis on the role of MNCs in the Porter (1990) cluster model.  
 
In the case of Ireland, the strength in infant formula / baby food production is related 
to a strong position in dairying. The growth in the dairy ingredient sector is also 
related to linkages to the infant formula industry in Ireland. Hence the infant formula 
industry can be categorised as a related industry, as well as a customer, in the context 
of dairy clustering in Ireland. Of course, the fact that the firms that produce infant 
formula / baby food in Ireland are foreign multinationals once again challenges the 
limited role for FDI suggested by Porter in his diamond model. In defence of Porter, 
Ketels (2006, p125) argued that there is nothing in the Porter concept of 
competitiveness and clusters that denies the important role of multinational firms.
73
 
However, a review of criticisms of the diamond model in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 
still leads one to conclude that Porter essentially saw only an occasional seed role for 
FDI, whereas Dunning (1998, 2001) saw a deeper role for FDI and MNCs in 
competitiveness.  The role played by the foreign owned infant formula industry in 
the development of the dairy sector is explored in greater detail during the 
examination of clustering in the cheese and ingredients segment below. This chapter 
suggests that this relationship has played a far deeper role than that envisaged by 
Porter in the cluster concept. 
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 For a more detailed discussion on this point, see the subsection on the criticisms of the diamond 
cluster model in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
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Clustering in cheese and ingredients segment of the Irish dairy 
sector 
 
Porter argued that, in explaining competitiveness at national level, one should focus 
not on the economy as a whole but on specific industries and industry segments 
(Porter 1990, p9). Furthermore, industries are not homogeneous; segments of an 
industry have a structure just as industries do and the strength of competitive forces 
often differ from one part of an industry to another (Porter 1998a). The dairy 
industry can also be divided into a number of industry segments that face different 
competitive environments and different supply and demand conditions. These 
differences have an impact on the context for firm strategies and the way related and 
supporting industries interact with firms. The key strategic questions for the firm that 
arise out of industry segmentation are where in the industry the firm should compete 
and how the firm strategy should reflect this segmentation (Porter 1998a). 
Essentially, a firm can adopt a broadly-targeted strategy that addresses many 
segments, or address a small number of segments in a focused strategy. This thesis 
takes a new approach to previous cluster studies, bringing together insights from 
Porter‘s work on industry segmentation and industry clusters with reference to the 
Irish dairy sector.    
 
O‘Connell et al (1997) and Mottiar (1997), in applying Porter‘s diamond to the Irish 
dairy industry, focused on the industry as a whole. Both were correct in identifying 
the CAP as a constraining factor on development of the industry, but only partly 
correct in the degree to which this restricted the applicability of the model to Irish 
dairying. Different dairy industry segments face different trading environments. 
Butter and SMP manufacturers have greater access to EU support schemes than other 
industry segments, with the Commission buying product during periods of market 
weakness. This underpins the price paid to farmers whose milk is processed into 
these products. As already outlined, CAP reform has reduced the level of agriculture 
support. But the intervention purchasing system for butter and SMP continues to 
exist, albeit at lower levels. In contrast, cheese manufacturers have never enjoyed 
such price support and, in this sense, have faced a more challenging trading 
environment than their butter/SMP industry counterparts. In addition, a strategic 
report commissioned by the Government with the support of Enterprise Ireland, 
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ICOS and the Irish Dairy Industries Association (IDIA), recommended that the 
industry ‗reduce dependence on commodity products and increase value-added 
content of manufactured dairy products‘. The report identified future market 
opportunities in areas such as dairy ingredients and functional and health foods, 
which could help to sustain industry competitiveness (Prospectus 2003, p10).  
 
The remainder of this section will examine clustering in the cheese and ingredients 
segment of the Irish dairy sector. There are at least two reasons for choosing this 
segment over others: (i) It is historically the least EU-supported segment of the Irish 
dairy industry and (ii) consumer demand for cheese and ingredients is growing faster 
than for other dairy products. In this context, it may be a good barometer for what 
lies ahead for the broader Irish dairy sector operating in a less protected trading 
environment.  The analysis will apply the Porter diamond model to this segment of 
the dairy industry, with a new focus on collaboration and social capital, drawing on 
the concepts outlined in the framework developed in Chapter 2.  
 
This segmented approach will also provide some indications of the different 
strategies adopted by the Irish dairy companies and cooperatives. Section 6.5 of this 
chapter will examine the emergence of a cluster initiative, involving high levels of 
collaboration between a number of dairy cooperatives / companies, a state agency 
and Irish universities, which contributes to the building blocks of a national 
innovation system in Ireland. 
The evolution of cheese manufacture 1960s - 2010 
 
The evolution of the cheese segment in Ireland is interesting from a cluster 
development perspective. In Ireland, cheese production is predominately cheddar 
cheese, with smaller amounts of alternative varieties including emmental, gouda and 
low-fat cheeses.   
 
In the UK, the other major producer of cheddar cheese in Europe, the cheese 
segment evolved from a farmhouse production structure. The substantial farmhouse 
sector in the UK has diminished in recent years, partly as a result of changes in farm 
structure and partly because of increased competition from generic cheeses produced 
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by large scale manufacturers.
74
  In Ireland, over the last 20 years, there has been a 
greater focus on and interest in farmhouse cheese production, but farmhouse cheese 
is not the foundation of the cheese industry in Ireland. In 2009 the Irish Food Board 
(Bord Bia) valued the Irish total cheese market at €180 million, with the farmhouse 
cheese share valued at less than €3 million (CÁIS, 2009). Teagasc (2009) estimate 
annual production of farmhouse cheese in Ireland at over 500 tonnes, including 
exports to the UK, other European countries and the USA.  Consequently, the vast 
majority of the 159,000 tonnes of Irish cheese exported in 2009 was produced by 
dairy processors in large scale factories (CSO 2010c). The UK is a key export 
market for Irish cheddar in particular, with Irish cooperatives / companies exporting 
over 77,400 tonnes of cheddar valued at over €215 million to the UK in 200975. 
Therefore, in order to understand the development of the cheese segment in Ireland, 
one must focus on the evolution of large scale manufacturing of cheese. 
 
In marked contrast to UK industry, in Ireland a driving force in the development of 
the cheese segment was foreign investment. Following the establishment of the 
IDA
76
, a number of UK multinational companies invested in cheese manufacture in 
Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s
77
. Unigate invested in four cheese plants located in 
the south Leinster and Munster regions (see Table 6.3).   
 
Express Dairies invested in two plants in the Munster region.  Unigate subsequently 
sold cheese plants to Avonmore, Waterford and Ballyclough cooperatives, retaining 
only one in Wexford. During the 1990s a number of mergers took place in the dairy 
sector. Ballyclough merged with the Munster based cooperative Mitchelstown, 
another cheese producer, to form Dairygold Cooperative in 1990.  
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 There are still a small number of farmhouse producers in the UK producing up to 7,000 tonnes of 
cheese per annum 
 
75
 Unpublished figures obtained directly from the CSO External Trade Section.  
 
76
 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on the establishment of the IDA and the government focus 
on FDI.  
 
77
 Following the first period of commercial production between 1910 and 1921 the Irish cheese 
industry declined greatly after the World War I, as creameries reverted to butter production, with 
limited developments in cheese making from the 1930s to the 1960s pioneered by Mitchelstown Co-
op and the Golden Vale Federation (Keane 1998, p12). 
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Table 6.3: Evolution of cheese manufacture in Ireland 1960 – 2010 
 
1960s-1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
drives cheese 
manufacture, limited 
Irish co-op 
involvement  
 
Irish Co-ops emerge 
in cheese sector,  
Unigate reduces 
investment in Ireland  
Mergers and  
Rationalisation of Co-
ops / Plcs,  
Express disinvests 
from Ireland  
Further 
Rationalisation  
and acquisitions 
Unigate  
 Wexford 
 
 Ballyragget 
(Kilkenny)  
 Kilmeaden 
(Waterford) 
 
 
 Rathduff  
(Cork) 
 
Unigate 
 Wexford 
 
Avonmore Co-op 
 Ballyragget 
Waterford Co-op 
 Kilmeaden  
 
 
Ballyclough  Co-op 
 Rathduff 
 
 
UK Dairy Crest 
 Wexford 
 
 
Glanbia Co-op / plc 
 Merger of 
Avonmore 
&Waterford 
 
Dairygold Co-op 
 Ballyclough 
 Mitchelstown 
 
Wexford (70% by 
Co-op, 30% by UK 
Dairy Crest) 
 
Glanbia Co-op /plc 
 
 
 
 
Dairygold Co-op 
Express Dairies  
 Carbery  
(Cork) 
 
 Deel Vale 
(Limerick) 
Express Dairies  
 Carbery  
(Cork) 
 
 Deel Vale 
(Limerick 
 
 
 
Carbery Ltd  
( West Cork Co-ops) 
 
Newmarket Co-op 
(Limerick) 
 
 
Carbery Ltd  
( West Cork Co-
ops) 
 
Kerry Group Plc  
 Newmarket 
acquired by 
Kerry 
Mitchelstown Co-op 
 
 
Golden Vale Co-op 
 Charleville  
 
Mitchelstown Co-op 
 
 
Golden Vale  
 Charleville 
(Merger to form 
Dairygold see above) 
 
Golden Vale  
 Charleville 
 
 
 
 
Kerry Group Plc 
 Charleville 
acquired by 
Kerry 
Tipperary Co-op 
 
Tipperary Co-op  
 
Tipperary Co-op 
 
Tipperary Co-op 
 
 
Source: Author‘s table constructed from interviews for thesis and secondary data.  
 
Later in the decade, Avonmore and Waterford merged to form Glanbia 
cooperative/plc in 1997. Unigate sold its interest in Wexford to the UK Dairy Crest 
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group. Express Dairies also divested from Ireland, with Carbery and Newmarket 
becoming independent cheese producers owned by Irish farming cooperatives. 
 
Consequently, despite the foreign origins of the industry, by the early 1990s all 
cheese production was controlled by Irish cooperatives/ companies, with the single 
exception of the Dairy Crest cheese plant in Wexford. The Kerry Group entered the 
Irish cheese sector by acquiring Golden Vale in 2001 and Newmarket in 2010. In 
2010, UK Dairy Crest reduced its stake in Wexford to 30 percent, with Wexford 
cooperative being the major shareholder. 
 
While the dominant cheese variety produced by the Irish dairy industry is Cheddar 
cheese, relatively small amounts of other types of cheese are produced by the major 
manufacturers and a number of independent cooperatives. Tipperary is an 
independent medium sized cooperative that produces emmental and gouda cheeses, 
and ingredient products for the infant formula industry. A small quantity of 
Tipperary cheese is sold on the Irish market, with the majority of its production 
being marketed through its cheese-packing and distribution centre in Dijon, France, 
and through the IDB in the USA and elsewhere.  
 
Therefore at this stage of evolution, there are six producers in the cheese segment of 
the Irish dairy industry, Dairygold Cooperative, Glanbia plc, the Kerry Group, the 
Carbery Group, Wexford Creamery Ltd and Tipperary Cooperative
78
.  
Geographic concentration of the cheese and ingredients industry 
segment  
 
Cheese plants are geographically concentrated in the traditional heartland of Irish 
dairying, where land and climatic conditions are best suited for milk production 
(Figure 6.1). Over three-quarters of national milk output is produced in the southern 
and eastern regions of Munster and Leinster (CSO, 2009a), where farm sizes and 
                                                 
78
 One cheese manufacturer not included in the analysis here, due to its very small scale, is 
Mullinahone Cooperative. It was established in 1893, did not amalgamate into the larger dairy groups 
but has strong collaborative links to Glanbia, who collect 60 percent of Mullinahone‘s small milk 
quota of 1.7 million gallons (Briscoe and Ward, 2006, p123). It small cheese manufacturing division 
is Compsey Creamery Society Ltd, which produces a range of soft cheeses, soured cream, 
mascarpone, yogurts, fromage frais and crème fraiche. 
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milk quotas are bigger than in north and west (Briscoe and Ward, 2006, p114). 
Cheese and dairy ingredient production is much more markedly concentrated in 
these good areas for milk production than is the case for the other segments of the 
industry. For example, in the province of Connaught, where land quality is poor for 
milk production, cooperatives have concentrated on butter and SMP production, and 
supplying liquid milk to local markets. Cheese production has not developed in the 
Connaught region. One plant in Connaught produces the dairy ingredient casein, but 
this is a by-product of butter production.  
Figure 6.1: Location of major Irish Cheese manufacturers 2010 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram  
 
In addition to natural cheese types such as cheddar and emmental, processed cheese 
is also produced by a number of cheese manufacturers. Processed cheese is made by 
combining natural cheese, butter and dried milk proteins.  Processed cheese is 
produced by Kerry plc (previously Golden Vale) and Dairygold cooperative in the 
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Munster region. Processed cheese production, and more recently mozzarella 
production, used as an ingredient for the pizza industry, has evolved in Ulster in 
Northern Ireland
79
.  
 
In the Republic of Ireland, the vast majority of manufacturing milk is produced in 
the spring and summer months, with very limited production in the autumn and 
winter. This seasonality feature of milk production has had an impact on the type of 
cheese produced. Cheddar is a cheese well suited to the challenges of the seasonality 
curve, being a hard cheese maturing over a period of months or even up to two years 
in the case of ‗fully mature‘ cheddar. In contrast continental type soft and semi-soft 
cheeses, such as brie, camembert and gouda, require a shorter maturation period of 
weeks rather months and year-round good quality milk production to secure supply. 
 
Section 6.3: The diamond model and the cheese and ingredients 
segment  
 
The following sub-sections will examine of the changing strength of Porter‘s four 
diamond elements in relation to the cheese and ingredients segment in preparation 
for a discussion of the extent to which it is a cluster (Figure 6.2). The four elements 
are demand conditions, factor conditions, related and supporting industries and firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry.  Insights from Porter‘s work on industry segmentation 
and its impact on firm strategy will be particularly relevant in the discussion of the 
fourth element of the model.  The analysis will also incorporate learning from 
interviews with senior industry figures carried out in order to gain a better 
understanding of the role of collaboration in the cheese and ingredients segment.  
 
Demand conditions for the cheese and ingredients segment 
 
Domestic demand influences the goods that an industry produces. The Irish domestic 
market of circa 4.5 million people is small by international standards. This can place 
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 By the late 1990s Kerry was a major supplier of process cheese slices to the fast food industry in 
Europe from their factory in Northern Ireland and Glanbia was a major supplier of mozzarella pizza 
cheese in Europe (Mottiar 1997, p276). 
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certain constraints on product development. On the other hand Porter (1990, p96) 
argued that early saturation of domestic demand ‗forces firms to continue innovating 
and upgrading‘.  In the case of the Irish dairy sector, the EU support regime, through 
providing Irish farmers with a guaranteed milk price, worked against innovation in 
general. It discouraged the development of new products and entry into new markets 
(Mottiar 1997, p277).  
 
Cheese is historically the least supported segment of the Irish dairy industry, facing 
more intense competition than other segments. Prior to recent CAP reform, butter 
producers not only had access to high levels of EU support via intervention 
purchasing, but also had access to schemes that supported the use of butter in 
confectionary and provided aid for private storage (APS) of butter. The Irish cheese 
industry had no such support; for example there has never been an APS scheme for 
Ireland‘s main cheese type, cheddar80.  In addition there was never any EU support 
for whey, the by-product of cheese production. There was substantial support for 
SMP and casein, the two protein based products produced after separating out cream 
for butter production. 
 
Furthermore, competition in the cheese segment has intensified from the early 1990s 
onwards, with the growth of multinational retailers and the introduction of the EU 
‗single market‘. This resulted in a greater variety of cheese types and brands 
appearing in retail outlets, affecting the competitive environment for cheese to a far 
greater extent than for butter.  
 
Therefore, demand conditions for the cheese segment are very different to other 
segments of the dairy industry. There is intense competition among Irish cheese 
producers on the domestic market with a number of established cheddar and cheddar 
type brands. Brands such as Kilmeaden and Avonmore (owned by Glanbia plc), 
Charleville (owned by Kerry plc), Wexford (now majority owned by Wexford 
                                                 
80
For a period of years, Ireland had a small allocation under an ‗aid for private storage‘ scheme for 
emmental. This was important to Tipperary cooperative the only Irish producer of emmental. But it 
was a minor element in the development of the cheese sector in Ireland, in contrast to the importance 
of the EU support in the development of the butter/SMP and butter/casein segments. During the CAP 
reforms of the 2000s the emmental storage scheme was abolished.  
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Cooperative) and Dubliner (developed by Carbery and the Irish Dairy Board
81
) 
actively compete for sales in retail outlets. There is significant spend on advertising 
of these brands, including on national television. Some producers also developed 
strong relationships with major retailers in supplying own brand products e.g. 
Tesco‘s Wexford cheddar produced by Wexford Creameries Ltd. 
Figure 6.2: Cheese and Ingredients Segment Cluster of the Irish 
Dairy Industry  
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram, using Porter (1990, 2003) diamond model framework.  
 
The introduction of the more open EU single market resulted in increased quantities 
of different brands and types of EU natural and processed cheese appearing in retail 
stores in Ireland. Since the early 1990s, there have also been significant innovations 
in terms of product offering of cheddar, with a wider range of maturation levels 
(mild, mature, extra mature)
82
 and convenience types (sliced, grated etc.). This 
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 The Carbery group manufacture Dubliner, while the Irish Dairy Board (IDB) market the cheese 
internationally for the group. Carbery and IDB worked in partnership with Teagasc in developing the 
cheese.  
82
 The national cheese grading scheme for cheddar cheese introduced by the Department of 
Agriculture in 1966 ( Enright 1997) is a positive government intervention that supports such grading 
of cheese.   
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facilitates a greater range of price differentiation in the market place, with the 
consumer willing to pay for both enhanced taste and convenience.  
 
Porter (1990, pp86-87) argued that home demand can confer competitive advantage 
by driving firms to improve and through that to become successful in export 
markets. There was substantial competition on the domestic Irish market but a 
credible cheese and ingredients cluster could not develop, to service the scale needs 
of the Irish dairy sector, relying solely on this small market. Consequently, exporting 
off the island was a focus from an early stage in the evolution of the cheese segment. 
The UK is Ireland‘s geographically closest neighbour and a traditional export market 
for Irish food. With a population of around 60 million consumers, the UK provides 
an obvious first choice export destination for Irish cheese.  Ireland is the largest 
European supplier to the UK cheddar market, which was valued at Stg£1.3 billion 
and accounted for 55% of the total cheese market in volume terms in 2009 (DairyCo 
–AHDB, 2009).  
 
Exporting beyond the UK has been more challenging for the Irish industry. Ireland‘s 
entry to the EEC in 1973 was not a major boost to the cheese sector and was much 
more important to other segments of the dairy industry. Mainland European 
consumers are not traditional consumers of cheddar. For example, in the northern 
European countries including the Netherlands and Germany, consumers preferred 
semi-soft cheeses such as edam and gouda. Relatively small quantities of edam and 
gouda are produced by dairy cooperatives in Ireland, but large scale volume 
production for export was not pursued by the Irish industry. Attempts to sell Irish 
produced edam and gouda in Europe would have meant Irish cooperatives competing 
against much larger Dutch and German cooperatives in their home markets.  
 
As a result, major Irish dairy cooperatives and companies choose to concentrate on 
developing a presence in the newer emerging dairy and food ingredients segments of 
the industry. Elsewhere in Europe in countries such as France and Greece, 
consumers preferred a range of soft cheese made from either cow or goat‘s milk, the 
production of which was not supported by the seasonality of Irish milk supply.  
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The cheese segment was more severely affected by the implementation of the WTO 
Uruguay agreement, than other segments of the dairy sector. This implementation 
meant that EU support for the export of cheese had to decline sharply. Supports for 
cheese exports to the USA were eliminated in the late 1990s and then to other 
destinations in the early 2000s.  
 
The WTO Uruguay agreement also opened up the EU cheese market through a 
general 36 percent decrease in import tariffs and through specific cheese import 
quotas at further reduced import tariff levels, for cheddar in particular. Global dairy 
competitors such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada were already established 
exporters of cheddar. Consequently, the impact of the import side of the WTO 
agreement was greater on Irish and UK cheese manufacturers than on cheese 
producers elsewhere in Europe who did not produce cheddar cheese.  
 
The combined effect of these different demand conditions is that the cheese segment 
operates in a far less supported, more openly competitive, environment than other 
segments of the Irish dairy industry. As outlined above, with a number of established 
brands owned by different cooperative/companies, there is substantial competition in 
the home market. After the home market, the main market for Irish cheddar has 
traditionally been the UK. The completion of the EU single market in goods, and 
reductions in import tariff protection as a result of the WTO Uruguay agreement, 
intensified the competitive environment for cheese manufacturers in both the home 
and UK markets. Modest exports of other types of cheese were achieved to a small 
number of other EU countries, for example regato cheese to Greece and a range of 
cheeses to Spain. Quantities of Irish cheese exported outside the EU have been 
relatively modest, but important to certain manufacturers. Some significant success 
was achieved in exports of emmental and low-fat cheeses to the USA.  
Factor input and supply conditions for the cheese and ingredients 
segment  
 
Porter distinguished between (a) basic/generalised and (b) advanced/specialised 
factors conditions. In the context of the Irish cheese and ingredient cluster, such 
factors had both positive and negative impacts. Appropriate climatic conditions for 
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the production of milk and good grass growth can all be considered basic factor 
advantages for the dairy industry.  An available supply of experienced and skilled 
dairy farmers can be considered an advanced / specialised factor advantage for Irish 
cooperatives/companies. The milk price offered to these farmers is a continual 
source of competition among all Irish cooperatives, with league tables published in 
farming newspapers on a regular basis. This is because, despite being members of a 
cooperative, dairy farmers can choose which manufacturer to supply from year to 
year (Mottiar 1997, p285).  The three largest Irish dairy manufacturers (Glanbia, 
Kerry and Dairygold) process 82 percent of milk and account for 44 percent of dairy 
farmers (Briscoe and Ward 2006, p115)
83
.  There is continuing consolidation in the 
industry; over 70 percent of milk was processed by the five largest dairy companies / 
cooperatives in 1995 (Forbairt 1995, p65) and 80 percent of milk was processed by 
the twelve largest cooperatives at the end of the 1980s (ICOS 1987, p3).  This would 
suggest that an oligopoly structure is developing within Ireland. However, the 
market for dairy products is European and increasingly global, with very large 
international industry players such the Dutch group, Friesland Coberco, and the 
Danish and Swedish group, Arla Foods. Therefore, in order to survive internationally 
Irish dairy cooperative / companies must achieve greater scale.    
 
One of the major challenges for the cheese segment of the Irish dairy industry over 
the years has been access to milk for production of cheese at a competitive price. As 
already outlined, the EU support primarily focused on butter and SMP, particularly 
from an Irish perspective. The CAP restricted, rather than supported, strategic 
development of the Irish cheese segment. Cheese producers found themselves 
competing for milk supply with butter/ SMP producers whose prices were artificially 
underpinned by EU support schemes. In years when world demand for butter and 
SMP was high, cheese producers had to pay high prices for milk. But in years when 
demand for the commodity products butter and SMP were low, milk prices did not 
fall as much as they would have (without intervention purchasing ) and cheese 
producers could end up paying uncompetitive prices for milk
84
. This was a 
                                                 
83
 Discussion of the three largest dairy organisations in this section draws on material on mergers, 
rationalisation, restructuring and acquisitions outlined in Briscoe and Ward (2006, pp115-118). 
 
84
 In the early 1990s, an Irish Minister for Agriculture came back from Brussels heralding a ‗success‘ 
in securing a 2 percent higher intervention price for Irish butter than in any other member state. This 
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particularly difficult situation for Irish cheddar producers since their major 
competitors on the world market, New Zealand and Australia, were not hampered by 
the EU milk pricing system.  
 
A unique factor condition, and in many ways a negative factor, that Irish dairy 
manufacturers face is the seasonality of Irish milk supply, which affects the product 
mix in the dairy industry and makes it difficult to develop product brands (Mottiar 
1997, pp 267-273). This seasonality of Irish milk production (Figure 6.3) was 
intensified by the EU support systems for butter and SMP. Seasonality of milk 
supply also restricted the development of the cheese segment.  
 
Figure 6.3: Seasonality of Irish Milk Supply  
 
 
Source: IDB, 2009 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
had the paradoxical result that the Irish Dairy Board (IDB) and other exporters of butter had to 
achieve 2 percent more than competitors from the market place before by-passing intervention. It also 
meant that Irish cheese producers had to pay 2 percent more for the milk they used to produce cheese, 
in order to compete with the alternative butter / SMP usage.   
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In particular, seasonality impacted on the potential to develop the production of 
cheeses other than cheddar. For example Waterford (now part of Glanbia plc), for a 
period during the 1990s, produced ‗Leerdamer‘, a gouda type cheese, in Kilmeaden. 
But the cooperative could not secure adequate milk at competitive prices during the 
off-peak months to make production of Leerdamer cost effective. Essentially, the 
production of varieties of cheese that have lower maturation periods than cheddar, 
and that require year round milk supply, was costly and difficult under the 
constraints imposed by the seasonality of Irish milk supply.  The cooperative 
considered paying a premium to encourage farmers to supply year round milk of 
quality required for this type of cheese production. But this proved too costly, 
particularly when international competitors in the market did not have to pay such a 
premium to secure year round milk supply. 
 
Mottiar (1997, pp271-274) concluded that these natural resources e.g. a ready supply 
of milk, are so important to the Irish dairy sector that it is possible to have a 
competitive advantage, but that factor disadvantages had to be overcome by recourse 
to specialised factors. She referred to the seasonality of milk supply and a high 
proportion of land with impeded drainage as factor disadvantages, which could be 
addressed by specialised factors involving collaboration between highly skilled 
individuals and research institutes. Section 6.4 below will consider the role of 
collaboration as a specialised factor in the generation of social capital in the cheese 
and ingredients cluster.  
 
Related and supporting industries: Infant Formula / Baby Food 
Industry  
 
Supporting industries can ‗confer potential advantages on a nation‘s firms in many 
other industries because they produce inputs that are widely used and important to 
innovation and internationalization‘ (Porter 1990, p100). The strength of a nation in 
one industry, according to Porter, can also be related to a strong position in another 
industry area (Porter 1990, p101).   In her application of the diamond to the Irish 
dairy sector Mottiar (1997, p286) outlined that related industries had developed as 
firms tried to diversify their products into areas such as meat, fruit juices and food, 
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but that this largely resulted  as a consequence of acquisitions abroad. An 
engineering firm called Brewery, Dairy and Chemical Ltd had also developed to 
serve a variety of industries (O‘Connell et al 1997), but did not develop 
internationally as Porter might have envisaged (Mottiar 1997, p287).   
 
The infant formula / baby food industry is a major customer for Irish dairy 
cooperatives/ companies but it is also the most important related industry in the Irish 
cheese and ingredients segment
85
. Three world class producers of infant formula 
have established major manufacturing bases in Ireland. All are foreign owned 
multinationals and their impact on the Irish dairy sector challenges the limited role 
that Porter suggests for MNCs in a cluster. The Danone owned company Nutricia 
Ireland Ltd
86
 produces the well known brands ‗Cow and Gate‘ and ‗Milupa‘ in 
Ireland. Two American owned companies Pfizer
87
 and Abbott also produce a range 
of baby food brands in Ireland for the EU and world markets– the best known of 
these brands are ‗SMA‘ and ‗Similac‘/ Gain.  
 
The infant formula/ baby food industry is a major purchaser of skimmed milk, in 
liquid or powder form, which contains the casein protein. A number of 
cooperatives/companies in the Munster and Leinster regions supply dried skimmed 
milk powder (SMP) to infant formula producers. One dairy cooperative in the North 
East region
88
 supplies liquid skimmed milk directly to an infant formula producer.  
 
The infant formula/ baby food industry in Ireland is also a purchaser of dairy 
ingredient products, whey and lactose. To understand the link between cheese and 
dairy ingredients and in turn the dairy industry‘s links to the infant formula /baby 
                                                 
85
 The Irish Dairy Board is this analysis is considered a supporting industry rather than a related 
industry, since IDB would not exist without the dairy cooperatives, who make up the industry.  
 
86
 The French multinational food group Danone acquired the Dutch company Numico who previously 
owned Nutricia Ireland Ltd, in 2007.  
 
87
 In a merger agreement in 2009, Pfizer acquired Wyeth to create one of the most diversified 
companies in the global health care business. Wyeth produced infant informal in Askeaton since 
1974. 
   
88
 Town of Monaghan Cooperative which has a close trading relationship with Abbot Ireland, 
supplying the majority of its skimmed milk directly to their infant formula factory in Cootehill, 
County Cavan. Today Town of Monaghan collects a substantial percentage of milk intake from 
Northern Ireland farmers as well as from farmers in the Republic of Ireland.  
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food industry, one has to be aware of the contribution that whey makes to 
competitiveness. Interviewee 6A, a director with a leading Irish dairy cooperative, 
commented that:  
 
―[T]here are three fundamental items of profitability in cheese production, - 
scale, efficiency and whey, - the whey piece is absolutely critical‖.  
 
Whey
89
 is the liquid protein remaining after the production of cheese or the removal 
of fat and casein (80% of the proteins) in milk. Annual world production of whey is 
estimated at over 100 billion kilograms with 50% of this amount produced in the EU. 
Most of the whey (92%) produced in the EU results from cheese production, with a 
small amount (8%) produced as a by-product of casein production. Whey and whey 
products are used by the food industry in a wide variety of applications on the basis 
of their nutritional and functional properties (de Wit 2001, p6).  At end of 2008, the 
world market value for whey proteins and whey protein fractions was estimated to be 
US$4 billion and for lactose, lactose permeates, pharma-grade lactose and lactose 
derivatives to be US$1.5 billion (3A Business Consulting, 2008).   
 
In the past, whey was viewed as a waste by-product of cheese production with little 
commercial value, which farmers fed to pigs.  In the early days of the dairy industry 
in Ireland, skimmed milk was also essentially viewed as a waste by-product of butter 
production. Infant formula, follow-on formulas and toddler milks, provide an 
increasingly important commercial outlet for both whey and casein proteins, in the 
form of skimmed milk or SMP.  But the relationship between the infant formula / 
baby food companies and the dairy cooperatives/ companies has also led to an 
increased focus on innovation in the dairy sector. It has contributed substantially to 
the development by a number of Irish dairy cooperatives /companies of whey-based 
food ingredient products. 
 
The development of the infant formula/baby food industry in Ireland provided 
evidence of a significant impact in terms of innovation and clustering from the 
                                                 
89
 The content of this paragraph draws on de Wit, 2001, which provides a detailed technical 
presentation on the manufacture, processing, properties and applications of whey and whey 
ingredients. 
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beginning. For example, the Nutricia Ireland baby food factory in Wexford is located 
on the same industrial site as the Wexford Creameries cheese factory.  The factory 
was called Irish Whey Products when originally set up, but later became Cow and 
Gate and then Nutricia
90
. In the early 1970s the usefulness of whey as an ingredient 
became apparent; by incorporating more whey in infant formula, one could alter the 
ratio of whey to casein proteins from 20/80, the ratio in cow‘s milk, to a 60/40 ratio 
to simulate the protein in human breast milk (de Wit 2001, p61). In 1972 Wexford 
Creameries invested in a ‗demineralisation‘ plant to process the whey coming from 
their cheese factory in a strategic move to participate in the new era of the baby food 
ingredients business. Demineralisation involves the removal of minerals and some 
organic acids through nano-filtration, ion exchange or electro dialysis (de Wit 2001, 
p25). As a strategy to improve competitiveness by building closer links with the 
baby food industry, establishing the whey demineralisation facility was successful. 
The U.K. company, Cow and Gate, who had already purchased whey from Wexford, 
subsequently closed its factory in Runcorn on the River Mersey in the UK and 
established a baby food factory in Wexford.  
 
This brought the number of producers of infant formula in Ireland to three, all of 
whom had received IDA support in setting up manufacturing facilities. Two US 
multinational companies had also established baby food factories in Ireland in the 
early 1970s. The Wyeth baby food factory, now owned by Pfizer, was established in 
the Limerick area of Munster in 1974. The Abbott baby food factory was established 
in County Cavan in 1975, situated close to Town of Monaghan cooperative who 
supply liquid skim milk to the facility. Both the US multinationals were major global 
players in pharmaceuticals, exposing Irish cooperatives / companies who supplied 
them to a new level of manufacturing standards.  
 
Increased use of skimmed milk and its dried form SMP by the baby food industry 
also resulted from advances in food science and technological innovation.  Increased 
medical understanding led to animal or milk fat being replaced by vegetable fat in 
the production of infant formula. Similar to the later focus on whey as an ingredient, 
mentioned above, the elimination of milk fat moved infant formula closer to the 
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 Nutricia Ireland is now owned by the French dairy and food group Danone. 
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constituents of human breast milk. This was also better for the development of the 
child. Prior to these developments, infant formula was made with whole milk or its 
dried form, WMP. There was significant collaboration between the dairy and baby 
food industries in Ireland to minimise and eventually eliminate milk fat from infant 
formula. Similar advances in scientific understanding subsequently led to increased 
use of whey in the production of first stage infant formula. Today skimmed milk / 
SMP is being increasingly incorporated into follow-on and toddler milk
91
 as baby 
food companies extend the range of products on offer to their customers.   
 
The use of these dairy ingredients by the baby food industry has grown with the 
volume of infant formula, follow-on and toddler milks produced in Ireland. 
Ingredients such as SMP, demineralised whey powder and other whey products e.g. 
whey protein isolates, and lactose in various different ratios or recipes are the basis 
of these mainstream baby food products that are offered to consumers. This has 
resulted in the link between the baby food industry and the dairy 
cooperatives/companies becoming an increasingly important part of the 
competitiveness of the dairy industry in Ireland, particularly as EU support schemes 
decline with the reform of the CAP.  
The strength of ties between the baby food and dairy ingredient 
suppliers  
 
As chapter 2 outlined, Granovetter (1985) argued that most behaviour, including 
economic behaviour, is embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. Dairy 
companies and cooperatives in the cluster benefited in different ways from the 
relationship with the multinational baby food companies.  For example, when 
discussing the role of major suppliers of whey products in the cluster, Interviewee 
6B, a board member and former managing director of a baby food company, stated: 
 
                                                 
91
 The advertising of infant formula is not permitted under the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
marketing code of practise introduced in the early 1980s. However, the advertising and marketing of 
follow-on formula for children aged six months and over is permitted. There is also no restriction on 
the marketing of toddler milks, produced for older children.  
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―[Y]ou cannot say co-ops in a general sense, because size and mass was a 
factor, in this context. The cooperatives who had sufficient mass to justify the 
investment in whey processing were the ones in a position to respond to the 
[baby food] industry‘s need. They were also the ones able to develop with 
changing needs and newer technologies as they emerged.‖   
 
In other words, not all Irish dairy cooperatives were of sufficient size to justify the 
capital investment required to process whey. Consequently, four dairy cooperatives / 
companies, Glanbia, Carbery, Kerry and Dairygold, emerged as key players in the 
additional processing of whey and lactose. Smaller cheese manufacturers delivered 
their whey, in liquid or concentrated form, to these larger dairy cooperatives for 
further processing. By processing whey, the four larger cooperatives /companies 
further embedded their position in the cluster as dairy ingredient suppliers to the 
baby food industry. They also benefitted in terms of supplying ingredients to the 
wider food sector. For example, an additional volume of whey generated from casein 
production by three of the four
92
, and a number of smaller cooperatives, is used to 
produce a range of whey products for use other than baby food. 
 
The relationship has also contributed to improvements in efficiency and innovation 
at cooperative / company level. For example, over the years, the baby food industry 
has looked for variation in the whey demineralisation process and the four Irish 
cooperatives/companies processing whey have responded to these needs. This has 
resulted in the production of some infant formula today is produced with 90% 
demineralisation whey for quality and safety reasons, with lower levels of 
demineralisation (60 – 80%) also possible.   
 
Porter presented his diamond as a mutually reinforcing system, with advantages in 
one determinant having the potential to create or upgrade advantages in other 
determinants (Porter 1990, p72). Related and supporting industries can enhance the 
prospects of international growth in demand via reputation and the ‗pull-through‘ 
effect (Mottiar 1997, p232). The relationship between the infant formula / baby food 
industry and the dairy ingredients manufacturers in Ireland provides an example of 
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 Glanbia, Kerry and Dairygold are casein producers, with Carbery being the exception.  
 
222 
 
the mutually reinforcing nature of the Irish cheese and ingredients cluster. 
Interviewee 6B pointed out that becoming a key ingredient supplier of whey and 
lactose to the Irish facility of a multinational baby food company also yielded 
competitive advantage for dairy cooperatives / companies at an international level.  
 
―Both [‗X‘] and [‗Y‘]93 used their relationship with Irish [based baby food] 
customers as a stepping stone to actually getting at the group on an 
international basis. So, for example, both of these companies also supply us 
around the world in significant quantities.‖  
 
Smaller cooperatives in the cluster benefited in a different way from the link with the 
baby food industry, but also contributed to embedding the infant formula industry in 
Ireland. Developments in the use of different skimmed milk protein types in the 
manufacture of baby foods required greater refinement in quality, involving a wider 
range of testing application to ensure higher health and safety standards.  Interviewee 
6B, when asked ‗Had the relationship with suppliers helped the business to 
develop?‘ replied:  
―Our smallest supplier in terms of turnover…without doubt has been our best 
supplier over the last 25 years, placing their relationship with us at the centre 
of their strategy from the beginning… How does this manifest itself? …they 
did a lot of work to get the standard of their raw material right both at farm 
and factory level. …were proactive in adopting the required test methods to 
actually ensure that the product they supplied to us would not be the cause of 
problems in the marketplace, exposing us to market recalls. …actively sought 
to develop an organic milk cluster among their suppliers to facilitate our 
demand needs…They put us at the centre of their strategy, see themselves as 
a being a long term supplier with a long term plan for the relationship...but 
not just with us, also with other baby food  manufacturers. They see 
themselves as a key supplier to the baby food business and have 
differentiated themselves from the bigger boys, giving them a stronger 
position in the marketplace.‖  
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 Names of companies have been removed from this quote for confidentiality reasons.  
 
223 
 
This quote outlined a high level of commitment on the part of the cooperative 
involved and suggests that small, as well as large, dairy cooperatives gained 
competitive advantage from their relationship with the baby food industry. When one 
considers the substantial gains for all actors involved, it suggests strong ties between 
the baby food industry and the dairy cooperative / companies, with relationships 
built on reciprocity, and an embedded cluster in Ireland.  
 
Further refinements are likely in the future as baby food manufacturers continue to 
work with their Irish dairy ingredient suppliers to fine tune and enhance the quality 
and range of products offered to consumers. Major innovations have taken place in 
the baby food business, such as long chain polyunsaturated fatty acid (LCPs) 
fortified formula, which are linked to brain and eye development in the child. 
Specialised infant formulas developed for sick children and pre-term babies are also 
innovative, being very close to pharmaceutical type products. In volume terms, 
production of these specialist products is small and they are not available in general 
retail outlets, but rather used on the advice of doctors, mainly in controlled 
environments such as hospitals. It would be difficult to argue that these products 
have a major commercial impact, but their development has a positive impact, not 
only for both baby food companies but also for their dairy cooperative / company 
suppliers, driving forward innovation and competitiveness.  
The role of IDB in the cheese and ingredients cluster  
 
The two supporting actors in the cluster are the export and marketing cooperative, 
the Irish Dairy Board (IDB) and the organisation for collaboration (OFC) the Irish 
Dairy Industries Association (IDIA). This sub-section will examine the role of IDB 
in the cheese and ingredients segment. Section 6.4 below will examine the 
collaborative role of both IDB and the IDIA in the generation of social capital in the 
dairy industry.    
 
The Irish Dairy Board (IDB) fits into the related and supporting section of the Irish 
cheese and ingredient cluster. IDB is an exporting and marketing cooperative owned 
by dairy processing cooperatives that form the core of the cluster. The forerunner to 
IDB, ‗An Bord Bainne‘, was established by the Irish government to assist the 
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development of industry before becoming a cooperative, following Ireland‘s entry to 
the European community in 1973 (Mottiar, 1997, p287). The IDB‘s central 
commercial purpose is exporting dairy products on behalf of the cooperatives who 
own the board. IDB own the Kerrygold brand and the cooperative has been most 
successful in developing butter sales in Germany and in a range of global markets. 
IDB also played a significant role in the development of the cheese segment in 
Ireland. IDB‘s contribution on the ingredients side is far less significant, with the 
manufacturing cooperatives / companies choosing to develop their own routes to 
market in the ingredients area.  
 
Porter (1990) saw rivalry as almost exclusively positive, rejecting the idea that 
global leadership grew out of one or two firms reaping economies of scale in the 
home market. He argued that ‗In global competition, successful firms compete 
vigorously at home and pressure each other to improve and innovate‘ (Porter 1990, 
p117). Rivalry within the Irish dairy sector may well have contributed to driving 
cooperatives / companies on, such as Glanbia and the Kerry Group to achieve the 
status of global multinationals, but rivalry was not invariably positive within the 
cluster.  The relationships between the Kerry Group and the Irish Dairy Board 
effectively broke down in the early 1990s. As the Kerry group grew in size, it sold 
very little of its product through IDB, with the result that the IDB management 
introduced rule changes that excluded Kerry from the board of IDB. Following this, 
the Kerry group tried to liquidate its share holding, claiming that it was worth 
substantially more than the face value (one Irish punt per share) of the shares. This 
would not only have weakened the IDB balance sheet but it would also have set a 
dangerous precedent for IDB, with the danger that in time other cooperatives might 
follow the Kerry move if it proved successful. A high court case ensued that ruled in 
favour of IDB. This indicates that organisation rivalry is not an exclusively positive 
aspect within a cluster. Had the Kerry group succeeded, it would have weakened the 
competitive position of IDB to compete, threatening to fragment Irish industry 
activity on global markets.  
 
In the 1990s, competition among Irish dairy cooperatives in the UK market also 
proved to be counterproductive, weakening the overall Irish industry strategic 
position. In the 2000s, in a change in strategy, Glanbia reduced capital investments 
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in the UK. At the same time the IDB, which was jointly owned by Glanbia and the 
other dairy cooperatives, made major investments in the UK. IDB strengthened their 
supply chain to the retail and food service sectors, investing further in slicing, 
grating and pre-packing facilities in the UK. This provides an interesting example of 
how collaboration, rather than rivalry, can yield benefits in a cluster, running counter 
to Porter‘s (1990) focus on competitive rivalry. It provides evidence of how 
cooperatives and companies working together had a better chance of achieving a 
favourable outcome for themselves and their suppliers in the UK market. The Irish 
Dairy Board (IDB) working with cheese manufacturers played a central role here, as 
interviewee 6A put it:  
 
―Our customer base is consolidating and our competitor base is consolidating 
and irrespective of what structure or how fragmented that structure is … if 
we are to compete we have to have unity of purpose in our interface with 
customers and the marketplace.‖ 
 
The Irish cheese cluster also provides evidence that in the case of cheese, while scale 
and efficiency in production is important, it is not enough on its own, as Interviewee 
6A commented:  
 
―[If] you look across Europe, across the major varieties of cheese, scale is 
becoming hugely important. But scale on its own is not adequate. … strength 
in the supply chain, in elements of it, for example in the pre-packing area, 
that are relevant to the retailer or to the food ingredient customer is at least as 
important, if not more so.‖    
 
The IDB strategy for the cheese business focused on developing scale and efficiency 
in routes to market, which it did across a range of markets including the UK, the 
USA and Greece. This complemented the scale and efficiency of cheese 
manufacturing cooperatives and companies. IDB also acquired and developed a 
number of brands to support sales.  
 
In 1997, IDB acquired a leading UK specialist cheddar ripening and distribution 
company with an established brand, ‗Pilgrim Choice‘, at the premium end of market. 
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In 2003, IDB acquired Meadow Cheese and strengthened its position as a supplier of 
cheese ingredients to the UK food industry. The majority of Irish dairy 
manufacturing cooperatives / companies now use these facilities as a route to market 
for the substantial part of their UK cheese business.  Essentially, the Irish cheese 
industry came to the view that if the IDB could perform the interface with the UK 
market efficiently then, by using IDB, the industry could exploit value added 
opportunities and scale in the market place better. This combination would give milk 
suppliers a better return than could be achieved through a fragmented approach, 
where Irish producers were competing with each other in the UK, rather than dealing 
more effectively with the reality of a consolidated customer and competitor base.  
Firm strategy and rivalry  
 
Nevertheless, rivalry and a desire to compete internationally has contributed 
postively to driving dairy cooperatives and companies  to growing their 
organisations globally. Cluster studies rarely link Porter‘s work on firm strategy 
(Porter 1980, 1998a), particularly his distinction between broadly-based strategies 
and focused strategies, with his diamond model (1990). This section will briefly 
review four of the key dairy producers with particular reference to how their 
business strategies have evolved, in a number of cases, towards a more focused 
strategy centred on cheese and ingredients. All four of these cooperative/companies 
are involved in the cluster initiative examined in section 6.5. Ketels (2006, p125) 
argued that the emergence of domestically owned MNCs is a sign of the success of a 
mature cluster. Glanbia and the Kerry group, who are both at the core of the cheese 
and ingredients cluster, have emerged as major Irish multinationals.  
 
Within the cheese and ingredients cluster, there was substantial rivalry between 
cooperative / companies with intense competition, particularly in relation to brand 
share of the domestic cheese market.  This satisfied one of the requirements of 
Porter‘s cluster concept, firm improvement built on intense rivalry on the home 
market. When considering firm strategy Porter (1990, pp107-109) observed that (i) 
the goals and ways of organising firms,  (ii) the attitudes of firms towards competing 
globally and (iii) government policy toward internationalisation all vary widely 
among nations. In the case of the two most successful actors at the centre of the Irish 
227 
 
cluster, the Kerry Group and Glanbia, the desire for growth led to a new combined 
cooperative and public limited company structure emerging in order to gain access to 
funding for acquisitions. The small size of the home market and EU milk production 
constraints resulted in the dairy industry having an open attitude toward 
internationalisation. There was early focus on exporting cheese in the first instance, 
and most successfully, to the UK, and then to other European and global markets. 
Organic growth in the dairy sector was also constrained by the EU milk quota 
regime, which capped the amount of raw material available to manufacturers. 
Consequently, Irish dairy cooperatives and companies sought investment 
opportunities abroad. Chapter 4 showed that Irish governments since the 1950s have 
adopted an open policy stance towards internationalisation. Irish government policy 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) supported the establishment of baby food 
manufacture in Ireland, with the IDA providing grants to both US and other 
multinationals. The expertise that the dairy industry developed in the production of 
dairy ingredients for multinational baby food manufacturers affected on their 
strategy for investment abroad. Both the Kerry group and Glanbia, who both adopted 
the new cooperative / plc structure, initially focused on the USA for the acqusitions 
to grow their business internationally.  
 
The Kerry Group
94
 began its existence as a dairy cooperative and still remains a key 
player in the sector, but it has evolved into a multinational food corporation with an 
annual turnover of approximately €4.5 billion, operations in 23 countries and 20,000 
employees worldwide. Kerry has a long established strategic focus on food 
ingredients, which encompasses dairy ingredients but now also includes fruit and 
cereals ingredients. Kerry Group‘s evolution through 3 separate corporate entities is 
a significant contrast to that of Glanbia and is important in understanding the 
business culture of the group.  Ownership of the original company established in 
1972 was shared by the State owned Dairy Disposal Company (DDC 42.5%), a 
federation of eight cooperatives (42.5%) and the US company Erie Casein Inc. 
(15%). The company link to the US was important from the start, leading to an early 
strategic focus on the manufacture of a dairy ingredient product, casein, for the US 
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 This paragraph draws on the corporate history of the Kerry Group presented on kerrygroup.com and 
on the book The Kerry Way (Kennelly 2001).  
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food market (Kennelly 2001, p65). Following Ireland‘s entry to the European 
community in 1973 Kerry acquired the state owned DDC and six of the eight 
independent cooperatives to become the smallest of Ireland‘s six major cooperatives 
in 1974, with modest sales of €29 million. However, in a reflection on Kerry 
strategy, structure and culture Kennelly (2001, pp 411-432) described an 
independent organisation that from the start was willing to adopt a position counter 
to other Irish dairy cooperatives.  
 
During the 1980s, the group embarked on a strategy of acquiring diversified 
businesses based on an equation for growth defined as ‗strategy x capability x capital 
= sustainable profitable growth‘ (Kennelly 2001, p423). Kerry has proven itself to be 
an organisation that places substantial emphasis on what Teece (2002, p157) has 
defined as  the dynamic capabilities of the group‘s executives to sense the need for 
change and then reconfigure competencies, significantly through acquisitions, to 
seize the opportunities created by rapidly changing environments. Reflecting a desire 
to gain access to additional financial capital in 1986, Kerry introduced a novel and 
innovative organisational structure that had not been embarked upon before within 
the cooperative sector in Ireland or elsewhere
95
. Essentially this involved the 
formation of a Public Limited Company (Kerry Group Plc) by acquiring the assets of 
the cooperative and, as a consideration; 90 million ordinary shares in Kerry group 
were issued to the Kerry Cooperative. In 1987, the Kerry Group opened its first 
overseas food ingredients plant in Wisconsin and in 1988 the group made a landmark 
acquisition of a US company Beatreme, which provided access to global markets and 
a platform for development into a leading global food ingredient corporation.  
 
Kerry continued its strategy of growth by acquisition throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, extending its reach into Europe and the new emerging markets of Asia and 
South America
96
. It also became more embedded in the Irish cheese and ingredients 
cluster. In 2001, Kerry substantially developed its cheese and cheese snack portfolio 
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 A number of other cooperatives also followed this model, including Avonmore and Waterford who 
later merged to form Glanbia, at the core of the cheese and ingredients cluster..  
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 Between 2000 and 2008 the Kerry group also acquired 11 ingredient and flavours technology based 
businesses in Europe, 33 businesses in the Americas (USA, Central and South America, Canada) and 
7 businesses in the Asia-Pacific region.  
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following the acquisition of Golden Vale, one of the major Irish dairy companies at 
that time. The range included cheddar cheese blocks, sliced packs, savoury cheese 
spreads and cheese snacks marketed under the Charleville, Coleraine, EasiSingles, 
Golden Vale, Cheestrings and Attack-a-Snack brands. In 2010, the Kerry Group 
acquired Newmarket Coooperative, a medium sized cooperative with a turnover of 
€56.6 million focused on cheese manufacture. In 2009 Newmarket had completed 
investment in a revamped and efficient cheese plant, with the capacity to produce 
over 35,000 tonnes of cheese.  
 
Glanbia is the largest purely dairy cooperative/ company in the cluster, and its 
strategic development is a significant contrast to the Kerry group. Glanbia
97
 plc, 
formed in 1997 through the merger of Avonmore and Waterford, is currently 54.6 
percent owned by Glanbia cooperative and 45.4 percent owned by equity investors 
through trading of shares on the stock exchange. Glanbia plc has evolved into one of 
the few successful Irish owned multinational corporations (MNC) and is evidence of 
Ketels‘s (2006) suggestion that one of the indications of strong clusters is the 
emergence of such MNCs from the cluster. In order to achieve higher levels of 
growth, in the early 2000s Glanbia changed overall global strategy following what 
Porter (1998a) might describe as a defined focused strategy.  The company remains a 
major liquid milk and general dairy processor for the small domestic market in 
Ireland. But, internationally, the Glanbia group focused on developing their cheese 
and ingredients business. As part of this strategy, Glanbia engaged in a restructuring 
plan that involved the disposal of a significant number of liquid milk, food service 
and meat businesses in the UK, and elsewhere. In 2008, reflecting the outcome of 
this new strategy, Group MD John Moloney described Glanbia as an international 
cheese and nutritional ingredients group with operations in Ireland, Europe, the 
USA, Canada and China, and  international joint ventures in the UK, USA and 
Nigeria (Glanbia 2008).  Glanbia‘s turnover in 2009 was €2.13 billion, joint ventures 
and associates represented 14 % of total revenue, and it employed 4,349 people in 
fifteen countries. The Glanbia group, including joint ventures, now processes 5.3 
billion litres of milk, producing 440,000 tonnes of cheese, nearly three times national 
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Irish cheese production, and 223,000 tonnes of dairy-based food ingredients (Glanbia 
2009).  The group‘s largest joint venture, Southwest cheese, located in New Mexico 
in the USA, is one of the largest cheese and high protein whey processing plants in 
the world.  
 
In contrast to Glanbia and the Kerry group, Dairygold, following its formation in 
1990, adopted what Porter (1998a) would describe as a broadly-targeted strategy. 
This strategy involved addressing multiple segments of the dairy industry including 
liquid milk, butter and SMP/Casein, cheese and whey and fresh dairy products, for 
example yogurts. The strategy was not successful, as the cooperative struggled to 
fully integrate the merged Ballyclough and Mitchelstown cooperatives into a 
coherent entity. In 2003 the then Dairygold Chief Executive, Jerry Henchy, stated 
that ‗for many years the Society had operated in a tightly regulated market which 
created a comfort zone allowing it to survive whilst operating inefficiently‘ 
(Dairygold 2003, p6).  Consequently, the cooperative embarked on a plan involving 
rationalisation, cost reduction and the sale of loss making businesses.  The strategy 
in relation to any underperforming aspect of the business was to ‗fix it, outsource it, 
sell it, or shut it‘ and, by 2006, the process was largely completed (Irish Examiner 
2006).  The new Dairygold strategy involved concentrating production in two sites. 
Building on the bonds within the sector, it also involved significant collaboration 
with other Irish manufacturers. Dairygold collaborated with Glanbia plc in the 
cheese area, in order to utilise processing capacity to the fullest extent, and 
outsourced the production of the ‗Sno‘ brand of yogurt products to the smaller Town 
of Monaghan Cooperative in the north east of the country.  However, the 
rationalisation process was controversial, dramatically reducing employment and 
selling various businesses, and the cooperative and Henchy parted company in 2009 
(Boyle 2009). But the rationalisation programme did change the cooperative‘s 
strategic focus significantly.  
 
Dairygold‘s new CEO, Jim Woulfe, described Dairygold‘s processing business as 
now ‗firmly focused on providing cheese and dairy ingredients solutions to the 
international food processing, baby food and ready meals sectors (Dairygold 2009, 
p10). Dairygold turnover in 2009 was €555.2 million and the group has around 900 
employees. On the cheese side, Dairygold focused on efficient production of cheddar 
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in Mitchelstown and production of speciality cheeses for export, including leading 
brands Jarlsberg and Regato, in their factory in Mogeely, Co. Cork. Recent 
investment in their Mitchelstown site created one of the largest demineralised whey 
manufacturing plants in Europe, as a foundation for the cooperative‘s focus on the 
baby food market, and further embedding the cooperative in the cheese and 
ingredients cluster.  
 
The Carbery group, the final actor at the core of the cluster, is also involved in the 
cluster initiative examined in section 6.5. Carbery is a cheese and ingredients 
manufacturer owned by four small to medium sized cooperatives. It is admired in the 
farming community for the consistent ability to pay among the top level milk prices 
in Ireland (Briscoe and Ward 2006, p122).   Successfully adopting what Porter 
(1985) would describe as a focused strategy, Carbery has reached a turnover of close 
to €200 million. The group developed a successful brand of cheese called ‗Dubliner‘ 
in collaboration with Irish Dairy Board. Carbery also developed significant expertise 
in the whey and lactose dairy ingredient areas, investing in its own R&D facility, 
which employs 15 percent of its 300 strong workforce.  Carbery is focusing on sports 
nutrition, among other areas, to further develop its ingredient‘s business.    
Concluding comments  
 
The above analysis of the cheese and ingredient segment provides evidence of 
clustering in a dairy sector embedded in the traditional sector of the Irish economy
98
. 
When all aspects of the cluster are considered, it has contributed very significantly to 
the strategic development of the companies within one of Ireland‘s most important 
indigenous industries. The role of FDI and multinationals in the cluster was complex 
and varied. Foreign investment (FDI) by UK multinationals played a significant role 
in establishing factory scale cheese production in Ireland during the 1960s and 
1970s, which aligns with Porter‘s (1990) view of a seed capital role for foreign 
investment. Within a nation, the microeconomic ‗engines‘ (clusters) vary in terms of 
their strength and dynamism; the stronger ones tend to lead to internationally 
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competitive firms, whereas the weaker ones tend to produce only locally competitive 
firms (Sölvell et al 2003). The cheese and ingredient segment of the Irish dairy 
industry on this basis could certainly be described as a strong dynamic cluster 
contributing substantially to the internationalisation and competitiveness of the dairy 
cooperatives / companies involved, particularly Glanbia and the Kerry group.  
 
But foreign investment also played a deeper role in the cluster, with relationships 
between multinationals infant formula manufacturers and the Irish dairy cooperative 
/ companies yielding benefits for both industries and for the economy. Firms inside a 
cluster must also have access to international markets to be able to sustain their 
efficiency and competitiveness. A dynamic cluster is characterised by three distinct 
dynamics (i) local dynamism, (ii) global attractiveness, and (iii) global market reach 
(Sölvell et al 2003). Irish dairy companies have helped the multinational baby food 
companies to develop and expand their businesses here in Ireland to serve markets in 
Europe and worldwide. In turn, the relationship with multinational baby food / infant 
formula companies has led to greater focus and higher level of innovation among the 
Irish companies and cooperatives in the cheese and ingredients cluster. It has also 
extended the market reach of some of the major dairy cooperatives / companies, 
leveraging off linkages formed with baby food multinationals in Ireland to develop 
business in international markets. It has made a major contribution to the ability of 
these firms to compete in the ingredients segment of the international food market.  
 
 
Section 6.4: Social Capital – a cluster initiative in the Irish dairy 
ingredients sector  
 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 reviewed the development of the social capital concept, 
which was only beginning to come to prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s when 
Porter was writing his seminal contributions to management strategy. Chapter 5 
examined the relevance of the concept for understanding collaborative relationships 
within clusters in the modern Irish economy, with particular reference to the ICT and 
software sector.  This section will examine the relevance of the social capital 
concept, to understanding collaboration within clusters in the traditional Irish 
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economy, with particular reference to the cheese and ingredients segment of the 
dairy industry. This section will examine the emergence and development of Food 
for Health Ireland (FHI), which focuses on improving health, wellness and quality of 
life through world class innovation in food. FHI is a cluster initiative involving 
collaboration between industry, universities and a state agency, which fits into the 
intersection of the framework developed in Chapter 2 and presented in Figure 2.2. 
Following a number of years of planning, the FHI initiative was finally established 
in 2008. Although it is not widely recognised as such in Ireland, the FHI can be 
viewed as part of the building blocks of what Lundvall (1985, 1992, 2005) referred 
to as a national innovation system. The cluster initiative performance model (CIPM) 
developed by Sölvell et al (2003) and presented in Figure 2.3 is used in assessing the 
FHI initiative. The emerging social capital concept, reviewed in Chapter 2, is used to 
deepen the analysis. The analysis is supported by in-depth case study interviews with 
actors involved with the various strands of the cluster initiative.  
Case Study 6: Food for Health Ireland - bonding and bridging social 
capital 
 
FHI involves three of the five actors that Sölvell et al (2003) suggest form a cluster 
(Figure 6.4). The government actor is the state agency, Enterprise Ireland. The 
industry actors are the four dairy cooperatives / companies: the Carbery Group, 
Dairygold Cooperative Society Ltd, Glanbia plc, and the Kerry Group. These 
cooperatives / companies are at the core of the cheese and ingredients cluster 
outlined in section 6.2. The research community actors are the four public research 
organisations: University College Cork (UCC), University College Dublin (UCD), 
University of Limerick (UL) and Teagasc, the food research institute based in 
County Cork. 
 
The IDIA, an industry organisation for collaboration (OFC) in the dairy cluster, is 
not an actor in the FHI. However, the four cooperatives/companies who make up the 
industry actors are active members of the IDIA. The fifth of Sölvell et al (2003) 
actors – financial institutes – is absent from the initiative.  
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Figure 6.4: Food for Health Ireland (FHI) – collaboration in a 
cluster initiative 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
Setting and Objectives of the FHI cluster initiative  
 
Section 6.3 provided evidence of significant clustering in the cheese and ingredients 
segment of the Irish dairy industry. Since earlier cluster studies of dairying 
undertaken in the late 1990s, the cheese and ingredients segment has become more 
deeply embedded in the Irish economy. This was partly driven by developments in 
agricultural policy that resulted in lower EU institutional support for the dairy 
products, butter and SMP. But it was also due to the interaction between the different 
elements of the cluster diamond, with consumer demand encouraging the production 
of cheese and related industries supporting the production of dairy ingredients. 
Therefore, in the case of the cheese and ingredients segment, the individual 
determinants of the diamond combined into a dynamic system, as suggested by 
Porter (1990, p131).   
Food for 
Health 
Ireland 
(FHI) 
UCC, UCD, UL 
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O‘Connell et al (1997, p74) found there was significant social interaction in the dairy 
sector with meetings at the Irish Dairy Industries Association (IDIA)
99
, the Irish 
Dairy Board and the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society, important in the 
creation of a valuable social network.  Of these three, only the industry organisation 
for collaboration, the IDIA, played a part in the establishment of the FHI initiative, 
leveraging off the significant social capital it had helped build in the dairy sector 
over the years. The IDIA was established in 1973 on Ireland‘s entry to the EU and 
facilitates interaction and collective action on policy issues affecting the sector. Over 
the years it has built significant social capital bonds between CEOs and senior 
executive management of the dairy cooperatives/companies and the baby food 
companies.  It also engages, on behalf of its members, in bridging social capital with 
relevant government departments and state agencies on a range of issues. For 
example, the IDIA played a key role in monitoring and advising members on 
developments in specific EU regulation, on milk policy and international trade 
agreements, affecting the different industry segments of the industry. The IDIA is the 
Irish member of the European association of companies who produce food for 
people, including infants, with special dietary requirements (IDACE) and the 
European Dairy Association (EDA). IDIA executives, and a number of its member, 
participated in the various committees and ingredients working groups of these 
organisations.  This extended the network that the IDIA provided to member 
cooperatives /companies from a national to a European level, avoiding an over-
reliance on a narrow range of business contacts (Cooke 2007a). The IDIA also 
facilitated direct access to senior officials working in relevant areas in the EU 
Commission. Irish dairy cooperatives / companies were also instrumental in 
establishing the European Whey Processors Association (EWPA)
100
. The mission of 
the EWPA is to promote good communication and understanding of whey based 
dairy ingredients and related issues towards potential customers and consumers. The 
role that the IDIA played in helping to establish the FHI will be commented on 
further in the sub-section below on initiation and planning.  
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The business environment facing the Irish dairy sector in the early 2000s was 
particularly challenging. The Irish industry was losing competitiveness due to high 
domestic costs, an over-reliance on declining EU support for the commodity 
products (butter and SMP) and lower levels of investment in R&D than that of 
international competitors (Prospectus, 2003, p8). This lose of competitiveness 
resulted in a renewed focus on rationalisation, consolidation and growth through 
acquisition by major Irish dairy cooperatives and companies, with a shift in strategic 
focus towards cheese and ingredients. This is covered in some detail in the sub-
section on ‗firm strategy and rivalry‘ in Section 6.3 above. Dairy cooperatives and 
companies were aware that they needed to innovate more and adapt strategies to 
compete. Staber (2007) argued that situational context is important in understanding 
how social capital evolves and how the social capital existing in a cluster can make a 
significant difference to the performance of firms. The situational context for the 
Irish dairy industry in the 2000s was very challenging and focused the industry on 
finding new ways to compete in a more open, and less supported, trading 
environment. In this context, FHI is a cluster initiative that presents a bridging social 
capital opportunity with four industry actors and four research actors collaborating 
together to improve competitiveness, by focusing on raising levels of R&D and 
innovation. An additional attraction to the cooperative and companies involved was 
that industry itself could lead the initiative.  
Traditionally food research in Ireland has mainly been carried out by public funded 
research institutes. In the period 2000-2006, funding was provided under the 
National Development Plan‘s Food Institutional Research Measure (FIRM), which 
was administered by the Department of Agriculture and Food. FIRM is a public 
good competitive programme, separate from Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), 
whereby multi-disciplinary teams from two or more public institutes carry out 
research projects. The FIRM aimed to develop public good technologies that 
underpin a competitive, innovative and sustainable food sector.  
A value-for-money review, covering the period 2000-2006, outlined that under the 
FIRM, 193 projects were awarded funding totalling to €97 million, €50.3m of which 
had been spent by the end of 2006 with the under spend being due to ongoing 
projects (DAFF 2007, p6). As table 6.4, shows the allocation of funding under the 
237 
 
FIRM was concentrated in three public research institutes, Teagasc, UCC and UCD, 
who, combined, accounted for 82.5% of the total funding awarded. The FIRM 
funding helped these three research institutes develop a critical mass in the food 
research area (DAFF 2007, p39).  Under FIRM, notable research was also 
undertaken in a number of other institutes including TCD, UL, NUI Galway, DCU 
and Dublin Institute of Technology.   
Table 6.4: FIRM Awards and expenditure by Institute  
 
Institute Total Awarded 
- €m 
Share of total 
awarded 
percentage 
Expenditure 
by end 2007  
€m 
Teagasc Ashtown 18.08 18.6 8.87 
Teagasc Moorepark 15.49 16.0 7.52 
University College Cork 
(UCC) 
26.31 27.1 16.30 
University College Dublin 
(UCD) 
20.24 20.8 10.23 
Trinity College Dublin 
(TCD) 
3.98 4.1 2.20 
NUI Galway 3.90 4.0 1.92 
University of Limerick 3.76 3.9 1.40 
Dublin City University 
(DCU) 
1.46 1.5 0.67 
Dublin Institute of 
Technology 
1.22 1.3 0.24 
Other institutes and 
organisations 
2.67 2.7 0.95 
Total  97.11 100 50.30 
 
Source: FIRM Review 2007, p38.  
 
By late 2007, when the FIRM review was undertaken, a total of 58 projects were 
completed at a cost of just under €27 million. The main output findings of the review 
suggested that these projects were quite academic in focus. Key outcomes included 
53 MScs, 83 PhDs, the publication of 526 refereed international papers (average of 9 
papers per project), and presentations at 447 workshops (average of 8 per project). 
There were 108 ‗outputs with commercial potential‘ associated with completed 
projects. But less than half of the completed projects (26) had actually resulted in an 
output that had been taken up by the food industry, or in an output that had led to 
changes in industry behaviour.  
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Stakeholders surveyed as part of the review were generally satisfied with the areas 
being addressed and the relevance of the FIRM funded research. But they requested 
more input into setting the research agenda and particularly raised the need for more 
industry involvement. While recognising that not all public good research is 
amenable to collaboration between industry and research institutes, the review 
concluded that more collaboration was possible and desirable. In fact, one of the key 
recommendations of the review was that ‗collaboration between research institutions 
and the food industry should be encouraged where appropriate‘ with the Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF) tasked with clarifying the types of 
collaboration permissible under FIRM (DAFF 2007, pp6-9).   
 
This indicated that the FIRM helped individual universities and centres achieve 
critical mass in the food research area. But FIRM had low social capital impact in 
terms of achieving collaboration with industry. As section 2.3 of chapter 2 outlined 
Burt (1997) defined social capital in terms of acting as a broker between those 
disconnected in the social structure, while Field (2008) emphasised that policy 
decisions may have an impact on social capital in a negative or positive way.  In the 
case of FIRM, it appears that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
missed an opportunity to act as broker in bridging the gap between publicly funded 
food research taking place in universities and the research needs of industry. The 
FHI cluster initiative outlined here changed the nature of the way research institutes 
and industry worked together in the emerging area of functional foods.  
 
On the private research side, Interviewee 6C commented that Enterprise Ireland 
carried out desk research in the early 2000s that highlighted two things:  
 
―There was a very low level of expenditure on research in Irish food 
companies. Out of 700 food companies surveyed, only 90 were actually 
involved in research to a significant degree, for example spending more than 
€100,000 per annum, and just 18 food companies spent more than €1 million 
on R&D. Secondly, there was a lot of focus internationally and activity 
happening around functional foods, particularly in Japan, which did not seem 
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to be on the radar in Ireland.‖ 
 
This functional foods area provided a focus to raise levels of R&D and innovation in 
the ingredients segment of the dairy industry. A functional food can be defined as ‗a 
food which is satisfactorily demonstrated to beneficially affect one or more target 
functions in the body, beyond adequate nutritional effects, in a way that is relevant to 
an improved state of health and well-being or reduction of the rate of disease‘ 
(Enterprise Ireland 2006, p4).  Functional foods marketed to consumers include 
foods enhanced with probiotics, prebiotics and synbiotics. The functional foods 
category is expected to grow significantly in the future as improved scientific 
understanding and consumer awareness of the links between diet and health further 
affects on the market for food products (IBEC 2009a, p30). 
  
Initiation and Planning – the value of collaboration and social capital 
 
The initiation and planning stage for the FHI initiative can be traced back over a 
number of years. As part of raising awareness of the potential for developing 
functional foods products in 2003, Enterprise Ireland, with their Tokyo office, 
organised a trade mission to Japan. The initiative leveraged off existing social capital 
bonds with the IDIA, the organisation for collaboration (OFC) for the sector, 
supporting the agency in promoting the mission among industry. The high-level 
mission was led by the Irish Minister of State for Food, who was accompanied by 
the Secretary General of the Department of Agriculture and Food
101
. In addition to 
the government and state agency, the IDIA and two public research institutes made 
up the Irish contingent.  The director
102
 of the IDIA and seven members of the 
association participated in the mission. These included Glanbia plc, the Kerry Group, 
the Carbery Group and the cooperatives - Dairygold, Lakelands, Shannonside and 
the Irish Dairy Board (IDB)
103
. The director of the Teagasc Dairy Products Research 
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the IDIA members referred to.  
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industry. 
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Centre and the Dean of the Faculty of Food Science at University College Cork were 
the two participants from the research community. As case study 4 in section 5.4 of 
chapter 5 outlined, significant social capital bonds had been built up between 
Teagasc and UCC over a number of years. In organising the mission, Enterprise 
Ireland leveraged off the strong ties and social capital bonds already existing in the 
sector, on the industry side through the IDIA and on research side through decades 
of close contact between UCC and Teagasc.
104
 Therefore, at least in the initiation 
stage, the FHI aligned with the idea that state agencies should work with, and build 
on, the resources already existing in a community (Field 2008, p141, Woolcock 
2001, p15). The positive and negative aspects of these social capital bonds will 
become apparent in further analysis of this case study.  
 
There were significant bridging social capital benefits for the industry and research 
actors who participated in the mission to Japan. During the mission, the Irish 
contingent was given presentations by research institutes on functional foods trends 
and consumer needs in Japan. They also learned about the regulatory system of food 
for specified health in Japan. They heard case studies by Japanese companies and 
visited a number manufacturing facilities including the Yakult Fuji factory, Meiji 
Dairies Corporation, the Calpis Tatebayashi factory, the Morniga Milk Industry Co., 
and Kyodo dairies. They visited Japanese research facilities focused on functional 
foods. Some of these were run by the state while other facilities were an integral part 
of private companies. It became apparent that there was a far higher commitment to 
R&D in Japanese food companies than that existing in Ireland. They also visited 
department stores and supermarkets in Tokyo to see how functional foods were sold 
to the consumer. There were significant benefits from this bridging social capital 
initiative, which brought senior Irish dairy executives and researchers together to 
Japan to see for themselves the potential of functional foods. They were exposed to a 
completely different way of using milk than experienced in Ireland, with a much 
greater emphasis on its potential as a food ingredient with certain well-being and 
health benefits. By organising this trade mission, Enterprise Ireland, with the support 
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of the IDIA, helped span the structural gap in knowledge in relation to functional 
foods between the Japanese and Irish food industries.  
 
In addition to the level of knowledge gained in the areas referred to above, the 
mission also had a number of less tangible social capital benefits. Some social capital 
theorists have emphasized trust (Putnam 1995) and the need to develop trust 
(Woolcock 2001), in building up systems of innovation (Lundvall 2005).  In relation 
to the mission to Japan Interviewee  
6C, a senior state agency manager, commented on the building up of trust among the 
participants: 
 
 ―One of the big benefits of the Japan trip is that we got to know each other 
better. The social aspect of bringing people together on a mission, sharing 
experiences and getting together with their guard down was important. This 
was very helpful in building the network to focus on developing functional 
foods in Ireland‖.  
 
Hence, higher levels of trust among the industry and research community 
participants was one of the outcomes of the visit to Japan that the state agency 
viewed as useful in building the network. Therefore in this case study trust may be 
viewed as an outcome of social capital, with the mission to Japan beginning the 
process of building lasting social capital within a network. Nooteboom (2007, p33) 
has emphasized that trust is not something that can be brought and installed but 
needs to develop over time. The mission to Japan was a start in building up trust 
between the various actors involved but further challenges would need to be 
overcome as the cluster initiative developed.  
 
On returning to Ireland, efforts were made to keep the momentum going on the 
potential of developing functional foods. A development workshop in November 
2003 covered topics such as managing clinical trials, patenting and 
commercialisation of intellectual property and functional foods science. Attendees at 
the workshop included the leading dairy and food companies, SMEs and academics 
working in the area. Following this in 2004, Glanbia, with funding support from 
Enterprise Ireland, opened a €15 million group innovation centre (GIC). Staffed with 
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a team of nutritional microbiologists, immunologists, food scientists and application 
experts, the Glanbia centre focused on the development of nutritional solutions for a 
range of industries including functional foods, dietary supplements, infant and sport 
nutrition (IBEC 2009b, p30). The Carbery group also upgraded their R&D facilities 
with the support of Enterprise Ireland. 
 
The Japan mission, and the follow up workshop, was successful in raising 
awareness, but it was only a first step in establishing an effective increase in R&D at 
firm level. Commenting on the Japan trade mission, Interviewee 6D, a director of the 
state agency, said: 
 
―It was a look and see type of initiative and certainly prompted people to 
think a bit more radically about what might be possible. In tandem with that 
we decided to set up a networking group called the functional foods forum. 
The idea was to get people to discuss issues relating to the sector and to see 
what the blockages were‖. 
 
Field (2008, pp159-160) argued that social capital may be termed capital insofar as it 
gives rise to resources that enable actors, both individual and groups, to pursue their 
goals more effectively than they could without it. The National Functional Foods 
Forum was set up in 2004, comprising representatives from the food industry, the 
research community, and government departments. Government departments 
involved included Agriculture and Food, Health and Children, and Jobs, Enterprise 
and Innovation
105
. Once again, the initiative was supported by the organisation for 
collaboration, the IDIA and its dairy industry members. The forum brought together 
commercial managers from the dairy, beverages and ingredients sub-sectors of the 
food industry that might be interested in developing functional foods. Enterprise 
Ireland coordinated the work of the forum, which essentially was a bridging social 
                                                 
105
 At that time it was the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, from 1994, was known 
as the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation before becoming the Department of Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation in 2011. 
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capital initiative bringing together industry, the research community and the 
government
106
. 
 
The objective of the forum was to work towards developing Ireland as an 
internationally recognised centre of functional food development and manufacture. 
The forum highlighted that there was very limited coordination of research taking 
place in different Irish universities and research centres that could contribute to 
development of the functional food area. The visit to Japan involving both industry 
and researchers had opened the participants‘ minds to different ways of using milk 
and marketing product to consumers. It had also helped to strengthen ties and build 
bonds between the participants. Krishna and Uphoff (1999) defined structural social 
capital as facilitating mutually beneficial collective action (MBCA) through 
established roles and procedures. Following the mission to Japan, both the state 
agency and industry actors believed that to bring potential ideas and new ways of 
working forward, a more formal structure was required.   
 
One of the key roles was the chairman of the forum and, following consultation with 
food industry members, Enterprise Ireland was anxious to get a high level individual 
with experience of the pharmaceutical sector. Globally the pharmaceutical industry 
had a strong reputation for R&D and significant focus had been placed on raising 
levels of R&D carried out by industry in Ireland. Joe Hartford, former President and 
CEO of the Japanese pharmaceutical company, Astellas Ireland,
107
 was approached 
and accepted the chairmanship. In addition to his pharmaceutical industry 
experience, he had an understanding of the agricultural sector, being a farmer as 
well. Hartford understood the potential social capital benefits from industry 
networks. He had built up strong ties and social capital bonds as an active participant 
in the pharmaceutical industry association. He also understood the benefit of weaker 
ties and was a member of the national council of IBEC and other bridging type social 
capital networks. Consequently, he was well placed to chair the forum.  
 
                                                 
106
  A second Irish state agency Bord Bia, the food marketing board, participated in the forum but 
played a less active role than Enterprise Ireland. 
 
107
 Astellas Ireland Co Ltd. was formed as a result of the merger of two Japanese companies Fulisawa 
and Yamanouchi in April 2005.  
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Enterprise Ireland and the members of the forum attempted to leverage the potential 
benefits of the more formal social capital structure by establishing a number of 
working groups. Some of these attempts failed, while others succeeded. Interviewee 
6D, a director of a state agency, commented that:  
 
―One was in the area of the market and Bord Bia was to take a lead on that. 
That group did not take off the ground – there was no energy forthcoming, it 
didn‘t happen and that bit of it petered out. The second piece was the 
legislation and business environment and the IDIA [the industry OFC] did a 
super job on that. It did work and added real value. The third area was around 
the innovation and R&D. In that group we had Teagasc and UCC and some 
of the companies‖.  
 
The failure of one working group, focused on marketing issues, to take off indicates 
that positive benefits do not automatically result from social capital structures. 
Cognitive social capital, a more intangible concept referring to norms, values, trust, 
attitudes and beliefs (Krishna and Uphaff 1999, Uphoff 2000, Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer 2001), is also a part of positive outcomes in addition to structure. The 
interviewee evidence indicates that the second state agency, Bord Bia, did not value 
or believe in the initiative to the same extent as Enterprise Ireland, who coordinated 
the overall forum. It also raises the question as to whether the level of trust was 
sufficient between the two agencies to enable coordinated action within the forum. In 
contrast, the IDIA industry OFC, who had worked closely with Enterprise Ireland on 
the Japan mission, valued the initiative and approached the task of leading their 
working group with a more positive attitude.  
 
This working group led, by the IDIA, focused on the legislative requirements for 
functional foods and gained significant momentum. It collated existing functional 
foods claims, the scientific justification for such claims and looked at what would be 
involved in new claims. The IDIA provided information on legislation, regulatory 
and labelling requirements. It helped the group to understand the development of 
such claims by focusing on the EU Food for Particular Nutritional Uses (Parnuts) 
and novel food directives. Dairy cooperatives / companies who produced the 
functional foods, or the ingredients for functional foods produced by their customers, 
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would want to use such claims in order to add value to the product. The IDIA had 
developed expertise in this area over many years through involvement with the 
European association of food companies involved in producing for people with 
special dietary requirements (IDACE) and through contact with the EU Commission 
and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). This was an example of how 
bridging social capital, built up by the IDIA with the European industry association 
and the European institutes, yielded benefits for dairy cooperative / company 
members. It also an example of the strength of weak ties in the context of innovation 
diffusion (Granovetter 1973, pp1365-1369). The IDIA engagement with IDACE and 
EFSA was on behalf of their multinational infant formula company members, rather 
than their dairy cooperative/company members. This case study 6, therefore, 
provides an example of knowledge gained while working for one sub-group of the 
IDIA network yielding benefits to another sub-group of the network, without loss of 
benefit to the first sub-group. Consequently bridging social capital should not be 
viewed as a zero sum game, but rather as something that can build contacts and 
knowledge with substantial positive outcomes. The comment above, by Interviewee 
6C, also indicates that this contribution by the IDIA was appreciated by others 
involved in the forum, including the state agency coordinating the initiative, 
providing the IDIA with the broker advantage referred to by Burt (1997, p340). In 
this instance, the IDIA was spanning the gaps that delineate the knowledge space 
between the Irish dairy industry and their customers who would purchase the dairy 
based ingredients to produce functional foods.  The interaction between the industry 
organisation and the state agency in the functional foods forum also suggests a 
relationship built on norms of reciprocity inhering in a social capital network 
(Putnam 1995, Woolcock 1998, Cooke 2007a).  
 
The second working group focused on the challenges and potential of the research 
and development agenda of the forum.  An Enterprise Ireland official, Dr. John 
Mulvihill, chaired the working group and was recognised as contributing 
significantly to building the necessary bonds among the industry participants that 
contributed to the success of the initiative. Interviewee 6E, a senior industry 
manager, commented:   
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―The first thing we needed was the R&D. That was my background and role 
and that was where we focused…John [Mulvihill] was the common link that 
everybody trusted and that was probably critical in the whole thing. There 
was somebody there from Enterprise Ireland who was neutral and who we 
[industry] had a lot of respect for and trusted. It would not have happened 
without that kind of individual in the middle of it‖. 
 
In this instance, Dr John Mulvihill of Enterprise Ireland acted as the broker spanning 
the gap between participants and provided a focal point of trust as a precursor of the 
social capital engagement. Hence, this trust in Dr Mulvihill appeared to be an 
essential part of the process that enabled different cooperative and companies to 
work together in this working group, rather than an outcome of social capital.   
 
The dairy cooperative/companies involved in the forum were concerned that 
universities, with a traditional focus on food research, were focusing more and more 
on the pharmaceutical industry and that the food industry was losing out. 
Consequently, the dairy industry members of the R&D working group concluded 
that they needed to develop a common research strategy for the medium to the long 
term. Interviewee 6E, from the industry side, commented: 
 
―There was a long standing criticism coming from researchers that there was 
no clear direction from the [dairy] industry as to where we wanted them to 
work and focus on ...the agenda of the main dairy companies and the agenda 
for the main researchers in Ireland had gone off in completely different 
directions. Certainly this was not to the good of the [dairy] industry.‖ 
 
In addition to the need for a more focused agenda from the industry, there was a 
second reason why university research had shifted toward the pharmaceutical sector. 
This is the fact that the mandate of Science Foundation Ireland, the state agency 
established in 2003 with responsibility for funding research, did not cover the food 
industry.
108
 Consequently, if universities and research centres wanted to work with 
                                                 
108
 As outlined in Chapter 4, Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) was mandated by government to focus 
on the development of a relatively small number of areas in the Irish economy, with the result that 
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SFI they had to focus on research in an eligible area for funding, such as 
biotechnology.
109
 Field (2008, p139) emphasized that government policy decisions 
may have an impact on existing social capital in either a positive or a negative way.  
From the point of the view of the ICT and biotechnology industries, the targeted 
focus of Irish government policy, as implemented by SFI, was a positive support for 
cluster initiatives involving their sectors (see case study 3 and 4 in section 5.4 of 
chapter 5). However, from the point of view of the dairy industry, it had the negative 
impact of encouraging research institutes such as UCC and Teagasc, who had 
traditionally worked with the food industry, to focus on initiatives outside the 
traditional dairy sector in order to gain access to funding.  
 
Process of establishing the food for health Ireland (FHI) cluster 
initiative  
 
By 2006, four of the dairy companies involved in the national functional foods 
forum were anxious to take the possibility of developing functional foods in Ireland 
to the next stage. The bonds between them had been strengthened and by working 
with the state agency within the forum structure, these cooperatives/companies 
formed a consensus view on their future research needs and defined the outlines of 
this common research strategy. This aligns with the Grootaert and van Bastelaer 
(2001, p5) view that structural social capital, such as networks, can facilitate 
information sharing, collective action and decision making. This is discussed in 
further detail in the section below on framework and consensus.  
 
With agreement reached between the industry partners and the state agency, the next 
step was to seek out partners from the research community. In mid June 2006, an 
open call was placed in a number of Irish newspapers
110
 inviting Expression of 
                                                                                                                                          
certain industrial sectors, including the large indigenous food and drink sector, were effectively 
excluded from receiving state support via the SFI. 
 
109
 Case Study 3 in chapter on the APC cluster initiative is an example of how UCC and Teagasc 
sourced funding through SFI by linking biotechnology and food research.  
 
110
 The open call for expressions of interest (EOI) in an industry led functional foods centre was 
placed in the Irish Independent, the Irish Times and the Examiner on the 16
th
 June 2006. Details in 
relation to the defined industry led research strategy in this section are drawn from a supporting 
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Interest (EOI) applications for the establishment of an industry-led functional food 
centre. The key objective was to create an internationally competitive, 
multidisciplinary, industry-focused research centre developing skills and 
technologies that would lead to new products, processes and services. The identified 
industry led research strategy revolved around the development of ‗new bioactive 
components to feed into the product development system, through the scientific 
substantiation of the nutritional and other beneficial values of food components‘ 
(Enterprise Ireland 2006, p2). Interviewee 6D,  a director of a state agency, indicated 
that approximately 12 universities and research institutes replied to the EOI 
invitation; including a number of those listed in Table 6.4 above who had built up 
their facilities and research capabilities through substantial state (FIRM) funding. 
EOI submissions were reviewed by a panel of expert technical evaluators, including 
independent evaluators, the industry actors and Enterprise Ireland. Successful 
applicants were notified by mid-August and asked to submit more detailed 
applications in a second call for proposals following this notification. Approximately 
half the original number submitted more detailed proposals.  
 
During the assessment of the more detailed applications, it was recognised that 
different research institutes had different areas of expertise. Independent evaluators, 
appointed by Enterprise Ireland, recommended that, to achieve maximum potential 
from the initiative, a collaborative approach combining a number of the detailed 
proposals would be the best option. This was not easy to achieve. The major public 
research institutes were traditionally independent-minded and used to limited 
collaboration with perhaps one other organisation in their region, for example the 
collaboration between UCC and Teagasc referred to in case study 4 in of section 5.4 
of chapter 5. They were now being asked not only to work in an ‗industry led‘ centre 
but also to work in close collaboration with other major public research 
organisations. The industry and state agency actors were determined that a joined-up 
collaborative approach would win out. Interviewee 6F, from the industry side, 
commented: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
document for the open call (Enterprise Ireland 2006).   
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―From where we sat at the time, we were quite clear if they were not working 
together, it was not happening at all. We needed the best brains in the country 
working on this. We needed to have the best offering from each of the 
research institutes and if we were not able to do that, well then you know it 
really wasn‘t giving us the world class capability that we needed to be able to 
compete.‖ 
 
The determination of the industry and state agency actors in this regard, evidenced 
by the comment above from interviewee 6F, illustrates the strong ties and social 
capital bonds that had been built up between them through the involvement in the 
cluster initiative. There followed a protracted period of consultation, facilitated by 
Enterprise Ireland, with the potential public research partners. The process was not 
helped by the fact that one of the research institutes had already expressed a wish to 
lead the initiative (see below) and already had strong ties with another institute on a 
regional basis. Consequently, according to interviewee 6D from the state agency 
side, there was significant resistance to broader collaboration involving other major 
research partners. However, the non-research partners in the initiative insisted on a 
collaborative approach and eventually a proposal was made involving UCC, UCD, 
UL and Teagasc, which the state agency and the industry partners were happy to sign 
off on. Consequently, one bridging social capital benefit that the FHI cluster 
initiative encouraged was collaborative activity between researchers in universities 
in different regions, who traditionally had not worked together.  In this way, the FHI 
initiative was similar to the CSET initiatives examined in section 5.4 of chapter 5, 
but it differed in other respects, particularly in relation to the level of collaboration 
among firms.  
Framework consensus / Resources and Facilitators  
 
The vision of FHI is ‗To improve health, wellness and quality of life through world 
class innovation in food‘ supported by a mission statement ‗To build genuine, long-
term industry-academic collaborations and networking and to develop appropriate 
industry-focused world class capabilities and competencies so as to create profitable 
new business opportunities‘(FHI 2010). 
250 
 
Interviews with participants from all three strands (the state agency, the industry 
partners and the research community) involved in the process of establishing the FHI 
cluster initiative emphasized the significance of the ‗industry led‘ aspect of the 
initiative. Interviewee 6D, from the state agency side, explained how in the R&D 
working group of the national functional foods forum, one research institute had 
presented an institute led model for establishing a competence centre.  
 
―Immediately friction arose between themselves and the companies because 
there was a diametrically opposed approach to innovation. Their [the research 
institute‘s] idea was they would lead the research and discuss how the 
industry could use it. But the companies were saying – look that model has 
not really worked to maximum effect in the past.‖   
 
This view, expressed by the companies, reflected the stakeholder desire for deeper 
involvement in setting the research agenda of institutes involved in food research 
referred to above in the 2007 review of the FIRM. Consequently, the four dairy 
cooperatives / companies and the state agency worked together to define the research 
agenda framework for the FHI initiative. The industry-led research agenda for FHI is 
broken into two interlinked strategic platforms
111
, as presented in figure 6.5. 
 
Interviewee 6F, from the industry side, indicated a consensus view on the research 
agenda was agreed with relative ease. This suggested significant social capital bonds 
already existed between the industry partners:      
 
―When we started, we had very little difficulty in coming to a common view. 
We all have marketing departments, capabilities and the knowledge of where 
the food industry is going and the importance of health. …It didn‘t take very 
long for us to actually lay down what we considered to be the health pillars 
and areas in which we considered the research needed to be carried out. That 
was quite quick from the industry point of view.‖ 
                                                 
111
 Information in this section is drawn from a combination of interviews, documents prepared in the 
process of open call for expressions of interest in establishing the initiative and the Food for Ireland 
website.  
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Figure 6.5: FHI Interlinked strategic platforms – technology & 
health 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
 
Interviewee 6G, from the research side, confirmed this view that the industry 
partners worked well together in defining the industry-led nature of the FHI cluster 
initiative: 
 
―The dairy companies working with Enterprise Ireland identified early infant 
development, which essentially is infant nutrition; the metabolic syndrome, 
which is obesity… type II diabetes; infection immunity – protecting against 
infection and so on. …the industry did spend a lot of time working together 
on it and that was quite remarkable, given the way they compete in the 
market place. The fact that they could sit around the table and were able to 
come to a consensus about what they needed to do is commendable.” 
 
As section 6.3 above outlined, the four cooperatives/ companies involved in the FHI 
initiative were part of an established industry cluster, in which there was substantial 
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rivalry among industry actors. But there was also a history of working together in 
organisations for collaboration such as the IDIA, in the cooperative organisation 
ICOS and also with the IDB structure. Industry ties were also strengthened for the 
individual industry managers through the functional foods forum. The facilitator role 
of Dr John Mulvihill, who industry participants could trust, also contributed to the 
ease of reaching agreement. Therefore, despite strong rivalry within the cluster, the 
significant social capital bonds between the industry actors could be built on, and 
contributed to, the success of the FHI initiative.  
 
By mid 2009, the ‗intelligent milk mining‘ process had started. This involved the 
systematic deconstruction of milk to reveal a new range of bioactive substances with 
the capacity to positively impact on human health. Material was sent to the various 
research teams to be screened for activities against the different health pillars. 
Interviewee 6G, a Professor of food microbiology at one of the major research 
university actors involved in the initiative, briefly explained how a positive result in 
the intelligent milk mining stage moved forward in the process:  
 
―You see something that might have an application in infant nutrition or you 
see something that might suppress appetite as part of an obesity agenda, then 
you have to ask a whole range of questions: Can an ingredient be formulated 
into a food? Is the food and ingredient safe? Can it be made in the way that 
the industry could make it?‖ 
 
Depending on the answers to these questions, the process moves through the 
subsequent technology stages, as outlined above. At a more advanced stage, the 
process may involve intervention in humans to provide scientific and clinical 
validation for a claim attached to an ingredient that came through the screening and 
other programmes.  This description of the research approach indicated a substantial 
benefit from the bridging social capital of the FHI initiative, linking the substantial 
knowledge and expertise of the public research community with the needs of 
industry.  
 
The research undertaken in the technology and health platforms involved a higher 
level of collaboration among the public research organisations than in the past, 
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particularly between institutes based in different regions of Ireland. Interviewee 6G, 
on the research side, commented: 
 
―This (FHI) is increasing the level of interaction quite significantly,… there 
is a huge amount of goodwill to make this work. We are a single centre even 
though we are geographically dispersed across four locations.‖  
 
One of the underlying strengths of the FHI initiative is that it brings together expert 
resources located in the different research centres. Interviewee 6H, the independent 
CEO of the initiative (see section below on governance and finance), outlined that:  
 
―Each of the centres is very good in its own right. All excellent researchers 
and they all have their own strong fields of academic research. But only if 
you bring them together in one room…. to work together, then you really get 
something world class out of that. One example is our hydrolysis milk 
mining package, where we have excellent capacity in UL –[Professor] Dick 
Fitzgerald [is] really one of the world known experts in enzymatic 
hydrolysis. And then you have [Professor] Alan Kelly in UCC, who is a well 
known expert in thermal processing of dairy products and indigenous 
enzymes in milk, and then Moorepark research centre can deal with the up 
scaling of hydrolysis and in UCD you have the bioinformatics experts [Dr. 
Lorraine Brennan] bringing in a completely new element ….Combining these 
four elements really allows us to create peptides and hydrolysis that have 
never been created before.‖ 
 
By acting as a broker between the different universities located in different regions, 
Enterprise Ireland working with the industry actors spanned structural gaps with 
substantial social capital benefits for all the partners involved in FHI. Burt (1997, 
p340) defined social capital in terms of the information and control advantage of 
being the broker in relations between people otherwise disconnected in social 
structure. The reciprocal benefit from the state agency perspective was the 
establishment of the cluster initiative involving the research community and their 
food industry clients.   
 
254 
 
In addition to the potential of new discoveries resulting from the research carried out 
across the four centres, the FHI also provided both the industry and the research 
actors involved in the cluster initiative with substantial social capital benefits. 
Reflecting what Lundvall (2005) would describe as a learning firm approach in the 
building of a national system of innovation, Interviewee 6F, from the industry side, 
commented: 
 
―Our R&D team have become familiar with the working of FHI on a day-to-
day basis and from that we gather significant learning...There is a huge level 
of capability which we can plug into. We can get real benefit from that…First 
of all,...our scientists are liaising with world class scientists...there is 
knowledge transfer. There is then the whole appreciation of our customers 
that we are involved in this level of scientific research. Then, from the 
university point of view, there is the whole market focus which is brought to 
their research, whereas in the past some might say that some research 
programmes were just there for the generation of scientific papers.‖ 
 
Cooke (2002, p135), in his analysis of regional innovation in the UK, suggested that 
specialist, tacit knowledge exchange arising from the agglomeration can reduce costs 
for firms
112
. The above comment from Interviewee 6F also suggests the potential for 
the cooperatives/ companies involved in FHI to lower their research costs through 
the knowledge exchange potential of the FHI initiative. A number of writers on 
social capital theory, including Woolcock (1998) and Cooke (2007a), have 
emphasized norms of reciprocity inherent in social networks. The above comment, 
from interviewee 6F, indicates norms of reciprocity at several levels: within FHI — 
with industry gaining from the knowledge expertise in research institutes and 
universities gaining from the market knowledge of industry, and outside FHI — with 
industry gaining reputational goodwill from customers and, hopefully, commercial 
contracts and the customers themselves gaining access to new ingredients.    
                                                 
112
 A detailed discussion of this point is contained Section 2.3 on national and regional innovations 
systems of Chapter 2.  
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Governance and Financing 
 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999) emphasized that structural social capital is important in 
facilitating mutually beneficial collective action, with established roles, rules and 
procedures. The structure of FHI is also important in generating social capital in the 
cluster initiative (Figure 6.6).  
Figure 6.6: Structural social capital in the FHI initiative 
  
 
 
Source: Author‘s diagram 
 
The four dairy cooperatives / companies and the four public research institutes, 
together with an independent Chairman and CEO, form the board of the FHI. A 
scientific advisory board has been established, similar to the SFI funded CSET 
structure outlined in section 5.4 of chapter 5. A scientific programme committee and 
publications review group coordinates the researchers in the different locations. An 
intellectual property committee facilitates the sharing of outcomes from the research 
undertaken in FHI among the different actors in the initiative. Finally, local 
management groups coordinate day-to-day activity and deal with personnel issue etc.  
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Food for health Ireland (FHI) is approximately 80 percent funded by the state agency 
Enterprise Ireland, with the remaining 20 percent of the budget being provided by 
the dairy cooperatives/ companies involved. The four cooperatives / companies share 
the contribution equally regardless of the overall size of their organisation, giving 
each of them equal weight in the cluster initiative. The overall budget for the FHI 
cluster initiative, secured for a five year period, is €23 million. Enterprise Ireland is 
not a board member but has observer status at board meetings. The IDIA is also not 
on the board, either as full member or an observer. Hence, it relies on weaker ties to 
maintain contact with FHI, providing support on regulatory and legislation matters 
where required. The substantial state funding for the initiative supports the view 
expressed by Cooke (2007a) that social capital initiatives involving industry and 
state agencies almost always involve an element of rent-seeking.  
 
One of the research organisations involved in the initiative provided an interim CEO 
in the initial set up stage, of around 6 months, of the FHI cluster initiative. An 
independent CEO, Jens Bleiel, with substantial international commercial experience 
and no connection to any research or industry partner was then recruited
113
. 
Interviewee 6E from the industry side commented: 
 
―Once we got the CEO in place, it (FHI) was clearly very even handed and he 
is passionate – that this is one team. That is a key principle for him and he is 
putting effort into building that sense of team and breaking down barriers.‖ 
 
The strong industry-led nature and the governance structure of the FHI cluster 
initiative made it unique as a food research centre from a European perspective.  One 
example of another research institute known for operating in an integrated, 
collaborative approach with companies and government is Wageningen University 
                                                 
113
 Jens Bleiel became the Chief Executive Office of Food for Health Ireland in August 2009, a 
business economist by training; his past assignments brought him from Germany (his home country) 
to the Netherlands and Argentina. After five years at a management consultancy in Germany, he 
joined Dutch company Numico where he held several management and executive functions in the 
baby food branch of the company (Cow&Gate, amongst other brands). After 10 years in this business, 
he joined the Dutch multinational DSM, world market leader in vitamins and other food ingredients, 
where he built up the functional food business.  
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and Research Centre (Wageningen UR) in the Netherlands
114
 . But as Interviewee 
6H, the CEO of the cluster initiative, commented:  
 
―Of course there are other research institutes, like for example the top 
institute for food and nutrition in the Netherlands which is located in 
Wageningen University.  That, in a certain way, is a similar institute, but not 
as strongly linked to industry.‖ 
 
This view that the collaborative nature of the FHI cluster initiative is unique was also 
supported by Interviewee 6G, from the research institute side:  
 
―Unique in that they (companies) would work at this level of closeness. 
There are other models …Wageningen, the big Dutch university, but their 
companies buy-in, as individual companies, rights to look at the research — 
but not together. These Irish companies have agreed to act as one almost, in 
terms of how they interface with us and what they are getting for their 
monies.‖  
 
In this sense, the FHI cluster initiative (case study 6) is also different to the SFI 
funded CSETs reviewed in case studies 3 and 4 in section 5.4 of chapter 5, where 
collaboration between the researcher actors and industry actors was largely at the 
individual firm level. Lundvall (2005, p10), in his theory on systems of innovation, 
defined social capital as ‗the willingness and capability of citizens to make 
commitments to each other, collaborate with others and trust each other in processes 
of exchange and interactive learning‘. The FHI cluster initiative largely fits into this 
definition; with the four dairy cooperatives / companies and the four university 
research centres committed to collaborating together in a process of exchange and 
interactive learning on the potential of milk, to create ingredient products with health 
                                                 
114
 Wageningen University and Research Centre (Wageningen UR) in the Netherlands provides 
education, undertakes research and generates knowledge in the field of life sciences and natural 
resources.  Wageningen UR‘s mission is ―To explore the potential of nature to improve the quality of 
life‖.  For Wageningen, quality of life means both an adequate supply of safe and healthy food and 
drink, on the one hand, and the chance to live, work and play in a balanced ecosystem with a large 
variety of plants and animals.  Wageningen UR is a collaboration between Wageningen University, 
Van Hall Larenstein, the University of Applied Sciences and the specialised former research institutes 
(Dienst Landbouwkundig Onderzoek) from the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture.  
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and wellness benefits. Lundvall (1998, p410) viewed trust as crucial for interactive 
learning and innovation, but he correctly observed that trust is a multi-dimensional 
and complex concept, involving consistency in behaviour and deep sharing of 
information and knowledge. In the case of FHI, in order to cement the relationships, 
the appointment of an independent CEO was an important part of generating the 
necessary level of trust among the different actors involved. 
The potential performance of FHI 
 
The FHI cluster initiative is firmly established, but in the early stages of 
implementation. Therefore one cannot assess or comment with certainty on how it 
will impact on research institutes and the four cooperatives/ companies involved in 
the initiative.  
 
However, the above analysis under the various headings of the CIPM, provided 
evidence that the FHI cluster initiative involved careful planning during a prolonged 
initiation stage. It indicates that cluster initiatives may take significant time to 
develop and supports Nooteboom‘s (2007, p33) contention that social capital 
requires investment, in the sense of effort and sacrifice, and that trust may need to 
develop in time. The objectives of FHI address some of the challenges identified in 
the section on the setting for the initiative, for example the need for closer 
collaboration between industry and research institutes involved in food research. The 
process of establishing FHI was robust, for example applications from universities 
were evaluated by expert and independent evaluators, who made recommendations 
that were taken on broad and shaped the final structure of the initiative. This was 
particularly important in achieving the potential for deeper collaboration between 
research institutes that had previously not worked closely together.  
 
The industry-led consensus on the framework for the initiative, involving two 
interlinked strategic platforms i.e. technology and health, indicates social capital 
bonds and a high level of commitment to the cluster initiative by the four industry 
actors involved. The coordinated industry-led nature of the cluster initiative is 
certainly unique in a European dairy research context.  
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The research resources available to FHI are substantial, with significant potential for 
tacit knowledge transfer between, and among, the scientists working in the various 
research and industry organisations. Lundvall (2005) advocated that connecting 
producers and users, in a process of interactive learning, would bring about 
innovations in terms of new products and systems. In the FHI initiative, the 
researchers in the universities are the producers of scientific knowledge and the 
research managers in the dairy cooperatives are the users. The interactive learning 
that takes place between the two will hopefully lead to valuable new dairy ingredient 
products. The weaker link that the dairy cooperative/companies can provide to their 
customers, and feeding their customers needs back into the FHI, has the potential to 
enhance the interactive learning within the initiative.  
 
The structure of FHI (Figure 6.6) is important in terms of generating social capital in 
the cluster initiative. The board structure provided evidence of sound governance 
involving all the key actors from the industry and research organisations involved in 
FHI. The appointment of an independent Chairman and CEO also reduced the 
potential for conflict between the various actors and helped to build the trust 
necessary for ‗a one team approach‘, as interviewees described it. The commitment 
to joint funding on an 80:20 percent basis by the state agency and industry actors 
involved is also significant. Enterprise Ireland, while choosing not to take a voting 
seat, did retain observer status on the board.  
 
Edquist (2001, p3) criticised the systems of innovation approach for lacking a 
theoretical component about the role of the state. While the state agency plays an 
obvious part in providing 80 percent of the funding for the FHI initiative, which can 
be viewed as part of a systems of innovation approach in Ireland, its role over a 
number of years in the planning of FHI went well beyond the provision of finance. 
The positive attitude, value and belief that individual directors and managers in 
Enterprise Ireland placed in the initiative was a critical component in over coming 
obstacles in the establishment of the FHI. The cognitive social capital which other 
actors, particularly the dairy cooperatives and companies involved, brought to the 
initiative was also instrumental in establishing the FHI. Enterprise Ireland worked 
well with, and appreciated the contribution of the industry organisation for 
collaboration, the IDIA, during the mission to Japan and the national functional food 
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forum. Hence, the IDIA also played a significant role in the initial planning stage of 
the initiative but is not on the FHI board even as an observer. Therefore, despite a 
positive role in establishing the initiative, it must rely on weaker ties to the FHI in 
terms of future involvement.  
 
Vandenburg (2002) provided a link between the literature on moral norms and 
ethical codes developed by North (1990) and literature on social capital, where trust 
is viewed as playing a role in economic and social relations
115
. Trust among the 
cooperatives/companies is clearly important in the FHI initiative. This is evidenced 
by the ability, with the support of Enterprise Ireland, to agree a framework for the 
initiative, to agree to jointly contribute to the initiative and to work in a collaborative 
mode together with the various research institutes. However, Lundvall (1998) in his 
theory on systems of innovation, emphasized that trust is a multi-dimensional and 
complex concept and the FHI initiative also has the ability to further build trust 
among the various actors, including the public research institutes who previously 
have not worked so closely together. Interview evidence provided here indicates that 
‗there is a huge amount of goodwill‘ among the public research institutes involved to 
make the FHI initiative work. If trust between the industry actors, or the research 
institutes, breaks down then, clearly, the potential of the FHI cluster initiative to 
deliver meaningful outcomes in terms of innovation and competitiveness would be 
damaged and constrained. However, the appointment of a CEO, with no previous 
ties to any of the actors involved, provides broker advantage, in social capital terms, 
at the centre of the FHI cluster initiative.  
 
Interviews involving a range of actors in FHI also provided some indications of what 
is expected from FHI in terms of goal fulfilment. The appointment of a commercially 
focused CEO is also seen as important in terms of the performance of the initiative. 
For example interviewee 6F from the industry side commented:  
 
―What is FHI going to deliver? It is going to deliver commercial output. So if 
it is going to deliver commercial output, it has got to be market focused and 
therefore we have got somebody [the CEO] who has commercial capability 
                                                 
115
 For a detailed discussion on this point see the subsection entitled ‗North – the rules of the game, 
the players – moral norms and ethical codes‘ in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.  
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and a track record. So we spent a little time looking around and, in the end, 
we considered him the best man for the job, with a good marketing 
knowledge and commercial capability and that is what we need really.‖ 
 
Interviewee 6E, a second industry participant, suggested some time-frames in terms 
of expected outcomes:  
 
―By two years we would need to see some revenue coming through, not 
complete pay back but a revenue stream, by five years we would be looking 
for pay back and a return on investment.‖  
 
Interviewee 6H suggested that even at this early stage there are significant returns, 
particularly for the smaller companies involved in the initiative: 
 
―[T]he smaller companies are benefiting in general terms, because they can 
really use FHI in their sales efforts. …..The next time they go to their 
customers they can not only talk to the purchasing manager, but also to the 
marketing manager and the research manager, because they have a new story 
to tell. Access to new technologies that can potentially deliver new product 
benefits, which is an interesting story.‖  
 
This interaction between the cooperatives / companies and their customers builds on 
the potential in FHI for what Lundvall (2005, p3) called ‗the kind of interactive 
learning that interconnects users and producers in a process aiming at new products‘. 
In this sense, the FHI cluster initiative has the potential to strengthen the cluster 
relationships referred to in Section 6.2 between the dairy cooperatives / companies 
and infant formula / baby food companies e.g. the supporting industry of the cheese 
and ingredients cluster. Of course, it also has the potential to build relations with 
other customers of the dairy cooperatives /companies.  
 
In 2010, the FHI CEO organised workshops to focus on how competencies and 
resources at the four universities / research institutes might be used to enhanced 
existing products that the cooperatives / companies have in the market. This has the 
potential to improve innovation and competitiveness at individual cooperative / 
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company level in the short term. Furthermore, this building of competences may in 
turn contribute to commercialising medium outcomes from the FHI initiative.  
  
There are early signs of progress from the research being carried out within FHI. For 
example, the new ‗metabolomics‘ team at University College Dublin is building on 
FHI‘s ‗intelligent milk mining scheme‘, which was set up to identify bioactive milk 
peptides with health-enhancing properties (Heller 2010). According to Dr Lorraine 
Brennan, project leader for FHI at UCD, metabolomics is used to examine how milk 
compounds can alter the metabolism and will play a ―key role‖ in the discovery of 
commercially viable bioactive ingredients from milk:  
―Through the precise, multivariate analysis of the metabolite environment, 
we can achieve a broader understanding of the exact processes taking place, 
following treatment with milk fractions. Additionally, it enables us to link 
milk-derived bioactives into metabolic pathways, substantiating future health 
claims with essential physiological data.‖  
FHI uses bioinformatics, a computer-based approach, to identify amino acid 
sequences in human, bovine and other mammalian milk proteins that have remained 
unchanged throughout evolution. Heller (2010) explains that an unchanged, or 
‗conserved,  region in a protein is a sign that the sequence is performing an important 
function, and is therefore more likely to deliver health benefits. The group has, so 
far, identified around 30 peptides that could be used to develop functional food and 
beverage ingredients.  
FHI researcher, Professor Philip Newsholme of UCD, contributes to research which 
has discovered a novel pathway for immune-mediated Type 2 diabetes mellitus. A 
study, result of collaborative FHI research involving scientists in TCD and UCD, as 
well as other institutes in Japan and USA, and co-authored by Prof. Newsholme was 
published on 12th September 2010 in the Nature Immunology journal. Prof 
Newsholme's research links nutritional biochemistry to endocrine, muscle and 
immune function in diabetes and ageing, which links into the metabolic health 
platform identified by the FHI initiative.  
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Concluding comments  
In summary, the analysis above suggests that FHI is a well thought-out cluster 
initiative with the potential to make a significant contribution as a building block, 
within a traditional sector, towards a national system of innovation in Ireland. 
Interviewee 6E, an industry participant, commented on the potential of the 
collaboration involved in the FHI initiative: 
 
―The key things are the pulling together of the marketing and production 
capabilities of four companies, and the research capabilities of a number of 
Irish public institutes. In the functional foods area, no one [Irish] company 
and no one [research] institute will be able to compete globally. We 
recognised that from an early stage and we also recognised that there is a 
national agenda here to pull together, and that there was a lever to access a 
significant level of funding.‖ 
 
Interviewee 6F, a second participant from the industry side, confirmed this view: 
 
―We have access to a scale of research that, as a stand–alone company, we 
couldn‘t have. It is a big one for us. ….we are actually accessing a whole 
cluster of world class capability that we certainly wouldn‘t even dream of 
doing ourselves. We could not afford to.‖ 
 
The potential social capital benefits of the cooperatives and companies linking into 
four different research institutes, in terms of raising levels of innovation, is critical. 
The comments above suggest learning benefits for the organisations, particularly the 
cooperatives and companies involved, within the systems of innovation approach 
encapsulated in the FHI cluster initiative. The initiative will undoubtedly face 
challenges over the next number of years as the research progresses and decisions 
have to be made in relation to outcomes. It is obviously not possible to comment in 
detail on these unknowns. The FHI cluster initiative is also a first attempt at moving 
collaboration in food research from the regional to the national level. If successful, it 
may, in time, result in collaboration in other areas of food research at the national 
level.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
The economic context and the thesis case studies  
 
Industrial policy in Ireland in recent decades has focused on high technology clusters 
as key drivers of growth.  This thesis highlighted the need for a better understanding 
of cluster policy and the contribution that cluster initiatives can make to supporting 
the development of clusters, increasing competitiveness and innovation.  For 
example the role of collaboration and social capital in cluster development is poorly 
understood in Ireland. Staber (2007) argued that situational context is important in 
understanding these factors in cluster analysis. Mjøset (1992) found that a weak 
system of innovation combined with population decline, due to high levels of 
emigration, resulted in vicious circles of under-development in Ireland for decades. 
This was in part the result, as highlighted in this thesis, of the fragmented evolution 
of state agencies focused on enterprise development, creating a disconnected agency 
structure, affecting innovation policy for the modern and traditional sectors. 
Industrial and business representative organisations, here defined as organisations for 
collaboration (OFCs), evolved to reflect the changing focus and needs of the Irish 
economy.  
 
This thesis and its case studies provide evidence of the embedding of ICT/Software 
and dairy clusters and recent efforts to improve the systems of innovation in Ireland. 
A better understanding of cluster initiatives, and how collaboration works in such 
initiatives, in both the modern and traditional sectors, can help to strengthen this 
endeavour. The six case studies (summarised in Table 7.1) provided examples of 
different types of collaboration within clusters and cluster initiatives and the 
principal forms of social capital involved in each case. Case study 1 examined the 
role of the industry OFCs, ICT Ireland and the ISA, in strengthening ties and 
building social capital bonds in a modern technology cluster. Case study 2 examined 
the role of OFCs in building social capital bridges between ICT/ software firms and 
other actors in the economy, including government departments, state agencies and 
the broader business community. Case studies 3 and 4 examined the process of 
collaboration involving universities and ICT / software and biotechnology firms 
within cluster initiatives, supported by the state agencies  SFI, IDA, and Enterprise 
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Ireland. The collaboration examined in both case study 3 and 4 did not involve an 
OFC. Case study 5 examined collaboration within a cluster initiative in the high-tech  
Table 7.1: Case studies –Types of collaboration and principal forms 
of social capital  
 
Case 
Study 
Title of Case Study Type of 
Collaboration  
Principal 
form of 
social 
capital  
Economic 
Actors 
involved 
1 ICT Ireland and ISA – 
collaboration among 
firms 
Within an industry 
OFC     
Bonding 
and 
Structural  
Firms  
2 ICT Ireland and ISA – 
collaboration with 
other economic actors 
Between an OFC 
and other economic 
actors  
Bridging 
and 
Cognitive  
Firms, 
Government 
and state 
agencies  
3 Centre for 
Telecommunication 
Value Chain Driven 
Research (CTVR) 
Between 
universities, and 
firms with support of 
state agencies  
Bridging 
and 
Structural  
Universities, 
firms and 
state 
agencies  
4 Alimentary 
Pharmabiotic Centre 
(APC) 
Between 
universities, and 
firms with support of 
state agencies 
Bridging 
and 
Structural  
Universities, 
firms and 
state 
agencies 
5 Leadership 4 Growth Between an OFC 
and a state agency, 
involving firms and 
an international 
university 
Bridging 
and 
cognitive  
An OFC, a 
state agency, 
firms and an 
international 
university   
6 Food for Health 
Ireland 
Between 
firms/cooperatives 
and universities 
supported by a state 
agency (and an 
industry OFC) 
Bridging 
Structural, 
and 
cognitive  
Universities, 
firms, and a 
state agency 
(with support 
of an 
industry 
OFC)  
Source: Author‘s table  
 
economy, involving an industry OFC  the ISA  and indigenous software firms, the 
state agency  Enterprise Ireland, and a leading international university  Stanford 
Business School. Finally, case study 6 examined collaboration within a cluster 
initiative in the traditional economy, involving four Irish dairy cooperatives/ 
companies, four universities and the state agency  Enterprise Ireland. The industry 
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OFC, the IDIA, is not a partner in the cluster initiative, but was significantly 
involved in the process of establishing the initiative.   
The role of clusters initiatives in embedding clusters and building 
systems of innovation  
 
Chapter 5 provides evidence on the ICT and software sector deepening its 
embeddedness in the Irish economy and builds on work undertaken by a number of 
Irish researchers (Ó‘Riain 1997, O‘Malley and O‘Gorman 2001, Ó‘Riain 2004, van 
Egeraat and Jacobson 2006, Barry and van Egeraat 2008). This research provided 
evidence of clustering, particularly in the case of the indigenous software industry. 
However, the importance of FDI remains apparent with an impressive number of 
global leaders in the computer industry continuing to locate and expand their range 
of activities, such as product development, in the country. This is a contrast to the 
limited seed role for FDI put forward by Porter (1990) in his original cluster model. 
The nature of the ICT cluster in Ireland and the level of embeddedness of various 
subsectors have changed over time. The microcomputer assembly subsector 
declined, with multinationals moving this part of their operations to lower labour 
cost locations, such as Eastern Europe. However, the research evidence reviewed and 
built on in this thesis suggests that other parts of the ICT sector are becoming more 
embedded over time, with collaboration between different economic actors playing a 
significant role in this process. The production of electronic components such as 
microchips, requiring more skilled labour, increased. The contribution of the 
multinational and indigenous software sector is also growing in importance. Firms in 
the ICT sector moved towards the provision of traded services, reflected in €24.2 
billion of exports of computer related services in 2009 (CSO 2010b). These 
subsectors provide opportunities for higher skilled, and better educated, workers. 
These changes also suggest a more enduring and embedded ICT cluster based on 
high-tech manufacture and services, rather than one based on computer assembly.  
 
From a cluster policy perspective, most attention is paid to the development of high-
tech manufacturing and services clusters in Ireland (Forfás 2008). However, clusters 
and cluster initiatives are also features of the traditional economy. Chapter 6 
provides new evidence of a deeply embedded cheese and ingredients cluster and 
builds on research undertaken in the late 1990s (O‘Connell et al 1997, Mottiar 1997) 
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that identified the elements of a dairy industry cluster in Ireland. Ketels (2006, p125) 
argued that the emergence of domestically owned MNCs is a sign of the success of a 
mature cluster. Irish dairy cooperatives/companies are much larger then the 
indigenous software SMEs and this thesis highlights that a number of dairy 
cooperatives have emerged as multinationals corporations in their own right. But the 
relationship with foreign owned firms was also important in the dairy sector, with 
multinational infant formula companies playing a significant role in the development 
of the ingredients segment of the dairy sector. By combining insights from Porter‘s 
work (1980, 1998a) on industry segmentation and its effect on firm strategy with his 
diamond model (1990), this thesis presents evidence of a strong cheese and 
ingredients segment cluster within the dairy industry. Given the declining EU 
intervention support for the production of agricultural commodities, such as butter, 
the focus on the potential of the cheese and ingredient segment is likely to grow in 
the future.  The expected increase in milk supply in Ireland following the abolition of 
EU milk quotas in 2015, indicates a need for the dairy industry cluster to continue to 
develop its product offering and to intensify its focus on innovation.  
 
This thesis also contributes to the literature on the cluster concept and builds on 
cluster research in Ireland through a focus on collaboration and the application of the 
cluster initiative concept (Sölvell et al 2003) in an Irish context. A new framework 
(Figure 2.4) for analyzing collaboration within clusters and cluster initiatives was 
proposed in Chapter 2, bringing together, in a novel way, insights from the literature 
on clusters, institutional economics and the systems of innovation approach. The 
thesis illustrated that there is a greater overlap between the development of the 
cluster approach (Porter 1990, Sölvell et al 2003) and the systems of innovation 
approach (Edquist 1997, Lundvall 1998) than that suggested in recent Irish research 
by Giblin (2007).  
 
Sölvell et al (2003, p31) defined cluster initiatives as ‗organised effort to increase the 
growth and competitiveness of a cluster within a region, involving cluster firms, 
government and/or the research community‘. The use of the Sölvell et al (2003) 
model (supplemented by the use of the OFC concept) in case studies 3,4, 5, and 6 
illustrated that cluster initiatives, involving substantial levels of collaboration, are 
further embedding the ICT /software and dairy clusters in Ireland. Sölvell et al 
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(2003, p10) found that cluster initiatives were most frequent in economies focused 
on the development of high-tech sectors such as ICT, medical devices and 
biotechnology. Case studies 3, 4 and 5 provide examples of such cluster initiatives 
that help to sustain and embed the ICT/Software and biotechnology clusters in 
Ireland.  
 
Case study 3 was a large national cluster initiative, focused on R&D in the software 
and telecommunications sector, involving a complex range of partners on both the 
research and industry side. Case study 4 was a regional cluster initiative based in 
Munster, focused on R&D in the biotechnology sector, involving a much smaller 
number of partners. Malerba (1999, pp5-6) placed significant emphasis on the role of 
non-firm organisations such as universities and government in the process of 
building sectoral systems of innovation. Both case studies 3 and 4 can also be 
viewed as contributing to building systems of innovation for the sectors involved, the 
former at national level and latter at the regional level, and thereby supporting the 
embedding of these industry clusters in the Irish economy.  
 
In addition to research and innovation, Sölvell et al (2003, p25) listed a number of 
other areas as appropriate objectives for cluster initiatives, including education and 
training. The Leadership 4 Growth (L4G) cluster initiative examined in case study 5, 
focused on the education and skill needs of the CEOs of indigenous software firms.  
It involved collaboration among software firms, the state agency responsible for the 
development of indigenous industry  Enterprise Ireland – a world class university, 
located in the heart of Silicon Valley  Stanford Business School – and an OFC116, 
the ISA. However, a key cluster stakeholder group identified by Sölvell et al (2003), 
financial institutions and venture capitalists, was not involved. The venture capital 
market in Ireland is at an early stage of development and one of the benefits of 
collaboration with Stanford was exposing Irish software firms to a mature venture 
                                                 
116
 The OFC concept replaces the Institutions for Collaboration (IFC) concept, that Sölvell et al 
(2003) borrowed from Porter and Emmons (2003), to capture the contribution of the industry 
association, in this case, the ISA.    
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capital environment. The success of the first programme led to the initiative being 
extended to other SME clusters in Ireland, including the medical devices and 
biotechnology sectors.   
 
Sölvell et al (2003) also found low-tech clusters in areas such as furniture, processed 
food and textiles. Food for Health Ireland (FHI), examined in case study 6, is a 
cluster initiative focused on innovation in the dairy sector of the Irish economy. It 
involves four dairy cooperatives/ companies collaborating together with four 
universities/ research centres in an R&D initiative focused on generating new dairy 
based ingredients for increased health and well-being. The FHI case illustrates that 
cluster initiatives in the traditional sector of the economy, as well as high-tech 
sectors, can contribute to embedding clusters and building systems of innovation in 
Ireland.  
 
Why do firms and universities engage in cluster initiatives?  
 
The principal reason why firms and universities collaborated together in the cluster 
initiatives examined in this thesis was to improve competitiveness and build research 
capabilities. However, the financial support provided by state agencies was 
important to the establishment of these cluster initiatives. Cooke (2007a) argued that 
access to funding or rent-seeking was almost always part of the reason for firms‘ 
interaction with state agencies. Case studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 and to an extent case study 
2, showed that even if there was rent-seeking motivation, the activities undertaken to 
obtain the funding still generated social capital.  These case studies thus illustrated 
the importance of the state in supporting cluster initiatives, involving collaboration 
between firms and universities. The Centres for Engineering and Technology 
(CSETs) profiled in case studies 3 and 4 were supported by funding provided by SFI, 
and supplemented by the IDA and Enterprise Ireland. These case studies could be 
seen as the State encouraging these initiatives to support the further embedding of 
these industry clusters by building R&D capabilities. This was in contrast to case 
study 1 where collaboration took place within a privately funded OFC with no 
element of public funding and to case study 2, where public funding support was in 
some instances an outcome of the collaboration rather than a driver of collaboration. 
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For example the ISA gained funding from a state agency for establishing an Irish 
Software Innovation Network (ISIN), employing a full-time executive to act as a 
broker between SMEs and research institutes. While the cluster initiatives profiled in 
case studies 5 and 6 involved significant financial commitment by the firms and 
cooperatives involved, they also received substantial state funding from Enterprise 
Ireland.  
 
Many of these cluster initiatives were valuable in the industry sector involved and in 
building a stronger system of innovation in Ireland. Mjøset (1992) found that 
Ireland‘s economic development was held back for decades by a weak system of 
innovation.  The fact that state funding was part of the process of encouraging 
collaboration, among research institutes, and between universities and industry, to 
address this issue should not be viewed negatively. In fact, finance and support for 
innovation remain low in Ireland, relative to its EU partners (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1: Ireland‘s improving innovation performance  
 
 
Source: European Commission Innovation Scoreboard, 2011 
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If state funding declines over time, as may well be the case given Ireland‘s economic 
challenges, it raises questions about the future long-term viability of these initiatives. 
It also highlights the need to develop alternative sources of funding through financial 
institutes and/ or a more mature venture capital market. 
The role of Organisations for Collaboration (OFCs) in clusters and 
cluster initiatives 
 
Porter‘s (1990) seminal work on clusters did not develop the role of collaboration 
between firms within clusters, preferring to emphasize rivalry. In later work, Porter 
and Emmons (2003, 2006) proposed the Institutions for Collaboration (IFCs) 
concept, citing industry associations, chambers of commerce, export promotion 
agencies among a list of examples of such IFCs. In their cluster research Sölvell et al 
(2003) placed substantial emphasis on collaboration between various economic 
actors and attributed IFCs with a central role.   
 
This thesis contributes to cluster and cluster initiative research by developing a new 
framework that provides a more precisely defined concept for describing the 
collaborative role of industry associations and other organisations, which represent 
the views of business. This new concept, organisations for collaboration (OFC), 
offers a clear way of analyzing how, and why, firms choose to work together, 
particularly in engaging with decision makers in the area of enterprise and 
innovation policy. It is suggested as an alternative to the Institutions for 
Collaboration (IFCs) concept suggested by Porter and Emmons (2003).  
 
The OFC concept is theoretically grounded in institutional economics and is 
consistent with the systems of innovation (SI) approach, particularly that of Edquist 
and Johnson (1997, pp46-47) who clearly distinguished between institutions and 
organisations. They defined institutions as common sets of habits and routines that 
regulate interaction between individuals and groups, while organisations are 
structures with an explicit purpose, which are consciously created. This distinction 
between institutions and organisations is more than an issue of semantics, it is also 
important for understanding how collaboration works in clusters and cluster 
initiatives. It aligns with the institutional economist North‘s (1990, 1994) view that 
institutions are the rules of the game and organisations are the players who try to 
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influence the outcome of the game. In extending  economic theory, Williamson 
(2005) in his new institutional economics argued that the firm can be described not 
only in technological terms as a production function but also in organisational terms 
as a particular mode of governance among a number of alternative modes. As 
discussed in Section 2.5, in 2005, the integrated NEWGOV project
117
 under the EU‘s 
6
th
 Framework Programme produced a glossary of different modes of governance, 
under which ‗coordination‘ was described as a non-hierarchical mode of governance 
where actors accommodate behaviour in a process of communicative exchange – 
without being subject to binding legal obligations. Organisations for collaboration 
(OFCs) are a particular mode of governance that facilitates not only information 
flow, exchange and interaction among firms, both large and small, but also 
interaction between firms and other actors (or players) in the economy, such as 
government and state agencies. OFCs can also enhance international connectivity by 
facilitating contact between industry and business associations at a national level and 
similar organisations, and their members, at a European or global level. Therefore, 
this thesis argues that this new OFC concept provides greater theoretical clarity (than 
the IFC concept) for analyzing the role of industry associations, and business 
representative groups, as players or actors within clusters and cluster initiatives.  
 
This thesis also contributes to Irish cluster research, placing greater emphasis than 
previous Irish studies on the role of collaboration in clusters and cluster initiatives. 
The thesis shows how industry OFCs contributed to further embedding the ICT/ 
software and dairy clusters in the Irish economy by facilitating interaction among 
firms (and cooperatives) and between firms and other actors in the economy.  
 
Polanyi (1944) was the first to refer to the concept of embeddedness and Granovetter 
(1985), in developing the concept, argued that most behaviour, including economic 
behaviour, is closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. Case study 1 
showed that the industry OFCs, ICT Ireland and the ISA, contributed to embedding 
the ICT and software clusters in the Irish economy by strengthening ties and building 
bonds among the firms in the sector. Case study 2 illustrated that the industry OFCs 
also built bridges to other actors in the economy, further supporting the process of 
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  http://www.eu-newgov.org//public/NEWGOV_pub.asp, Glossary of shared terminology (M) 
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embeddedness by developing contacts between individuals who are not part of the 
same societal group – for example between industry executives and government 
officials.  Through interaction with government, ICT Ireland and the ISA could also 
influence the rules of the game – national government policy for the sector and how 
it was implemented – for their sector. Case studies 3 and 4 illustrate the fact that 
collaborative cluster initiatives, involving firms, do not always involve an industry 
OFC. However, the absence of an OFC in case studies 3 and 4 possibly contributed 
to the collaboration largely taking place between universities and individual firms, 
rather than among a group of firms working together as a unit. In contrast case 5, 
which examined the establishment of the L4G cluster initiative, involved substantial 
collaboration between an industry OFC, the Irish Software Association, and a state 
agency, Enterprise Ireland, in addition to collaboration with individual firms.  
 
The examination of the evolution of the Irish dairy industry cluster in chapter 6, 
referred to the collaborative role played by the industry OFC, the Irish Dairy 
Industries Association (IDIA). In the traditional dairy sector there are long 
established ties among famers and the farmer members of cooperatives boards, with 
the ICOS organisation in existence since the late 1800s. The IDIA complemented 
collaboration in the sector by providing a defined focus on the impact of policy on 
the development of agri-business as opposed to farming. The IDIA, following 
Ireland‘s entry to the EU, contributed to building bonds among the Irish dairy 
industry executives and bridges to their European dairy industry counterparts. 
Through their involvement with the European Dairy Association (EDA), a pan-
European OFC, the IDIA provided a bridge to EU Commission and Parliament for 
their members. Together with their members, including the IDIA, the EDA could 
influence the ‗rules of the game‘ – EU regulations and directives – which were set by 
these European institutions to govern the dairy industry.  
 
The IDIA was also involved in the initiation and planning stage of the FHI cluster 
initiative, with Enterprise Ireland leveraging off the strong ties and social capital 
bonds built up within the industry group. The collaborative process to establish FHI 
was long and complex, with the IDIA and Enterprise Ireland working together to 
facilitate a mission to Japan to explore the potential of the functional foods area and 
to establish the National Functional Food Forum.  
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Field (2008) argued that social capital can be termed capital insofar that it creates 
resources that enable their member firms to pursue their goals more effectively. In 
this context the industry OFCs, ICT Ireland/ ISA and the IDIA can be viewed as 
social capital assets of modern and traditional clusters in the Irish economy.  
How the process of collaboration works through social capital in 
clusters and cluster initiatives 
 
The emerging social capital concept (Field 2008) was used as an analytical tool to 
examine collaboration within clusters and cluster initiatives in this thesis. 
International studies have examined the role of social capital in an economic 
context. For example, Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), in an econometric study, 
found a positive and significant relationship between social capital and economic 
performance in a regional analysis covering seven EU countries. Ireland was not 
included in the study and Northern Ireland was also excluded from the UK element 
of the study. Few Irish studies have considered the relevance of the social capital 
concept in a business context (Breathnach 2006, Bradley and Kennelly 2008a, 
2008b).  
    
This thesis contributes to research on the investigation of social capital from a 
business context in an Irish setting. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 provided a summary of 
the key definitions and theoretical components of social capital that were used to add 
depth to the analysis.  Naphapiet and Ghosal (1998) suggested three dimensions of 
social capital  structural, cognitive and relational. The dual distinction between 
‗bonding and bridging‘ and ‗structural and cognitive‘ social capital was used in this 
thesis, because it provided greater theoretical clarity and a clearer analytical tool for 
examining collaboration within cluster initiatives.   It proved to be a useful 
mechanism to explore how the process of collaboration worked in the various case 
studies undertaken as part of the thesis.  
Bonding and bridging social capital  
 
In case study 1 the bonding social capital achieved by ICT Ireland and the ISA 
yielded benefits for both multinational and indigenous firms. Putnam (2001) 
distinguished between the benefits of dense and larger networks. The ability of ICT 
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Ireland and ISA to generate bonding social capital in the ICT and software clusters 
could be viewed as part of the benefit of interaction within dense networks.  
 
Extending connections through the creation of larger networks also has the potential 
to yield benefits (Bourdieu 1986, Putnam 2001). In case study 2, by creating bridges 
to other actors in the economy, such as government and state agencies, the OFCs 
involved in the ICT and software clusters extended the size and extent of network 
connections for their member firms. This aligned with Burt‘s (1997) contention that 
there is an advantage from being the broker between people otherwise disconnected 
in social structure, with the OFCs playing the role of broker in this case.  
 
Several writers emphasize mutual benefit and reciprocity in their definitions of social 
capital (Putnam 1995, Woolcock 1998, Cooke 2007).  In an example of this, ICT 
Ireland established a bridge between CEOs and high-level civil servants in the ICT 
Clearing House, with reciprocal benefits for both sides. A key benefit to the industry 
OFC and its members was that, with the support of the high-level civil servants 
involved, various items that they raised were responded to quickly, with appropriate 
follow-up action taken at lower levels in the administration. The government 
department benefited from the understanding of the market environment they gained 
from high-level business executives, which helped in the design and implementation 
of enterprise policy affecting business.   
 
Nooteboom (2007) also emphasised the relationship between groups, rather than 
within groups, as the most relevant relationships in social capital terms. In case 
studies 3 and 4 the state agencies SFI, the IDA and Enterprise Ireland supported the 
generation of bridging social capital between universities and firms, with the aim of 
raising levels of innovation and supporting systems of innovation in Ireland. Case 
studies 5 and 6 provide examples of the process of  establishing bridging social 
capital within cluster initiatives involving universities, firms, state agencies and 
OFCs. Both cases indicated that the generation of bridging social capital may not be 
a straight forward task and requires high levels of commitment to stay the course on 
the part of the different actors/ players involved.  
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Structural and cognitive social capital  
 
Several writers (Coleman 1988, Grootaert 1998 and Krishna and Uphoff 1999) 
emphasize structure in their definitions of social capital, with Coleman (1994, p302) 
viewing social capital as a process of building up ‗social structural resources‘. 
Researchers at the OECD (Grootaert 1998 and Krishna and Uphoff 1999) have also 
emphasized the importance of shared norms, values and beliefs, which they describe 
as cognitive social capital.  
 
Case study 1 provided evidence that the industry OFCs, ICT Ireland and the ISA, 
provided structures that facilitated ICT and software firms working together 
effectively to strengthen ties within their sector.  In the various examples of bridging 
social capital of case study 2, structure appeared to be less of a feature than in case 
study 1. A shared belief in and valuing of the collaborative initiatives by the different 
actors involved, indicated that cognitive social capital, which also encompasses 
norms of reciprocity, was a more important feature of the bridging social capital in 
that case study. This accords with the emphasis placed on mutual benefit and 
reciprocity by a number of writers in their definitions of social capital (Putnam 1995, 
Woolcock 1998, Cooke 2007).   
 
The cluster initiatives reviewed in case studies 3 and 4 can be viewed as examples of 
structural social capital, which provided universities and firms with the opportunity 
to work together, sharing knowledge and experience, and make informed collective 
decisions to advance ideas and innovation. Case studies 3 and 4 also suggested that 
by collaborating in these cluster initiatives, individuals in the different organisations 
could learn about each other‘s knowledge and research, which in turn could alter the 
value they placed in each other‘s work  building up cognitive social capital over 
time.  
 
The cluster initiative reviewed in case study 5 showed elements of both structural 
and cognitive social capital. The social capital bonds built up in the ISA structure, 
over an extensive period of years, increased participation rates in the L4G initiative 
and helped secure the belief (cognitive social capital) that enabled the initiative to 
take place. The structural social capital within the ISA was shown to facilitate 
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decision making and collective action. Structural social capital was shown to be 
important in the design stage of the initiative, while the lack of a formal oversight 
structure during the implementation stage of the initiative was a weakness in 
addressing the challenges posed by the coaching element of the programme.  
In case study 6 the importance of structure to the FHI initiative was also apparent, 
with an organisation board, independent scientific advisory board, an independent 
CEO and various committees and working groups. The industry-led nature and the 
governance structure of the FHI cluster initiative make it unique as a food research 
centre from a European perspective. Again in the design stage of the initiative the 
structural and cognitive social capital built up in the OFC, the IDIA, over a number 
of years was supportive in getting the initiative off the ground. The National 
Functional Foods Forum, established in 2004, can be considered an example of 
structural social capital driving the initiative forward. This involved both the state 
agency and the industry OFC, with norms of reciprocity inherent in the social capital 
engagement. The shared value (cognitive social capital) of the cluster initiative 
facilitated joint action to drive the initiative forward. A second state agency, which 
did not share the same belief in the initiative as the IDIA and Enterprise Ireland, 
effectively opted out of the cluster initiative. Case study 6 also indicated that norms 
of behaviour (cognitive social capital) on the university side had to be challenged in 
order to admit new players into the initiative.  
Trust and social capital within clusters and cluster initiatives 
 
Trust proved to be a complex but important element of the social capital engagement 
in the cluster initiatives examined in the thesis. Vandenburg (2002) provided an 
analytical lens that links the institutional economics literature, on moral norms and 
ethical codes, developed by North (1990) with the literature on social capital, in 
which trust is viewed as playing a role in economic and social relations.  
 
Woolcock (2001) argued that trust is better understood not as social capital per se, 
but as a measure of it. In case study 1 the deeper collaboration facilitated by the 
OFCs, ICT Ireland and ISA, helped to build relationships of trust within the sector. 
Therefore, in this example of strengthening social capital bonds in a business 
context, trust was an outcome rather than a precursor of collaboration.  
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In developing his theory of systems of innovation, Lundvall (1998, p410) observed 
that ‗trust is a multidimensional and complex concept‘. In case study 3, the structure 
of the cluster initiative enabled people to get to know and understand each other 
better. This suggested that, through achieving shared norms and attitudes, trust could 
be built up over time and be an outcome, rather than a precursor, of social capital. In 
case study 4, a lack of trust between industry actors, in regard to access to the 
intellectual property (IP) arising from collaboration, was dealt with through a formal 
agreement. In this sense, the formal structures within the cluster initiative helped to 
solve this problem and ensure that a lack of trust was not a barrier to the generation 
of social capital. However, this case study did highlight the challenges faced in 
sharing IP in such cluster initiatives.  
 
Trust in case study 5, the L4G initiative, was shown to be a complex issue, which 
cannot be assumed, even in situations where organisations have a history of 
collaboration. On the one hand, trust was a precursor to the involvement of industry 
CEOs, leveraging off the social capital bonds within the ISA. On the other hand, 
trust was an outcome of the collaboration between particular individuals, in the OFC 
and the state agency, who had not worked together previously. This supports 
Nooteboom‘s (2007, p33) contention that ‗trust as a feature of social capital cannot 
be bought and installed‘.  
 
Case study 6 revealed the tenacity of the various actors to stay the course, solving the 
problems and overcoming the various obstacles as they arose. Once again, the FHI 
initiative illustrated that trust is a multidimensional and complex issue (Lundvall 
1998) that cannot be bought and installed (Nooteboom 2007). The trust that industry 
participants placed in a state agency executive provided an example of trust as 
precursor to social capital engagement. The significant levels of trust between the 
state agency and the OFC, the IDIA, helped establish the National Functional Food  
Forum, which in turn helped to get the FHI initiative off the ground. The experience 
of researchers in different universities working together, and with the industry 
partners, in FHI may increase levels of trust between the various actors over time, 
ensuring that trust is also an outcome of the cluster initiative.  
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Concluding comments  
 
This thesis provided an analytical framework for examining collaboration within 
clusters and cluster initiatives.  The OFC concept is theoretically consistent with 
institutional economics and the systems of innovation approach, which underpin this 
framework. It is suggested as an alternative to Porter and Emmons‘ (2003, 2006) IFC 
concept for examining the role of industry associations, and similar organisations, in 
clusters and cluster initiatives.  
 
This thesis contributed to cluster research in Ireland, by using the cluster initiative 
model put forward by Sölvell et al (2003) to examine the process of collaboration 
between firms, state agencies and universities in two sectors of the economy. The 
two clusters examined, the ICT/ software cluster and the cheese and ingredients 
cluster of the dairy industry, provide an interesting contrast between a modern and a 
traditional sector of the Irish economy. The thesis and its case studies indicate that 
the process of collaboration, among firms and between firms and different economic 
actors, works in broadly similar ways.  
 
The use of the Sölvell et al (2003) cluster initiative model, supplemented by the use 
of the OFC and social capital concepts as analytical tools can be recommended for 
examining collaboration in other areas of the economy. Other sectors of the modern 
economy, such as medical devices and biotechnology, and the traditional economy, 
such as the plastics industry, would provide rich areas for further research. The role 
of industry associations in each of these sectors would be interesting to consider with 
the OFC concept as a theoretically grounded tool to examine that role. The social 
capital concept, supported by the dual distinction between ‗bonding and bridging‘ 
and ‗structural and cognitive‘ forms, provide useful analytical tools to explore how 
the process of collaboration works. Further research on CSETs within the ICT and 
software sector would also be interesting. The focus on cluster initiatives, as a way 
of sustaining and embedding industrial clusters, and the recognition that traditional 
sectors, as well as modern sectors, have an important role to play in this regard 
would improve Irish policy implementation.   
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